

The Politics of a South African Frontier

Martin Chatfield Legassick

*The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana,
and the Missionaries, 1780–1840*



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Introduction by Robert Ross

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**The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana
and the Missionaries, 1780–1840**

This book publishes the dissertation by Martin Legassick, originally submitted to the University of California at Los Angeles in 1969.

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Preface

In 2005, the year that Martin Legassick retired from formal academic life, the University of the Western Cape (UWC) convened a workshop at what is now the Centre for Humanities Research. During this event, Gary Minkley, Noor Nieftagodien and Thozama April spoke appreciatively about the significance of Legassick's work as a scholar, activist and educator over a period spanning half a century. The presentations recalled Legassick's enormous contributions to historiographic innovation on such matters as the frontier, liberalism, racial and social formation, and the peculiarities of capitalist development in South Africa. The speakers reflected on the connections between this scholarship and Legassick's political activism during and after exile, and especially on the relationships between trade unions and politics, and Marxism and the national movement. They also referred to Legassick's work as an educator and mentor in Britain in the 1970s, in South Africa at UWC after his return, and in the setting of the South African Democracy Education Trust project, where he supervised and tracked the work being conducted by young researchers on the resistance to apartheid. The addresses by Minkley, Nieftagodien and April (together with an appreciation by Bill Freund) were published the following year in the *South African Historical Journal*, alongside a wide-ranging interview with Legassick conducted by Ciraj Rassool, his UWC colleague and member of the journal's editorial board.¹

The interview, with the title 'History Anchored in Politics', focused on Martin Legassick's development as a historian, his work as a political activist, and their interconnections. During the interview, Legassick described the origins of what became his doctoral dissertation:

In 1966-67, I went to Britain to do my [PhD] research, which started on the Tswana. However, what happened next shows that you have to listen to what primary sources say and be prepared to rethink what you are doing as a result of what you discover. I went to look at the London Missionary Society records and these start before the Bamangwato, which I thought I would get to. I began to see how much the Griqua and the creation of Griqua society had affected this area and how one couldn't understand the southern Tswana, especially the Thlaping and the Rolong, without understanding the role of the Griqua. It is an omission from the Comaroffs' study of the missionaries and the Tswana: they do not take account of the role of the Griqua. My thesis turned into a study of the

¹ The contributions and interview were published as a feature, 'Martin Legassick, Marxist, Historian and Activist: A celebration', in *South African Historical Journal*, 56, 2006, 1-42.

Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the missionaries and never got as far as the Bamangwato. It stopped in about 1840.²

Submitted to the University of California at Los Angeles in 1969 under the title 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries, 1780–1840: the politics of a frontier zone', the dissertation immediately became an influential study and can be regarded as one of the most widely cited dissertations in Southern African historiography. Forty years later, it remains, as Robert Ross points out in his introduction in this book, 'by far the best account of what is a crucial, and fascinating, episode in Southern African history.' Not only does it provide a magisterial history of the Northern Cape frontier, it is also a powerful study of the making of race and ethnicity.³

However, the dissertation was never published. As Legassick explains in the interview:

I sent the manuscript to Clarendon Press [Oxford University] at Leonard Thompson's [Legassick's supervisor] recommendation and they sent it to a reader. The reader came back to them and said that it was insufficient as it did not consult the German sources. I thought this was absolutely incredible. I suspect the person it was sent to was Isaac Schapera who didn't like somebody treading on his territory of the Tswana. He played an academic gamesmanship thing and one-upped me and said I hadn't consulted the German sources. Did they expect me to learn German in order to make the changes? As far as I was concerned, the manuscript stood on its own. Tim Keegan used it quite extensively in his book and it has stood the test of time. Because I had shifted my interests back to development and underdevelopment in South Africa, and the Communist Party and so on, I didn't send it to any other press. I felt that I didn't want to put in the work that was necessary to meet the Clarendon Press's standard.⁴

Publication of the dissertation was superseded by other work and writing Legassick was doing, and the question of publication ceased to be important.

It was after conducting the interview that Ciraj Rassool approached the Basler Afrika Bibliographien with the idea to have Legassick's thesis finally published. The Basler Afrika Bibliographien had shown an interest in branching out its Namibia-related academic publishing activities. The publication of this dissertation thus emerged from cooperation between the Department of History at UWC and the publisher and is, indeed, long overdue.

Ciraj Rassool (Cape Town)

² Ciraj Rassool, 'History Anchored in Politics: An Interview with Martin Legassick', *South African Historical Journal*, 56, 2006, 22. Legassick's reference to the Comaroffs is to *Of Revelation and Revolution*, 2 volumes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

³ Martin Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries, 1780-1840: the politics of a frontier zone', Ph.D Dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1969

⁴ Ciraj Rassool, 'History Anchored in Politics', 28.

Note on this Edition

This edition makes available in unabridged form the original dissertation of 1969, including the original maps and tables. Omitted here are only the dissertation's original abstract and the author's accompanying vita. Obviously, the thesis had to be retyped, an arduous task accomplished by Lameez Lalkhen, after which both Martin Legassick and Ciraj Rassool proofread the chapters. Dag Henrichsen could then compile the name index, a likewise arduous task because the book focuses on numerous male protagonists, their migrations and politics and is thus saturated with personal, community and geographical names, many of which are very similar. As much as the index is another attempt to make accessible the many historical characters and networks brought to light for South African historiography by Legassick's thesis, it may display omissions. It is also likely that the extensive proofreading process has not picked up all typographical errors. The layout of the book, including the redrawing of some of the maps and tables, was handled by Petra Kerckhoff.

Ciraj Rassool and the publisher wish to acknowledge the support of the Department of History and the Centre for Humanities Research at UWC in the preparation of the dissertation for publication. We thank Robert Ross for writing the introduction and, last but not least, Martin Legassick for his renewed interest in his dissertation, and for his patience.

Martin Legassick, *The Griqua* and South Africa's historiographical revival: an appreciation

An Introduction by Robert Ross

It is not unusual for Ph.D. theses to be published, though rarely, I am glad to say, in unaltered form. They are included in the mass of academic literature which scholars have to digest, and at best slowly move from being among the most relevant and up-to-date pieces of work to the status of received wisdom. Eventually most become outdated, and are mined only by specialists for the information which they contain. Often they are forgotten by all except for bibliographers and, perhaps, their authors.

This makes it all the more remarkable that it is now worthwhile publishing the thesis which Martin Legassick presented to the University of California, Los Angeles, more than four decades ago. This study remains by far the best account of what is a crucial, and fascinating, episode in Southern African history. I will attempt to explain what that was.

What Legassick did, at the beginning of the revival in South African historiography in the late 1960s, was to provide a very detailed account of the formation of the Griqua polities in the frontier zone north of the Gariep. He showed how a significant social unit coalesced out of the loose kinship groups of Khoekhoe and those of partial European descent who had found their way to Namaqualand and the middle reaches of the Gariep valley during the course of the eighteenth century. They profited from, and to some extent contributed to the destruction of those groups of Khoekhoe who had lived in the islands above the Augrabies falls, but finally came to settle in more concentrated numbers around the springs near what was to become the village of Klaarwater, later Griquatown. In particular, two widely extended and intermarried patrilineages, the Kok and the Barends families, acquired the political leadership over these groups. They did so in collaboration with the missionaries of the London Missionary Society (LMS), who indeed persuaded those who had previously been known as Bastards to take on the appellation of "Griqua", because of the unfortunate connotations of the former name in English (though not in Dutch). Between them they provided a degree of legitimacy — a key concept in Legassick's analysis — which allowed the development of a widely, if not totally, accepted social order. Initially this covered a territory to the west of the Vaal River,

and to the north of the Gariep. Later it came to include areas further east, in what is now the southern Free State, centred on the town of Philippolis. While the latter polity came under the control of the Kok family, the captain of Griquatown and its surrounding areas was Andries Waterboer, a newcomer who owed his prestige and power to his skilful, and at times ruthless, political ability and to his association with the LMS.

The Griqua had to contend with the difficulties of making a living in what was and remains an arid area, unsuited to any sort of farming except for the raising of sheep on an extensive scale. Even this was only really possible around Philippolis, and only after merino sheep had been introduced.¹ The Griqua never succeeded in establishing irrigated agricultures as the springs around Griquatown were too weak and the available technology was insufficient to take water from the Gariep or the Vaal, or indeed, as happened later, the Harts river.² The only really reliable and usable source of water in the region was the Eye of Kuruman, some 150 kilometres to the north of Griquatown.³ Moreover, in general the Tswana of the area were better able to exploit the dry-land environment than were the Griqua, and further north towards the Molopo the rainfall becomes marginally better. In these circumstances, the natural strategy for the Griqua was to move north, and to attempt to impose their hegemony over the south-western Tswana. This was a possible option because of the weakening of Tswana political authority in the 1820s and 1830s in the wars known, when Legassick was writing his thesis, as the Mfecane. The establishment of the Ndebele state under Mzilikazi, which dominated what is now Gauteng, the north-west Free State and much of North-West Province, meant that the strategy could for a period not be put into operation. However, Mzilikazi abandoned the area, as much under pressure from the Griqua as from the Voortrekkers. As a result, in the late 1830s, a major Griqua push was made to subjugate a variety of Tswana chieftaincies. In the event, these failed, and from the early 1840s, the Griquatown captaincy went into terminal decline. The political subordination of the Northern Cape and the lands both east and west of the Kalahari, in Botswana and Namibia, to colonial control would have to wait for more powerful forces, although the Griqua had clearly begun the process.

In 1970, as a neophyte researcher looking for a thesis topic, I visited Martin Legassick, who was then teaching at the University of Sussex. My memory is that, as he described his thesis to me, he put most emphasis on this drive to the north, as being the discovery

¹ Robert Ross, *Adam Kok's Griquas: a study in the development of stratification in South Africa*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, esp. 66-80.

² Kevin Shillington, "Irrigation, Agriculture and the State: the Harts Valley in Historical Perspective", in William Beinart, Peter Delius and Stanley Trapido (eds) *Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural South Africa, 1850-1930*, Johannesburg, Ravan, 1986, 311-335.

³ Nancy J. Jacobs, *Environment, power, and injustice: a South African history*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

of which he was most proud, and which he saw as the most significant aspect of his work. I think he was right in this, on an empirical level. What he has to say about the way in which Griqua society coalesced in the decades around 1800 is fascinating in its way, but is not, I think, particularly surprising. It builds on, and adds detail to, the account given by J.S. Marais in the later 1930s.⁴ Rather it is in the later chapters of this book that Legassick shows his true qualities as a researcher, describing and analysing with great subtlety the interplay of Griqua, Tswana and missionary politics. He shows that conflicts within the LMS, between Dr. John Philip and Robert Moffat as the leaders of what can best be described as “tendencies”, were in their way as crucial for the political history of the area as those between more evidently political actors. It may be that this was the area of Southern Africa in which the power (in a narrow sense of that word) of the missionaries was the greatest. If so, it was because in that area legitimacy was being created through the relations to the South, with the Cape Colonial authorities and that legitimacy was garnered through missionary intervention.

This narrative was constructed on a most impressive basis of documentary and other forms of primary source material, above all collected in the archives of the London Missionary Society, then held in the buildings of the Society above Westminster underground station. Like many other researchers, he was inducted into their use by the legendary archivist, Miss Irene Fletcher. It was in these archives that he came to realise the importance of the Griqua to the history of the Southern African interior, and indeed to the Tswana, on which his earliest (Southern African) historical work had been done. Indeed when he arrived in the LMS archives he was intending to concentrate his thesis on the Ngwato in modern Botswana.⁵ The work which Legassick did there, and also in the archives and journals of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society, formed the empirical bedrock of his thesis, and the surest proof of its lasting importance. The more theoretical constructions which he built on them have their foundations solidly resting on his knowledge of, in particular, the missionary material, and to some extent that of a number of travellers’ accounts. This makes his suppositions easily verifiable, and further allows subsequent research to build on what he did.

There is a certain irony in this. Legassick’s initial attempts to have the thesis published stranded, so he relates, on the demands of the Oxford University Press’s reader that he

⁴ J.S. Marais, *The Cape Coloured People, 1632 – 1937*, London, Longman Green & Co, Ch. 2.

⁵ Personal communication 5.5.2008. The qualification is necessary because Legassick’s first published work was on West Africa, both “Firearms, Horses and Samorian Army Organisation, 1870-1898”, *Journal of African History*, 7, 1, 1966, 95-115, and “The ideology of the Convention People’s Party (Ghana): An historical perspective”, *Proceedings of the Graduate Academy*, Berkeley, 1966, 69-81.

incorporate German sources, which he explicitly comments that he had not done.⁶ First, this is a question of the best being the enemy of the good. Such a demand failed totally to take account of just how detailed and valuable the work that Legassick had done actually was. Legassick's supposition was that the author of the report was well aware of what the work entailed, and deliberately torpedoed the publication of the thesis as part of classic academic turf-protection tactics. Secondly, there has been a major effort in recent years to study the archives of the Berlin missionary society, which was the main institution which might have been relevant for Legassick's work. So far, to the best of my knowledge, nothing has come up to suggest that the very considerable investment of time and effort which learning German, and the old gothic *Schrift* in which the documents are written, would have made any serious difference to what Legassick wrote.

A more serious complaint could have been made against the absence of any use of the archival or other sources in South Africa. From the mid-1960s up till 1994, Martin Legassick could not visit the country, for the best of political reasons. How much effect on his thesis a good stint in the Cape Archives would have had is, however, open to question. Certainly documents would have turned up which would have added to what was already a very substantial annotation. Particularly with regard to the 1830s and 1840s, notably in the Philippolis state, colonial documentation provides important additions to what Legassick was able to discover outside the country. The course of the succession to Adam Kok II, who died in 1835, is the most evident such case.⁷ In the more central parts of the thesis, in contrast, there is little that would have been gained from extensive work in the Cape Archives, primarily because the main sources would have remained the missionaries working in Griquatown and further to the north. What they wrote to the colonial government, they also wrote to their parent society in London, and they reported fully on their negotiations with Cape Town. Moreover, at least in the period up to the later 1820s, much of the correspondence between the frontier missionaries and the Cape governor was sufficiently sensitive for the letters to be sent on to the Colonial Office in London, and thus to appear in the *Records of the Cape Colony*.⁸

Legassick also commented in his thesis that his inability to visit South Africa meant that he was unable to collect such oral traditions as may still have existed on the early nineteenth century. He was writing at the high point of the hope that the collection of

⁶ Ciraj Rassool, "History anchored in politics: an interview with Martin Legassick", *South African Historical Journal*, 56, 2006, 28.

⁷ Ross, *Adam Kok's Griquas*, 38-40.

⁸ G. McC. Theal (ed.), *Records of the Cape Colony*, London, Swan Sonnenschein, 1899-1905. This 36 volume collection of archival sources consists of the material which Theal found in the Public Record Office, and is thus a more or less complete record of that correspondence.

oral traditions would provide the basis for the pre-colonial history. In a way which is currently described as “fundamentalist”, traditions were too often seen as in some sense direct, if, obviously, condensed, relations of events which had occurred in the past.⁹ Even though he believed that “at least for the eighteenth century onwards” it would still have been “possible to gather fresh information”, despite the dangers of what later came to be called “feedback”,¹⁰ it is probable that he would have ended wasting a lot of time, producing a work which was less, rather than more convincing. It is even not inconceivable that such attempts to collect new, and thus in some sense more “authentic” traditions would have detracted from what was in fact one of the more methodologically innovative aspects of his work, namely his use of both oral tradition and testimony collected by other people, and indeed for other purposes. There were, first, those traditions which had been collected by officials of the Native (subsequently Bantu) Affairs Department, which, however objectively the investigations were conducted, were concerned to discover the “true” leaders of Tswana tribes, for the purposes of the administration of segregation and apartheid.¹¹ Secondly, there were those compilations of traditions which were made by early twentieth century missionaries and others. The interpretation of these sources required a careful understanding of the filters and the mind sets of those who published them, which Legassick does provide, and also, a full appreciation of the origins of the sources, which were indeed often articles written in Sesotho for a missionary published journal, which he does not discuss.¹² Thirdly, and most notably, there was the mass of testimony provided in the course of the nineteenth century for a variety of government commissions, notably those concerned with the boundary between the Afrikaner Republics and the Cape Colony.¹³ It is the understanding that the memories, and the ideological statements which were expressed in the testimony to these commissions, which form the

⁹ David Newbury “Contradictions at the Heart of the Canon: Jan Vansina and the debate over Oral historiography in Africa, 1960-1985”, *History in Africa*, 34, 2007, 213-254.

¹⁰ Martin Legassick, “The Sotho-Tswana before 1800 A.D.” in Leonard Thompson (ed.), *African Societies in Southern Africa*, London, Heinemann, 1969, 82 see also David P. Henige “The problem of feedback in oral tradition: four examples from the Fante Coastlands”, *Journal of African History*, 14, 2, 1973, 223-235.

¹¹ For some account of the collection of this material, see W.D. Hammond-Tooke, *Imperfect Interpreters: South Africa's anthropologists, 1920-1990*, Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press, 1997, 109-118.

¹² Elizabeth A. Eldredge, “Land, politics, and censorship : the historiography of nineteenth-century Lesotho”, *History in Africa*, 15, 1988, 191-209.

¹³ Above all *Evidence Taken at Bloemhof before the Commission appointed to investigate the claims of the South African Republic, Captain N. Waterboer; chief of West Griqualand and certain other native chiefs to portions of the Territory on the Vaal River, now known as the Diamond Fields*, Cape Town, 1871, known as the Bloemhof Blue Book.

basis of much of what Legassick wrote, in a way which now seems fairly commonplace but which at the time was not.

It would of course be mistaken to believe that what Legassick wrote forty years ago is still the last word on everything. South African history has moved on; perhaps sideways, perhaps backwards as well as forwards, but at any rate on. This is evident with regard to his analysis of eighteenth and early nineteenth century Sotho-Tswana history. Legassick was writing at a time when the archaeological exploration of the Southern African interior had hardly begun. In this thesis, he hardly refers to any archaeological reports.¹⁴ Nevertheless, his careful disentanglement of the Kwenana and Kgatla traditions, as recorded in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, led him to postulate a steady rise of state formation and state expansion led by these two dynasties. This has become part of the received wisdom of Tswana historiography, and has been, in broad lines, confirmed by the archaeology which has been performed in the region over the last decades.¹⁵ On the other hand, his treatment of the wars in and around the Highveld in the 1820s probably places too much emphasis on the Shakan revolution as the prime motor for the disturbances, as might be expected for a thesis written only three years after the publication of John Omer-Cooper's *The Zulu Aftermath*.¹⁶ Omer-Cooper's ideas, which for some time were part of the received wisdom of South African historiography, came in for considerable criticism, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, Legassick took the Shakan origin for the Mfecane for granted, and limited his discussions to what was going on west of the Drakensberg. His arguments would not suffer from accepting John Wright's revision of the history of regions to the east of the mountains,¹⁷ except that he would then have had no real explanation for what happened within the area with which he was primarily concerned.

¹⁴ The exceptions are Brian Fagan, "Radiocarbon dates for Sub-Saharan Africa, V", *Journal of African History*, VIII, 3, 1967, 525, which in fact refers only to matters relating to Zimbabwe and Swaziland, and R.J. Mason and P.J. van der Merwe, "Radiocarbon dating of Iron Age Sites in the Southern Transvaal", *South African Journal of Science*, LX, 1966, 142, which provides for the first time dates for iron smelting at Melville Kopjes, within what is now Johannesburg.

¹⁵ Neil Parsons, "Prelude to the *Difaqane* in the interior of Southern Africa, c.1600–c.1822" in Carolyn Hamilton (ed.), *The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive debates in Southern African history*, Johannesburg and Pietermaritzburg, Witwatersrand University Press and University of Natal Press, 1995, 331; Simon Hall, "Farming Communities of the Second Millenium: Internal frontiers, identity, continuity and change", in Carolyn Hamilton, Bernard Mbenga and Robert Ross (eds), *The Cambridge History of South Africa, Vol I*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

¹⁶ J.D. Omer-Cooper, *The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth-century revolution in Bantu Africa*, London & Ibadan, Longmans, 1966,

¹⁷ John Wright, "Political transformations in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu region in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries", in Hamilton (ed.), *The Mfecane Aftermath*, 163–182; also "Turbulent Times: Political transformations in the North and East, 1760s – 1830s", in Hamilton, Mbenga & Ross, *Cambridge History*, I,

With regard to the Sotho-Tswana area, in contrast, Legassick stressed the importance of the illegal trade in African captives as slaves into the Cape Colony, and the destructive effects of Griqua and Korana raiding in the Southern Highveld, both of which were to be seen as part contributing to the unrest which was known, rightly or wrongly, as the Difaqane.¹⁸ Perhaps, if his priorities had been otherwise, Legassick might have built on these insights along the lines that have since become relatively commonplace. However, one thing is certain. He would never have suggested that Robert Moffat and John Melvill would have precipitated the battle of Dithakong as the pretext for a slave raid.¹⁹ His understanding of what drove missionaries was too great, even though, I suspect, he had little sympathy for what they were attempting to achieve.

Indeed, his description of the missionaries is one of the areas of this work which seems most dated, at least at first sight. Legassick's missionaries, notably John Philip and Robert Moffat are portrayed as resolutely political animals (which they were, probably much more than they themselves would have admitted). Legassick is primarily interested in their actions to achieve and to maintain political power for themselves and their protégés within the arena of Transorangia, and more widely in Southern Africa. The religious and the cultural aspects of the processes of mission and conversion do not really receive much attention. There is no foreshadowing of the concerns of the Comaroffs, with regard to the "colonization of consciousness",²⁰ or the subtler and more solidly empirically based work of Elizabeth Elbourne on the specifically religious history of the LMS's converts.²¹ This is a book written before the "cultural turn".

It is also a book written before the great expansion of Cape Colonial historiography of recent years. It is indeed sobering to read the early chapters of Legassick's thesis and to realize how little he actually had to go on, in order to provide the colonial background against which the narrative he told had to be set. The riches of the Cape Archives had yet to be worked with. Even the path-breaking theses by Richard Elphick and Bill Freund

¹⁸ Julian Cobbing, "The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolombo", *Journal of African History*, 29.3.1988, 487-519; Elizabeth A. Eldredge, "Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa, c. 1800-1830: the 'Mfecane' considered", *Journal of African History*, 33, 1, 1992, 1-35; also Eldredge, "Delagoa Bay and the Hinterland in the Early Nineteenth Century: Politics, trade, slaves and slave-raiding", in Elizabeth A. Eldredge and Fred Morton (eds), *Slavery in South Africa: Captive Labour on the Dutch Frontier*, Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford, Westview Press and Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1995, 127-65.

¹⁹ As Cobbing did in "The Mfecane as Alibi".

²⁰ John .L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, "The Colonization of Consciousness in South Africa. *Economy and Society*, 18(3):267-95; *idem*, *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press., Vol I, 1991.; Vol II, 1997.

²¹ See above all, Elizabeth Elbourne, *Blood Ground: Colonialism, missions and the contest for Christianity in the Cape Colony and Britain, 1799-1853*, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal, 2002.

still had to be written.²² Thus, aside from his own investigation of the multifarious travellers' accounts, the most important work on which Legassick relied was by I.D. MacCrone and had been published before World War II.²³ It is a situation which has changed dramatically. There are a whole variety of major works on which a researcher into Griqua history could now base his or her account of the other, that is to say the colonial, side of the frontier. Since 1969, there have been published both the collective *Shaping of South African Society*, to the second edition of which Legassick indeed contributed a chapter on the northern frontier, and a whole range of monographs, most importantly for his purpose those by Susan Newton-King on the Eastern Cape Khoikhoi and early Graaff-Reinet colonial society²⁴ and by Nigel Penn on the northern Cape.²⁵ In particular the latter is in some ways a prequel to Martin Legassick's thesis.

This is not so very surprising. In the course of his thesis Legassick makes (at least) two major theoretical claims about the nature of South African frontiers. The first is that they should be considered geographically as zones, rather than as lines, and consequently that the frontier in any given place was a process, not an event.²⁶ In this, Legassick built on some of the comments of I.D. MacCrone and, in particular, W.K. Hancock.²⁷ These were buttressed with certain of the comments by Jan Vansina on the kingdom of Kazembe, an early and still far too rare comparison between South African history and the lands north of the Zambezi.²⁸ It is a realization which has, I believe, become commonplace within the study of South African history.

²² Richard H. Elphick, "The Cape Khoi and the first phase of South African Race Relations", Ph.D. Yale, 1972, later published as *Kraal and Castle: Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa*, New Haven and London, Yale UP, 1977; William M. Freund, "Society and Government in Dutch South Africa: the Cape and the Batavians, 1803-1806", Ph.D. Yale, 1972. Hermann Giliomee's MA thesis "Die Administrasietydperk van Lord Caledon, 1807-1811", in *Argiefjaarboek vir Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis*, 1966, II, which was available to him and would have been of importance, is just about the only obvious work which Legassick seems to have missed.

²³ I.D. MacCrone, *Race Attitudes in South Africa: Historical, Experimental and Psychological Studies*, London, Oxford University Press for the University of the Witwatersrand, 1937.

²⁴ Susan Newton-King, *Masters and Servants on the Cape Eastern Frontier, 1760-1803*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

²⁵ Nigel Penn, *The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist and Khoisan on the Cape's Northern Frontier in the 18th Century*, Athens and Cape Town, Ohio UP and Double Storey, 2005.

²⁶ This was something which the British in the Eastern Cape were unable to comprehend, with significant consequences for the course of conflict between the Xhosa and the Cape Colony.

²⁷ MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*; W.K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth affairs. Vol 2 problems of economic policy, 1918-1939*, pt 1-2, London, Oxford University Press, 1942

²⁸ Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savanna*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1966, 155-6; c.f. Igor Kopytoff (ed.), *The African Frontier: the reproduction of traditional African societies* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1987), particularly Kopytoff's own "The Internal African Frontier: the making of African political culture", which should have cited Legassick, but does not in fact do so.

Legassick's second major point was more polemical. It was worked out formally in an article which was to become one of the most influential pieces on pre-industrial South African history, but it took most of its empirical foundation from Legassick's research for the thesis, and was implicit within it. This was, of course, "The Frontier Tradition in South African historiography".²⁹ In it, Legassick began an attack on the prevailing liberal historiography, at least with regard to the importance of the frontier situation on the later establishment of racial prejudice and, implicitly, the segregationist and apartheid systems. Rather, he argued, the frontier was a zone of acculturation, in both directions, and of various forms of partnership between those of European descent and those who were not. Of course, the Griqua fitted into both these categories, and were a particularly salient example of the processes which Legassick was analyzing. The frontier was violent, obviously, but the violence was by no means exclusively interracial. Racial stereotyping and discrimination were thus implicitly produced,³⁰ perhaps in the agricultural regions of the Western Cape, and more decisively with the establishment of the capitalist political economy in the wake of and as a result of the mineral revolution of the late 19th century.

This is a line of argument which has become widely accepted, and which, at first sight would appear to proclaim the irrelevance of much of what Legassick was engaged in. Indeed, it was to be several decades before he himself returned to the pre-industrial period, in his own work.³¹ Nevertheless, the work which Legassick had done has proved an inspiration for those of us who have attempted to understand the pre-industrial history of South Africa in its own right, although always with an eye on what followed after the discovery of diamonds and gold. Thus to take the works mentioned above: Susan Newton-King commented that her book "can in a sense be read as an extended interrogation of the views of...Legassick."³² Nigel Penn, too, considered Legassick's work as the basis of the historiography with which he was grappling.³³ In addition there are those who have written on the history of the Griqua, or more generally of what are now the Northern

²⁹ Martin Legassick, "The Frontier Tradition in South African historiography", in Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore (eds), *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa*, London, Longmans 1980, 44-79. first published in *Collected Seminar Papers of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London: The Societies of Southern Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, II, 1971, 1-33.

³⁰ The article ends with the question "If the stereotype of the African as enemy cannot be traced to the eighteenth century, when and why did it in fact come into existence?"

³¹ Except for a short summary of his thesis in Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee (eds), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1820*, Cape Town and London, Longman, 1979, and in the second edition (which has the same editors but the dates covered extended to 1840). A comparison of the thesis and the theoretical sections of these two versions, which differ substantially, would form a fascinating historiographical exercise, unfortunately beyond the scope of this introduction.

³² Newton-King, *Masters and Servants*, 9.

³³ Penn, *Forgotten frontier*, 10-12.

Cape and Northwest Provinces.³⁴ As should be obvious, I myself am one of these. Naturally enough, we do not all agree in everything with Legassick (or with each other), but I am sure that we all look to him as the modern founder of the enterprise in which we are engaged — and indeed, the same may be said of all those, again including myself, who have been working more broadly on the history of pre-industrial colonial, and late pre-colonial South Africa. For this reason, I am sure that I speak for all my colleagues in welcoming, finally, the publication of this important book.

Leiden, July 2009

³⁴ In addition to the works by Ross, Jacobs and the Comaroffs, cited above, see also Linda Waldman, *The Griqua Conundrum: Political and socio-cultural identity in the Northern Cape, South Africa*, Berne, Peter Lang, 2007, Michael Besten, “Transformation and Reconstitution of Khoe-San identities: AAS Le Fleur I, Griqua Identities and post-Apartheid Khoe-San Revivalism (1894-2004),”, Ph.D. thesis, Leiden, 2006, Kevin Shillington, *The Colonisation of the Southern Tswana, 1870-1900*, Braamfontein, Ravan, 1985.

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Martin Chatfield Legassick, 1969

Introduction

The history of South Africa in the nineteenth century has been viewed in a number of perspectives. Some have focused on the ebb and flow of British imperial influence, defined narrowly by the political annexation of territory, or at least by the overt decisions of metropolitan or local British policy makers. Others have traced the origins and growth of an Afrikaner community and of Afrikaner nationalism, often viewed in terms of reaction to British imperial influence. The growth of the Union of South Africa, born in 1910, from the Cape Colony of the turn of the nineteenth century, or, more dramatically, from the refreshment station at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, has been seen in terms of enlargement of political scale, of state-formation, in the limited sense of the expansion in scale and depth of formal institutions. In more sophisticated fashion, another group of historians has been concerned with the divergence in attitudes towards non-whites between the 'liberal' Cape Colony and the Trekker Republics, whose tradition of 'no equality in Church or State', it is argued, stems from an ethic of the frontier: the Union of South Africa is then seen as the triumph of the frontier tradition over Cape liberalism.¹ Non-whites have often focused on economic processes: the alienation of their land, and their incorporation in a farming and mining economy, from the benefits of which they were largely deprived.

The assumptions of this study are different. Two themes, it is argued, dominate the history of nineteenth century South Africa, and transcend or side-step the perspectives already listed. One is the erosion of the political power of non-whites through their absorption into plural communities in a subordinate political status. In 1700 the formal limits of white control in South Africa hardly extended beyond the Cape Peninsula: a century later, as defined by the frontier of the Cape Colony, they embraced an area perhaps half the extent of the present Cape Province. The remainder of Africa south of the Limpopo was occupied by numerous other autonomous political communities, predominantly Bantu-speaking, but also Khoi (Hottentot) and San (Bushman), as well as some ethnically or culturally 'mixed'. These varied in their size and structure, but most were uninfluenced, or only peripherally influenced, by the white settlement at the Cape. Yet by 1910 there was no territory south of the Limpopo in which ultimate political authority did not lie with white governments. Control over the bulk of the region was in the hands of the single central government of the Union of South Africa, whose electorate

¹ See, for example, Eric Walker, *The Frontier Tradition in South Africa*.

was almost exclusively white. The second theme is the integration of the peoples of South Africa into a market economy linked ultimately with the industrializing, capitalist economy of Europe: along with this came the diffusion of European culture. If in 1800 relatively few of the peoples of South Africa had been touched by these influences, then a century later there was no community, and hardly any person, that had escaped them. The establishment of white supremacy, and acculturation, these are the themes: in short, the creation in South Africa of a 'colonial situation'. These two processes, though each clearly has a strong influence on the other, are analytically distinct: it is only through ideological rationalization that they can be made to entail each other.

The fact of white supremacy has been too often unquestioned. Too often the prior existence of autonomous non-white political communities has been ignored or regarded as irrelevant, and hence the manner in which such communities and their leaders used their political power has been passed over. In some cases to ignore them has been impossible: even though the interpretations have usually been ethno-centric and often disparaging, it has been difficult to write out the role played by such men as Moshweshwe, Shaka, Dingane, Mzilikazi, Hintsa and others in the history of nineteenth century south Africa. But even here the emphasis has been on the military conquest which established white supremacy, largely neglecting the slow, complex, varied, and partly peaceful manner in which non-white political power was eroded, and in which political-diplomatic, economic, and ideological factors were as important as the military. Whether historians of South Africa have adopted a hostile or paternal attitude to non-whites has, in fact, not affected their basic assumption that the assertion of white hegemony was inevitable, desirable, or necessary. That 'civilized mankind, in his onward march, cannot afford to have compassion on men who inhabit the earth fruitlessly' is only an extreme Social Darwinist form of white settler historiography.² For whether non-whites have been viewed as inherently without social or political rights (as mere 'skeptels' or 'creatures'), whether it is believed that they may exercise these rights 'in their own areas,' or whether it is argued that they can acquire rights through meeting certain white-determined criteria, in each case the assumption is that the ultimate powers of decision-making for non-whites lie in white hands. Nowhere indeed is the convenient elision of the former autonomy of non-white communities so evident as in the debate over the history of 'Native policy.' Both segregation, or *apartheid*, and integration, imply a single authority able to enforce one or the other. Outside the Cape colony, Natal, and certain areas of the Trekker Republics, such conditions did not obtain for the period before the elimination of the autonomy of non-

² C.E.G. Schutte, 'Dr. John Philip's Observations Regarding the Hottentots of South Africa,' *Archives Year Book* (1940), I, 151. See also *ibid.*, 234.

white political communities. Before the end of the nineteenth century, in other words, it is meaningless, except in certain cases, to trace the pedigree of a particular 'native policy'.

The elision is, of course, no accident. The absence of consideration of autonomous non-white political power, the *lacunae* on the manner in which power was used by non-whites and in which it was destroyed by whites, is the basis of a historical myth or 'charter' rationalizing continued white hegemony in South Africa. It might be argued that consideration has indeed been paid to the origins and growth of white racism in South Africa. But while studies of the development of racial attitudes can lead to an understanding of why white hegemony was *sought*, they do not explain how it was achieved: this demands a consideration of political power. It might, and has been argued, that the attainment of white hegemony was the inevitable result of the superior economic strength and technological ability of Europe. In an ultimate sense this is true, and if every non-white political community in South Africa has been subdued by military conquest, this explanation would approach adequacy. But since in many cases there was no conquest, and in some no military conflict at all, this explanation elides any detailed study of the *political* implementation of European technological superiority.

That European economic strength, or the 'cultural superiority' of 'Western civilization' entailed the establishment of a plural society under white hegemony is, in fact, an ideological construct: the economic and cultural influence of Europe and the establishment of white supremacy were, it has already been pointed out, analytically distinct. In fact non-white societies could, and did, use the techniques and ideas brought originally from Europe to defend their traditional systems, or in an attempt to win greater political power within the new plural societies. Guns and horses, or integration into a money economy, could be used to increase the power of traditional societies. Different non-white communities, different sections of the same community, responded in different ways to these influences; just as different elements among the whites — settlers, missionaries, traders — transmitted them in different ways. Of great assistance in the analysis of these complex events, it is argued in this study, is the concept of the 'frontier zone.'

The Concept of the 'Frontier Zone'

The concept of the 'frontier' in a society of white settlement as distinct from the static frontier or boundary between sovereign nation-states dates, so far as systematic analysis of its implications is concerned, to the American historian Frederick Jackson Turner. For him the moving frontier of white settlement was 'the wave of civilization advancing across

the continent,' its outer edge 'the meeting-point between savagery and civilization.'³ Since then the concept, and many of its implications, have been applied by historians to South Africa.⁴

Turner's usage, and that of the South African historians who have followed him, has its limitations. In particular, the identification of the moving frontier between 'savagery' and civilization' with the spread of white settlement leads to a blurring of the two analytically distinct processes described above. In the first place, even within the assumption of the thesis, 'civilization' (that is, the culture of the metropolitan society or its local adjunct) did not spread uniformly with white settlement. Secondly, the thesis tends to equate white settlement with white control, and thus again conveniently ignores the existence of non-white political communities with autonomous power. For in reality the frontier — the frontier of white control — moved with the frontier of white settlement only in so far as those contemporaneously in power wished it so to move and were able to achieve this. Some South African historians have recognized both these points, though not their full implications. Thus MacCrone writes:

...the frontier...is always expanding and moving further and further *into* the interior provided by a continental hinterland. At the same time the frontier region is moving further and further *away* from the older, more densely settled centres of population situated near the seaboard, where communication with the mother country remains easier... Unlike the frontiers between countries in metropolitan Europe...the frontier of the continental colonies are zones which may cover vast areas and where new modes of life and new institutions are evolved which differ considerably even from those practised in the older, more settled parts of the same colony. In other words, the frontier is not merely a place or a population but a process...⁵

Similarly Hancock partly recognizes the second of this points:

...the frontier of settlement...has no necessary connexion with any political frontier... The advance of a settlement frontier may pull the frontier of imperial sovereignty after it, or the establishment of sovereignty may encourage settlement; but neither of these things necessarily happens...⁶

These historians, however, have not followed the logic of their analysis to its conclusions. In dealing with the reasons why white settlement should lead to white supremacy, for

³ F. J. Turner, 'The Significance of the Frontier in American History' in Turner, *Early Writings*, 187 – 8.

⁴ See, for example, Walker, *Frontier Tradition*; MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 89136; W. K. Hancock, 'Perspective View' in Hancock (ed.), *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, II, 1, 172; MacCrone, 'The Frontier Tradition and Race Attitude in South Africa,' *Race relations Journal*, XXVIII (1961), 3, 19-30.

⁵ MacCrone, 'Frontier Tradition...', 21.

⁶ Hancock, 'Perspective View,' 6.

example, MacCrone and others have explored the growth of white racist attitudes. These, they have argued, emerged to preserve the identity of the white society, and to prevent its regression to 'barbarism'. But in reality, as will emerge in more detail later in this study, the frontier culture in South Africa produced a way of life substantially similar to that of the indigenous inhabitants, and to label the latter as 'barbarism' and the form as 'civilization' was itself racist.⁷ MacCrone's argument, that the growth of racism was caused by the existence of racism, is therefore circular: in addition, as noted earlier, the exploration of attitudes does not lead to an understanding of how such attitudes were institutionalized.

Hancock, in dealing with the questions of the frontier as a 'process', recognized that in this case one is speaking of acculturation, and that different groups from white society play different roles. He distinguishes the settler's frontier, the trading frontier, the missionary frontier, the miner's frontier, and the frontier of investment.⁸ To each he assigns certain characteristics. But in two respects this is to weaken the concept of the frontier. Firstly, though analytically separable in theory, the different frontiers are not separate in practice. In 1801, for example, there arrived almost simultaneously on the Orange, members of the London Missionary Society and an official expedition from the Cape Colony: both the official expedition and, shortly, the missionaries, would engage in trading. Three 'frontiers', according to Hancock, and yet clearly to the non-white communities with whom they came in contact these would not have been sharply, or at all, differentiated. If one's concern is with the acculturative influences of the different white groups, then it is very often the differential access to, or differential acceptance of, these influences by non-white groups in the same area which is significant. The interaction between Hancock's 'frontiers', in other words, is more significant than the individually separable frontier roles themselves.

Secondly, by including the 'mining' frontier and the frontier of investment, Hancock risks diffusing the concept of the frontier beyond all recognition. To be separable at all from the general concept of 'acculturation', the frontier must have a rough geographical definition as well as a definition in terms of process: thus individual prospectors or miners might well constitute an element of the frontier, but not the mining industry or the industrial development of South Africa after the 1870's.

In defining the concept of the frontier for use in this study, it is essential, in fact, to regard it comparatively not only with the frontiers of modern nation-states, not only with other colonies of white settlement or exploitation (which is the extension provided by Hancock), but with the frontiers of pre-industrial states. Vansina's description of the

⁷ See Chapter 2.

⁸ Hancock, 'Perspective View,' 6-21. See also Turner, 'Significance...', 196-210 *passim*.

situation among the main Luba kingdom of Kazembe and the Lozi state has more general applicability:

There was no balance of power, there was no overall domination of one state, there was no dichotomy between the states in a system of alliances — in other words the area was not one supranational field for power competition. The reason lies in the structures of these states, all of which had a nucleus which was tightly controlled by the central government, and all of which had outlying provinces, where the authority and power of the central government faded away more and more the farther one went from the center toward the boundaries. Thus boundaries between states were vague, sometimes even overlapping, and there was little conflict of power between the states, since their respective common border areas were so weak.⁹

Between such states, in other words, there was a 'frontier zone' in which there was no single source of legitimate authority, in which different legitimate authorities could compete, an in which anyone who could generate power for himself could exercise it. Such a situation is clearly comparable to the frontier regions of colonies of white settlement such as South Africa. That the Cape Colony administration was unable to exert its authority over eighteenth century frontiersmen is by now a truism, and similarly, the non-white political communities established 'on the other side' of the frontier zone were unable to exert authority over either white frontiersmen or, in many cases, fragments from their own society.¹⁰

If the first element in a definition of the frontier zone is the lack of a single source of legitimate authority, the second, and dynamic element, is that described under the general term 'acculturation' or, better but even less elegant, 'mutual acculturation'. If the frontier society, as MacCrone suggests, evolved 'new modes of life and new institutions,' this was done not in the vacuum which he implies, but through interaction between different cultures. Anthropologists have been concerned with 'culture contact', generally known now as 'social change': indeed, 'the first academic course of lectures in which the modern phenomena of change in small-scale societies formed the central theme was that given by Radcliffe-Brown at Cape Town in 1924 on the effect of Western economic influences on the social organization of the Bantu.'¹¹ But whether their concern had been with 'the borrowing of objects, techniques and ideas by one people from another' or, as

⁹ Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savanna*, 155 – 6. See also Hancock, 'Perspective View,' 3, speaking of the borders between medieval England and the Celts: 'The border was not a line, but a district, where the thieving Scot and the thieving Englishman has sufficient liberty for roving forays... Before the frontier, there was the march...'

¹⁰ See, for example, Marais, *Maynier*, 39-43, where a frontier commando against the Xhosa in the Zuurveld is supported by the Xhoso-Rarabe chief, Ndlambe, because he feels they are his revolted subjects.

¹¹ L. Mair, 'Malinowski and the Study of Social Change' in R. Firth (ed.), *Man and Culture*, 230.

more recently, a study of the 'extending system of relationships' or of institutional change, they have implicitly done so in the context of a single source of legitimate authority.¹² The mutual acculturation of the frontier zone, however, takes place under conditions where there is no such legitimate authority and where, therefore, changes cannot so easily be *enforced*. The mutual acculturation which occurs in the frontier zone should therefore show significant distinctions from that generally studied by anthropologists.

What are the implications, and what is the utility, of this characterization of the frontier zone as an area where mutual acculturation occurs in the absence of any single source of legitimate authority? It should be clear that frontier zones are temporary, unstable, fluid, and dynamic. Essential to their existence is a crisis of values, cultural and political, which cannot be resolved by the imposition of superior force. By those who have praised them, they have been described as fostering 'individualism'. By their detractors, they have been accused of creating 'anarchy', of fostering a 'turbulence' which inevitably draws to the scene the forces of order, one or other of the polities bordering the zone.¹³ Both these views are correct, although it would be a mistake to see frontier zones as totally without identifiable and analyzable patterns, or as uninteresting to the historian. As J. A. de Mist wrote, 'this is perhaps the most important outcome of anarchy...that at such times, as if by an electric shock, the whole order of things is changed, and sweeping reforms which have been needed for many years are immediately instituted.'¹⁴ Such social change is the very stuff of the historian's craft.

Frontier zones are unstable. The frontiersmen, having moved into a region where there is a vacuum of legitimate authority, wish to preserve the mode of life they have developed and the institutions which support it. From this wish, however incoherently articulated, whether explicit or implicit, springs the resistance of frontiersmen to the re-imposition of established authority. But established societies, almost by definition, cannot tolerate such deviance from their norms, such irregularity and disorder; this is true both of the societies from which the frontiersmen spring and those with which they have made subsequent contact. Hence while the frontiersmen strive to maintain their 'independence', one or other 'parent' society will seek to reincorporate them. The result is likely to be conflict, unless the 'parent' society is unable to prevent, or willing to tolerate, the independent evolution of the frontier society towards its own system of stability.

¹² Monica Hunter, *Reaction to Conquest* (rev. ed. 1961), xiii. See also L. Mair, 'Malinowski and the Study of Social Change'; A. I. Richards, 'The Concept of Culture in Malinowski's Work,' in *Man and Culture*; M. Gluckman, 'Malinowski's 'Functional' Analysis of Social Change,' *Africa*, XVII (1947).

¹³ See, for example, J. S. Galbraith, 'The 'Turbulent Frontier' as a Factor in British Expansion,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, II, 2, January 1960, 150 – 168.

¹⁴ Quoted in MacCrone, 'Frontier Tradition...', 27.

The concept of the frontier zone has much utility. It enables one to distinguish the white colonist in the frontier society zone who, in the absence of any legitimate authority, sold firearms and ammunition to non-whites (and thus enabled them to become a part of the frontier culture) from the white colonists of the Trekker Republics who sought to deny firearms to the non-whites who could threaten their autonomy. It allows one to see that land alienation from non-whites in the nineteenth century occurred not primarily because of different conceptions of land tenure, but through the mechanism of the frontier zone. It is not correct to pose a dichotomy between 'communal' ownership of land by non-whites and 'individual' land tenure by whites: recent anthropologists have shown that in any society rights to land are not indivisible but involve a complex of relations which preclude absolute ownership. Specifically, residual rights to the land are vested in the state, but rights of occupation can never be arbitrarily denied.¹⁵ Conflicts arose then, not primarily over the utilization of land but over the refusal of white colonists to recognize the 'residual rights' over the land of the community from which it was acquired, over their refusal to recognize legitimate non-white political authority. By so doing, the land occupied by white colonist became a part of the frontier zone: it fell under real white 'control' only when white colonist occupation of that land was legitimated by a white-ruled political community. Similarly, the concept of the frontier zone enables one to distinguish between the missionary in his role as agent of cultural transformation — by evangelization and the stimulation of 'artificial wants' for European goods — and in his role as agent in some sense of legitimate authority, usually of the British colonial and imperial administration.¹⁶

Finally, the concept of the frontier zone is useful in examining the manner in which white supremacy was achieved. It was rare in South Africa that non-white societies came under white hegemony without being subject to extensive acculturative influences. Though some were able to endure, or strengthen themselves, by such influences — Moshweshwe, for example, or the Mpondo, or such Tswana communities as the Ngwato — others fell within frontier zones where the traditional political structures became transformed: access to leadership, rights to property and so on took on new forms. It could be argued that this was true for the Xhosa, and also for many groups enclosed within the nominal domain of the Transvaal Republic until the 1870's. It was certainly true for the first half of the century in Transorangia — which is defined in this study as the area bounded by the Langeberg and the valley of the Caledon to the west and north. In such areas non-

¹⁵ See, for example, J. Beattie, *Other Culture*, 190-5; M. Gluckman, *Politics, Law and Ritual*, 36, 40-5. For early statements of this kind referring to the Tlhaping, see Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 149-150, 193

¹⁶ See Chapter 3; Chapters 9-12.

whites became incorporated into the frontier zone retaining considerable political power and initiative. By the time the frontier zones were restabilized, non-white power had been eroded, even if it had not atrophied completely. Incorporated within white-ruled plural communities, the power they had lost as autonomous groups was not replaced by equal access to power in the plural society.

The restabilization, rather than the creation, of such frontier zones was the time when such erosion of power predominantly occurred. For while there was no single source of legitimate authority, whites and non-whites had to compete for control by essentially the same methods. In much of the Transvaal, for example, white settlement preceded any clear white hegemony: the settlement crept around and into the edges of non-white political communities, demanding their labor or initially appeasing them, depending on their size and cohesion, but for a while at least recognizing their autonomy. As late as the 1870's white farmers were paying tribute to African chiefs in the Zoutpansberg.¹⁷ It was only as, and if, the white societies could generate institutional cohesion that they were able to dictate terms to the non-whites. It is this which gives so much importance to the 'Imperial factor' in nineteenth century South Africa, for in a large number of cases it was only the British who could exert sufficient force, or threat of force, to resolve the crisis of values and authority in the direction of white hegemony, or at least give it a strong push in that direction.

For example, it was Sir Harry Smith's annexation of Transorangia in 1848 which tipped the balance in favor of white hegemony in that area by allowing the whites to consolidate their institutions and land-holding at the expense of Adam Kok's Griqua and the other Khoi, Sotho and 'mixed' communities of the area, with the exception of Moshweshwe. With white institutions established, this white hegemony was further advanced by the treaties of 1852 and 1854 which recognized white states both in Transorangia and north of the Vaal, and forbade trade in arms with non-white communities and treaties between such communities and the British government. The proposed federation schemes of the 1870's provided for the unification of white-ruled plural societies, to the exclusion of non-whites, and were further designed to strengthen the capacity of such white-rule societies in extending hegemony over as yet autonomous non-white groups.¹⁸ And though the stalemate between the Transvaal and the Pedi might have been one of the excuses, rather than the cause, of the British annexation of the Transvaal in 1877, it remains true that the subordination of the Pedi and of many other non-white communities north of the Vaal,

¹⁷ Walker, *History*, 351.

¹⁸ See, for example, Carnavon as quoted in De Kiewiet, *Imperial Factor*, 69: 'the most immediately urgent reason for general union is the formidable character of the native question, and the importance of a uniform, wise and strong policy in dealing with it.'

could be accomplished only after the period of institutional strengthening produced by British rule.¹⁹

The Present Study: Focus, Sources and Methods

The present study focuses on the Griqua in the frontier zone of Transorangia and, more particularly, on the Griqua state of Waterboer and its relations with other indigenous communities of the frontier zone on the one hand, and Colonial government and evangelical missionaries on the other. The position of the Griqua was anomalous; they were both the product of Cape Colony society, in its mediated frontier form, and yet they were non-white. Like the Cape Coloured today, they were socially marginal 'in that the status ascribed to [them] by the dominant group, or various sections of the dominant group, has...hovered between those of the sharply dichotomized white in-group and black out-group.'²⁰ It is hoped, however, that investigation of this anomalous position will illuminate the assumptions and theses here outlined: namely that the major processes in operation in nineteenth century South Africa were the establishment of white supremacy and acculturation, and that an important area in which both processes occurred can be characterized as the 'frontier zone'.

As frontiersmen, the Griqua managed to establish several independent states in Transorangia in the early nineteenth century. As frontiersmen, they incorporated within those states peoples from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds; and they incorporated them neither as equals nor with the rigid dichotomy between black and white established where possible in the Trekker Republics. With some degree of support from the Colonial government and the staunch backing of LMS Superintendent John Philip, they almost succeeded in the late 1830's in establishing Griqua hegemony over much of Transorangia. In this period they presage, though imperfectly, a potential alternative course which South Africa might have followed. Theoretically, the Griqua 'might well have been able to hold the line of the Orange, or at least the Caledon and the Vaal, in the way that the AmaXhosa maintained themselves behind the Fish River and the Kei,' the implementation of which, as Agar-Hamilton points out, had evaded the Sotho-Tswana.²¹ Theoretically the Griqua could have provided the nucleus for a South Africa less dichotomized along 'racial'

¹⁹ This holds true whether one places more emphasis on the role of the British administration itself, or the strengthening (or, indeed, creation) of Afrikaner nationalism in response: see F. A. Van Jaarsveld, *The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism*.

²⁰ S. Patterson, *Colour and Culture in South Africa*, 5.

²¹ Agar-Hamilton, *Road to the North*, 12. See also Arbousset, *Narrative*, 128-9. Agar-Hamilton blames this failure on the *Difaqane*, but in fact the Sotho-Tswana were never densely settled south of the Vet River, except in the valley of the Caledon, before 1800: see Chapter 1.

lines. Linked with the Coloured community in the Cape, able to restrain the Trek, the Griqua could have directed subsequent South African history along a different path.

But the Griqua were also non-white in milieu where color was already a significant factor. This was a major factor hindering the growth, stabilization, and continuation of the Griqua states, though of course there were others. The decline of the Griqua began with the establishment of white farmers in Transorangia and the annexation of the territory in 1848, on the one hand, and with the reassertion by the Sotho-Tswana of their autonomy from the Griqua, on the other. It began, in other words, insofar as there was a polarization between white and Bantu-speakers. Waterboer's state continued to exist, however, in attenuated form, and it was only with the entry of David Arnot on the scene as Secretary to Nicholas Waterboer, the annexation of the Griqua state in 1871, and the subsequent 'land commissions', that the Griqua era really ended in Transorangia. This latter period provides a clear illustration of the manner in which the crisis of values and authority in the frontier zone was resolved by the erosion of non-white power at the expense of whites. The claims and counter-claims to land, property, and leadership which had been battled over in the 'frontier zone' period, and which had been manipulated by the missionaries and the Griqua themselves to advance different interests, were now further manipulated in the interests of establishing white supremacy.

This further manipulation in the 1860's and 1870's will, however, be dealt with only briefly: the main focus of this study is the politics of the frontier zone itself. The first three chapters establish the broader pre-1800 context in which the frontier zone emerged. Chapters IV and V, and VI, and Chapters XI and XII are concerned particularly with the Griqua of Griquatown and their political and economic relations with the southernmost Sotho-Tswana groups, and specifically the Tlhaping. Chapters VII, VIII and X treat, besides Waterboer's state, and in rather less detail, the other Griqua states which came into existence in Transorangia. Chapter IX discusses the attitudes of John Philip and Robert Moffat towards the Griqua and each other, attitudes which were to have a major effect on the growth and decline of Griqua hegemony in Transorangia. In the conclusion to this study will be examined some further implications of the frontier zone, as well as the role played in the frontier zone by the missionaries.

Several remarks must be made with regard to sources and methods. The main body of source material for this study is contained in the archives of several missionary societies at work in Transorangia in the period: the London Missionary Society, the Wesleyan Missionary Society, and the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society. This is supplemented by three other sources of primary material: oral traditions, government documents, and the published works of contemporary travelers and missionaries. Being unable to visit South

Africa to collect documents for this study, I have been unable either to collect fresh oral traditions, or to gain access to unpublished government documents in, for example, the Cape Archives. The oral traditions used, therefore — for the Sotho-Tswana, for the Kora, and to a lesser extent for the Griqua — are those already published: particularly valuable has been the so-called *Bloemhof Bluebook*, the evidence given to the land court which met at Bloemhof in 1871.²² I have commented elsewhere on the merits and limitations of the body of extant published oral traditions of the Sotho-Tswana: the major remarks of relevance here are the interpenetration of oral with written tradition, and the *a priori* biases of collectors and compilers of these traditions.²³

My inability to collect further oral traditions and the lack of access to unpublished government material has not been a serious drawback. It would seem highly unlikely, indeed, that much more of value could be gathered on the Griqua and the Kora by collection of oral tradition. Only the successor to the Philippolis state in Griqualand East preserved a structural continuity through to a period where there would still be living persons retaining some memory of the state, and Philippolis is less central to this study than Griquatown.²⁴ Apart from that, the Griqua and the Kora are now scattered, and the chance of obtaining information of value is slight.²⁵ No doubt, despite the fragmentation of the Tlhaping and the Rolong, a knowledge of the contemporary written materials would enable significant information to be gathered amongst them by asking suitable questions, but I do not believe that for this study this would do more than correct points of detail or provide new information on matters of peripheral concern. Hopefully, however, this study may enable further research, more directly centered on the Southern Tswana, to be performed, by providing the context for their history which has hitherto been lacking.

The lack of access to government documents is, perhaps, more serious. However, scattered through contemporary and later works, as well as in published collections of official

²² Dr. I. Schapera was kind enough to allow me to take notes of his Xerox copy of this document. I was not able to consult the additional Bluebook containing further correspondence on this affair: Correspondence between H. M. High Commissioner and the President of the O.F.S. relative to the respective rights of that State, the Chief Waterboer, and others to the Country between the Orange and Vaal Rivers, in which diamonds have been discovered...[Cape Bluebook, G27-71].

²³ See Martin Legassick, 'The Sotho-Tswana Before 1800' in L. M. Thompson (ed.), *African Societies in Southern Africa*.

²⁴ For the sort of information that can be collected in such 'Bastard' communities where structural continuity has been preserved, see P. Carstens, *The Social Structure of a Cape Coloured Reserve*.

²⁵ In the 1930's both L. Maingard and J. A. Engelbrecht were able to find Kora informants who could give some fresh information: Maingard, 'Studies in Korana History...'; Engelbrecht, *Korana*. The history of the Kora remains, however, confusing and obscure: the major untapped source is undoubtedly the archives of the Berlin Missionary Society, who began work among the Kora in Transorangia in 1834.

documents, there has been found sufficient evidence to provide a coherent picture of government policy during the period.²⁶ More evidence might indeed have given a more rounded picture, but government policy is not the central feature of this study. Apart from that, it is in government documents that there are often to be found small fragments of information about the Griqua (or Bastards as they were in the eighteenth century), the Kora, or later, Sotho-Tswana groups. But the marginal utility of expenditure of time on such work is small, especially in the absence of the general framework which this study now seeks to provide. Finally, there are certain of the reports of boundary commissions, land courts, etc., which would have contained, in some cases, information as valuable as the *Bloemhof Bluebook*, though probably containing considerable repetition: these are an undoubted gap.²⁷

The major source material for this study, the missionary archives, suffers from defects as well. The missionaries were, or should have been, primarily interested in evangelical activity and its progress. Their correspondence, in fact, touches on many other matters, particularly the politics and economics of the societies among whom they were working and, did it not, this study would not be possible. But their evidence on these matters varies considerably in its reliability and its value; this is both because their comprehension of the manner in which non-white societies functioned varied enormously, and because they were very often interested parties in matters they describe. Where possible, of course, their views on and descriptions of the events and processes they describe have been checked, not only with those of other missionaries and contemporaries (which accounts for the length of many of the footnotes), but also, at least implicitly, against more recent anthropological studies of the societies concerned.

There are some other reasons why it has been necessary to document assertion so abundantly in footnotes. Firstly, where government documents have been obtained from secondary works, the original document has been cited when possible, and the work where it was obtained in addition. Secondly, in many other cases, evidence has been credited as directly as possible to its source: for example R. Moffat in Smith, *Diary*; L. Jansz

²⁶ C. W. De Kiewiet, 'The Northern Frontier Policy of the Cape Colony, 1800-1843,' M. A. Thesis, U. of Wits, was unfortunately burned in the Gubbins Collection fire which also destroyed most of the Philip Papers. Galbraith, *Reluctant Empire*; Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*; provide relatively little information on the central concerns of this study, while Agar-Hamilton, *Road to the North*; Waldemaar Campbell, 'The South African Frontier, 1865-1885: A study in Expansion,' treat the earlier period only briefly in retrospect. With regard to government documents, I should like to thank Christopher Saunders for procuring for me notes on several documents from the Cape Archives, particularly Baird to Co, April 21, 1820 [CO 2625/34].

²⁷ For Example, Griqualand West Land court Proceeding, Judgment and Documents, 1875 - 6 (Surveyor-General's Office, Cape Town); report on Land Questions in Griqualand West (Colonial Office, June 1880).

in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, etc. Thirdly, in research of this kind, where material emanating from the societies who are the direct focus of the study is meager, information on, for example, secondary personalities in those societies must be pieced together from a number of shreds of evidence. If this is to be generalized into broader statements, relating to the social and ethnic composition of the Griqua population, for example, the documentation on which assertions are based obviously mounts enormously.

Finally, there is the question of rumor. It is generally accepted that rumor is most prevalent in society in periods of crisis, where established channels of information have broken down.²⁸ It is doubly likely to flourish in the crises of a frontier zone, where established channels of information scarcely exist. In the sources one comes across frequent examples of such rumors, of minor and of major importance. In many cases, it is subsequently discovered that the rumor is false, or it is easy for the investigator to evaluate this himself.²⁹ In other cases, including some of the more significant for the study, the precise validity of certain pieces of information cannot be determined. In this case it is important to trace the channel by which the rumor has been diffused. For, it is argued, the truth of falsehood of the rumors in such cases is often less important than that they exist.

...at my first entry into their country [wrote Burchell of the Tlhaping] I began to experience some part of that deceit and disregard for truth, which, although pervading more or less every African tribe, seem scarcely to be considered by the Bichuanas as a vice or as disgraceful practice; and which, in these countries, so deeply contaminate every class of society, that I afterwards proved by too many trials, that no man's word, not even the Chief's, could be relied on in any case *where the least advantage was to be gained by falsehood*.³⁰

Rumor, in fact, could be and was manipulated for political ends. Thus if source A reports to B certain information hostile to C, it is likely that either A is hostile to C, and/or wishes to make B hostile to C. And so on. This is of particular relevance to the issues discussed in chapters X – XII, the attempt and failure by the Griqua to secure hegemony over Transorangia. Further, it is an additional reason for the stress and documentation of individual assertions; for either the type and wealth of documentation illustrates the evidential validity of the particular statement, or else it does at least provide a guide to the channel by which it has diffused.

²⁸ See, for example, T. Shibutani, *Improvised News: a sociological study of rumor*.

²⁹ See, for example, Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 219 – 220, 227 – 8; Smith, *Diary*, I, 305. See also Marais, Maynier, 26.

³⁰ Burchell, *Travels*, II 217 (My emphasis). See also Thompson, *Travels*, 116.

1 The Sotho-Tswana Peoples before 1800

Much of the area of the present Transvaal, Orange Free State, Botswana, and 'British Bechuanaland' was occupied, at the end of the eighteenth century, by the Sotho-Tswana peoples. The Sotho-Tswana (or Sotho, as they are often generically called) were Bantu-speakers, distinguished from neighboring Bantu-speaking groups by their language, their material culture, and preferred cross-cousin marriage.¹ To the east and south-east of the Sotho-Tswana, across the Drakensberg escarpment, mingling where the mountains ceased to be an important barrier, were the Nguni, who married only outside their clans (descendants of a common ancestor) and who, unlike the Sotho-Tswana, had no *siboko* (totems) and a different settlement pattern.² A number of communities who are almost certainly Nguni had indeed crossed the Drakensberg to the north-east and distributed themselves far and wide through the Sotho-Tswana chiefdoms. Some of these 'clung to [Nguni] custom and language with extraordinary tenacity,' while others adapted almost completely to the culture of the area into which they had moved.³ North of the Nguni were the 'Thonga', mainly in present-day Mozambique, probably a cultural mix of people whose differentiation and origin has been inadequately studied.⁴ By the eighteenth century, it has recently been suggested, many of the 'Thonga' were functioning as professional traders, carrying the trade-goods of the Portuguese settlements far south among the Nguni and far west among the Sotho-Tswana and other peoples of the interior.⁵

The Zoutpansberg, to the extreme north of the area of Sotho-Tswana settlement, was dominated by the Venda, whose ruling elements, at least, were relatively recent immi-

¹ Within the Sotho-Tswana area itself, however, there remain differences of dialect, of material culture, and of preferred marriage-patterns which may provide clues to early cultural influences. See for this, and other assertions in this chapter otherwise undocumented, Martin Legassick, 'The Sotho-Tswana Before 1800,' in L. M. Thompson (ed.), *African Societies in Southern Africa*.

² The characteristic Sotho-Tswana chiefdom has a large single settlement, and possibly a few smaller outlying villages; the characteristic Nguni chiefdom is composed of hamlets scattered throughout the territory. Amongst the Sotho-Tswana there are variations: in the eastern and north eastern areas for example and also, at least since the *Difaqane*, among the southern Sotho prior to the *Difaqane* suggest that some at least of them, were established in large main settlements: See Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 350-1; Kay, June 20, 1821 [MMS: I-1821/21]; Broadbent, March 31, 1824 [MMS: II1824/23].

³ Van Warmelo, 'Grouping and Ethnic History,' in Schapera (ed.), *Bantu-Speaking Tribes*, 53.

⁴ But see fuller, 'Ethnohistory in the Study of Culture Change...' in Bascom and Herskovits (eds.), *Continuity and Change in African Cultures*, 113-129; H. Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*. The word 'Thonga' reportedly means 'those who were judge' and was applied by Shona-speakers to those whom they subjected: see, for example, Mason, *Birth of a Dilemma*, 74.

⁵ See Alan Smith, 'Delagoa Bay and the Trade of South-Eastern Africa,' in R. Gray, *Trade and Politics in Africa* (forthcoming).

grants from the north during the sixteenth of seventeenth centuries. It is presumed that the Venda were an offshoot of one of the Shona empires north of the Limpopo, probably that of the Rozwi Changamire dynasty. The 'Shona' peoples, whose cultural and ancestral unity is as uncertain as that of the 'Thonga', spawned other groups which moved southward to settle among the Sotho-Tswana in comparatively recent times: the Birwa and the Tlhalerwa, for example, as well as the 'Kalaka' (Karanga) communities on the northern tributaries of the Limpopo who became subject to the Ngwato in the late eighteenth century.⁶ It is probable, however, that the association of 'Shona' and Sotho-Tswana antedates this period considerably. Both the Nguni and Sotho-Tswana languages, as well as Venda, have their immediate ancestry in the Zezuru dialect of Shona, according to Guthrie, and it is possible that the Sotho-Tswana *siboko* (totems) are ultimately derived from the similar institutions among the Shona.⁷

East of the Sotho-Tswana peoples, in the eighteenth century, was the Kalahari desert, which separated them from the rather dissimilar Bantu-speaking groups, the Ambo and the Herero, of the west coast. There is considerable evidence, however, particularly for the southern fringes of the Kalahari, that desiccation was spreading rapidly eastwards during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁸ One suggestion that has been made, for that area, is that an increased density of such domestic animals as cattle and goats, cropping the vegetation, led to climatic changes.⁹ In this case it should not be assumed that the Kalahari always presented such a barrier to settlement or contact between peoples as it does today. In Herero traditions, for example there are several provocative statements concerning wars on the western side of the desert between the Herero and Sotho-Tswana peoples.¹⁰ There still exist, furthermore, peoples on either side of the Kalahari such as the Bergdama and Katteä who may be related, and whose origins appear to be distinct from both Bantu-speakers and Khoisan peoples.¹¹ At some time in the past, therefore, it

⁶ See, for example, Schapera, *Ethnic Composition*, 65-93 *passim*; Breutz, *Rustenburg*, 398-412; *Ventersdorp*, 125-130; Van Warmelo, *Preliminary Survey*, 49-50; (NAO/BAO), 29, 153, 29-49; TNAD *Short History*, 51; Krige, 'Traditional origins...', 352 - 3. For the Venda see also H. A. Stayt, *The BaVenda*.

⁷ See, for example, Guthrie, 'Some Developments in the Prehistory of the Bantu Languages,' *JAH*, III (1962) 2, 273-282. For Shona 'totemism' see, for example, C. Bullock, *The Mashona Laws and Customs*; H.M.T. Meade, 'The Origin and Universality of Taboo and Totemism,' *NADA* (1923), 73-9.

⁸ See, for example, Campbell, *second Journey*, II, 113, 125, 128, 268-9; Smith, *Diary*, I, 284-5, 305-10; Philip, *Researches*, II, 56; Miles, October 27, 1830 [LMS12/3/B]; Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, 124-5; Stow, *Native Races*, 418; Theal, *Ethnography and Condition...*, 185. Also Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 47-9 and below, Chapters IV, X.

⁹ Warren, *On the Veldt*, 337-8, 367. See also Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XX who argues that the use of trees in building settlements produced the climatic change.

¹⁰ See, for example, Vedder, *South West Africa*, 134-5, 141-2.

¹¹ See, for example, Breutz, *Vryburg*, 15, 18-19; *Kuruman*, 24-30; 'Ancient People of the Kalahari,' *Afrika und Uebersee*, XLII (1959), 51-4; Vedder, *South West Africa*, 60-7, 107-119. It is significant that the

is conceivable that the Kalahari area was cultural reservoir from which the Sotho-Tswana could have derived elements of culture or structure not only from Khoisan and Bergdama/Kattea, but also from the Middle Zambezi Bantu and, more tentatively, the west coast Bantu-speakers.

Around the western and southern fringes of Sotho-Tswana settlement in the late eighteenth century were spread Khoisan peoples — the so-called ‘Hottentots’ (Khoi) and ‘Bushmen’ (San) — who were also to be found scattered amidst the Sotho-Tswana, especially in less accessible areas. It is usually assumed that these peoples are the descendants of the aboriginal populations of Southern Africa, though some have suggested that the Khoi contain at least an element of pre Bantu-speaking migrants from the north. To what extent the distinction between Khoi and San is most usefully described in terms of language, culture, ethnicity or economy is at present uncertain; nor is it known whether some of the Khoisan peoples became cattle-herders (rather than hunter-gatherers) before or after the arrival of Bantu-speakers in South Africa.¹² In about 1700 it would not be a wildly incorrect to assume that the line which separated Bantu-speakers in the interior from the Khoisan peoples ran approximately at 28°E longitude; though in certain areas such as the Caledon valley, possibly the Modder River and the Orange west of its confluence with the Vaal, and even Philippolis, it is possible that then or soon afterwards Sotho-Tswana were settled south of this line.¹³ Further south at this time, the Khoi appear to have herded their cattle predominantly along the coastal plains and river valleys stretching north and east of the Cape, while the San hunted and gathered in the dry interior.¹⁴

Recent dating suggests that ironworkers were present in the extreme north-east of the Sotho-Tswana settlement area by the fifth or sixth century A.D., and that by the year 1000 A.D. ironworking was being practiced as Melville’s Koppie on the central Highveld.¹⁵ Not, however, until the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, some thousand years after the earliest known iron-working, can much useful knowledge be gained from oral traditions on the culture, structure, or settlement distribution of the Sotho-Tswana. It is

Bergdama appear not only to have been servants of the Nama, but also important ironworkers.

¹² See, though C. Ehret, ‘Cattle-keeping and milking in eastern and southern Africa: the linguistic evidence,’ *JAH*, VIII (1967), 1.

¹³ See, for example, Melvill, entries May 14-26 [LMS 11/4/A]; Orpen, *Basuto*, 5; Casalis, *Basuto*, 156; Smith diary, I, 285-6, 288, 396-9; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. 1. William F. Lye also informs me that he is in possession of correspondence between the Rev. Dyke and G. McC Theal on the southwards limits of Sotho-Tswana settlement in the Caledon valley before 1833.

¹⁴ See particularly L. F. Maingard, ‘The Lost Tribes of the Cape...’ For an instance of Khoi settlement north of this line, in the Pilansberg district, see Breutz, *Marico*, 11.

¹⁵ R. J. Mason and N. J. Van der Merwe, ‘Radiocarbon Dating of Iron Age Sites in the southern Transvaal...,’ *SAJS* (1964), LX, 142; B. Fagan, ‘Radiocarbon dates for sub-Saharan Africa, V,’ *JAH*, VIII (1967), 3, 525.

not necessary to assume that the first iron-workers were Bantu-speakers: as the skeletal material of the Bambandyanalo Iron Age site shows, amongst other examples, it was possible for Khoisan ('Boskopoid') peoples to adopt ironworking through acculturation or intermarriage with the southwards moving Bantu-speakers. During this thousand years, however, speakers of Sotho-Tswana spread over much of the area between the Limpopo and the Vaal as far west as the Kalahari. During this thousand years, presumably, not only iron-working, but also the practice of agriculture and possibly the keeping and/or milking of cattle diffused to South Africa. During this thousand years the Sotho-Tswana peoples evolved many of the cultural and structural characteristics by which they are recognized. There is little evidence, apart from *a priori* assumptions, to suggest, as has been characteristic of South African historians, that the Sotho-Tswana arrived in South Africa in a series of 'waves of migration', each 'wave' exterminating or subduing those who came before. It is equally plausible to imagine that the settlement of the territory occupied by the Sotho-Tswana was a slow process, involving the migration to the area of relatively few people, with the bulk of population increase occurring *in situ*. Two probable features of this process of occupation should be mentioned. Firstly, it seems highly likely that Sotho-Tswana culture is the product of influences, whether by 'diffusion' or population movement, from a number of different directions. It is not implausible, for example, to suppose that the deviant elements of the culture of the easternmost of the culture of the easternmost Sotho-Tswana derive at least partly through the 'Thonga', from the Central Bantu-speaking 'matrilineal belt'. The 'Roka', for example, of the north-eastern Transvaal, may derive from the 'Ronga' of Mozambique, of which 'Roka' is simply a Sothoized form.¹⁶ Similarly, as has already been suggested, one should look to the Shona area, and even the Middle Zambezi Bantu-speakers, for other influences on the Sotho-Tswana.

The second feature of this occupation has already been touched on: interaction between Bantu-speakers and the earlier Khoisan inhabitants. It has recently been demonstrated that South Africa Bantu-speakers have a variance in skull-type from other Negroid populations due to an almost uniform incidence of Khoisan physical characteristics.¹⁷ One should therefore assume that mutual acculturation between Bantu-speakers and Khoisan, and intermarriage between Sotho-Tswana men and Khoisan women in particular, were a constant feature of the first thousand years and more of Sotho-Tswana penetration. Around the fringes of the spreading settlement of Bantu-speakers, in particular, there was probably more intense interaction of this kind than at the center, where Khoisan peoples

¹⁶ For the 'Roka' see Van Warmelo, *Preliminary Survey*, 108-110; D. Hunt, 'An account of the BaPedi...', 27507; H. O. Monnig, 'The Baroka ba Nkwana...', *African Studies*, XXII (1963), 172-3.

¹⁷ H. De Villiers, *The Skull of the South African Negro*, *passim*.

would have been fewer, and where Sotho-Tswana peoples would have felt more secure in their own culture. Thus some groups who are now, or were recently, identified as Sotho-Tswana may consist wholly or partly of acculturated Khoisan peoples, or at least contain a strong element of Khoisan 'blood' and/or culture. Some such communities appear to have remained autonomous in isolated areas, others became subject in some form to more powerful Sotho-Tswana groups. Yet others, it will be argued, competed successfully with the 'purer' Sotho-Tswana, and became political communities of equal status. What is at this stage not clear, however, is the extent to which non-acculturated Khoi communities remained around the fringes of Sotho-Tswana settlement. Certainly in the present Orange Free State, along the Orange River, not to mention south of the Orange and in the Drakensberg, there were still in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries communities of 'San', or hunter-gatherers. But it is usually argued that the Khoi peoples found along the Orange at that time — the so-called Nama and Kora — were recent returnees from further south, retreating before white settlement. It would seem likely, though, that these simply added to an already-existent Khoi population; the fact that it has been impossible to correlate all Nama and Kora groups with Khoi communities of the western Cape would support this hypothesis.¹⁸

The Dispersal of the Kwena and Kgatla Lineage-Clusters

Over much of the area of Sotho-Tswana occupation at the end of the eighteenth century, the members of two royal lineages, which may be termed the Kwena and Kgatla lineages, were politically dominant. During the previous three hundred years, so far as can be determined, these two lineages, at first the ruling lines of the chiefdoms, had undergone a series of acts of fission through which they ruled two groups of chiefdoms, genealogically related but politically autonomous in each case. These clusters of chiefdoms will be termed lineage-clusters. Theoretically, it would seem, the senior chief in the lineage-cluster (determined according to rules discussed below) retained a degree of social and ritual authority over the junior members of the cluster: hence it would be incorrect to describe the chiefdoms of the cluster as entirely independent of one another. In practice, however, it was each chiefdom which was the significant political unit. With regard to judicial affairs, and command of the allegiance of his subjects, each chief enjoyed autonomy and equality of status, and very often, it would appear, geographical distance between cluster

¹⁸ See especially L. F. Maingard, 'Studies in Korana History...'; 'H. J. Wikar: His Editors, Translators and Commentators,' *Bantu Studies*, X (1963), 1, 31-40; Engelbrecht, 'The Tribes of Wikar's Journal' in Wikar, *Journal*, 225-230; *Korana*, 1-66.

members or their relative political power led to the atrophy of ranked relationships. Conversely, obligations of a political kind between genealogically unrelated chiefdoms have often become converted in historical memory into the obligations due from a junior to the senior members of the lineage-cluster.

The nuclear Kgatla chiefdom appears to have been situated in the center of the Highveld: early settlement sites mentioned for it are in the present Pretoria and Rustenburg districts. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the ruling lineage of this chiefdom underwent fission to produce a lineage-cluster dispersed over the area north of the Vaal and *eastwards* from the central Highveld towards the Drakensberg. Some of the southernmost chiefdoms later became amalgamated into Moshweshwe's post-*Difaqane* southern Sotho state, and on Kgatla chiefdom, the Kgafela, moved westward into Rustenburg district. For example the most part, however, the Kgatla chiefdoms lie outside the area of concern of this study. It should be mentioned, however, that the most successful segment of the Kgatla lineage moved eastward from the Pretoria district to the Lulu mountains where, in the eighteenth century it was able to incorporate into a state a large population spread over a considerable area: the Pedi state. It may also be significant that the nuclear Kgatla area is not far from the early ironworking site of Melville's Koppie, and that several groups who have been associated with the Kgatla lineage-cluster were important iron-workers. The Mmanaana-Kgatla, who during the eighteenth century appear to have been subordinate to the Hurutshe near the headwaters of the Marico, are of particular importance in this regard.¹⁹

The dispersal of the Kwena lineage-cluster appears to have begun from a place called Rathateng, near the junction of the Marico and Crocodile Rivers, in perhaps 1500. From here, within three hundred years, the Kwena lineage-cluster was spread from the center of the Highveld near Brits to the borders of the Kalahari, and from the northernmost points of the Limpopo as far south as the Caledon River. The most plausible reconstruction of the dispersal suggests that from Rathateng the Hurutshe moved up towards the headwaters of the Marico, while another Kwena chiefdom moved up the Crocodile River to the Brits district. At about the same time a third section of this lineage appears to have crossed the Vaal to a place called Ntsuanatsatsi in the present Orange Free State.²⁰ During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries each of these chiefdoms subdivided further.

By the end of the eighteenth century, each of the chiefdoms of the Kwena lineage-cluster (and probably of other Sotho-Tswana communities as well) consisted of both

¹⁹ For Mmanaana-Kgatla ironworking see Livingstone, *Missionary Correspondence*, 14-5, 34-5, 64; *Family Letters*, I 117-8; Edwards, January 28, 1845 [LMS 21/1/A].

²⁰ For the site of Ntsuanatsatsi see the various claims of Arbousset, *Narrative*, 131; Ellenberger, *Basuto*, 17-20, 68; Breutz, *Ventersdorp*, 119.

lineage-members and those unrelated to the ruling lineage. The ruling lineage, in fact, provided the skeleton of the chiefdom, with the members of the community linked to the ruling lineage through the hereditary headmen of so-called 'wards' or hamlets (the *kgoro*, *kgotla*, *motse*, etc.). The nuances of these sub-units were many, but their basic feature was a reproduction of the chiefdom on a smaller scale: they enjoyed under the leadership of their headmen, in other words, substantial separate corporate life.²¹ It is significant that Lemue should have written in 1830 that when a Motswana traveled, he was known by the name of his ward 'and moreover it is know from this to which chief and which tribe he belongs.'²² Sometimes these headmen were themselves members of the ruling lineage. In other cases they would be leaders of a group which attached itself to the community. Sometimes, too, the chief would create new wards and promote a non-lineage member to be its headman.

It is theoretically feasible that the Kwena and Kgatla ruling lineages established their predominance over the pre-existing inhabitants of the areas they entered by conquest. In the case of the larger political units, such as the Pedi, this was sometimes true. The large proportion of members of the chiefdom, however, who were members of the ruling lineage, and the absence of severe distinctions of status in the community (with some exceptions) lead one to believe, however, that the dispersal of these lineage-clusters was due rather to some unknown factor causing increase of population. Perhaps, as Monica Wilson has recently suggested, this was the expansion of patrilineal and polygonous lineages possessing cattle at the expense of those without cattle.²³ Or, if the chronology of the introduction of cattle does not permit this as a cause of Kwena and Kgatla lineage-cluster dispersal, then a similar effect might be produced by differential access to important resources such as iron. This is also suggested by the fact that the status differences among the Sotho-Tswana appear to derive from relationships of trade: towards ritual tribe in some instances, and towards real tribute and clientship in others.

Apart from the evidence to be derived from status relationships within the Sotho-Tswana communities, our knowledge of the effects on earlier occupants of Kwena or Kgatla dispersal deals, naturally, only with such communities as were not completely absorbed or completely fragmented. Thus in the case of the Kwena lineage-segment which crossed the Vaal to Ntsuanatsatsi, there is evidence that they legitimized their occupation

²¹ Burchell, *Travels*, II, 313, 367 was the first, when among the Tlhaping, to distinguish the 'ward'. See also Campbell, *Travels*, 173-4, 176-7, 183, 185-6; *Second Journey*, I, 177.

²² Lemue, November 27, 1830 [JDM, VI, 299 – 300].

²³ See Monica Wilson, 'Changes in Social Structure in South Africa' in Thompson (ed.), *Forgotten Factor*. It may be significant in this context that when Smith visited the Marico-Crocodile junction area in 1835, near the Kwena dispersal site of Ratheteng, he found it thinly populated by cattleless people due to water scarcity: this may point to a cause of the dispersal.

of the territory south of the river by intermarriage with the previous Fokeng inhabitants. The mixed Kwena-Fokeng chiefdom apparently returned north of the Vaal some two generations later in c.1600/1680, from where there was a secondary dispersal over a wide area both north and south of the Vaal. Except for the Fokeng ba Thekwane of the Rustenburg district, the Fokeng in no case retained political power, though they continued, and still continue, to command ritual respect as the 'owners of the land.'²⁴ When the Hurutshe moved southwards to the headwaters of the Molopo, on the other hand, it would be seen that after first forcing the previous inhabitants of the area, the Rolong, to pay tribute, they then drove the Rolong southwards across the Molopo where they remained in comparative isolation from perhaps 1550 to the eighteenth century.²⁵ Similarly when, in the eighteenth century, Kwena lineage-segments moved west from the Pretoria and Rustenburg districts across the Marico district into present-day Botswana, they drove ahead of them several Sotho-Tswana chiefdoms. Unable to sustain their independence in the arid conditions of the Kalahari, such chiefdoms fragmented, entered into relationships of clientage with other Sotho-Tswana groups, and formed a large part of what became generically known as 'Kgalagadi.'

These communities who were absorbed, forced back, or fragmented by the Kwena dispersal were, and continued to be, on the fringes of Sotho-Tswana settlement; they were peoples, it has already been suggested, most likely to be influenced by Khoisan culture and 'blood'. Though there is evidence for this, as will emerge later, it is also apparent that they shared many features with the general Sotho-Tswana culture: the 'Kgalagadi', for example, before their fragmentation appear to have had a system of wards, similar preferred marriage practices, clients of their own, and a hardly-functioning system of *siboko* (totems).²⁶ Since it is these communities on the fringes of Sotho-Tswana settlement (the Rolong, the Fokeng, the Ghoya for example)²⁷ as well as the south-westernmost communities of the Kwena dispersal (the Ngwaketse, the Hurutshe, some of the mixed Kwena-Fokeng communities) with which this study is concerned, it is convenient at this point to elaborate some relevant features of this culture and structure.

Each community, it has been said, was governed by a chief who was its judicial, administrative, economic and political focus. The chieftaincy descended within the lineage according to fixed rules of succession. The heir was the eldest son of the chief wife, for

²⁴ Ellenberger, *Basuto*, 17, 25 – 6, 60; Sheddick, *Southern Sotho*, 42, 74.

²⁵ Breutz, *Marico*, 23 – 4; *Mafeking*, 24 – 8; *Vryburg*, 20.

²⁶ See Schapera and Van der Merwe, 'Notes on the Bakgalagadi...', 20 – 2.

²⁷ 'Ghoya' is a term which, strictly speaking applies only in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century when these people had a chief Leghoya. Prior to this the people who became 'Ghoya' probably consisted both of Kwena-Fokeng elements, and of Tsatsing/Kgalagadi/Lala clients etc. See particularly Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 85fn; Backhouse, *Narrative*, 390; Smith, *Diary*, I, 388, 396, 407, II, 268.

whom the *bogadi* or dowry was paid by the tribe. In the event of the death of the heir before accession it was his children, if any, who succeeded. Next in line was the second son of the chief wife, and his offspring, followed by the other sons and their offspring. Then came the children of the second ranked wife and so on.²⁸ In practice these rules were more honoured in the breach than the observance. Not only could disputes arise over who was the chief wife, but were this wife to be married late in life, the heir would be too young to succeed, and a regent would rule who might be unwilling to return power to the correct line. A further complication was the practice of the levirate: if the regent, for example, raised seed by a wife of the dead king, or by the wife of an heir who had died young, then the offspring, biologically his, were socially in the line of succession. Disputes over succession were, of course, the major proximate cause of the fission of a lineage.

Each political community, divided into wards under the overall authority of the chief, was centered on a single main settlement, which contained up to 10,000-20,000 inhabitants.²⁹ In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, however, and perhaps earlier, the processes of *fission* among the Sotho-Tswana appear to have been giving way to processes of *amalgamation*. Not only did this mean that groups seceding from one chiefdom would often join another rather than seek autonomy, but in some cases it would appear that powerful chiefdoms extended their authority over other smaller settlements, which would then be included within the chiefdom. In some cases such people were allowed to remain separate because they were specialists: the Mmanaana-Kgatla for example, who were in the eighteenth century tributary to the Hurutshe and were their blacksmiths.³⁰ Besides such full members of the community, divided generally into royals, commoners, and recent immigrants, there were other subjects of the chiefdom —clients or serfs — many of whom did not live at the main settlement.

Clearly the ward-structure allowed for fluidity in the community: it was structurally easy for groups to join or leave the community, which they would do depending on the benevolence or wealth of the chief.³¹ There, were however, a number of ways in which such a relatively ‘confederal’ community was defined and held together. Firstly, all full

²⁸ For the most complete account of Sotho-Tswana succession rules see Schapera, *Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom*, 53-7, 230-8; *Native Land Tenure*, 87 – 9, 152 – 5. For different accounts of the choice of the great wife, however, see Brown, *Bantu Nomads*, 61, 64; Casalis, *Basuto*, 186-7; C. R. Condor, ‘The present Condition of the Native Tribes in Bechuanaland,’ *J. Anthropol Inst.*, XVI (1887), 85.

²⁹ See, for example, Casalis, *Basuto*, 213; Archbell, August 10, 1832 [MMS:V – 1832/27]; Thompson, *Travels*, 193; Condor, ‘President Condition...,’ 87.

³⁰ For the tributary condition of these people, see Schapera, ‘Ngwaketse...,’ 4; Breutz, *Marico*, 95.

³¹ Barrow, *Cochin-China*, 398, 405 – 6; Philip, *Researches*, II, 132; Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, 186. But see Smith, *Diary*, I, 387.

male members of the community would participate in the general assembly or *pitso* at which there was great freedom of discussion and at which all important decisions were made.³² Secondly — and this varied from one community to another, and perhaps from one chief to another, and perhaps from one chief to another — there were another councils, including at minimum the closets relatives of the chief and at maximum all the ward headmen. Thirdly, the age-regiment and initiation systems provided a further definition of the community. Boys and girls of about the age of puberty would, every few years, be grouped into such regiments and undergo an ‘initiation’ process, lasting from a few weeks to a few months in different areas. The institution socialized the young into the ways of the chieftdom and separated them from those who had not learned the inner customs and traditions.³³ Such integrative tendencies were, however, checked by the fact that those initiated within each ward formed a subsection of the age-regiment under the command of a leading ward regiment-member.

Fourthly, the community was at least partially territorially defined. Around the main settlement were the agricultural lands, allocated to members of the community by the chiefs and headmen, but remaining in the use of the family to whom they were allocated so long as they were needed.³⁴ Away from the main settlement, at distances up to fifty and even a hundred miles, were the cattle-stations and the hunting-stations, where youths or retainers looked after the cattle, and where the men congregated during the hunting seasons. Such pasture-lands and hunting-terrain appear to have been included within the bounds of the chieftdom. Though this would not preclude other peoples necessarily from heading their cattle or hunting in them, settlement by an alien community at a source of water within this territory would have required permission from the chief. If the main settlement of the chieftdom was moved, it would be moved this general territory. ‘It is customary when a chief assumes this chieftainship,’ Gasietsiwe, the Ngwaketse chief, said

³² For accounts of the *pitso* and other councils see Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 330; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 351, 376; Philip, *Researches*, II, 132-6; Thompson, *Travels*, 99-107, 109; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XV; Holub, *Seven Years*, I, 394; Condor, ‘Present Condition...’, 86. Also Casalis, *Basuto*, 233-6; Borchers, *Memoir*, 133; Edwards, November 20, 1801 [LMS 1/4/E]. The *pitso* was held in the chief’s *kgotla*; there appears to have been a slightly more exclusive council held outside the town, especially in the event of going to war, called *letsbulo*.

³³ For perhaps the earliest account of part of the (female) initiation ceremonies, among the Tlhaping, see Campbell, *Travels*, 169, 175 – 6, 177 – 8, 180, 183 – 4, 189 – 90. See also Casalis, *Basuto*, 261 – 9; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XV; Holub, *Seven Years*, I, 398 – 401; Brown, *Bantu Nomads*, 73 – 4.

³⁴ On land rights see particularly Burchell, *Travels*, II, 362, 375; Campbell, *Travels*, 164; *Second Journey*, II, 149 – 150, 193; Smith, *Diary*, I, 319; Mackenzie, *Austral Africa*, I 28; *Ten Years*, 368 – 370; Condor, ‘Present Condition...’, 86; Casalis, *Basuto*, 157, 159 – 162.

at Bloemhof, 'his country and people are formally handed over to him, and the boundaries described.'³⁵

Finally, membership of the community as well as status within it were defined by the mutual obligations between chief and community members. This is a complex subject, on which it is hard to be definite at this stage. It has been said that the junior chiefs in a lineage-cluster owed certain ritual obligation to the senior chief, but that in many cases such obligations were not performed, or might even be paid to the chief of a sub-cluster, according to factors of relative political power.³⁶ In some cases, such obligations descended within the chiefdom itself; such would appear to have occurred in many cases with the first-fruits ceremony, in which the chief of each community, rather than the senior chief of a cluster, bit the first fruits of the harvest. Other obligations — which in different cases are defined as presents (*sehuba*) and tribute (*lekgetho*) — rested almost exclusively within the chiefdom: the chief would receive one tusk from every elephant that was killed, and the breast of every ox or large wild animal slaughtered.³⁷ Perhaps in some cases members of the chief's family would be exempt from such obligations: certainly free members of the community were not. In return the chief had the general obligation of using and distributing his wealth for the benefit of full members of the community.

Of considerably lower status were various types of clients, attached to the chief, or to ward headmen. Such clients may be classified in various ways. There were those that herded the cattle of the wealthy, those that hunted on behalf of the wealthy, those that kept birds off gardens and sometimes assisted with the harvest. There were those who lived mainly at the chief settlement and those that did not. The origins of such people, too, were diverse. Some of them were clearly of Khoisan extraction; they were called Barwa amongst the southern Sotho-Tswana and Masarwa in the north, indicating that those communities on the southern fringes who had intermarried with them regarded them as 'kindred' people, while those in the north did not.³⁸ At the other extreme were the

³⁵ Gasietsiwe in *Bloemhof* Bluebook, 190.

³⁶ See, for example, the case of 'tribute' paid by Sechele to Sekgoma; Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, 51. See also Breutz, *Rustenburg*, 125. For the question as to whether or not ritual precedence was given the Hurutshe, and whether or not they were the senior of the Kwena lineage-cluster see *ibid.*, 51; Smith, *Diary*, II, 221 – 2; Stow, *Native Races*, 520 – 1; Holub, *Seven Years*, I, 327ff; Condor, 'Present condition...', 86; TNAD, Short History, 11 – 3; Brown, *Bantu Nomads*, 260 – 2; Breutz, *Ventersdorp*, 76, 113 – 9; *Marico*, 25 – 7.

³⁷ See, for example, Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 329-330; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 216, 384; Smith, *Diary*, I, 408; Holub, *Seven Years*, I, 389; Mackenzie, *Austral Africa*, I, 29; Ellenberger, *Basuto*, 265-6, 271; Breutz, *Rustenburg*, 68, 125; *Marico*, 108; *Ventersdorp*, 117.

³⁸ 'Le' (plural Ma) is the prefix for aliens, and 'Mo' (plural Ba) for kindred: see on this point Brown, *Bantu Nomads*, 24. For the condition of the Barwa/Masarwa and their situation relative to the Kgalagadi see, for example, Smith, *Diary*, I, 280; II, 187-8, 194-5, 202, 217.

‘Kgalagadi’, peoples who had previously been cattle-owners but who had been reduced to clientage when forced into the dry Kalahari.³⁹ In some cases the Kgalagadi groups appear to have maintained a degree of political coherence, so that their relationship with other Sotho-Tswana bordered on payment of tribute or even trade rather than clientage on an individual basis. Before they had lost their cattle, some Kgalagadi groups had clients of their own, and some managed to maintain such relationships.⁴⁰ A third amorphous group variously described as ‘Lala’, ‘Poor Bechuanas’, ‘poor Caffers’, and hardly separable from the continuum between the Kgalagadi and the Masarwa, were in perhaps the worst position. They did not have the ability of many Khoisan groups to evade the demands of their masters, not the political coherence to ensure reciprocal obligations.

The more privileged of these clients lived in the towns as domestic servants, or at the Cattle-stations as herders or batlanka.⁴¹

All the chiefs [headmen] maintain as many Men as their wealth will admit, to each of whom they assign the milk of one or two cows, which, with the efforts of the Man’s wife in gathering roots, wild fruit, locusts, and in the cultivation of a Garden, is generally sufficient to enable him to maintain his family.⁴²

In some cases, it would appear, such clients or retainers could in time gain entrance to the community: the head retainer of a Kwena chief, for example, is reported as exercising leadership over remnants of the community at the time of the *Difaqane*.⁴³ Others — perhaps the majority — of the clients did not live in the towns; in some cases they had left them, preferring a modicum of autonomy outside, and in many cases they may not have lived in large settlements at all.⁴⁴ ‘Every tribe,’ wrote Smith, ‘seems to have a class of poor who live on the outskirts of the nation and subsist entirely by hunting.’⁴⁵ Such clients

³⁹ For their earlier possession of cattle see, for example, Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, 55; Mackenzie, *Ten Years*, 128; Smith, *Diary*, I, 240, 407.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Schapera and Van Der Merwe, ‘Notes on the Bakgalagadi...’, 4, 148-154; Smith, *Diary*, II, 271.

⁴¹ Burchell, *Travels*, II, 267 claims that *molala* indicated a dependent of higher stature than *motlanka* (‘Muchunka’), but other evidence would suggest the reverse. On this term, and such person in the settlement in general, see Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 193; Burchell, *Travels*, 362; Philip, *Researches*, II, 141; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 331, 316; Casalis, *Basuto*, 188; Condor, ‘Present Condition...’, 89.

⁴² Hodgson and Archbell, March 31, 1827 [MMS: IV – 1827/11]. See also Burchell, *Travels*, II, 216, 247-8; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 214; Casalis, *Basuto*, 155 for the same practice. See further Brown, *Bantu Nomads*, 48.

⁴³ Smith, *Diary*, II, 207. See also Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 138; Mackenzie, *Ten Years*, 128; Schapera and Van der Merwe, ‘Notes on the Bakgalagadi...’, 2, 6.

⁴⁴ See, for example, Smith, *Diary*, I, 303, II, 173; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. I, XXIII.

⁴⁵ Smith, *Diary*, 174. Similar statements see *ibid.*, I, 296, 409; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 248, 383; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 67; *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XXIII, Thompson, *Travels*, 113; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II 167.

were compelled to bring all the produce of the hunt to their masters, retaining only a little meat for their subsistence. They were forbidden to wear *karosses* made with the furry skins of small animals: these were reserved for the chiefs and headmen. They could not wear ornaments. They could be called on to perform any services: carrying meat to the main settlement which had been hunted by their masters, tending the gardens. In exchanged they would receive protection of a sort, hunting dogs, tobacco, and old iron weapons; sometimes however their produce would be seized without payment.⁴⁶

It had recently been suggested that both clientage and large settlements among the Sotho-Tswana are connected with the existence of trade.⁴⁷ Such trade took various forms. In the first place there were, by the early nineteenth century at least, and probably considerably earlier, long-distance trade routes extending from the Portuguese settlements of Delagoa Bay and, possibly, Inhambane, westwards across the Highveld to the most distant Sotho-Tswana communities.⁴⁸ On the west coast, furthermore, the Ambo were linked with the Portuguese trade routes in Angola, and it must remain an open question as to whether goods from this direction had percolated to the Sotho-Tswana via Lake Ngami before 1800.⁴⁹ The major export along these trade routes was ivory, and the major import was beads. Secondly, there were various forms of internal trade for such commodities as iron, copper, *sibello* (a form of ochre used in decorating the body), as well as various manufactures: there was also a trade in *karosses*, particularly those suitable for chiefly wear.

Such trade certainly strengthened the political position of communities with access to resources. The power of the Hurutshe, for example, was due to their access to deposits of iron and, more particularly copper and various woods: iron and copper were traded as ore or in manufactured form, and carved wooden materials were traded also.⁵⁰ Similarly, south of the Molopo, the power of the Rolong in the eighteenth century and the Tlhap-

⁴⁶ See, amongst other, Burchell, *Travels*, II, 335, 386; Campbell, *Travels*, 20405; *Second Journey*, II, 67-8, 116; Lemue, October 15, 1831 [JDM, VII, 196-201]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 241, 278, 296, 308, 310; II, 173-4, 184-6, 199; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 80, 84, 125-6; *Missionary Labours*, Chs. I, XXIII; Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, 56; *Missionary Correspondence*, 37, 160, 191; *Family Letters*, I, 46, 170, 187; Casalis, *Basuto*, xv; Holub, *Seven Years*, I, 343-4; Mothibi in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 186.

⁴⁷ Monica Wilson in *Oxford History of South Africa*, I, 154-5, 179-181.

⁴⁸ See Legassick, 'The Sotho-Tswana...' in *African Societies*. I hope elsewhere to develop the evidence on such trade at more length.

⁴⁹ See, example, Vedder, *South West Africa*, 28, 107-8, 109-110, 157-8; Rolland, February 14, 1834 [JDM, IX, 271]. Rolland describes a journey by Hugh Millen in 1833 probably to the Waterberg district of the Transvaal, where a piece of water visited by the Portuguese, which could have been Lake Ngami or the Indian Ocean, was described to him.

⁵⁰ See, for example, Burchell, *Travels*, 399, 420; Campbell, *Travels*, 200, 203; *Second Journey*, I, 115, 119, 228, 244-5, 275-7. See also Edwards, July 22, 1802 [LMS 2/2/A]; Read, July 29, 1813 [LMS 5/2/D]. The Hurutshe also traded tobacco.

ing in the early nineteenth may well have been based on their access to resources of *sibello*. That, as Monica Wilson has suggested, the existence of trade controlled by the chief encourages the formation of compact large settlements, where community members have access to trade-goods, seems likely. For the same reasons, it would seem that such trade would encourage amalgamation of peoples and discourage fission.

The relation of trade to stratification in the community is less clear. Indeed clients were sometimes required to obtain ivory for their masters, and the obligation of even full community members to give one tusk of each elephant to the chief suggests that the transformation of clients to full members may have provided one means by which the community grew.⁵¹ The ivory trade, in other words, may have contributed to stratification as well as amalgamation. But since the major item provided by clients was pelts, the degree to which different communities had access to these needs to be more firmly established. It would appear that the Sotho-Tswana communities of the central Highveld were less stratified than those on the fringes of the Kalahari.⁵² This might imply simply that those near the Kalahari had a greater access to suitable clients, or that they did indeed trade a great deal in karosses. One might also speculate that at least a part of the client population had arrived in southern Africa with the knowledge of agriculture but without cattle, and, spread to the fringes as cattle-herding communities began to dominate the center, became eventually subordinated to the cattle-owners.⁵³

Apart from trading, the Sotho-Tswana economy showed a mixed dependence on herding, hunting, and agriculture. The rainy season fell between November and March, and the land would be ploughed and crops planted before this time and harvested towards the end of it, at a time depending on the rainfall. While crops were in the ground some activities were taboo: killing certain animals and cutting certain woods, for example.⁵⁴ It was after the harvest that the initiation ceremonies might be held, and that hunting, cattle-raiding, or long trading expeditions took place. Productive activity was specialized to a certain extent. Besides the more-or-less full-time administrators, and the practitioners of

⁵¹ For clients obtaining ivory, see for example Lemue, October 15, 1831 [JDM, VII, 196-201]; Schapera and Van der Merwe, 'Notes on the Bakgalagadi...', 3.

⁵² See, for example, Schapera, *Tswana*, 28, 37; *Praise Poems*, 31; Condor, 'Present Condition...', 89.

⁵³ Insofar as clients attempted to evade restrictions imposed on them, many chose to grow gardens rather than acquire herds, though doubtless the latter would have been harder. See for example, Smith, *Diary*, I 282-7, II, 199, 203. But see *ibid.*, 306-7; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 126. At least some of these clients were Katte or Vaalpens: see A. H. Keane, *Boer States*, 71-3 and footnote 11 above.

⁵⁴ See, for example, Burchell, *Travels*, II, 388; Kramer [LMS Journals 1/7]; Read, entries, January-March [LMS Journals 3/64]; Hamilton, entries November-December [LMS Journals 3/68]; Hamilton, entry October 30, 1820 [LMS Journals 3/75]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 199; Smith, *Diary*, I, 336, 394; Lemue, March 30, 1832 [JDM, VII, 367]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 39; Schapera, *Native Land Tenure*, 186ff, 243ff.

traditional medicine and rainmakers, blacksmiths were full-time professionals.⁵⁵ Hunting and cattle-herding was the exclusive occupation of the men, who were also responsible for making clothes from skins. The women did the bulk of the agricultural work, built the houses, and did the domestic chores, besides making pottery.⁵⁶ The extent to which the men participated either in agriculture or house-building varied in different areas and may possibly give an indication of the extent of Khoi influence on the community, for among the Khoi the houses were built exclusively by the women.⁵⁷

The Rolong, the Tlhaping and the Kora, 1700 – 1800

Driven from the Mosega area by the Hurutshe in about 1550, the Rolong moved southwards to establish themselves between the Molopo and the Orange. Already an autonomous community for a long time, as it would appear from their list of rulers, they were by the end of the eighteenth century one of the longest-lived Sotho-Tswana chiefdoms of whom we have record.⁵⁸ At first, it seems, they remained fairly close to the Molopo river, and it must be presumed that there were to the south of them other Bantu-speaking and mixed Bantu-Khoisan communities who had been forced towards the fringes at an earlier time. Towards the end of the seventeenth century the Rolong, perhaps as the long-distance trade network penetrated to their area, began to extend their hegemony over such groups, and under their famous chief Tau, (c.1700 – 1760), it is recorded, their 'power extended from the Bahurutsian mountains to the Hamhana hills, a distance of two hundred miles.'⁵⁹ Indeed Tau's martial prowess and ruthless state-building led one writer to call him 'this Barolong Chaka.'⁶⁰

About the Rolong state, its trade, and its relationships with subject communities, almost nothing appears to be known: such as has been written is chiefly legend or speculation. The Tlharo, an offshoot of the Hurutshe, were living to the south and west of the

⁵⁵ In some cases the chiefs themselves were rainmakers, but in other cases communities in better-watered districts would be called on to provide rainmakers in other areas: see, for example, S.S. Dornan, 'Rain Making in South Africa,' *Bantu Studies*, III (1927-9), 185-195.

⁵⁶ Edwards, July 22, 1802 (LMS 2/2/A); Borchers, *Memoir*, 125 – 7; Casalis, *Basuto*, 131-146, 131-146; Rolland, November 19, 1830 (JDM, VI, 131); Baillie, September 30, 1830 [LMS 12/1/C]; August 16, 1832 [LMS 13/2/D]; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 362 – 3, 397; Brown, *Bantu Nomads*, 49-51.

⁵⁷ See, for example, Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. VIII; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 146.

⁵⁸ For Rolong genealogies see Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 179; Fredoux, August 8, 1857 [JDM, XXXIII, 19]; Breutz, *Mafeking*, 26-7.

⁵⁹ Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XXIII. Stow, *Native Races*, 490-2 believed this referred to Tau's son Ratlou (i.e. Ra-Tlou) but other accounts do not confirm this.

⁶⁰ Matthews, 'Tshidi-Rolong,' 12.

Rolong by this time, but whether subject to them or not is uncertain.⁶¹ Some writers have assumed that the Tlhaping were also an autonomous group of this area subjected by the Rolong: it is equally if not more probable that they were a cluster of dispersed Bantu-Khoisan clients whose autonomy as a single chiefdom dates only from the disintegration of the Rolong state.⁶² By as early as the late seventeenth century the Rolong (or the Tlharo) were trading not only with the north, but with Khoi peoples to their south and east: to whites of the Colony there percolated information on iron, copper and beads which such Khoi obtained from the 'Briquas', the Khoi name for Sotho-Tswana.⁶³

More evidence exists, though of a confusing nature, on the disintegration of the Rolong state. At least three factors seem to have combined to lead, between 1750 and 1800, to the division of the area of Rolong hegemony among a number of separate chiefdoms. In the first place, the establishment of a colony of settlement at the Cape caused the retreat northwards and north-eastwards of a number of Khoi groups, who arrived on the lower and middle Orange between 1700-1750 to add to the population density in that area. A satisfactory analysis of this movement, and of the inter-relationships of the Khoi groups (Kora and Nama) who became established along the Orange valley, has yet to be made, nevertheless it is indisputable that some such groups had moved from the Cape,⁶⁴ and equally likely that others had never been in the Cape area.⁶⁵ By the late 1770's at least one of these groups, the Kei Kora, were settled in the area of the Vaal-Orange confluence.⁶⁶

At about the same time the Kwenamagopa chiefdom that had crossed the Marico river into the present Botswana in about 1650 underwent subdivision, resulting in the move

⁶¹ For the Tlharo see Breutz, *Kuruman*, 89-144, 225-234; *Vryburg*, 119-125. Their dispersal during the nineteenth century makes the reconstruction of their history difficult. See also Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 107-111; Smith, *Diary*, I, 388, 406-7.

⁶² For the most recent summary of the alternative view of the Tlhaping as a community with a lengthy period of autonomy, see Language, 'Herkoms en Geskiedenis...', 115-122. See also below, footnote 73.

⁶³ See particularly Saunders, 'Early Knowledge of the Sotho...', 60-6; Harrinck, 'Interaction between Xhosa and Khoi...', in Thompson (ed.), *African Societies*.

⁶⁴ The earliest statements of a Cape origin for Kora groups may be found in Arbousset, *Narrative*, 25; J. Edwards, December 16, 1836 [MMS: VII]; Edwards, *Reminiscences*, 109-111; Backhouse, *Narrative*, 393. For corroboration from other Kora not, apparently members of the Kei Kora (to which these testimonies refer) see Smith, *Diary*, II, 284 - 293; *Berlin Mission Berichte*, 1850, 212; Stow, *Native Races*, 275ff; Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 12-7 (which reports other earlier evidence and his own collected oral testimony). For attempts to link groups at the Cape with those on the Orange see Maingard, 'Korana History...', 110-4; Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 3-28.

⁶⁵ See, for example, C. F. Wuras, 'An Account of the Korana,' *Bantu Studies*, IV (1929), 290-1. This document, compiled by a missionary who worked among the 'Right Hand' Kora at Bethany from 1836 to 1858, was originally sent to Sir George Grey in 1858. See also Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 260; Smith, *Diary*, I 407.

⁶⁶ Wikar, *Journal*, 159.

towards the south (and hence towards the Rolong) of a chiefdom that became known as the Ngwaketse.⁶⁷ Within thirty years of this fission the Kwena-Magopa threw off another chiefdom, the Ngwato, which became as wealthy and powerful in northern Botswana as were the Ngwaketse in the south. It seems feasible to suppose that these splits were made possible by the tapping of resources of game and clients in the Kalahari, and that this involved competition with Rolong and in fact weakened their position in trade.⁶⁸ Also the same time, though whether as a consequence of the weakening of the Rolong state, or as an additional cause of it, some of the Rolong subject communities became restless.

Thus, though the chronology is uncertain, it appears that in the mid-eighteenth century the Rolong state was subject to pressure from two directions. From the north there was a challenge to the Rolong export of ivory, and in the south both the Kora and the subject communities made attacks on the Rolong, the Kora in order to obtain pasturelands for their increased numbers of cattle-herds, and the subject communities to escape the payment of tribute. It was claimed by the Kora during the land disputes of the 1870's that at this time Tau died, and Kora took occupation of his territory as far up the Vaal and Harts as Taungs; this story has gained currency through the writings of Stow and others.⁶⁹ But, as has since been demonstrated, the Kora did not occupy the Vaal higher than its confluence with Orange until probably towards the end of the century;⁷⁰ and though they may have defeated the Rolong in battle, the military balance between them and the Sotho-Tswana was relatively equal.⁷¹

'All the history of these kings which we could learn,' wrote Campbell in 1813 of the Tlhaping, 'was — That during the reign of Makkoshee [Makgosi], the Morolong asked from him the breast of every ox killed by his people, which would have been acknowledging dependence on him. He replied 'Am I then your servant?' The refusal caused a war, in which Makkoshee and his people were driven to three different places at considerable distances from each other.'⁷² This stereotype of a form of fission has been elaborated on

⁶⁷ See Schapera, 'Ngwaketse...', 1-2.

⁶⁸ See Lemue, February 28, 1834 [JDM, X, 26-7] for remarks on the movement of elephants in the Kalahari area in the rainy and dry seasons.

⁶⁹ See Mosweu Rijt Taaibosch in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 290 – 1; Lindley, *Adamantia*, 10-3. Also Stow, *Native Races*, 286-7; Theal, *History and Ethnography*, III, 350-2. See also Petrus Rooy, Johannes Links, Andries in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 291, 292, 298 and the comments on their evidence by Mahura and 'Booy' (Phoi?) in *ibid.*, 291, 298.

⁷⁰ See particularly Maingard, 'Studies in Korana History...', 114 – 6.

⁷¹ For the military balance see Wikar, *Journal*, 151; Barrow, *Travels*, I, 403 – 4.

⁷² Campbell, *Travels*, 194. See also Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XXIII: Moffat in *European Mail*, March 9, 1871 [*Bloemhof Bluebook*, 345 – 6]; Mankurwane in *ibid.*, 301; Stow, *Native Races*, 437 – 440, 490 – 2; Theal, *History and Ethnography*, III, 344; Brown, *Bantu Nomads*, 205 – 8; Language, 'Herkoms en Geskiedenis...', 121 – 2; Breutz, *Kuruman*, 155 – 7, 198. Stow and others, apparently following Mankurwane, assert that it was under Maswe rather than Makgosi that the Tlhaping seceded.

by others who have written the history of the Tlhaping. But despite the lengthy Tlhaping genealogy which has been formulated by successive writers since Campbell, it appears probable that the rise of the Tlhaping to autonomy at about the time of the Kora raids and the Ngwaketse fission should be explained more in terms of the gathering together of clients and subject communities.⁷³ This could have been possibly, as Breutz believed, under a Rolong-derived ruling lineage, or it could have been through the rise of one lineage of the subjects to power.

What is the evidence for this? Firstly, the name 'Tlhaping' (a derogatory name 'fish-eaters', which food was taboo for the Sotho-Tswana, and was eaten by people in a time of famine) is a term more likely to be applied to a *class* of people than a chiefdom. Secondly, the traditions of the Tlhaping record a series of sites which they occupied after their separation from the Rolong and before they came together in the Langeberg in the 1770's: the latter Griquatown, Dikgatlong, east of the Vaal, and so on.⁷⁴ These were more likely to have been occupations by separate groups than successive occupations by one group. Thirdly, the traditions gathered by Breutz include a number of different 'sections' of the Tlhaping who separate from the Rolong, suggesting again that these gathered under one chiefdom only later.⁷⁵ Fourthly, the rise to autonomy of such a collection of clients was possible, as is indicated by somewhat later case of the Thamaga or Tsatsing. These, clients of the Tlhaping in the closing years of the eighteenth century, were allowed to join in cattle-raiding and retain a part of the booty, and by 1805 formed an autonomous community.⁷⁶

As a result of these events, the Rolong territory fell under hegemony of a number of different groups. In the south and south-west were the Kora, Tlharo and Tlhaping, while the Rolong themselves after the death of Tau moved northwards to settle again around

⁷³ For Tlhaping genealogies see Campbell, *Travels*, 193 – 4, *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 108; Mackenzie, *Austral Africa*, I, 43; Stow, *Native Races*, 437. Also Language, 'Herkoms en Geskiedenis...', 132 – 2; Breutz, *Vryburg*, 23 – 4, 25a. For the name 'Phuduhudutswana,' for the Tlhaping, relating them to the *steenbok* and first used as an apical ancestor by Mackenzie, see Read, May 20, 1817 [LMS 7/2/A]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 33.

⁷⁴ Besides the sources in footnote 70, see for this Moletu in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 53; and the important, but confused, descriptions of these events in Smith, *Diary*, I, 396, 406-7, II, 267-8.

⁷⁵ See Breutz, *Kuruman*, 38, 149-224 *passim*; *Vryburg*, 161-177. For other evidence of the situation of the Tlhaping as mixed Bantu-Khoisan type clients, particularly on their linguistic and physical affinities, see for example Smith, *Diary*, I, 358, 388, II, 267; Mosweu Taaibosch in Lindley, *Adamantia*, 10-3; Molema, *Bantu*, 38; Breutz, *Kuruman*, 154; *Mafeking*, 24; *Vryburg*, 16, 22-3; Stow, *Native Races*, 488-9; Warren, *On the Veldt*, 42. See also Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 330; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 384; Mothibi in Read, entry March 22 [LMS Journals 3/64].

⁷⁶ Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 289, II, 6 – 7; Moffat; *Apprenticeship*, 126; *Missionary Labours*, Ch. I. See also Smith, *Diary*, I, 396; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 324; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 275; Campbell, *Travels*, 201, 215; Mooi in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 134.

the headwaters of the Molopo.⁷⁷ It is possible that their move northwards was not only induced by the increased pressures from the south, but also an attempt to regain the trading position which had been challenged by the Ngwaketse. Judging by the disputes which racked the Rolong for the next several decades, the attempt was not successful. Though the Rolong remained a single community until the death of Tau's son Ratlou of smallpox, and possibly until the death of Ratlou's heir Seitshiro, fission took place after this. Within a short time at least five Rolong communities had established themselves separately: the Rolong-Mariba, the Rolong-Ratlou, the Rolong-Tshidi, the Rolong-Seleka, and the Rolong-Rapulana. Despite the efforts of Makgetla, a son of Tau, to hold the Rolong together, the forces of conflict were too great. The Rolong-Seleka, followed by the Rolong-Rapulana moved south eastward from the Molopo to establish themselves at Thabeng, near Klerksdorp, where they came into conflict with the Kwena-Fokeng chiefdoms of that area.⁷⁸ The Rolong-Ratlou became established at Khunwana, and the Rolong-Tshidi somewhat further to the north-west Phitsane, both on parts of the Molopo River.⁷⁹

The Tlhaping, meanwhile, had gathered at Nocuning in the Langeberg.⁸⁰ Here they and such other communities who remained in the southern parts of the area of Rolong hegemony developed close relationships with the Kora who were settled along the Orange. By the late 1770's on the Orange near Kheis were a people termed by Wikar the 'Gyzikoa', or 'Twin-folk', a Sotho-Tswana and Kora mixture.⁸¹ Maswe, the Tlhaping chief at this time, took a Kora wife, and though she was only the third wife, it was in fact his son by her, Molehabangwe, who succeeded Maswe.⁸² Such intermarriage between Tlhaping royals and Kora continued, and one must presume that it was widespread, if not more

⁷⁷ For Rolong history during this period see particularly Stow, *Native Races*, 490 – 4, TNAD, *Short History*, 8 – 9; Molema, *Bantu*, 40; Brown, *Bantu Nomads*, 217; Matthews, 'Tshidi Rolong...', 12-3; Molema, *Moroka*, 1-5; *Montshiwa*, 4-10; Breutz, *Mafeking*, 31, 101-4; 184-6, 260-2. Also Smith, *Diary*, I, 407; II, 25; *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 91, 135, 138, 144, 170, 264.

⁷⁸ See particularly Stow, *Native Races*, 503-5; Molema, *Moroka*, 4-7. For these Kwena-Fokeng chiefdoms see also Breutz, Ventersdorp, 74-9; 111-121.

⁷⁹ See, besides the references in footnote 75, Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 325; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 375; Campbell, *Travels*, 201; *Second Journey*, I, 293-309.

⁸⁰ See particularly Maingard, 'The Brikwa and the Ethnic Origins of the Bathlaping,' *SAJS*, XXX, (1933), 597-602. Also Mahura and Gert Molehabangwe in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 281, 289.

⁸¹ See Wikar, *Journal*, 30-1, 142-7, 156-7; also Engelbrecht in *ibid.*, 222-4.

⁸² See Mosweu Taaibosh in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 291. Also Stow, *Native Races*, 440; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 171. Molehabangwe and his half-Kora son and successor Mothibi also had Kora wives, as did Mothibi's brother Mahura rather later: see Burchell, *Travels*, II, 258; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 117-8; Thompson, *Travels*, 92fn; Kuruman missionaries, July 2, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]; Ross, May 14, 1845 [LMS 21/1/A]; Breutz, *Kuruman*, 38, 161. There are differences of opinion, however, as to whether Mahutu or Kogogile, of Mothibi's wives, was Kora, and as to which was the 'chief' wife: see also Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 17fn; Campbell, *Travels*, 187-8, 189, 194; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 342, 348, 357; Stow, *Native Races*, 458.

so, among other members of the Tlhaping.⁸³ In the Langeberg in 1820, Campbell met two Kora chiefs of communities living interspersed with the Tlharo who spoke of joining with the Tlhaping and Tlharo in commandos in earlier times.⁸⁴ The settlement of Patanie, which fell under Tlhaping hegemony in the 1795-1820 period, was mixed Tlharo and Kora.⁸⁵ As time went on, and the Kora moved north-west to the Vaal and Harts Rivers, this inter-mixing continued: Kora had Sotho-Tswana living as subordinates in their communities and vice versa.⁸⁶

The Kora, furthermore, became more firmly attached to the trade-routes which linked the Sotho-Tswana communities together. The Sotho-Tswana (probably the Tlhaping) reported Wikar, 'come each year' to the Kora of the Orange,

...bringing with them tobacco, ivory spoons, bracelets, copper and iron beads, glass beads, copper earrings and bracelets, knives, barbed assegais, and also smooth axes and awls. This is the way they trade: for a heifer they give eight assegais, an axe and awl, a small bag of tobacco and a small bag of dagga, and for a bull or an ox, five assegais plus all the other things as for a heifer. They also bring soft, well tanned skins of hartebeest with the grain removed...⁸⁷

Such exchange of cattle for the manufactures of the Sotho-Tswana (as well as for *sibello* ochre), continued. Lichtenstein reported how the Sotho-Tswana obtained their pack-oxen and riding-oxen almost entirely from the Kora, who were skilled in the training of such animals.⁸⁸ Despite the impact of the southern frontier, which reoriented the network of trade, such exchanges were still continuing in 1820.⁸⁹

Along the southern fringes of Sotho-Tswana settlement, therefore, there was towards the end of the eighteenth century an area of cultural interaction. It is to be presumed that such Khoisan-Bantu interaction had been a constant feature as Sotho-Tswana numbers had increased and their area of settlement had spread. The increased density of Khoi settlement on the middle-Orange by the last part of the eighteenth century, however, made for more intense interaction and mutual acculturation. This situation did not remain undisturbed for long. Before the end of the century, in fact, the southern frontier society of the Cape, before which some of the Khoi of the Orange had retreated, made its impact

⁸³ See, for example, Burchell, *Travels*, 343, 398; Campbell, *Travels*, 218; and compare Smith, *Diary*, I, 270. See also Brown, *Bantu Nomads*, 206; Chapman, *Travels*, I, 127.

⁸⁴ Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 88ff, 125 – 8. Compare Mosweu Taaibosch in Lindley, *Adamantia*, 10 – 2.

⁸⁵ See, for example, Burchell, *Travels*, II, 376, 386.

⁸⁶ See, for example, Kay, June 20, 1821 [MMS: I – 1821/21]; Broadbent, entries January – February, 1823 [MMS: II – 1823/5]. Also Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 77 – 9.

⁸⁷ Wikar, *Journal*, 149.

⁸⁸ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 253–4.

⁸⁹ Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 274–6, 349.

on the area of Khoi-Bantu interaction. The Kora were the first to suffer, but when some Kora themselves joined in raids on the Tlhaping in the Langeberg, the latter retreated to establish themselves on the Kuruman River. It is with the evolution of this frontier society in the South that the following chapter is concerned.

2 The Evolution of a Frontier Society, 1700 – 1775

By 1700 the refreshment and provision station which had been established in 1652 by the Dutch East India Company (DEIC) in the extreme south-western corner of the African continent had evolved into a colony. It was, to be sure, a colony of minute size and uncertain future, but in the preceding fifty years a number of social and cultural patterns of lasting significance had been established. By 1700 the 'social interactions released by the [first] movement of...colonization were beginning to reach a state of relative equilibrium.'¹ In the next three generations, however, a second expansion of white settlement would occur, to be followed by a second period of stabilization which would entrench similar patterns over a much vaster area. It is the intention in this chapter to examine the 'social interactions released' by the second movement of colonization, the movement of pastoral farmers out of the enclosed area of the western Cape towards the Fish and Orange Rivers. The succeeding chapter will discuss the initial attempts by governments of the colony, DEIC, Batavian and British, to restabilize the social relationships which had developed and the emergence of a third zone of social interaction. But as an introduction some aspects of the patterns established in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope by 1700 will be examined.

The transformation of the Cape refreshment station into a colony occurred, it is commonly recognized, through the Company decision to release officials to become 'free burghers.' The growing strategic significance of the Cape was one factor in this decision, but more important was the inability of the Company to grow sufficient crops to satisfy the *raison d'être* of the station, supplies for passing ships. Thus from 1657 officials became free burghers, and from 1679 until early the following century immigrant colonists arrived in substantial numbers, mostly Dutch and German but with a leavening of French Huguenots. The rapidity with which this free burgher community acquired a self-consciousness has been exaggerated by those who have traced the pedigree of Afrikaner nationalism; nevertheless its members had, by the turn of the century, 'sufficient spirit and sufficient confidence in their own position to fight vigorously for their rights as free agriculturalists when these were being trampled upon by an unscrupulous governor.'²

¹ I. D. MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 84-5. The historical chapters of this work have been heavily relied on, though sometimes reinterpreted, in this chapter; they are the most useful analytical study. See also Isobel Edwards, *Towards Emancipation*; V. de Kock, *Those in Bondage*; M. Whiting Spilhaus, *South Africa in the Making, 1652-1806*.

² MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 85-8.

By 1700 there was not only a colony in existence, but a particular type of colony: a society of slave-owners. The decision of the DEIC to import slaves for the use of the free burghers as well as for itself produced a society in which, in the words of Van Imhoff, 'every common or ordinary European becomes a gentleman and prefers to be served rather than serve.'³ At first it was quite possible for these slaves or their offspring (many of whom were part-white) to gain freedom and social incorporation in the Colony by conversion to Christianity; indeed a certain obligation towards conversion was recognized by the whites. But as the number of slave-owners increased, so did their vested interest in preventing the freeing of their slaves. If baptism was to be the precondition of freedom, then the baptism of slave must cease. This was indeed what occurred until it came to be assumed that the condition of the slaves — and, indeed, of Khoi dependents who fulfilled much the same role — was a natural one. More and more, 'Christian' came to be equated with 'white': a community which had extended membership on criteria of religion came instead to insist on criteria of colour.⁴ When, in the late eighteenth century, the Evangelical revival brought renewed concern for the conversion of slaves and Khoi, there was little question among the colonists that this entailed an alteration in the status of either dependent group.

A third feature of the colony has been given less attention. The transformation of the refreshment station into a colony occurred essentially at the expense of destroying the cordial relations with the Khoi community which had existed to that point. It is highly significant that the first two wars between the Company and the Khoi broke out after attempts to settle free burghers on previously Khoi-occupied land. Indeed, even as the site near Rondebosch was being surveyed in 1657 for the first colonists, the Goringhaiqua, 'hearing us talk of building houses here and there...asked us, if we built houses, and broke up the ground which they observed to be our intention, where should they live? (for they now lay just on the spot chosen by some freemen).'⁵ The second war occurred, between 1672 and 1677, when an extension of settlement to Hottentots-Holland was attempted. And, besides the seizure of land, the establishment of the colony coincided with Company attempts to trade directly with Khoi groups more to the interior. This usurpation of the middleman role of the Khoi in closest touch with the settlement began a process of destruction of the Khoi trading system which would eventually leave them almost without property.

³ Baron Van Imhoff, in 1743, from *The Reports of Chavonnes and His Council* (VRS, I, 1918), 136-7.

⁴ MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 31-3, 41-6, 74-80; S. Patterson, *Colour and Culture in South Africa*, 23, 25, 171-2; V. De Kock, *Those in Bondage*, 15, 48, 192, 219; Marais, *Maynier*, 112-3; Van der Merwe, *Die Trekboer*, 256 and references.

⁵ MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 28, 33-8, 46-9, 60-2. The quotation is from Van Riebeeck's Journal, February 20, 1657.

Nursing these grievances, many of the Khoi continued to wage resistance to the colony for so long as they were able. Not was the Company able to formulate an adequate response. Militarily weak, in urgent need of bartering the Khoi cattle (until the emergence of the pastoral colonist produced a new source of cattle-supply), the Company officials needed to maintain friendly relations with Khoi groups. Thus the response of Van Riebeeck to the Khoi complaints of land seizure was that 'they might live under our protection, and that there was room enough everywhere for them to graze their cattle.'⁶ As they traded their cattle faster than the cattle could reproduce, the Khoi attempted to incorporate themselves in the colony society as dependents of white farmers. But to the Khoi, full incorporation in the colony society was even less possible than for the slaves. To the differences of religion were added the fear of the colonists that the land they had seized and the society they had constructed might be wrested from them should the Khoi become incorporated into the society. Hence sprang the futile gesture of the wild-almond hedge to 'separate' the colony from the Khoi. And hence the increasingly ludicrous maintenance by the Company of the fiction that the small Khoi groups, deprived of their land, deprived of their role in trade, deprived of their cattle, and (in 1663, 1665, 1713, 1755, 1767)⁷ decimated by the white man's diseases, were 'free and independent' entities with whom relations could be established by negotiation and treaty. Bound to the mercantile economy of the Cape yet denied participation in its society, clinging to their traditional political structures and modes of action while the basis of these was undermined, the Khoi were the first victims of the colonization of South Africa. That this should have been the case was a consequence of colonization by conquest. That such was the case would have an effect on the development of social and cultural patterns as least as powerful and long-lasting as that produced by the existence of slave-holding.

But if in the colony's social structure in 1700 there were tendencies towards exclusiveness, towards a society in which political participation was denied not only to non-Christians but to men of colour, and in which the only role seen appropriate for slaves or Khoi was as economic dependents, the range of possible futures had not been completely closed. There had, during the seventeenth century, emerged a class of freed and 'acculturated' slaves and persons of mixed 'racial' descent who could have provided a social base for the growth of a society whose divisions were not based on colour. At the time of Van Riebeeck's visit in 1685 it was laid down that slaves of mixed descent could achieve freedom as of right when adult, and that they should be trained in useful occupations 'so that in

⁶ Journal of Van Riebeeck, February 20, 1657 [Quoted in MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 28-9].

⁷ See Wagenaar's Memorandum, September 24, 1666 in Moodie, *The Record*, I, 293-4; F. Valentyn, *Beschryving...*, V, 51-2; C. Thunberg, *Travels*, I, 120; Engelbrecht in Wikar, *Journal*, 231.

time the whole country may be handed over to the same, together with its cultivation, for which they are better fitted than any one else, since, born in these parts, grown up in its service, having understanding and physical strength, the Hon. Company would have no better subjects.’⁸ Simon van der Stel, the Governor most closely associated with the emergence of a colony at the Cape, was indeed himself of mixed descent.

It would seem that Van Rhee de envisaged the ‘half-breeds’ as on the one hand a buffer group, to be settled with land on the fringes of the colony and thus protect it from groups outside, and on the other hand as an agency through whom the assimilation of whites, freed slaves and acculturated Khoi might proceed and encourage the formation of a homogeneous society. Some of the factors inhibiting such a course, a course almost identical to that which would be advocated by John Philip for the Griqua, have already been outlined. A related factor was the changing social attitude towards inter-racial marriage or even irregular unions of varying degrees of permanence. From the establishment of the refreshment station until well into the nineteenth century white men at the Cape outnumbered white women, creating strong pressures towards miscegenation.⁹ In addition, of course, slave men outnumbered slave women, creating the same pressures towards unions between slave men and Khoi women. From this point of view the dispatch of young white female orphans to the Cape in 1662 might be viewed as an event as significant for the shaping of the social structure of the Colony as the introduction of free burghers and slaves or the seizure of Khoi land. For, white women being present, the closure of the society which was promoted by slave-holding and the fear of the Khoi was naturally introduced into the basic institution of marriage.

In the early years of the settlement miscegenation was extensive. Three-quarters of the children born to slave mothers at the Cape by 1671 were ‘half-breeds’.¹⁰ Slave or ‘half-breed’ women, in particular, could find it easy to gain entrance to the Christian community for themselves (by marriage) or their children (if their unions were irregular), just as Khoi women, if they wished, could gain some status by unions with slave men. Indeed even through the eighteenth century interracial marriages continued. A survey of the marriage records of one of the colony’s oldest churches has shown that the incidence of mixed marriages from 1700-1795 remained consistent at 10% and this neglects unions which were irregular but permanent.¹¹ But the law, and customary sanctions, began

⁸ Journal of H. A. Van Rhee de, 357-8 [Cape Archives, 38] [Quoted in MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 76-7]. See also S. Patterson, *Colour and Culture*, 172.

⁹ As Sheila Patterson points out, ‘the relatively few European Women were not so likely to risk their higher social status and economic position for the sake of casual, much less permanent, intercourse with slaves or the despised Hottentots.’ (*Colour and Culture*, 18).

¹⁰ MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 45.

¹¹ See the useful anonymous article, ‘The origin and incidence of miscegenation at the Cape during the

to prevent this. It was, surprisingly enough, the enlightened Van Rhee de who in 1685 forbade marriage between colonist and slaves of full colour, even if they were freed and Christian. Thereafter, increasingly, the children of irregular or casual unions with persons of full colour tended to remain in their mother's group rather than entering, as before, the colonial community in the right of their father. In the colonial community a hierarchy of status developed: the colonist whose wife was born of colonial parents at the Cape, the colonist with an emancipated slave wife, the colonist with a wife of mixed union (legal or not). Overlapping the bottom end of this hierarchy were emancipated slave men married perhaps to colonial women, but more often to emancipated slaves or women of mixed parentage. The new generations of 'half-breeds', 'quarter-breeds', etc. might move more fully into the colonial community, but more often they were forced into marriage among themselves and hence into an ambivalently situated social community of their own.

The Evolution of a New Society in the Interior, 1700 – 1775

Through the eighteenth century the patterns which were dominant in the western Cape in 1700 continued to stabilize themselves. In Capetown itself the social tone was set by the often-corrupt Company officials, the only group retaining close ties with Europe and affecting a dubiously cosmopolitan style. Around them in the town were the colonial lodging-house keepers and the traders with their slaves, and the skilled artisans, mainly slaves and usually from the East Indies. In the western districts within fifty and a hundred miles of the capital were settled corn and wine farms, the bulk of their work performed by slaves. The growing community of mixed descent of the eighteenth century was increasingly divided between those who gained admittance to colonial society and those called 'Afrikanders, a growing class, who were household slaves and often the confidants of their masters and mistresses, permanent family servants and almost members of the family.'¹² Or, as will be seen, these socially marginal persons had moved to the interior of the country.

For, by the end of the eighteenth century, the plural society of the western Cape was only a part of the colony. In the interior, over the mountains which ringed the western settlement, there had developed an almost separate, but also plural society that was a distinctly 'South African' product. The precondition for this diaspora from the western Cape was the end of armed resistance by the Khoi communities who had surrounded

Dutch East India Company's regime, 1652-1795, *Race Relations Journal*, XX (1953), 2, 23-7. For the number of marriages by German settlers with light-skinned halfbreed slaves see Hoge, 'Personalalia of Germans at the Cape, 1652-1806,' *Archives Year Book*, 1946.

¹² E. Walker, *History of Southern Africa* (1962), 84.

the settlement. By 1700, this was more or less achieved. In 1717, the Landrost of Stellenbosch could write that the Khoi 'danger' was so slight that there was no need for Khoi kraals but for isolated families for two or three hundred miles around the Cape.¹³ Their communities decimated by smallpox and venereal disease, their cattle gone, many form the Khoi groups who had inhabited the colony area had already died or become destitute dependents of the colony agriculturalists. To the north and east, indeed, were other Khoi communities, wealthy still and politically intact, but in time the majority of these would suffer the same fate. Along the coastal land both whites and refugee Khoi pressed on the pastures of the outlying Khoi groups. The network of trade which had extended from the southern Nguni and the Sotho-Tswana through the Khoi to the western Cape was slowly demolished by the new trade system oriented towards the Capetown market.¹⁴ Slowly the cattle resources of the Khoi were depleted by trade and raiding. By the end of the century it was only the Khoi along the Orange, those generically known as Nama and Kora, many of whom had retreated before the advance of the colony frontier who could be said to have retained their economy and polity intact. Other fragmented Khoi groups sought refuge in less hospitable and less desirable areas, perhaps buttressing their claims to territory by the acquisition of a Company 'staff of office' for their chief. In the east and in the north, as Khoi, Bantu-speakers, San, white farmers and the products of frontier miscegenation and acculturation were pressed more closely together, new culturally and ethnically mixed political units came into existence: in the east that under the leadership of the runaway slave Ruiter, for example.¹⁵ At the end of the eighteenth century, by far the majority of the Khoi were in the service of white farmers, economically a part of the colony but lacking any political or social incorporation.¹⁶

Free burghers had begun to turn from agriculture to the more profitable pastoralism even before the end of the seventeenth century. But it was predominantly after 1700 that the limits of the seventeenth-century colony were broken. Disillusioned with the precarious agriculture of the western Cape, attracted by the need of the Company for cattle and the unbounded pastures of the interior, no longer faced with Khoi resistance, resentful at the corrupt governorship of the younger Van der Stel, the colonists moved

¹³ St 288: Minuut Afgaande Brieven, August 3, 1717; C.516: Uitgaande Brieven: Kaapse Regering -Here XVII, February 25, 1726 [Quoted in Van der Merwe, *Trekboer*, 143]. See also MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 80-3.

¹⁴ For this trading network, see Gerrit Harrinck, 'Interaction Between Xhosa and Khoi; Emphasis on the Period c. 1620-1750,' in Thompson (ed.), *Forgotten Factor*.

¹⁵ See A. Sparrman, *Voyage*, II, 15ff; Marias, *Maynier*, 6; Campbell, *Travels*, 86-7; W. Paterson, *Narrative*, 85.

¹⁶ Cf. C461: Inkomende Brieven: Mentz-Goewerneur, February 22, 1769 [Quoted in Van der Merwe, *Trekboer*, 144].

overbergh to the north and east to herd cattle, hunt the abundant game, and raid the indigenous inhabitants. Defying the continual attempts by the Company to impose limits on their movement, just as they had always ignored the edicts against cattle-trading with the Khoi, they spread within three generations as far as the Fish River in the east and the Orange River in the north. The momentum of expansion was preserved by the demand of each adult for at least one 6000-acre 'loan farm' registered with the government; but the direction and speed of movement were shaped by both climate factors and the mood of the indigenous inhabitants. Along northern border, San kept the farmers back by stealing cattle encroaching on their ancestral lands. The white farmers replied with a vicious campaign of extermination which came to halt only at the turn of the century; only when more peaceful relations were established could northward expansion begin again.¹⁷ And, by the last quarter of the eighteenth century the frontiersmen had come into contact with the relatively dense settlements of agricultural Bantu-speaking people both between the Fish and Sunday Rivers and in the region of the Orange.

The rapidity of the expansion of settlement, the different environment of the interior, and the inability the colonial society to extend its institutions and *mores* systematically to the interior meant, of course, that the diaspora entailed a cultural as well as a geographical separation. Much attention has been devoted by South African historians to the emergence of this 'frontier society.' But the search by Afrikaner historians for the emergence of an Afrikaner community, and the search by liberal historians for the origins and history of white racialism have resulted in an over-simplification of the qualities of the 'frontier society', a projection into the past of contemporary attitudes and values which obscure the possible options open to the society. The over-simplification has resulted from three incorrect perceptions. Firstly, of course, attention has been devoted exclusively to the white frontiersmen at the expense of non-whites who became an integral part of the frontier society. Secondly, although it is recognized that 'there had emerged in the interior or the country...a new kind of society clearly distinguished from the older, more settled, slave-owing, corn-and-wine farming community...[with] a distinctive mode of life and point of view,' it is assumed that this was forged 'under frontier conditions...in a more intense struggle either against the forces of nature or of man or of both than is usually the case with a more firmly established society.'¹⁸ In fact it is pure romanticism to suppose that the 'struggle' on the frontier is any more intense than in 'settled society'. Furthermore the suggestion that relations of the whites with non-whites were purely those of struggle

¹⁷ See Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 13-25; Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, Chapters II-V.

¹⁸ MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 125; MacCrone, 'The Frontier Tradition and Race Attitudes in South Africa,' *Race Relations Journal*, XXVIII (1961), 3, 24-5.

neglects elements of cooperation and acculturation and implies wrongly that the 'distinctive mode of life' emerged in a cultural vacuum. Finally, it would be most surprising if over the wide area of the diaspora, so thinly settled by whites, there should have emerged such a self-conscious and cohesive community as many have suggested. No doubt among an element of the whites, particularly those of the east and north-east, the dominant ethos was, as described by MacCrone,

...a consciousness of race and social supremacy which coincided almost uniformly with the distinctions based upon creed and colour. Christianity and skin-colour, membership of a particular group and social superiority, became so closely associated with one another that any one by itself could serve as a criterion of group membership. And conversely the absence of any one of these carried with it the stigma of religious, social and racial inferiority which almost automatically excluded the individual so distinguished from membership of the group. The group had, in fact, become, to all intents and purposes, a kind of caste into which the individual was born, or from which he was excluded as the result of the same accident.¹⁹

But was this ethos quite as entrenched as MacCrone would have us believe? Was it as universal? In MacCrone's study the question is conveniently evaded in a section entitled 'frontier slums and border ruffians.' These are the people whose relationship with Khoi, Bastards and Bantu-speakers was closest, those who showed 'a steady deterioration in their behaviour and an estrangement from any religion of whatever kind...[so that] without a doubt their descendants will have to be placed on the same footing as the heathen.'²⁰ These, in short, were the group who were most advanced in the elaboration of a 'distinctive mode of life and point of view' which has been described as the characteristic of frontier society. Naturally the Company officials and eighteenth century travelers would have disparaged this group, as they disparaged the Khoi and other non-whites, but they cannot be neglected by the historian. Particularly in the north-west, where we read of those such as Willem van Wyk who 'in every way behaved and clothed himself like a Hottentot' and where as early as 1679 three colonists had had to be recovered by force from living with the Khoi of Gonnema, the ethos of the frontier society was different.²¹ This applied also in

¹⁹ MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 130-1. See generally *ibid.*, 98-101, 125-136. See also, for example, Van der Merwe, *Trekboer*, 256; S. Patterson, *Colour and Culture*, 173.

²⁰ J. W. Cloppenburg, *Annotatien en Remarques*, Cape Archives 95 [Quoted in MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 116]. See generally *ibid.*, 109-118; Moodie, *Saxon Nomads*, 36; Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 301. Also Walker, *History*, 99 and refs.

²¹ [50 of 1835, 15]; P.L. Scholtz, 'Die Historiese Ontwikkeling van die Onder-Olifantsrivier, 1660-1902 ...', *Archives Year Book*, II 1996, 36-39fn; MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 52, 115; Barrow, *Travels*, 384. MacCrone mentions also one Herman Remajenne, who in 1659-1660 was assisting the Khoi, with whom he was trading, against the colonists. Remajenne would qualify as a 'border ruffian', like Coenraad Buys or Frederick Bezuidenhout, both of whom had Khoi wives (and Buys a number of others), Buys, significantly, had had a baptized Bastard named G. Coetzee living with him on his farm for six years prior to 1793 (Marais, *Maynier*, 31).

other isolated areas of the frontier zone: the Cedarberg and Outeniqualand for example, as well as on the outer fringes around the Fish and Orange Rivers. At the least we must recognize a greater degree of deviance among white frontiersmen than has commonly been asserted, representing a society more disparate in ethos, in wealth and status than has often been painted.

The diversity of response which existed was a direct result of conflicting pressures on the frontiersman. Far from being an isolated subsistence farmer, he was subject to cultural influences from both the Cape Colony and the indigenous inhabitants. When the free burghers turned pastoralist, indeed, 'the layout of their homes shrank to a couple of rooms, their personal belongings to what they could carry in their wagons, their libraries to a single Bible.'²² But still the common heritage with the settled society of the western Cape was not entirely lost, for the links with that society were by no means entirely broken. Only by the sale of cattle and other products (notably the ivory and skins which they hunted or traded) could the men of the frontier acquire the guns, powder and wagons with which they could engage on rather more than equal terms with indigenous enemies. Only by traveling to Capetown or the surrounding villages to register their farms, to marry, to baptize children, to attend the quarterly *Nachtmaal* could they ensure that the colony government would legitimize and safeguard their continued existence in the interior. But it was the very frailty of these ties which fostered the development of new ways of life. Both formal education — socialization into 'Western culture', that is — and the institutional church, which was the major purveyor of such culture, fell into abeyance in the interior. A recent study of local history by an Afrikaner historian writes rather defensively that 'in the almost five hundred eighteenth-century archive-files which I covered, I found few instances where the people of the Olifantsrivier could not write their names. Indeed, the majority wrote their letters themselves although the effort was in most instances pitiful.'²³ In fact, in this area, the only schooling was provided by such meagerly-educated itinerants who could be persuaded to attach themselves to a farm, and in the absence of any visit by a *predikant* during the century, contacts with organized religion were maintained only through hardly-exercised membership in the Swartland church.²⁴

Nor did the new ways of life of the frontier evolve in a vacuum. The white colonists were moving into areas which had traditionally been inhabited by the Khoi (and the San) and, partly by similar adaptation to environment and partly through direct acculturation 'were compelled to adopt a semi-nomadic, pastoral way of life which was not so

²² S. Patterson, *Colour and Culture*, 19-20.

²³ P.L. Scholtz, '*Historiese Ontwikkeling...*', 51.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 47-51.

entirely different from that of the Hottentots whom they displaced.²⁵ In their houses made of matting, and in their folk medical practices in particular, the white colonists owed a great debt to the Khoi. One must imagine that in the case of physical disorders, and even more in the case of mental illness which seems to have been especially prevalent among the white women, that resort was frequently made to Khoi medical practitioners. And, though it would be hard to find evidence, it seems highly probable that the gaps in cultural transmission from the colony were filled by a greater interest in Khoi folktales, mythology, and religion.²⁶

Even the social, political and military institutions of the white frontiersmen differed from those of the Khoi more in form than content. A close anthropological examination of the patriarchal family structure of the white colonist, extended to kinsmen on nearby farms, each of which had a cluster of non-white dependents, might reveal close similarities to the loosely-structured political units of the Khoi.²⁷ To what extent, indeed, was the *veldkorporaal* or *veldwagmeester* the leader of group composed largely of kin rather than an appointed official? Certainly, as with the Khoi, the main activity which was pursued in a fashion requiring communal leadership was the commando: the Khoi chief's authority, like that of the *veldkorporaal*, was predominantly military. Beyond that, like the Khoi chief, the *veldkorporaal* could exercise a measure of judicial authority in setting local disputes over land, etc. One would not, perhaps, be able to carry this comparison too far or into too much detail. But the overall point remains, that the white frontier community consisted of numerous separate local units, that its major institution (the commando) had evolved from local exigencies and was almost completely separated from the military institutions of the Cape colony itself, and that the authority which the local official derived from his local election or appointment was far greater than handed down to him from above.²⁸

To complete this picture of the elements and way of life of frontier society it remains to consider the non-white elements of it. If there was, within the white community, a cultural continuum embracing varying degrees of the culture of the colony and of that of

²⁵ S. Patterson, *Colour and Culture*, 19-20. See also Patterson, *Narrative*, 47; Le Vaillant, *New Travels*, I, 45 who speaks of 'the Hottentots, whose customs they [the frontier farmers] have adopted, and from whom they in no respect differ but in their complexion and features.'

²⁶ See W. P. Carstens, *Social Structure of a Cape Coloured Reserve*, 231-4; MacCrone, *Race Attitudes* 110.

²⁷ Compare S. Patterson, *Colour and Culture*, 303-4. On the clustering of farms, see Scholtz, 'Historiese Ontwikkeling...', 29-30; MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 110.

²⁸ See, on the local officials, F. Van Jaarsveld, 'Die veldkornet en sy aandeel...', *Archives Year Book*, II, 1950, Ch. I; on military institutions, G. Tylden, 'The Development of the Commando System in South Africa, 1715-1922,' *Africana Notes and News*, XII, December 1959, 8, 303-313. See also the description of each farm as a 'State in miniature' by Lichtenstein, *Travels*, I, 47.

the Khoi, and in all cases synthesizing these into a new way of life, the situation among the non-whites of the frontier was little different. Acculturation was working, in fact, in both directions: slaves, Khoi and persons of mixed descent were learning Dutch, acquiring firearms and the knowledge of their use, wore some form of European clothes, and had an appetite for European trade goods. But whether the mutual acculturation which was taking place would result in an assimilative society was dependent on two factors: the access of non-whites to land and other property and their admission to the Christian community.

The second factor had been, as has been seen, more or less decided by the end of the seventeenth century. Attempts to evangelize non-whites had lapsed, and particularly in the case of slaves or dependents there was a strong feeling among white colonists against baptism. Until the revival of concern at the end of the eighteenth century there was little baptism of non-whites and, significantly, those who achieved this were for the most part landowners. The crucial struggle of the eighteenth century was therefore over rights to land in the frontier zone, and the most severe divisions among the various ethnic elements of the non-white frontier was one of property, between those who retained a hold on land sufficient for survival in independence and those forced into dependence on white farmers.

Those in the most secure position among the non-white frontiersmen were the group known as 'Bastards'. It is often assumed that the Bastards were simply the offspring of unions between white men and Khoi women. Undoubtedly in the conditions of the frontier society where there was scarcity of white women, such unions were fairly common, and there are frequent references to them in contemporary sources.²⁹ Research into the genealogies of the Bastards of Rehoboth, as well as those of Namaqualand, has shown similar ancestry.³⁰ But the Bastards were as much culturally and economically as biologically defined: Andries Waterboer, most famous of the Griqua chiefs, is supposed to have been of San extraction and without any white blood. Almost certainly, persons of slave-Khoi descent and acculturated slaves, Khoi or San could, under certain conditions, become classified as 'Bastards'.³¹ We read complaints, for example, that runaway slaves, particu-

²⁹ Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 10-11; Barrow, *Travels*, 383; Blackhouse, *Narrative*, 505; Paterson, *Narrative*, 28 – 9, 50; Le Vaillant, *New Travels*, II, 150-1, 159, 168-170; Campbell, *Travels*, 265-6

³⁰ E. Fischer, *Die Rehobother Bastards*, 15-23, 41-56, etc.; W.P. Carstens, *Social Structure of a Cape Coloured Reserve*, 19, 106ff.

³¹ As Fischer and Carstens, as well as MacCrone, Marais and Patterson point out, 'white blood' in a Bastard is regarded with pride, and such persons tend to look down on those who did not have it. But (a) this situation has undoubtedly become more pronounced as white racism has exerted its hegemony over the whole of Southern Africa (b) one should take historical references to this fact with some caution because of possible projection by white authors of their own values (e.g. Sparrman, *Voyage*, I, 52; Howison,

larly if they had some admixture of Khoi 'blood', found it easy to pass themselves off as Bastards in the interior.³² It is, almost by definition, hard to give an account of the origins of the Bastards as a social group: this will be taken up again later. The first uses of the term appear to come only towards the middle of the eighteenth century.³³ And frequent references to a class of Bastards emerge in the sources only towards the last quarter of the century, by which time the frontier society had been in existence for three generations and the Bastards would have been forced into greater social cohesion by discrimination against them.

It is by examining the Bastards in their capacity as landholders that further clues may be gained as to their origins. Not all Bastards, indeed, owned land, but they were almost exclusively the only non-whites to do so. The first of them, perhaps, were the black free burghers of the seventeenth century or their descendants, some of whom moved away from the western Cape rather than lose their landrights as the society grew more restrictive.³⁴ Others may have included the trusted slaves and dependents of the agriculturalists or Company officials, who would be placed in charge of outlying farms, and might acquire landrights by default or acquire sufficient appetite for independent farming as to move away from the Cape altogether.³⁵ Then there were the children of the Khoi dependents of the colonists, children

...in whose veins Christian blood often flowed, [who] were educated in Christianity: they learnt to sing psalms, and to read; and were, even to receiving the sacrament of baptism, as good Christians as the offspring of Europeans. At the death of one of these heads of [colonist] families, his servant would often assume his name; and not infrequently sought himself to some little spot, to which he retired with all belonging to him, and gained subsistence for himself and his family by the breeding cattle.³⁶

In all these cases, Bastards held land explicitly or implicitly under the authority of the colony government, as did the white farmers. In some cases they were able to register their farms: there are several such instances in the extreme north-west. In the Graaff-Reinet

European Colonies, I, 238). And see, for example, Maynier, April 25, 1825 [Theal, *RecCC*, XXI, 394] defining Bastards as 'such Hottentots, *particularly* of the mixed race, who possessed some property, were more civilized...' (My emphasis).

³² See Landdrost and Heemraaden of Stellenbosch to Von Plettenberg, October 25, 1774 (Moodie, *The Record*, III, 34). Also Ibid., 77fn. Scholtz, 'Historiese Ontwikkeling...', 19, 26 writes that in the eighteenth century, 'especially the Olifantsrivier, the lower Bokkeveld and Namaqualand were paradises for deserters where deserters could rove for years without being called to account.'

³³ See, for example, O. Mentzel, *Life at the Cape in the Mid Eighteenth-Century* (VRS, 2, 1919), 151.

³⁴ For the black free burghers see MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 70-3.

³⁵ Thunberg, *Travels*, II, 145; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, I 55, 82; Brink, *Journal*, 74-5, 81; Paterson, *Narrative*, 46, 102, 103.

³⁶ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 241.

district there was, from 1787 until at least 1822, a separate roll of some 40 Bastard pastoralists, and some at least of these Bastards were baptized.³⁷ In other cases, as Lichtenstein points out, 'no quit-rent was paid by him [the Bastard or Khoi landholder] to the government: they perhaps did not know of his existence, or thought that a Hottentot had better be exempted from taxes, the imposition of which might have been considered as a tacit acknowledgement of his existence.'³⁸ In such situations the Bastards could retain their hold on their land only by choosing areas less desirable to whites, and by the end of the eighteenth century there were clusters of Bastard settlements in the Zwartberg and the Cedarberg besides the main cradle of Bastard existence, the Namaqualand-Orange River area.³⁹ There was a final method by which Bastards might acquire land under conditions equally if not more tenuous than those already mentioned. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries many Khoi chiefs were given staffs of office by the Company, supposedly as guarantees of their land and authority and their friendship with the Company. As Khoi societies fragmented or disintegrated it might occur that, through their part-Khoi ancestry, Bastards could inherit such staffs of office and use them to assert claims to land. Or a Bastard farmer, with his collection of dependents, might himself be mistaken for or regarded as a chief in his own right and acquire a staff by this means.

Not all the Bastards, by any means, acquired or retained a hold on land. Many were never anything more than dependents, although often 'a superior and confidential type of servant...relied upon in positions of trust and responsibility, much as taking charge during an owner's absence or acting as overseers on a loan farm.'⁴⁰ As servants, 'superior' or not, the Bastards overlapped culturally with another group, those who became known as Oorlams or 'Oorlammers...that is Hottentots who come from the upper country and are born or bred with the farmers; most of whom understand and speak the low Dutch language.'⁴¹ Like the Bastards, the Oorlams not only had some familiarity with Dutch, but had acquired firearms and knew how to use them, wore some form of European clothes, and had an appetite for European trade goods. And if this class of people could not, until

³⁷ Resolution, November 20, Cape Archives C82 [Quoted in MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 121fn]; Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 12; Marais, *Maynier*, 31 and fn.

³⁸ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 241.

³⁹ See Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 12.

⁴⁰ MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 121.

⁴¹ Albrecht and Seidenfaden, entry October 12, 1805, [LMS Journals, 1/6]. For the origin and meaning of 'Oorlam' see also Hahn, Vedder, Fourre, *Native Tribes*, 116; Carstens, *Social Structure*, 95; Vedder, *South West Africa*, 171; W. Hudson, *et al.*, *Anatomy of South Africa* (Cape Town: 1966), 88, 95. Though the meaning, as non-white South African having familiarity with the ways of 'white society' is widely accepted, the origin is in doubt: some suggest 'orlang lami', a Malay phrase meaning an old person, hence one familiar with customs. Others prefer 'oorlandsche mensch', one who has traveled to serve white farmers, which is the implication of the 1805 definition.

the establishment of missionary institutions at the start of the nineteenth century, hope to gain access to land, many of them were able while in service to acquire oxen or cattle and perhaps even a wagon.⁴²

'I assure you,' wrote Mary Moffat to her parents in 1823, 'we think better of the Griquas, with all their faults, having seen again the outmost Boers. They have been civilized from generation to generation, and seem gradually to sink; the Griquas are now only emerging from their barbarous state, and the difference is small.'⁴³ This was, by the time she wrote it, if anything a condescending understatement. But the statement, and many others similar by travelers and missionaries, re-emphasize the cultural similarity of white and non-white frontiersmen, or at least the almost identical modes of life of elements within both communities. To say this, however, is not to neglect the divergences, actual and potential, between white and non-white communities. For while there were Bastard land and property-owners who, having acquired 'a position of some independence,'⁴⁴ paid taxes and were treated with some grudging respect, there were no white dependents. And the white farmer despised his Khoi servant as a *skepsel*, 'not actually human, but at the same time he cannot be classed among the animals...a sort of creature not known elsewhere.'⁴⁵ These Khoi were treated with the harshness which this view of them permitted, and they were virtually enslaved in many cases by the use of devious means to prevent them leaving the service of their masters. The law made it easy for a white to bring a case against a Khoi, did he not choose to take the law into his own hands; it was almost impossible for a Khoi to bring a case against a white. The achievements of the Oorlams, in terms of acquisition of property and so on, were the more remarkable in occurring in spite of white racism.

But even here one should not exaggerate. The struggle of the eighteenth century frontier zone, it has been argued, was primarily a struggle for land. The major crime of white expansion was the almost complete dispossession of the indigenous Khoi inhabitants of their territory and property, allowing only a few tenacious Bastards and Khoi 'chiefs' of fragmented societies to cling to the remnants. It would appear, from an overview of the evidence, that the main oppression of the Khoi occurred in the eastern parts of the frontier zone. It was here that white settlement was most dense, and it could be argued that the establishment of rigidly hierarchical relations between white and Khoi

⁴² See, for example, the list of property possessed by those entering Bethelsdorp in Campbell, *Travels*, 92-3.

⁴³ Mary Moffat to J. and M. Smith, November 21, 1823 [*Apprenticeship*, 111]. Also Thompson, in [50 of 1835, 134].

⁴⁴ MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 113.

⁴⁵ Landdrost Alberti of Uitenhage to Governor Jansens, June 12, 1805, commenting on the 'unfortunate notion prevalent here.' [Quoted by J.S. Marais, *Maynier and the First Boer Republic*, 73.]

was the consequences of *restabilization* of the frontier society rather than its evolution. Further, it was in the eastern area, for the most part, that the descendants of those who had moved *overbergh* as pastoralists once again began to supplement or supplant their cattle-herding by agriculture.⁴⁶ Agriculture requires increased and more disciplined labor, than herding cattle and requires it seasonally: this might be an added factor in the seemingly worse treatment accorded the Khoi in this area. Finally, as the great Khoi rebellion of 1799 gives evidence, there were considerable numbers of Oorlams who had merged in the eastern districts and, in the absence of a safety-valve such as was provided by the thinly populated area along the Orange, considerable resentment at their condition. The intensity of the oppression of the Khoi in this area might then also be correlated with the intensity of their resentment: it has always been the 'cheeky native' who suffers most.

The Northern Frontier Society in the Eighteenth Century

One reason why hypotheses on the different treatment accorded non-whites in different parts of the frontier society must remain at this time largely speculative is that the northward expansion of the frontier society has received far less attention from historians than that to the east. It was, no doubt, far less dramatic: the bulk of the warfare by white farmers against the San was in the north-east, and it was in the east that historians have looked for the origin of the two major issues of twentieth century South Africa, the conflict between African and white and the emergence of a self-conscious white community. Furthermore, far fewer white farmers were to be found in the north than the east. The population of the Stellenbosch district, under which the entire north-west of the Colony fell until the establishment of the magistracy of Tulbagh in 1804, has been estimated at 7256 in 1798, and of these, most lived south of Clanwilliam. In contrast, Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet contained between them 8229 souls.⁴⁷ Even at the time, then, the north and particularly the north-west, was neglected. From Stellenbosch, thirty miles from Capetown, a Landdrost could give it little attention, and there was indeed not even any attempt to proclaim a northern frontier to the colony between 1660 and 1798, in which latter year Lord Macartney established a boundary from the Buffels River on the coast, dropping rapidly south-east to the Middle Roggeveld, and climbing again north-east to Van Plettenberg's beacon.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ See for example, G. Thompson, *Travels*, 313 – 331; Sparrman, *Voyage*, II, 163, etc.

⁴⁷ *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, VIII, Chapter V.

⁴⁸ Theal, *RecCC*, II, 95ff.

The boundary of 1798 reflected roughly the distribution of white settlement in the north. The expansion northwards along the coastal plains, which began at the turn of the eighteenth century, had by the 1730's been largely diverted inland because the region north of the Oliphant's River was so arid. The bulk of white frontier expansion after this time was eastwards over the mountains to the Bokkeveld, the Roggeveld, the Nieuwveld and eventually the Sneeuwberg. Even here, on the plateau, settlement was sparse and much of the area, particularly towards the north, was used as *trekveld*. And as the farms were occupied further into the dry Karroo, they impinged more and more on the territory of the San who successfully prevented the expansion of white settlement beyond the Roggeveld-Nieuwveld-Sneeuwberg line until the end of the century, and indeed at times forced the abandonment of considerable areas.⁴⁹

This is not to imply that white settlement in the Oliphant's river area and further north was entirely absent. Along the river itself and in its environs some two dozen or so farms were registered by 1753, after which there was a pause of two decades.⁵⁰ The site of the present Calvinia was leased in 1750 and, particularly after the Company expedition to the north in 1761, occupation of farms in the Khamiesberg increased. But as Van der Merwe writes, these few

...exceptional cases are...no indication of a real expansion to the north. Indeed during this time the farmers used the whole region far to the north as *trekveld*, but very few farmers established themselves further north than the point which had been reached in 1760. Even in 1826 there was, according to information supplied by *veldkornets*, scarcely ten 'fixed and lasting occupied residences' in that part of the northern frontier lying between the Khamiesberg and Kobiskow. When the Great Trek began, the Agterveld still did not have permanent occupiers. Periodically, though, the occupiers of the Under Bokkeveld and the Hantam used it as communal *trekveld*, if there had been thunderstorms during the summer.⁵¹

It was, in fact, non-whites who were the 'real pioneers of this part of the Colony,'⁵² or, more precisely, the agents by which the acculturative processes of frontier society spread to the north. But, it must be repeated, it is hard to ascertain from the available contemporary sources much information on the origin of acculturated non-white groups: between descriptions of traditional Khoi societies, whose situation and movements can be traced

⁴⁹ The classic work on the geographical dispersion of white farmers is A. J. H. van der Walt, *Die Ausdehnung der Kolonie am Kap der Guten Hoffnung, 1700 – 1779* (Berlin: 1928). See also Van der Merwe, *Trekboer*, especially 133-169; *Noordwaartse Beweging*, especially Chapters I-II; S. D. Neumark, *The South African Frontier*.

⁵⁰ Scholtz, 'Historiese Ontwikkeling...', 29-33.

⁵¹ Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 4-5.

⁵² Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 26, 74; Van der Merwe, *Trek*, 207.

to the early eighteenth century, and the emergence of a recognizable class of Bastards in the Khamiesberg area in the last third of the century, there is a striking gap. No doubt in the intervening period, as already outlined, black free burghers, slaves, and others of mixed descent from the seventeenth century colony drifted northwards, preferring to live on the fringes of society rather than as second-class citizens at its center. But the bulk of the Bastard community must have derived ultimately from the remnants of the Khoi and San communities of the area, mingled of course, with the 'blood' of whites and slaves.

The most important of these Khoi communities were the 'Gunjemans', the Karihuri (Griqiqua), the Cochoqua and the Namaqua.⁵³ The 'Gunjemans', of 'Goeymans' were the remains of the seventeenth century 'Gorinhaiqua', named after one of their chiefs Gonnema, and seem to have been dispersed at various points from Malmesbury to the Outeniqua mountains. The Karihuri, split into 'great' and 'little' branches, were located at various points between the Oliphants River and Suldanha Bay. Until the 1720's each successive contemporary traveler makes some mention of these groups, and occasionally of their interrelationships. But a recent study of the Oliphants river area tells us that 'by the time that the vanguard of the cattle farmers trekked into the Oliphants river region, there were with the exception of only a few families, no more Hottentots in the area.'⁵⁴ This is, almost certainly, an exaggeration. Some Khoi remained, willy-nilly, to be pressed into dependence and to contribute to the formation of a Bastard class. Already in 1724 there could be found Karihuri who spoke Dutch around the Doorn River.⁵⁵ Forty years later the Company expedition traveling to the Orange could recruit as many as fifty 'half-breed' Khoi, probably also Karihuri, near the Oliphants River.⁵⁶ The founding father of the famous Kok family of Bastards, by repute a slave, occupied a farm near Piketberg until the middle of the century and, as Campbell found in 1813, attached to himself many persons of part or wholly Karihuri descent.⁵⁷ And is it permissible to suppose that the

⁵³ See particularly L. F. Maingard, 'The Lost tribes of the Cape...' Also P. Kolbe, *The Present State of the Cape of Good Hope* (1731); Scholtz, 'Historiese Ontwikkeling...', 4-27 *passim*; and, for the 'Gunjemans', Smith, *Diary*, II, 283-293.

⁵⁴ Scholtz, 'Historiese Ontwikkeling...', 30.

⁵⁵ Rhenius, *Journal*, (VRS, 28, 1942), 137, 145.

⁵⁶ Brink, *Journal*, (VRS, 28, 1942), 17, 58 – 9fn; Coetzee, *Narrative*, (VRS, 15, 1935), 277. Amongst these were persons by the name of Jantje Constavel and Domburg; a full account of the Khoi on this expedition is contained in O. Mentzel, *Description of the Cape*, Vol. II.

⁵⁷ See Campbell, *Travels*, 235-6; *Second Journey*, II, 259; Arbousset, *Narrative*, 20-1; Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 1; Walker, *History*, 95 [citing Theal], *History Before 1795*, I, 48, or 50 of 1835, 18]. Campbell has it that Kok sold two farms in succession in the Piketberg area because they were not productive, while Walker claims that Kok 'rashly reported that Bushmen had been raiding the cattle-runs; whereupon the Stellenbosch landdrost had then made enquiry and bidden him take himself off the Bokkeveld.' For origins of other Griqua in this area, see Tryn Isaac, April 10, 1873 [Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 174]; Warren, 1825 *Journal*, in Warren, *On the Veldt*, 46-7.

San chief Waterboer, who participated in the San resistance war near the Oliphants River in 1739-40 and afterwards made peace and obtained a Company staff of office, was an ancestor of the well-known Andries Waterboer?⁵⁸

But the bulk of the Khoi did no doubt retreat northwards ahead of the encroaching tide of white settlement: later travelers journeying near the Orange heard frequent tales of land and waterholes further to the south of which the Khoi had been dispossessed.⁵⁹ Undoubtedly it was in the 1720's or slightly earlier that the Nama⁶⁰ abandoned the valley of the Oliphants River and established themselves nearer to the Orange as well as across it in the present-day South West Africa. Here, in 'Little Namaqualand', they would suffer the brunt of the Cape's insatiable demand for cattle. Throughout the century it is the Nama who are mentioned as the main source from which the colonist traded or raided cattle.⁶¹

By the middle of the century, with white farmers entrenched in the valley of the Oliphants River, the bulk of the Bastards appear to have been following the Khoi northward. Some indeed remained in isolated areas further south, and probably some who had held land drifted back into the service of whites. But, as Lichtenstein wrote,

Many [Bastard] families...had established themselves in the Lower Bokkeveld, when the increasing population of the colony occasioned new researches to be made after lands capable of cultivation; and the white children of the colonists did not hesitate to make use of the right of the strongest, and to drive their half yellow relations out of the places where they had fixed their abodes. These Bastard Hottentots were then obliged to seek asylum in more remote parts...united more and more every day in a community with each other, their former ties with the Christians growing every day weaker, yet retaining the customs, manners, and opinions which they had imbibed among them, in the utmost purity.⁶²

The cradle of the Bastard population, in fact, the 'more remote parts' where they were able to gain respite for a time from white pressures, was Little Namaqualand and, more specifically, the Khamiesberg. But it is important to realize that in this area they lived side by side with, and coexisted on better or worse terms, not only with Nama and some San, but also with whites. Hermanus Engelbrecht, for example, had rights over at least five

⁵⁸ See Scholtz, 'Historiese Ontwikkeling...', 38-40.

⁵⁹ See, for example, Campbell, *Travels*, 305; B. Shaw, *Memorials*, 20; J. Barrow, *Travels*, 386.

⁶⁰ Scholtz, 'Historiese Ontwikkeling...', 27; Vedder, *South West Africa*, 126 (?).

⁶¹ See, for example, Neumark, *South African Frontier*, 118; Barrow, *Travels*, 398-9.

⁶² Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 241-2. See also G. also Thompson, *Travels*, 83, 298. On the emergence of the Bastards see L'Afrique Hollondaise (1783), 150 [Quoted by S. Bannister, *Humane Policy*, 211], 'Their [some of the frontier colonists'] poverty often prevents their marrying and forming establishments; and some mix with the Hottentots, from whom a bastard race is springing up, which must be mischievous to this colony...who will only require a leader of talent to unite the injured Hottentots, and perhaps the slaves, against the white inhabitants.' See also petitions at the same time by colonists complaining at white-Khoi intermarriage: Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 10 citing Beyers, *Die Kaapse Patriotte*, 12, 230.

farms in the Khamiesberg at various times in the period after 1771, and others holding land there included persons by the name of Jantz, Coetzee, van den Heever, van der Westhuizen, and Beukes.⁶³ The first of the Nama chiefs of the area of whom there is mention is 'Wildschut', who with his people occupied the 'farm' of Leliefontein in the Khamiesberg. This Little Nama community had their rights to the land upheld over Hermanus Engelbrecht, how had tried register the farm, and 'Wildschut' was still their chief when Barnabas Shaw established a Wesleyan mission at Leliefontein in 1816.⁶⁴ There were, however, other Nama chiefs in Little Namaqualand, related in some manner yet to be determined with the Nama across the Orange. A recent study of the Bastard communities of this area asserts that

...at the beginning of the nineteenth century most of the territory known as Little Namaqualand was claimed by Kupido Witbooi, *kaptein* of the /Hobosen tribe. But his land was too large for him to manage alone, and while he occupied the eastern section of the territory he appointed the heads of two other tribes as *onder-kapteins* (assistant captains) to look after his interests in the central and western regions. The former he placed under the jurisdiction of Kaptein Vigilant Oorlam (who was later known as Abraham Vigilant), head of an offshoot of the Gei/Khaun formerly the senior tribe of the Great Namaqua. The western section he put under Paul Links, an immigrant from the south who was acting-captain for a branch of the Swartboois. Later these two areas were named Steinkopf and Richtersveld.⁶⁵

Existing studies have tended to give the impression that the movement of Bastards into the area of Little Namaqualand occurred only in the nineteenth century.⁶⁶ No doubt the

⁶³ Van Reenen, *Narrative*, 297, 321; Brink, *Journal*, ix, 95, 112, 114-5; Wikar, *Journal*, 196-7, 199. G. Thompson, *Travels*, 305-6.

⁶⁴ Von Plettenberg to Landdrost of Stellenbosch January 31, 1772 (Moodie, *The Record*, III, 10-1); Shaw *Memorials*, 70, 266-7. See also G. Thompson, *Travels*, 301-2; Le Vaillant, *Travels*, III, 430-7; Carstens, *Social Structure*, 204-5.

⁶⁵ Carstens, *Social Structure*, 18. Carstens derives his historical information largely from an unpublished manuscript by G. Meyer, 'Die Gemeente the Steinkopf' (1927?). The Gei/Khaun and the Swartboois were two Nama groups north of the Orange: see Vedder *South West Africa*, 126. Witbooi was still important in 1828, when Andrew Smith suggested that a treaty be made with him, but by the 1840's he appears to have moved somewhat higher on the Orange and come under the jurisdiction of Andries Waterboer: see Kirby, *Smith*, 72 - 4; Backhouse, *Narrative*, 514-5; Solomon, October 20, 1844 [LMS 20/1/B]; Hughes, February 11, 1847 [LMS 23/1/A]; Solomon, April 7, 1848 [LMS 23/4/A]; Solomon and Hughes, November 6, 1848 [LMS 23/4/C]. In the works of such travelers as visited Namaqualand in the second part of the eighteenth century there are frequent mentions of Khoi communities, some with 'staffs of office' for their chiefs but rarely of their leaders or their names: see the works of Brink, Paterson, Le Vaillant, Van Reenen, Barrow, for example, and also the letters of the LMS missionaries in Namaqualand after 1805.

⁶⁶ For example, Carstens, *Social Structure*, Chapter 2; Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, Chapter III. In part this is due to the inadequate source material on the area for the eighteenth century: the Khamiesberg was not included in the colony in terms of the boundary of 1798, and fell only just within it after the redefinition of 1804. When de Mist toured the northern parts of the Colony in 1803 he did not think it

bulk of those who remain today on 'Coloured reserves' in the region trace their origins to interracial unions of this time, as do the Bastards of Rehoboth who emigrated to South West Africa in 1868. But the settlement of Bastards in this area dates in fact from the second half of the eighteenth century, a fact which has been largely passed over simply because the majority of those who came into existence at that time were to move north and east to become the 'Griquas' of the middle Orange. It was to the Khamiesberg that Adam Kok I moved from Piketberg around the middle of the century taking with him, 'several relations, as well as servants.'⁶⁷ It is in the Khamiesberg area that we first hear of the family of Berends, to be equally important Griqua leaders. And it is here that we must presume that families originated such as the Engelbrechts, the Goeymans, the Stuurmans, the Dreyers, the Hendricks, the Cloetes, the Balies, all of whom appear again later in the middle Orange. It is rarely easy to determine whether any of these families were in fact Bastards with white blood, or whether they were simply Oorlams who had adopted the names of their masters before seeking an independent existence. This is especially the case of the ambivalent position of the wealthiest Bastard families, like the Koks and the Berends, whose status was intermediate between that of burgher with dependents and that of 'chief' of a group of followers. Adam Kok I, for example, appears to have acquired a Company staff of office, and yet we find him or his son granted a loan farm at Stinkfontein on the Orange River in 1771.⁶⁸ Thus less wealthy Bastards or Oorlams might attach themselves to Kok or other wealthy Bastard families in a status intermediate between dependent and follower. By acquiring greater property through trade or cattle-herding, or marriage into the Bastard community, Oorlams and even traditional Khoi or San might achieve the economic and cultural status of Bastards.⁶⁹

Such evidence as is available may however shed light on some of these questions. In view of their later importance the origins of the Berends (or Barends) family is of particular interest. Klaas Berends, or Klaas Bastard as he is often known, accompanied both the Jacob Coetzee expedition to the Orange in 1760 and the Company expedition a year later, suggesting that he already had some familiarity with the region north of the Khamiesberg.⁷⁰ In 1777-9, H. J. Wikar, a deserter from Company service, traveled on the Orange with Berend who had by now established a kraal near the junction of the Hartebeest and Orange Rivers and was on friendly terms with the Kora of the Orange val-

worth while to travel beyond the valley of the Oliphants River: see Lichtenstein, *Travels*, I, 1-140 *passim* especially 5-6, 85.

⁶⁷ Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 359.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, II 359; Moodie, *Afschriften* [Quoted by MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 121fn].

⁶⁹ See my reservations on this point at fn 31.

⁷⁰ Vedder, *South West Africa*, 19-20.

ley besides trading with the Nama across the Orange.⁷¹ Returning to the Colony in July 1779, Wikar encountered Colonel Gordon and William Paterson on their expedition to the Orange, which included also the farmer Pieter Pienaar and, apparently, Cornelius Kok (son of Adam Kok I).⁷² At Wikar's suggestion, Gordon took Berend with him as guide, and later gave to Le Vaillant an introduction to 'Klaas Bastard'. There would seem no doubt, in fact, that the person whom Le Vaillant refers to as Klaas Bastard and his brother Piet were in fact the Berend brothers. However Le Vaillant claims that they were the half-breed sons of one van der Westhuizen, a burgher living in the Khamiesberg, with whom Le Vaillant spent some time. Since Le Vaillant is notoriously given to embellishment of his tales, however, and since there is indisputable evidence that his account of his stay with the van der Westhuizens contained much that was blatantly false, we may with caution accept his history of the Berend brothers as referring not to van der Westhuizen but to a burgher named Barends.⁷³

Her father [Le Vaillant was told by the sister of Klaas and Piet] was an European, who in his youth had gone over in the Cape and who, first in the service of the company, and next of a farmer, had contrived, by his labour and industry, to form himself a pretty considerable establishment...on the banks of the Groene-Rivier. At first he had cohabited with a Hottentot woman, by whom he had Klaas Baster, Piet Baster, and their sister. But growing vain in proportion as he grew rich, he became ashamed of his wife, and separated from her to marry a white. The latter brought him several children, two of whom, boys, the one twenty, the other twenty-two years of age, lived in the same house with him; but being, as well as their mother, at enmity with him, they contrived to lead him a most wretched life.⁷⁴

Is it purely coincidence that there should in fact have been burgher named Jan Nicolaas Barents (or Berends) who arrived in the Cape from Oldenburg as a soldier in 1748, whose second marriage was in 1775, the year he became a burgher, and who, besides three daughters and a son born in 1756 (perhaps an early death), had two sons born in 1760 and 1762, who would in fact have been 22 and 24 years old in the year of Le Vaillant's trip north (1784)?⁷⁵

⁷¹ Wikar, *Journal*, 21-5.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 199; Paterson, *Narrative*, 104; C. J. Barnard, 'Robert Jacob Gordon se Loopbaan and die Kaap,' *Archives Year Book*, 1950, I, 351 – 360; Le Vaillant, *New Travels*, I, 168 – 9.

⁷³ For the Van der Westhuizens (who were friendly with the [Hermanus] Engelbrecht family) see Le Vaillant, *New Travels*, II, 81 – 128 *passim*, III, 437 – 442. The most complete evaluation of the truth and error in Le Vaillant may be found in Forbes, *Pioneer Travellers of South Africa*, 117 – 127. See also, for Le Vaillant and the Van der Westhuizens, Campbell, *Travels*, 305.

⁷⁴ Le Vaillant, *New Travels*, II, 45.

⁷⁵ C. C. de Villiers, *Genealogies of Old South African Families* (Cape Town: 1966ed), 21. It should however, be pointed out that there was a Bastard called Klaas van der Westhuizen; see Van Reenen, *Narrative*, 299.

These young men were not only ashamed of their mulatto brothers, but had so persecuted and harassed them, as to oblige them to flee from home. Their sister had repaired from choice to the Hottentot horde of her mother. The two Basters, attached to each other by ties of friendship as well as consanguinity, were unwilling to separate, and had first formed a settlement together more to the south in the plain. They had cleared successively two spots, from both of which their relatives had driven them by force, at the same time killing part of their cattle. Frequently they had been savage enough even to beat and wound poor Klaas who was the principal object of their animosity. At length...[Klaas and Piet] had agreed...to come and settle among the mountains... Having both married Hottentot women, they formed, with their family and the people attached to them, who were all relations, a horde composed of sixteen or eighteen huts.⁷⁶

Klaas Bastard, Le Vaillant continues, could speak Dutch fluently but could not read; he possessed some 800 sheep and 200 oxen, but was suffering from shortage of ammunition.⁷⁷

Another family for whom there is some evidence of origin is that of the Engelbrechts. Gert Engelbrecht emerges in 1814-5 as an Oorlam interpreter at the LMS mission station of Bethesda under Christopher Sass on the Orange, and later became a lay evangelist to the Kora. His congregation and his youngest son joined the Bergenaar rebellion, and the latter was executed by Waterboer in 1827.⁷⁸ One might imagine that this family originated from the farmer Hermanus Engelbrecht of the Khamiesberg. In fact Gert was the son of William Engelbrecht, also of the Khamiesberg, without doubt the same man who was the founding ancestor of the Engelbrechts of Steinkopf (Little Namaqualand). This man was a Hollander who married a Nama woman, traded in the Bokkeveld, and like most of the frontiersmen engaged in illegal trade in firearms as well as cattle-raiding. He was eventually arrested and died in gaol.⁷⁹ Other families who became divided between the Little Namaqualand area and the middle Orange include the Cloetes, a definite Bas-

⁷⁶ Le Vaillant, *New Travels*, II, 45-6. Klaas is described by Wikar as 'Goeyman' Hottentot: Wikar, *Journal*, 21 - 5.

⁷⁷ Le Vaillant, *New Travels*, II, 22-65, 230-1; III, 443-9. Le Vaillant also 'encountered' a possibly fictional character called 'Bernfry', a cattle-raider living on the banks of the Orange: see *ibid.*, II, 215-231 *passim*, 292-340 *passim*, III, 330. See also Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 252; Barrow, paying a brief visit to the Khamiesberg some years later encountered a 'mixed horde of Bastaards and Namaquas' (possibly the Kok family) but wrote also 'those heroes in infamy...drawn in the pages of [Le Vaillant]...have most of them met the fate they so well deserved. Pienaar, and Bernfry, the bastards Piet and Klaas...have murdered one another, or have fallen by the hands of their own Hottentots' (Barrow, *Travels*, 388-9, 395). True for Pienaar, this was not true for Piet and Klaas, if they were indeed Berends.

⁷⁸ Helm and Sass, January 1814 - March 1815 [LMS Journals 2/47]; Helm, entry October 14, 1822 [LMS Journals 3/79]; Sass, December 13, 1825 [LMS 9/4/A]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 281, 371.

⁷⁹ Carstens, *Social Structure*, 107 - 110; Smith, *Diary*, I, 203. Gert and his brother were unwillingly coerced onto a white commando against the Tswana in the late eighteenth century. For mention of William Engelbrecht see also Albrecht, etc., august 1805 [LMS Journals 1/6].

tard family, and the largely Khoi Balies.⁸⁰ Another Bastard family, the Beukes, many of whom now be found in South West Africa, may well have originated with Hans Beukes, a *knecht* in the Oliphants River valley early in the century, who appears to have obtained a Khamiesberg farm in 1761, and whose Bastard descendants may have been encountered by George Thompson early in the nineteenth century.⁸¹

From about 1780 onwards the first Bastards, as well as a few whites, began to move north from the Khamiesberg to the Orange and beyond.⁸² At first, no doubt, the settlements along the Orange were used as temporary pasture but increasingly they became permanent habitations. Along with the non-whites went a few of the more venturesome whites. By 1778 the company has granted at least loan farms on the banks of the Orange, around the Kamas River near what was later to be Pella; and by 1791 Guillian Visagie had been granted permission to occupy Modderfontein, now Keetmanshoop, in the present South West Africa.⁸³ Visagie, although recalled from this farm because of illegal activities (Cornelius Kok was one of those to make a deposition against him), had Bastards living with him, including one Jan Sieberd, and appears to have been on friendly terms with the Bondelswarts Oorlams.⁸⁴ In the sources one finds references also to other whites and Bastards trading north across the Orange: the peripatetic Peter Pienaar, Pieter Brand, Solomon Kok, and others.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ See Carstens, *Social Structure*, 110 – 4. Jacob Cloete, an early convert at Griquatown, became a major leader of the Hartenaar rebellion: see Chapter IV. Adam Balie, a nephew of Short Adam Kok (who was brother of Cornelius Kok I) was one of the first Griqua settlers at Campbell: see Campbell, *Travels*,

²²⁸⁻⁹: A. Waterboer to Wright, December 11, 1832 [425 of 1837, 150-1]. A relative (son?) of his, Leonard Balie, became a Griqua field-cornet and lay evangelist: see E. Edwards, January 8, 1825 [MMS Box III-1825/2]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 214; Blackhouse *Narrative*, 473; Philip, May 20, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A]. It is not clear how Adam Balie is related to October Balie, the San occupant of the Campbell fountain prior to Griqua occupation, who is supposed to have been paid 150 rix-dollars to cede territorial rights: see Philip in [538 of 1836, 621]; Abraham Kok, June 23, 1864 [Quoted in Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 154].

⁸¹ See Scholtz, 'Histories Ontwikkeling...', 37; Brink, *Journal*, ix; C. and A. Albrecht and J. Seidenfaden, entry September 19, 1805 [LMS Journals 1/6]; G. Thompson, *Travels*, 298. Thompson speaks of 'Dirk Boukes' which is probably 'Beukes', and writes of the wealth and 'respect' able footing' of his establishment, except for the Khoi-style hut; Boukes' father, and seven or eight brothers, also occupied property in the Khamiesberg.

⁸² For various estimates of the date at which the Bastards first moved to the Orange, see Anderson, August 12, 1806 [LMS 3/3/B] (c.1780); Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 240, 252 (before 1779); Burchell, *Travels*, I, 252 (c.1770). See also Wikar, *Journal*, 21-5; Arbousset, *Narrative*, 20-1; Stow, *Native Races*, 322-3; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 259-60.

⁸³ Wikar, *Journal*, 4, 34fn; Van Reenen, *Narrative*, 307.

⁸⁴ Van Reenen, *Narrative*, 319; Brink, *Journal*, 114 – 5; Vedder, *South West Africa*, 32.

⁸⁵ See, for example, Wikar, *Journal*, 47; Van Reenen, *Narrative*, 229, 301, 319ff, Vedder, *South West Africa*, 16 – 17, 32 – 9

The attraction of the area north of the Khamiesberg to the whites was the opportunities provided for hunting, trade, and cattle-raiding. As will be seen in the following chapter, there were the same 'pulls' towards the north for the Bastards too, especially as they and the whites made contact with the Sotho-Tswana as well as the Kora and Nama of the Orange. But, in addition, the Bastards were subject to 'pushes'. The most important of these was the continual insecurity of their land and property. But from the 1770's there were additional factors which caused an acceleration of the movement to the north. In the first place there were increasing pressures by white frontiersmen for some sort of regulation on the movement of Bastards, applying particularly to those of mixed slave-Khoi descent. As early as 1721 some Stellenbosch farmers had complained that the offspring of their slaves and Khoi dependents 'when they have reached an age to be of some use... are either enticed away or maliciously withdraw themselves from the duty they owe to those who brought them up.'⁸⁶ In 1774 the Landdrost of Stellenbosch proposed to the Governor that Bastards should be issued with passes if they were in service, both to distinguish them from runaway slaves, and to prevent their desertion. The following year the Stellenbosch and Swellendam districts passed a local regulation requiring the offspring of slave and Khoi to be apprenticed to the farm on which they were born until the age of 25.⁸⁷ No doubt these regulations were seen as restrictive by all categories of acculturated non-whites, even those tracing descent from whites.

Secondly, the Bastards sought to escape from military service. When the resistance of the San to the occupation of their lands became more fierce in the 1770's, the massive frontier response involved Bastards as well as whites: in 1774 a general commando was called consisting of 100 whites and 150 Bastards. But though both whites and Bastards disliked equally the San who stole and mutilated their cattle, neither were particularly anxious to serve on commandos; the whites tended where possible to send their Bastard or Khoi servants as substitutes for themselves.⁸⁸ Then, in 1781-2 Bastards, as well as other Khoi, were for the first time subject to call up for military service in Cape Town itself, with the formation of a Hottentot corps.⁸⁹ But the Bastards felt no obligation to defend, either from the San or from external enemies, a colony which increasingly impeded their access to land and imposed upon them restrictive regulations. 'All the Hottentots and Bastards fit for commandos are going away to Namaqua country to evade serving on

⁸⁶ Resolution, September 2, 1721, Moodie, *Afschriften* [Quoted in MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 84].

⁸⁷ See Landdrost and Heemraaden of Stellenbosch, October 25, 1774 [Moodie, *The Record*, III, 34]. Also *ibid.*, 77fn; Jeffreys, *Kaapse Archiefstukken* (1781), 301; MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*, 84fn, 130fn.

⁸⁸ See Moodie, *Record*, III, 26 – 77 *passim*; Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 12, 17. Also Jeffreys, *Kaapse Archiefstukken* (1782), 162.

⁸⁹ Jeffreys, *Kaapse Archiefstukken* (1731), 48 – 9; (1782), 61 – 2; Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 131 – 2. See also Le Vaillant, *New Travels*, I, I, xxx – xxxiii.

commandos...[they are] trafficking and bartering with the Namaquas,' was the complaint of a field-sergeant in 1778.⁹⁰ The aversion of the Bastards to military service on behalf of the Colony would be a recurrent theme. It was a Colonial request for military conscripts which sparked the first revolt at Griquatown in 1814 and which was also a factor in the Bergenaar revolts of the 1820's. And when George Thompson visited Namaqualand in 1823, he found that many Bastards living there had 'absconded' because they were afraid that he was a military recruiting officer.⁹¹

Overall, then, the Bastards and the Oorlams who would eventually become known as the Griqua were driven from the Colony by the increasing discrimination against them: they were the victims of a society of growing racism. In a Memorial to the Governor, in 1829 some of the Griqua, by then augmented by refugees from all over the Colony, would state as the main grievances which had caused their departure the deprival of their land and the harsh treatment accorded them as dependants.⁹² Both these grievances were felt in the north-west. But despite this, in the north-west, there were relations of a cooperative kind. In the present chapter the co-existence in the Khamiesberg of white and Bastard landowners has been mentioned. Baptized Bastards like Cornelius Kok, who remained in the Khamiesberg until 1815, were accorded respect, could raise credit in Cape Town, and even took under their protection destitute whites.⁹³ But above all there was cooperation in hunting, in 'trafficking and bartering', and in raiding the Khoi and Sotho-Tswana communities along and north of the Orange. As the authority of the Colony grew more firm in the area of eighteenth century expansion, as discriminatory regulations reinforced individual prejudices, the frontier zone moved outwards to the Orange River valley. This question will be taken up in the next chapter.

⁹⁰ Field-Sergeant, Van Zyl, November 2, 1778 [Moodie, *Record*, III, 77]. Van Zyl, who suggested to the Stellenbosch administration that the Bastards and Khoi be compelled to muster on commando in order to 'relieve us', was the same man who eight years later was sentenced to seven years banishment from the Colony for cattle-raiding on the Orange: see Chapter III. See also Field-Sergeant Steenkamp in *ibid.*, III, 77.

⁹¹ Thompson, *Travels*, 301.

⁹² Memorial of A. Kok and Counsellors to Sir Lowry Cole, January 23, 1829 [LMS 11/3/A].

⁹³ For the status of Cornelius Kok see particularly A. Albrecht, *et al.*, August-November 1805 [LMS Journals 1/6]; November 1805 – May 1806 [LMS Journals 1/10]; C. Albrecht, April 10, 1812 [LMS 5/1/C]; Sass, January 18, 1813 [LMS Journals 2/34]; Borchers, *Memoir*, 118 – 9; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 252 [citing Colonel Gordon]; Stow, *Native Races*, 234. Also J. Kicherer in *LMS Transactions*, II, 1, 32.

3 The Frontier Zone and Colonial Policy, c. 1770 – 1815

From the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the successive administrations of the Cape Colony gradually reasserted their control over the elements of the frontier society which had evolved during the century. That frontier society, evolving through adaptation to a different environment, and mutual acculturation among whites, Khoi, and slaves, was sufficiently fragmented to permit a variety of modes of inter-ethnic relationship to exist; and although it had inherited tendencies towards racial oligarchy from the seventeenth century Cape Colony, these were not uniformly distributed or universally enforceable. In the north-west, in particular, the ideology and practice of racism were tempered by the existence of a land- and property-owning class of Bastards. In this remote north-western area the increased exertion of Colony authority in a discriminatory fashion (regulations passed, military service requirements), coupled with increased white pressure on land, caused a fresh movement of non-white frontiersmen beyond the confines of the Colony. In the east, the re-establishment of Colony authority was initially requested by the frontiersmen themselves: it was a request by Adriaan van Jaarsveld, prominent leader of commandos against the San, which led ultimately to the establishment of the new magistracy of Graaff-Reinet in 1785.¹

Even as this 'restabilization' was occurring, the real frontier society was moving outwards. Both in the north and the east the non-white and white frontiersmen had established contacts with Bantu-speaking communities. In the north, the center of gravity of the late eighteenth century frontier zone was along the valley of the Orange, while in the east it embraced the area of colonist-Xhosa contact between the Fish and Sunday's Rivers. In both areas the cultural interaction was complex, involving Khoi as well as whites, Bantu-speakers, and the offspring of all three; in the eastern frontier zone, for example, were the Gona, products of Xhosa-Khoi interaction, and weak Xhosa off-shoots such as the Gqunukwebe who were strongly responsive to new cultural influences. In both areas, with different results, frontiersmen resisted reincorporation by seeking to form frontier states.

In the eastern frontier zone, attempts by the Colony to regain control over the eighteenth century expansion overlapped with the problems raised by this new frontier zone. A number of revolts by white frontiersmen, as well as one by Oorlams, were suppressed. Until 1819, indeed, the Colony attempted to destroy the 'frontier zone' entirely by an

¹ See Walker, *History*, 98, 116.

embargo on contacts between whites and Bantu-speakers, and when this attempt proved futile, several decades were expended in the search for a new policy. Only with the establishment of British rule in British Kaffraria in the late 1840's, where whites and acculturated Mfengu refugees were interspersed, and with the advent of Sir George Grey, could the Colony be said to have established its hegemony over this area of cultural interaction.² In comparison, the effort of the Colony to re-establish its authority over the northern frontier zone, that in which non-white frontiersmen were the dominant element, was slight. Not until the annexation of the Orange River Colony in 1848 was formal British authority extended over the frontier society of Transorangia, where political communities of whites, Bastards, Kora, Bantu-speakers and the products of their interaction were engaged in inconclusive dispute. Meanwhile, as John Philip pointed out,

...while it was thought necessary to maintain a large military establishment on the eastern frontier, to defend it against the inroads of the Caffres, the defence of the northern frontier has been left entirely to the people at the missionary stations, and the efforts of the boors, when occasional called out to punish particular instances of robbery and murder, and recover stole cattle.³

It is with establishment of the new frontier society in the valley of the Orange, and with the first stages in the formation of Colonial policy towards it, that this chapter is concerned.

The Frontier Zone in the North, 1700 – 1800: Trade, Warfare, and Acculturation

From the late 1760's [writes Neumark] the Cape's meat supply was dependent upon livestock produced by the colonists in the interior and frontier districts as well as upon the livestock obtained...through barter... The expansion of the frontier was thus aimed not only at opening up new areas for grazing, but also at tapping the cattle resources of the native tribes for the ever-widening Cape market.⁴

As mentioned in the last chapter, it had been the Nama of Little Namaqualand who, from the 1720's had been the main resource for cattle: indeed the most severe General Placaat against trade with indigenous people was issued after a contretemps between white fron-

² The policy then developed, of establishing on the fringes of the Colony groups of non-whites under British hegemony whose interests lay with the Colony, has affinities with that suggested by Van Rheede in 1685 (see Chapter II), and that implemented by Philip on the northern frontier in the 1830's: see Chapter IX. On the eastern frontier, the Kat River settlement was an early experiment in such a policy.

³ Philip in [538 of 1836], 608]. See also Major W. B. Dundas in *ibid.*, 276-7.

⁴ Neumark, *South African Frontier*, 104 – 5.

tiersmen and Nama near the Orange in 1739.⁵ But as the cattle supplies of the Nama south of the Orange dwindled, and as this in itself facilitated settlement by the colonists on Nama land, it was necessary to look further for supplies. It was the journeys of Jacob Coetzee and Klaas Barends in 1760, and the large Hendrik Hop expedition the following year, which made evident to the frontiersmen the abundance of cattle among the Great Nama north of the Orange and the willingness of the Nama to exchange their cattle for beads.⁶ It was probably the travels of H. J. Wikar along the Orange in 1777-9, and the journey of Colonel Gordon in the latter year, which stimulated both white and non-white frontiersmen into increasing trade with (and raiding of) the Kora and Sotho-Tswana communities living higher on the Orange.⁷ For though Wikar reports that Klaas Barends already had a kraal on the Orange in 1777, and was familiar with the peoples higher up the river, it was only after 1780 that a major thrust of the southern frontier developed in that direction.

Along and north of the Orange there was already, as described in an earlier chapter, a 'frontier zone' in existence: this was an area of interaction and acculturation between the Khoi and Bantu-speaking communities. What was to occur, then, was an overlapping of two frontier societies into a new 'frontier zone' where the number of different cultural traditions, the complex modes of acculturation, and the lack of any central source of legitimate authority, were almost unique in South African history. It is little wonder that that staid historian, Eric Walker, should cast his eye over the sources and speak of the 'pandemonium' in the Orange River Valley, which 'swarmed with half-breeds, Hottentots, runaway slaves and outlaws.'⁸ But even in such chaos, patterns could be found, inter-relationships based on the interest which had brought the frontier zone into existence. Such patterns, of trade, warfare, and subjection to dependence, provide a basis on which acculturation proceeds.

All such contacts were, by the General Placaat of 1739 and its successors, illegal. No doubt the fact of illegality acted as slight deterrent to some frontiersmen. But the embargo was not enforced. Since both in the north and the east local officials were involved 'no one particularly is charged with enforcing it; and everybody besides is interested in the fraud...so that certainty of profit is added to that of impunity.'⁹ Further, were frontiers-

⁵ Walker, *History*, 93-4 [citing Theal, *Bel Hist Dok*, I; 50 of 1835, 18]; Scholtz, 'Historiese Ontwikkeling...', 36ff. Theal, *History Before 1795*, III, 43 claims it was the 'coloured servants' who went back to steal cattle.

⁶ See J. Coetzee, *Narrative*, *passim*; Brink, *Journal*, *passim*, especially p. 57.

⁷ See Wikar, *Journal*, *passim*; Paterson, *Narrative*, 38-70, 99-129; Forbes, *Pioneer Travellers*, 93-116; Barnard, 'Robert Jacob Gordon...'

⁸ Walker, *History*, 129, 151.

⁹ Le Vaillant, *New Travels*, II, 71-2.

men willing to defy the law, it was obviously preferable to defy it by the most profitable means, by seizing cattle rather than bartering for them:

...were these contraband traders guilty only of infringing the fiscal laws, the business would be a trifle: But what daring iniquities, what horrible crimes, do they not commit! A few colonists, well armed, assemble together: then, falling suddenly on some solitary horde, they compell those who compose it to bring them all their cattle, from which they select such as may suit them, and give in return what they think proper.¹⁰

The skirmishes and counter-skirmishes which have been characterized as ‘Kaffir Wars’ on the eastern frontier were, at least until 1800, nothing more than such cattle-raids, nothing more than frontier zone interaction.

In the north-west those white frontiersmen who wished to engage in illicit exchange had an additional advantage. If raiding was too much risk for them, they could remain safely within the frontiers and use as intermediaries in the trade the non-white frontiersmen who had already moved beyond the Colony. It was, and continued to be during the whole period that the Bastards remained unincorporated in the Colony, essential for them to engage in this trade. Equally with the whites, the status of the Bastards as frontiersmen, superior to those around them, depended on their access to items of frontier material culture, and especially the firearms and powder of which they were chronically short.¹¹ Sometimes they could trade cattle from their herds. If they were short of cattle, or if — as happened to many incipient communities of Kora frontiersmen in the nineteenth century — they had not pasture sufficient for their cattle, it was necessary to hunt or raid.¹² So, the bastard families would leave their cattle at their homes in the care of servants or young, and range far and wide hunting and trading for more cattle, for ostrich feathers, for skins, and for ivory. Ivory, in the eighteenth century, was exchanged with ‘some citizens at the Cape Town, through agents [who have cattle-places] on the borders. They [the Bastards] bought the powder from the foreign ships that touched there, and gave the elephants teeth in exchange, at a moderate price; thus under-selling the East India Company, who had formerly the monopoly of this trade.’¹³

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 72-3.

¹¹ See, For example, Anderson, August 12, 1806 [LMS 3/3/b]; Burchell, *Travels*, I 232, 259, 303; II, 10, 160, 178, 196-205 *passim*; Le Vaillant, *New Travels*, II, 35, 65; Somerset to Bathurst, January 23, 1817 [Theal, *RecCC*, XI, 252-6].

¹² See, for example, Melvill, October 17, 1825 [LMS 9/4/A]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 215; Wright, August 1833 [Quoted in Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 62].

¹³ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 240, 252, 259. See also Anderson, August 12, 1806 [LMS 3/3/B]. Barrow, *Travels*, II, 305 relates that the ivory passing through the customs house over a period of four years (probably c.1795-8) was 5981 ponds, of value 6340 rix dollars: on the profitability of the ivory trade see also Bannister, *Humane Policy*, 110-6 *passim*; Newmark, *South African Frontier*, 64-7.

Trading in firearms by colonists was, naturally, regarded with more disfavor by government than other forms of illegal trade. In 1797 Macartney, for the British administration, reconfirmed the regulations requiring gunpowder to be purchased from government alone and forbidding resale, and this stood in force until the 1830's. Nor was it extensively flouted until 1829, when traders were selling guns to Kora and Sotho-Tswana in Transorangia.¹⁴ But it was evaded sufficiently to supply the Bastards with firearms, though

...in this traffic the disadvantage is so much on [the] side [of the Bastards] that they cannot obtain a musket of even a middling quality for less than five or six oxen, or a hundred-weight of ivory... Individuals among the Bastard families have sometimes come privately to Cape Town, where they have bought the powder more advantageously: but experience has taught them that it is better to give the higher price, and be spared the fatigue and expense of the journey.¹⁵

Though the terms of trade were unfavorable, this trade between Bastards and the frontier farmers made for, at worst, a grudging cooperation, and at best friendly relations between them. From the late eighteenth century onwards to the 1840's, in fact, the collaboration in illegal trade which existed between the Bastards and white colonists was an important factor in the politics of the frontier zone, for such trading could bypass any regulations or restrictions which the Colonial government (or missionaries) sought to impose on the Bastards (or, as they were to become, the Griqua). This illegal trade flourished especially in the north-west, the 'cradle' of the Bastards. Thus in 1818 Stockenstrom would note with dismay that despite pass requirements on Griqua entrance to the Colony, the farmers of the Tulbagh district were welcoming Griqua indiscriminately and telling them that their oxen were the best passes they could bring.¹⁶

From the late eighteenth century, through the Hartenaar and Bergenaar rebellions, and even afterwards when isolated Kora and Bastard groups were ensconced on the middle Orange and conducting raids, such exchanges would continue.¹⁷ They were, of course, mutually advantageous: if the Bastards obtained powder and guns, the white farmers bought cattle and, in many cases, 'apprentices', usually captured children, who were in-

¹⁴ For statistics on the trade from 1797 onwards see Wade to Stanley, January 14, 1834 [252 of 1835, 75-84].

¹⁵ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 259. See also Thompson in [50 of 1835, 136]; and, for the consistency of prices for guns, Smith, *Diary*, I, 252.

¹⁶ Stockenstrom, August 27, 1818 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 34-6].

¹⁷ See, for example, Somerset to Bathurst, January 23, 1817 [Theal, *RecCC*, XI, 252-6]; Baird to CO, April 21, 1820 [CO 2625/34]; Thompson, *Travels*, 293; Thompson in [50 of 1835, 134, 139]; Moffat in *ibid.*, 128; Philip, *Researches*, II, 228, 287, 344; Bannister, *Humane Policy*, 220; General Report of Commissioners of Enquiry at the Cape [quoted in *ibid.*, 174-5, and as qualified by Philip, *Researches*, II, 292-9]. See also Chapter 7.

creasingly valuable as labour after the abolition of the slave trade and the 50th Ordinance of 1828. And these contacts led to others. Between January and May, for example, the Griqua who became established at Griquatown would keep their horses on the farm of a white colonist to avoid the horse-sickness which infested the lowlands along the Orange.¹⁸ These relatively cordial relations, among at times to a mutual conspiracy against the Colony authorities, were made possible by the withdrawal of the Bastards from the competition for land in the colony. Severe conflict between white farmers and Bastards re-emerged only when there was again competition for land, in Transorangia in the 1840's.

But it was in raiding as well as trading that white and non-white frontiersmen co-operated. Prominent among these raiders, of the whites, were the Van Zyl family, Pieter Pienaar, and Jan Bloem, a German from Thuringia who deserted from his ship in 1780 and soon after fled from the Colony having murdered his wife.¹⁹ Pienaar, who accompanied Colonel Gordon and is mentioned also by Le Vaillant and Paterson, was a classic frontiersman. He had had farms in the Hantam district and at Oliphants River, and had been responsible for building a pass through the Witsemberg in about 1780. 'He was a man whom no danger could deter from any undertaking,' wrote Lichtenstein, 'the more arduous the task, the more was he determined upon accomplishing it.'²⁰ Le Vaillant paints a less favorable, and indeed more accurate, picture.²¹ It must have been in the early 1780's that Pienaar encountered Jan Bloem in the Namaqualand area and persuaded him to take care of a farm that he had been granted on the Orange. Soon Bloem, Pienaar, and a following gathered from the Kora and San on the Orange as well as from Pienaar's dependents were raiding cattle along the river as well as in the Langeberg.²² They were not without competition. In 1786 a large party headed by one Adriaan Van Zyl, a Field-Sergeant, and including his two sons as well as Jan Wiese and two Bastards named Engelbrecht interfered in an inter-necine Kora dispute and obtained a large haul of cattle. They managed to keep their booty safe from an attack by Jan Bloem, but on returning to the Colony were discovered: Adriaan van Zyl and Wiese were banished for a period from

¹⁸ Burchell, *Travels*, I, 258, 352.

¹⁹ For Bloem's early life see Berlin Missionary Society, *Jahresbericht*, 1843, 50-1.

²⁰ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, I, 139. See also Campbell, *Travels*, 357; Paterson, *Narrative*, 99ff; Thompson, *Travels*, 230.

²¹ See Le Vaillant, *New Travels*, I, 147-8; II, 68-73, 216-224; III, 369-370.

²² See Campbell, *Travels*, 361; Jan Bloem, Jr., in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 293 - 4; Smith, *Diary*, I, 149, 203, 285. Engelbrecht's version, that Bloem went to Dikgatlong before meeting Pienaar, is less acceptable: *Korana*, 30, 56-7.

the Colony while one of the sons was imprisoned for three years.²³ And there were other raiders who cannot be identified.²⁴

The initial raids were conducted on the Kora communities along the Orange, depriving them of their cattle, and contributing greatly to a process of dislocation and fragmentation which had been set in motion by the earlier interaction between Khoi and Sotho-Tswana. So serious was the impact of incorporation in the new frontier zone on the Kora, both then and subsequently, that recent investigators have found it almost impossible to trace continuities between the Kora political communities encountered by Wikar in 1777 – 9 and those which re-emerged higher on the Orange in the nineteenth century.²⁵ But Bloem, and perhaps Pienaar with him, began to raid more widely. After their first commando together, Pienaar returned to the Colony while Bloem moved higher up the Orange, settling successively at Blinkklip and Dikgatlong, near the junction of the Vaal and Harts. From here he extended his raids against other groups; the Tlhaping, certainly, and perhaps as well the Tlharo, Rolong, and Kgalagadi / Lala-type clients.²⁶ He ‘took a great number of cattle,’ we are told, ‘and as the Caffers retired...the Corannas gradually advanced to the east until they reached the Harts River which they ascended and occupied.’²⁷ He may possibly have attacked the Rolong-Seleka, but his final, and most ambitious, venture was a commando against Makaba, the Ngwaketse ruler who had come to power in about 1790.²⁸ For this it was necessary for Bloem to repair his hostile relations with the Tlhaping and Rolong and to mount a joint commando with them as well as his own following and at least a section of the Taaibosch Kora. Here, however, he met his match. The Ngwaketse ‘are said to have raised high walls across the passes between the mountains, leaving small openings in them, like gates, which could easily be closed up at the approach of an enemy. Many lay in ambush; while others were stationed on the tops

²³ See Smith, *Diary*, I, 203 – 4, and, in a somewhat different version, *ibid.*, 149. The date is derived from Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 20, who mentions Cape archival documents of that year concerning the Van Zyl case. The Kora dispute was between chiefs by the names Taaibosch and Philip.

²⁴ See, for example, mentions of these in Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XIV; Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 157; Campbell, *Travels*, 232, 359; Moodie, *Record*, III, 73. But see also Burchell, *Travels*, II, 393-4; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 325-6. See also below, fn. 44.

²⁵ See in particular Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 1-66.

²⁶ For identification of groups raided see particularly Smith, *Diary*, I, 139-140, 149, 161, 203, 285; Campbell, *Travels*, 361; Jan Bloem in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 293-4.

²⁷ Smith, *Diary*, I, 161. For this period of Bloem's career see also *ibid.*, 139-140, 149, 285; Maingard, ‘Studies in Kora History...’, 117 – 8; Jan Bloem, Jr., in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 293-4; Evidence at Griqualand West Land Court, 1875 [Quoted by Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 56-7 and see also *ibid.*, 30]; Campbell, *Travels*, 361; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 271, 325-6; Barrow, *Cochin-China*, 403; Borchers, *Memoir*, 82, 86; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 177.

²⁸ For the attack on the Rolong-Seleka see Jan Bloem, Jr., in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 293, a commando ‘together with the Korannas who came out first to Maquana country (now Buispoort) where the Barolongs dwelt.’

of the mountains, who rolled down great stones upon their assailants. It is not known that he captured a single beast...'²⁹ On his return from the expedition, Bloem died of poisoning, which some have attributed to the Ngwaketse and others to his allies, resentful of his earlier raids and his failure on this occasion.³⁰

Bloem was accustomed to sending his captured cattle with his Khoi followers to Pienaar, who would return arms and powder. He was also helped, however, by the brothers Jacob and Franz (or Carel?) Kruger, currency forgers who had escaped from the Robben Island in a boat, and lived among the Kora beyond the colony boundaries from about 1780.³¹ Franz (Carel?) was trampled by an elephant near the Zak River before 1800, but Jacob survived to win a pardon for acting as guide to a government expedition to the north in 1801. After this he moved to the Colony and guided first the van de Graaff expedition to Dithakong in 1805, and then the ill-fated expedition of Dr. Cowen in 1808, on which he lost his life.³²

The Krugers, as well as Bloem and Pienaar, like the other comparable 'border ruffians' of the eastern frontier zone, contributed as well to acculturation by their unions with non-white wives. Pienaar, 'together with Arnoldus Pienaar, was in the habit of cohabiting with the wives of...the Hottentots in his service,' 'Hottentots' who included the well-known figure Klaas Afrikaner (!Garuchamab), a man probably of mixed San and Khoi descent, whose subsequent career will be discussed shortly.³³ It is almost certainly from this Piet Pienaar that there sprang the Pienaar family, including Piet and Jan, who were associated with the Griqua state at Klaarwater.³⁴ Jacob Kruger had four of five wives (one Tlhaping, one Rolong and one Kora) who were certainly not colonists, and Franz (Carel?) may also have had mixed-descent offspring. Again, the name of Kruger becomes prominent among the Griqua: Nicholas Kruger, son of Jacob by a Rolong mother, was to become one of the major counsellors of Andries and Nicholas Waterboer.³⁵

²⁹ Campbell, *Travels*, 362.

³⁰ See *ibid.*, 361-2; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 177; Jan Bloem, Jr., in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 293-4; Schapera, 'Ngwaketse...', 3-4. Jan Bloem's death is commonly placed in 1799, but there seems no reason why it should not have been as late as 1802-3.

³¹ See Borchers, *Memoir*, 63, 65; Barrow, *Cochin-China*, 383-4; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 201-2, 212-3, 271; Burchell, *Travels*, I, 40, 144, 211; II, 217; Campbell, *Travels*, 206, 361; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 134-5, 144. See also Nicholas Kruger in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 2-10, 349-350, 375-6.

³² Anderson, entries November 1808 [LMS Journals 1/20].

³³ Smith, *Diary*, I, 202. See also Campbell, *Travels*, 357.

³⁴ See Jan Pienaar in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 16-21; 347-349. See also below, Chapter IV.

³⁵ For Nicholas Kruger see *ibid.*, 2-10, 349-350, 375-6. See also below, Chapters X-XII. For other sons of the Krugers see Burchell, *Travels*, I, 374; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 134-5, 144; Smith, *Diary*, I, 86, 93-5, 163, 166; also Chapter 7.

Jan Bloem was even more prolific. It was probably when he first moved to the Orange, and before meeting Pienaar, that he became associated with the Springbok Kora living at the Hartebeest-Orange junction. From them he took a wife who bore his son, Jan Bloem, Jr., who was later to figure as a leader in Transorangia almost equal in significance to the Koks and the Berends. Thereafter Jan Bloem senior took perhaps eight or ten other wives from among the Katse, Taaibosch and Links Kora as well as the San. Indeed, despite his raiding activities, Jan Bloem senior was among the first constructive contributors to the new political order of the frontier zone. The following which he established around him at Blinkklip and Dikgatlong, drawn from among San, Khoi and Sotho-Tswana, contributed heavily to the mutual acculturation of the area, and should be classified almost as a multi-ethnic chiefdom. The stature which the father had achieved permitted the son to succeed to the chieftainship of the 'Springbok' Kora, who by then were undoubtedly a multi-ethnic group.

The relationships established between frontiersmen from the south and the Kora and Sotho-Tswana in the Orange River valley were thus not entirely hostile or destructive. Besides the raiding, intermarriage, and state-building of the whites, there was the trade initiated by the Bastards. Initial contacts between the Bastards and the Sotho-Tswana, in fact, appear to have been without exception peaceful.³⁶ Some time after Jan Bloem had raided the Tlhaping, for example, they were visited for the first time by Cornelius Kok, who found 'their circumstances truly deplorable, being in a starving condition, and obliged to live on what roots they could find.' Kok threatened to inform the Colony government of Bloem's activities, and 'assisted the Matchappees in their distress, by now and then living amongst them, and shooting game for them.'³⁷ In consequence the Tlhaping retained warm feelings for the Kok family, which they expressed and acted out on a number of later occasions.³⁸ By 1801, it would appear, trade between the Tlhaping on the one hand and the Bastards, or at least the Kok and Berends, was sufficiently well established for in-

³⁶ The Krugers also appear to have established friendly relations with the Tlhaping: see Lichtenstein. *Travels*, II, 271-2. It should be mentioned that there is a contrary story on the first relations between Bastards and Tlhaping, relating that the Bastards were received with apparent friendship, but the party was divided by a ruse, set upon, and all but five killed: it may be found in different versions, according to whether the Bastards were intending to trade, hunt, or raid, in Burchell, *Travels*, II, 195; Campbell, *Travels* 206; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 120-2; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XIV. Some versions appear to refer to the Tlharo rather than the Tlhaping; alternatively this may be the incident involving a Kora trade party referred to obliquely in Anderson, entry March 1807 [LMS Journals 1/7].

³⁷ Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 261. Also *ibid.*, I, 88-9. As he does in his *Travels*, 361, Campbell here confuses Jan Bloem the elder with Jan Bloem, Jr.

³⁸ See, for example, Campbell, *Travels*, 167, 195; *Second Journey*, I, 88-9; Anderson, July 31, 1816 [LMS 6/4/A]; Hamilton, April 28, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C]; Thompson, *Travels*, 175; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XIV.

formation to be given to an official cattle-bartering expedition to the Tlhaping that 'of the Bastards living with or near the Koranas, Cornelius Kok, Nicholas Barend, Piet Barend and Claas Adonis would be very proper to act as Interpreters and to assist in opening a communication with them.'³⁹

Shortly before 1800, however, the patterns of the frontier zone were disrupted by the arrival of a new and formidable raider, Klaas Afrikaner and his family, whose style of warfare was reported to be more brutal than had been seen before.⁴⁰ Klaas Afrikaner was, as we have seen, an Oorlam dependent of Pieter Pienaar. Fearing that he would be conscripted into the army (presumably the Cape Hottentot Corps established in 1793), he requested permission from Pienaar to leave the Colony.⁴¹ Pienaar sent him to supervise his cattle on the Orange and, we may be sure, did not discourage him from increasing the herds by raiding. During their absence, Afrikaner and his sons, Titus and Jager (or /Hoa-/arab), came to believe that Pienaar was seducing their wives as well as mistreating their children. (Indeed Moffat claims that Pienaar had trodden some of the children to death.) The Afrikaner family returned to confront Pienaar and an altercation broke out. Of the details of this there are various accounts, but the result was that Titus Afrikaner killed Pienaar, the gunpowder of the house was seized, and the family fled to the north.⁴²

Until this time the Afrikaner family had cooperated with white frontiersmen. In 1792, Eric Walker relates, they did 'yeoman service' in commandos against the San, killing over 600.⁴³ Shortly afterwards, perhaps even after Pienaar had allowed them to flee the colony, Afrikaner was requested by government officials to drive Gideon Visagie from his farm north of the Orange because of his raiding activities.⁴⁴ Nor would the white frontiers-

³⁹ Theal, *RecCC*, IV, 200.

⁴⁰ See, for example, J. Kicherer, *LMS Transactions*, II, 1 (1804), 27; Borchers, *Memoir*, 91, 93; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 226.

⁴¹ Campbell, *Travels*, 357; *Marais, Cape Coloured People*, 132.

⁴² See, for accounts of the Afrikaner family at this time, Campbell, *Travels*, 'History of Africaner...', 357-8; Smith, *Diary*, I, 202-4, 257-8 [Evidence of R. Moffat]; Borchers, *Memoir*, 91; Kicherer, *LMS Transaction*, II, 1, 27; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, I, 139; Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 18; Thompson, *Travels*, 290, Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. V; J. L. M. Franken, *Duminy-Dagboeke* (Cape Town: 1938), 213-234. Campbell indicates that Afrikaner murdered Pienaar in 1794: others say 1798 which seems more likely.

⁴³ Quotation from Walker, *History*, 118. See Theal, *History Before 1795*, III, 212-4 who says Afrikaner, and presumably Pienaar, had recently moved from the Witsenberg to the Hantam.

⁴⁴ Theal, *History Before 1795*, III, 214-5 relates that, after the commando against the San, which had made the government 'well satisfied' with his conduct, he was granted more ammunition which he used to attach 'a band of half-breed and Hottentot marauders under the leadership of a European renegade.' He did so and took some of their guns which he delivered to the Government in Cape Town on August 7, 1793. See also R. Moffat in Smith, *Diary*, I, 255-6; [Stel Vol 3/12: Kriminale Verklaringen, 1786-1793] (for complaints against Visagie by white burghers, Cornelius Kok, and Nama including 'de Oude' Links, Cupido Links and 'Zwartbooi') [Quoted in Mossop (ed.), *Journals of Brink and Rhenius*, 114-5];

men, even the field-cornets, necessarily have objected to Afrikaner's cattle-raiding, since Pienaar was highly regarded among them.⁴⁵ The murder of Pienaar, however, was a direct attack on the system of Khoi dependence, especially as it was believed by the farmers, though denied by Afrikaner, that he had murdered Pienaar's wife and children as well.⁴⁶ Some white farmers approached the Berends family and offered them guns and powder if they would destroy Afrikaner, sparking a lengthy series of engagements between the two groups of non-white frontiersmen which included at least one battle waged intermittently over five days.⁴⁷ Afrikaner soon discovered that it was the colonists who had set Berends to attack him, and returned to the colony to take his revenge on the instigators. Though the evidence is confusing, it would seem that it was at this time that Afrikaner and his following attacked and killed the son of Hermanus Engelbrecht of the Khamiesberg and plundered his farm.⁴⁸ Now, indeed, the cooperation which had existed between Afrikaner and the farmers had turned to unrelenting hostility.

Klaas Afrikaner had based himself north of the Orange not far below the Aughrabies falls, where he collected around him an increasing number of Kora and San, and would soon hand over the leadership of his following to his son Jager.⁴⁹ His revolt had had a traumatic effect on the political and economic patterns of the frontier zone. The Berends family had been placed in the role of combatants for which they, as hunters and traders, could have had little enthusiasm, and division had been created between them and the Koks who for the moment were prudently concerned with conciliating Afrikaner.⁵⁰ Furthermore the continuation and intensification of his raiding north of the Orange and

Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. V. Theal also claims that Afrikaner possessed a Company staff of office as a Khoi chief.

⁴⁵ See Smith, *Diary*, I, 204 for the awe in which the other local officials held Pienaar, who was apparently himself a field-cornet (or field-sergeant).

⁴⁶ Afrikaner told Robert Moffat that Pienaar's wife, whom they had not harmed, had escaped through a window with her children, and that one child had been killed and another seriously wounded by some San who were resentful at Pienaar's treatment of them: see Smith, *Diary*, I, 258. But see, for example, Campbell, *Travels*, 358.

⁴⁷ See, besides the sources already cited, Anderson, August 12, 1806 [LMS 3/3/B]; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 226-7; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 239 (which implies that the fighting was in 1796); Theal, *RecCC*, II, 423, 437-8, 464-5; Jan Bloem in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 293-4; Smith, *Diary*, I, 258-261; Philip, *Researches*, II, 215-225.

⁴⁸ Hermanus Engelbrecht to field-Cornet van Wyk, May 11, 1799 (Theal, *RecCC*, II, 423). Stow, *Native Races*, 342-3 says however that 'we learn from Borchers' that Van Wyk had reported the murder of Engelbrecht by the Afrikaner following, numbering over 100, *early in January*. See also *ibid.*, 330-1. Kicherer, *LMS Transactions*, II, 1, 31-2 believes that Engelbrecht was murdered by the fugitive Stephanus, but unless this occurred before he reached the Orange from the Zak River, this would have been in 1800.

⁴⁹ See Albrecht and Siedenfaden, entry October 22 [LMS Journals 1/6]; Campbell, *Travels*, 272-1.

⁵⁰ See, particularly, Anderson, August 12, 1806 [LMS 3/3/B].

along it created a flood of refugees who fled eastwards up the Orange, and contributed to the disruption of trading patterns: for a number of years thereafter those attempting to trade north of the Orange would be treated with hostility, for the Nama had come to fear the 'hat-wearers' as robbers and marauders.⁵¹ This disruption became even more pronounced as Afrikaner's revolt merged into the general uprising of Khoi in the Graaff-Reinet and Swellendam districts after April 1799. Indeed there is some tenuous evidence suggesting a direct connection in terms of leadership between the two events.⁵² Through May and June 1799 reports went in to the government from the north-western districts of farmers being robbed and (predominantly) their dependents murdered. The indications are strong that these acts were committed by disaffected Khoi or slaves intending to take their booty of horses, guns and powder to Afrikaner.⁵³ This rather disjointed and unplanned rebellion appears to have continued in the north-west until at least the middle of 1800, although there are some indications that Afrikaner was willing to make peace with the farmers in 1799.⁵⁴

To escape from Afrikaner, the Berends family and their followers, followed rather more slowly by the Koks, retreated higher up the Orange River. Here the Berends family came to hear of the mission established in 1799 by the London Missionary Society among the San at the Zak River. The missionaries had, within a short time of their arrival, received requests from Kora groups on the Orange to proceed there, and had been visited by Bastards from the Orange, Adam Balie, for example, and Peter Goeyman, who were to be early converts. When a request from the Berends' group was added to that of the Kora, and new arrivals had reinforced missionary numbers, four missionaries of the LMS decided to pursue their activities on the Orange.⁵⁵ Within the next few months the

⁵¹ See Albrecht, *et al.*, entry October 14 [LMS Journals 1/6]; A. Albrecht, entries June-September [LMS Journals 1/15]; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. VIII.

⁵² This is the presence of people named Stuurman (a) as leaders of the eastern frontier revolt in 1799, (b) on the northern frontier, with Afrikaner. The name is indeed common, and the northern frontier evidence consists in a mention in 1778, and in the existence of a raider named Stuurman on the Orange river in the late 1820's and early 1830's who had been attached to Cornelius Kok and, prior to that, Afrikaner: see Moodie, *Record*, III, 73; Smith, *Diary*, I, 302-3; Philip in [538 of 1836, 616-8, 627]. For the eastern frontier Stuurman see, for example, Marais, *Maynier*, 104ff; Philip, *Researches*, I, Chs. IV-VI; II, 371-3; Bannister, *Humane Policy*, 54-5.

⁵³ See, for example, Theal, *RecCC*, II, 424, 437-8, 464-5; XXXI, 39-40; Stow, *Native Races*, 341-4.

⁵⁴ See Landdrost of Stellenbosh to Brig. -General Fraser, August 10, 1799 [Theal, *RecCC*, II, 464-5]. Before 1805, at any rate, Afrikaner was at peace with the government as represented by Field-Cornet Van der Westhuizen: see Albrecht, *et al.*, entry October 1, 1805 [LMS Journals 1/6].

⁵⁵ Anderson, August 12, 1806 [LMS 3/3/B]; Kicherer in *LMS Transactions*, II, 1 *passim*; Campbell, *Travels*, 228. Kicherer later stated that 'the people did not come to the missionaries; but the missionaries went to the people.' This argument would be inverted by Philip and elaborated to show that the Griqua were dependent on the missionary society for territory since 'the Grikwas did not receive the missionaries into that country, but that the missionaries found the country for them. When...Anderson and Kramer first

missionaries has settled with the 200 or so followers of Berends, supplemented by Kora and San, at Rietfontein, 70 miles from the Orange River, had built a temporary church, and, with the assistance of twenty Khoi who came with them from the Zak River, begun to cultivate the land.⁵⁶ Through the missionaries, no doubt, the Kora and Berends hoped to protect themselves from further engagements with Afrikaner.

Meanwhile the Kok following, established some eight days lower down the river, had also found a white 'protector', though of a different kind. A Pole named Stephanus, a forger escaped from prison in the Colony who had found refuge for a while at the Zak River mission, had fled to the Koks where he also built a temporary church and began preaching. Hearing that he was inciting the Koks against them, the LMS missionaries visited Stephanus and managed to induce him to head for the west coast where he could try and escape in a passing ship. On the way, however, he encountered a local official who tried to apprehend him; Stephanus killed him and fled, this time to Afrikaner.⁵⁷ At this stage, perhaps incited by Stephanus, or perhaps because the Koks' wealth in cattle and sheep was an irresistible target, Afrikaner broke his peace with the Kok family. The consequence was reunion of the Kok and Berends groups. In February 1802 they engaged in a joint expedition against Afrikaner with the assistance of an official government expedition sent to barter cattle north of the Orange. A few months later the two groups joined together as Sandcraal (or Canahiephyjs) which lay midway between Rietfontein and the Kok settlement at Bethesda.⁵⁸

Thus by the middle of 1802 at least two groupings of non-white frontiersmen were engaged in the preliminaries of establishing a political system to provide security for themselves in the frontier zone, a security which for different reasons they had not been able to achieve within the colony as government authority spread towards its boundaries. Already established with one state were missionaries of the LMS, to whom Afrikaner would soon be making overtures too. Of the four LMS missionaries who had joined Berends at the Orange, only William Anderson and his colonist assistant, Cornelius Kramer, would remain for any time.⁵⁹ Anderson, the thirty-three year old son of a British merchant, who

went among this people they found them wandering on the borders of the Beaufort and Clanwilliam districts': Kicherer in Campbell to Cradock, January 28, 1814 [Theal, *RecCC*, IX, 318-9]; Philip in [538 of 1836, 149]. See also Chapter 9.

⁵⁶ See, besides the above, Anderson, December 6, 1801 [LMS 1/4/E]; September 7, 1802 and September 13, 1802 [LMS 2/2/B]: Borchers, *Memoir*, 71-2; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 242, 252. Also the statement by Anderson, December 23, 1825 [Quoted in Philip, *Researches*, 57-60; 538 of 1836, 608-9].

⁵⁷ For Stephanus see Kicherer, *LMS Transactions*, II, 1, 22-32 *passim*; Barrow, *Cochin-China*, 424-7; Burchell, *Travels*, I, 252-3; Campbell, *Travels*, 'Account of Stephanus...', 359-360. He was eventually killed by the inhabitants of Great Namaqualand.

⁵⁸ See Borchers, *Memoir*, 91-5; Anderson, September 7 and 13, 1802 [LMS 2/2/B].

⁵⁹ J. J. Kicherer left almost immediately to return to the Colony, then to Holland and England. Soon after

was to marry the daughter of a Cape official in 1806, remained with the Bastards on the Orange for nearly twenty years. Kramer, absent from the mission in the Colony for long periods of time, would finally abandon the mission to go to the Cedarberg in 1813, leaving Anderson to be assisted by Lambert Jansz, who joined the Bastards after an abortive expedition to the Tlhaping in 1805.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, lower on the Orange, another party of LMS missionaries, refused permission to work inside the Colony with Cornelius Kok, (who had himself not moved to the Orange), established themselves among the Nama and Oorlam communities of the area and were soon engaged with Afrikaner's following too. But the LMS effort never took foothold here: the temperamental Afrikaner soon abandoned the missions and in 1812 attacked the people at two stations. Soon after this Henry Helm and Christopher Sass, two arrivals of 1811, began to move slowly north-eastwards with the remainder of the Kok family and following, leaving some other missionaries to restore relations with Afrikaner and continue with other Oorlam groups. Apart from the conversion of Jager Afrikaner by Ebner and Robert Moffat in 1817-8, the sporadic continuance of LMS activity in Namaqualand was soon overshadowed by Wesleyan and Rhenish Society activity.⁶¹ On the middle Orange, Lambert Jansz died in 1815,

his return with missionary reinforcements for the LMS in 1805, he accepted a post as Dutch Reformed Church Minister at Graaff-Reinet: he died in 1825. For William Edwards, see Chapter 5.

⁶⁰ A biographical chapter on Anderson, sometimes inaccurate, may be found in John Bond, *They Were South Africans*. Kramer was described as popular with the Bastards in 1813, though he had been at the station only two years in the previous seven and would soon leave: Read, July 29, 1813 [LMS 5/2/D]. For Jansz see also Chapter 5.

⁶¹ See Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Chs. V-VII; Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 74-5. Since the Afrikaner family will be mentioned only peripherally in this study, this is a convenient stage at which briefly to resume their subsequent history, in the hope of stimulating further research. Though Jonker Afrikaner has been the subject of a carefully-researched historical novel by W. A. De Klerk, *Die Laer*, it is shameful that the family has been given such scant treatment by historians. The converted Jager Afrikaner died in 1823, handing the chieftainship to his son Jonker who immediately took up again the raiding career which Jager had relinquished, re-establishing Afrikaner domination over the lower valley of the Orange. Soon after this, the leading Nama community invited the well-armed Afrikaner following to join with them in beating back the Herero who were slowly taking over their cattle-lands. This Jonker did, and by 1835-40 was established near Windhoek, where he would build a state in which Herero as well as Nama became subjects or tributaries: when he died in 1861, his son would claim to be permanent chief of Hereroland. Meanwhile David Afrikaner, brother of Jonker, had before 1840 returned southwards to establish a Christian community in association with the Wesleyans at the old 'Afrikaner's kraal.' Though the Afrikaner family was brutal in its raiding tactics, their constructive contribution should not be neglected: free from any government pressures, Jager and then Jonker Afrikaner built up frontier states, incorporating persons from many different cultures, on a scale nor achieved by any other Oorlam or Griqua leader. Their relations with other Nama and Oorlam groups, with missionaries, and with the Herero, need close attention. Among the published sources dealing with the Afrikaners in this period are Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Chs. VIII-XII; Sir J. E. Alexander, *An Expedition of Discovery into the Interior of Africa, 1836-7*; J. Backhouse, *Narrative...*; B. Risdale, *Scenes and Adventures in Great Namaqualand, 1843-7*; *The Journals of Joseph Tindall* (ed. B. A. Tindall); Vedder, *South West Africa*, 179-182, 186-9, 196-281 *passim*.

leaving behind a half-caste son who in the 1840's would emerge as a Griqua counselor: Jansz was replaced by Helm and Sass.⁶²

The Colonial Government, the Northern Frontier and the Missionaries, 1800 – 1815

Until 1822 missionaries of the LMS were the only continuous expressions of the authority of the Colony on the northern frontier. For a part of this period, in fact, the missionaries were viewed by the non-white frontiersmen as agents of Government. This was largely because the Colonial government was inhibited from a more direct exertion of its authority in the area by two factors: logistics were unfavorable, and the northern frontiersmen were non-white. Afrikaner's state, and the Kok-Berends state which would become established at Griquatown were separated from the Colony by hundreds of miles of barren terrain inhabited by few others than scattered San. Any attempt to impose Colony authority on these states was impossible, since, forewarned, the frontiersmen could flee further to the interior: conversely, the frontier states could not be regarded as posing a serious military threat to the Colony.⁶³ Furthermore, and as a result of these two factors, government was relatively uninformed on events in the north in comparison with those in the east.⁶⁴ The official government expedition which proceeded to the Orange River and the Tlhaping, its sole mission to replenish the depleted cattle supply at the Cape, left so little information on record that one of the first acts of Henry Van De Graaff, appointed Landdrost of the new Tulbagh district (1804) was to travel north 'to gain information respecting the conduct and disposition of the Hottentots of the Great River...these equivocal and dangerous people.'⁶⁵ Only after 1814, when Andries Stockenstrom, Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet took over responsibility for the middle Orange from Tulbagh, did events in the area force the attention of Government. The new sub-magistracy at Beaufort in 1818, and the appointment of a Government Agent to the Griqua were both indicative of renewed attempts to exert direct Colonial authority.

⁶² For the death of Jansz, see Anderson, February 2, 1815 [LMS 6/1/B]; Helm and Sass [LMS Journals, 2/47]. For his wife and son see Read, July 29, 1813 [LMS 5/2/D]; Solomon, November 13, 1848 [LMS 23/4/C]; December 28, 1849 [LMS 24/1/B]; May 30, 1850 [LMS 25/1/C]; L. Jansz (Jr.) in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 10-6, 351-2.

⁶³ See Lichtenstein, *Travels*, 11, 241-1. Also Chapter 6, footnote 23.

⁶⁴ See, for example, Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 150 commenting on the reasons for the establishment of the Tulbagh magistracy.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 151-2. Also *ibid.*, II, 240. Lichtenstein accompanied Van de Graaff on this expedition. For 1801 expedition see Theal, *RecCC*, IV 198-202, 359-436; Barrow, *Cochin-China*, 365-436; Borchers, *Memoir*, 40-133.

In the meantime, however, Colonial authority was mediated through the missionaries; and even after the appointment of a Government agent, missionaries were to continue to play an important political role. The reasons for this need examination for, overtly at least, the missionary societies which emerged from the British evangelical revival were not political organizations. The London Missionary Society was formed merely to 'spread the knowledge of Christ among heathen and other unenlightened nations.'⁶⁶ Moreover, the first four missionaries from the LMS who arrived in the Colony in 1799 had intended to work among the Xhosa in complete detachment from the Colony. That within a few years the first permanent establishments has been founded among the Khoi at Bethelsdorp, and among the Bastards and others on the Orange river, in both cases with explicit political implications, was little more than fortuitous.⁶⁷ The 'political' activity of the missionaries resulted, initially at least, as much from circumstances as intent. Nevertheless, as Stockenström would later argue,

I dare say I shall give offence to some of the missionaries by saying that I do not think they have done so much in the way of Christianizing as I think they have been useful in a political point of view...I differ from those who think the principal object is to start with religion...I think the influence which they obtained was more of a political nature, because these natives looked upon them as a sort of medium of communication between them and government...I think they can be principally beneficial...in making representations on behalf of those natives and warning the government of the state of things, as also by their advice restraining the depredations of the natives.⁶⁸

The pressures towards 'political' activity were even more fundamental than Stockenström suggests. 'Politics' may often be defined by a society, or a social group, as activity to change the *status quo*, while activity in support of the *status quo* is not so defined. In this sense, where missionaries were working outside the Colony among societies whose interests were not necessarily in coincidence with those of the Colony, submission to the status quo in either society would constitute 'political' activity with respect to the other. And in such a situation, the missionaries naturally tended towards submission to the Colony authorities, whose disfavor they believed would prevent their activity. Thus when Van de Graaff, on his journey in 1805, informed William Anderson that the Batavian administration was perturbed by the presence on the Orange of armed Bastards supposedly

⁶⁶ Lovett, *History*, I, 30.

⁶⁷ Van der Kemp had been forced by the Colony government to withdraw from the Xhosa to Graaff-Reinet, where he began preaching to refugee Khoi. Two other missionaries had been diverted from the Xhosa mission on their arrival in Cape Town in order to set up a mission for the San on the Zak River, from where, as described above, they proceeded to the Orange; the Zak River mission was abandoned in 1806.

⁶⁸ Stockenström in [538 of 1836, 184-5]. See also, for example, R. Edwards, September 24, 1841 [LMS 18/2/A].

under the leadership of a missionary of foreign (British) origin, Anderson assured Van de Graaff that he was 'completely under the control of the government.'⁶⁹ LMS Directors, replying to a query as to whether William Edwards, missionary among the San on the Zak River, should correspond with government about San political concerns, wrote that they 'trust[ed] that Br. Edwards...will be able to forward such information to General Dundas⁷⁰ as may be *expected* from him.'

Such circumstantial involvement soon shaded into political initiative. This was partly for the reasons suggested by Stockenstrom: political initiatives could take the form of pseudo-diplomatic representations on behalf of the community among whom the missionaries were working. In a Memorial to Lord Caledon in 1809, Anderson appealed for the granting of 'common privileges' in the Colony to baptized members of his institution at Klaarwater (Griquatown).⁷¹ Further, and it was probably a main reason why the Bastards welcomed a missionary presence, Anderson was able to negotiate with the Colony for a supply of the precious gunpowder. In 1801 the official expedition had granted some for the defense of the institution, but this, used for hunting as much as protection, had been exhausted by 1805. When Anderson journeyed to the Colony in 1806 and 1809, therefore, a major purpose was to secure further supplies of powder.⁷² In the latter case the supply was of exceptional urgency, for the settlement was threatened by raiders of Xhosa extraction: in 1808 the missionaries had appealed unavailingly to Van de Graaff for the launching of a military expedition against these raiders.⁷³

But such pseudo-diplomatic initiatives could not be separated from matters of more direct interest to the Colony or the missionaries themselves. In Anderson's 1809 Memorial to Caledon he asked that the ban be lifted on the teaching of writing at missionary institutions, a ban imposed by Janssens in 1805.⁷⁴ Being outside the Colony, it could be argued, he could simply have taught writing: this was an unnecessary appeal to Colony authority. The same would apply to his request to Van de Graaff, in 1805, as to what attitude he should take towards commandos by the Bastards against the San who were raiding their cattle.⁷⁵

⁶⁹ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 260. Also *ibid.*, II, 257.

⁷⁰ Clinton, *Melting Pot*, 15. (My emphasis).

⁷¹ See Anderson, July 24, 1809 [LMS 4/1/C]; June 30, 1809 [LMS 4/3/B].

⁷² See Anderson, August 1, 1806; August 22, 1806, [LMS 3/3/B]; September 1, 1806 [LMS 3/3/C]; Anderson to Philip, February 13, 1823 [LMS; PPapers 3/1/A]. Also Hardcastle to Caledon, February 27, 1809 [LMS 4/1/A]; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 259; Anderson, entry February 3, 1806 [LMS Journals 1/8].

⁷³ See Anderson to Bird, July 10, 1814 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/A].

⁷⁴ For Janssens Edict, February 20, 1805, see [50 of 1835, 163-4]; Du Plessis, *Christian Missions*, 425-8.

⁷⁵ Anderson, entry July 1805 [LMS Journals 1/2]. Van de Graaff replied, on August 16, 1805, that he left 'the same to your own option and judgement' [Anderson LMS Journals 1/14]. On these raids see also

On the Colonial side, such initiatives by the missionaries were welcome because of the lack of other means of information about, or influence on, non-white communities beyond the northern border. If the authority of the Colony in this area was at the best slight, it was further negated by the collusion in illegal acts between white colonists, including local officials, and non-white frontiersmen. And on the part of the missionaries, these initiatives were not solely the result of a pragmatic response to their situation. The cooperation between missionaries and government was fostered by the broad ideological assumptions they shared about policies to be followed towards 'heathen' and non-white peoples in general. The heathen, it was believed, should be introduced to 'Christianity' and 'Civilization.' 'Civilization', it was broadly understood, implied the acceptance and practice of the customs and institutions of European, and specifically, British, society. It included the Protestant virtues of industry, regularity, thrift and cleanliness no less than the wearing of European clothes, the building of European-style houses, secure and square. So long as the government endorsed these goals, so long were the missionaries prepared for unconditional cooperation. So long as the missionaries appeared to be promoting these goals, so long was the approval of government ensured. Thus in 1809 Lord Caledon informed Anderson that the Orange River mission would have 'every support in his power' because of its 'most beneficial effects in recalling the Native...to habits of Industry and Regularity, without which it will ever be impossible to bind them in Society.'⁷⁶

A rupture in this harmonious cooperation between missionaries and government for the simultaneous extension of Christianity, Civilization, and the authority of the Colony was likely to occur only when the two elements differed on the chief mode by which 'civilization' was to be fostered. More specifically, it would occur when there was a divergence of approach on this matter between the government and the *people* of the missionary institutions. Such a divergence, which developed at the LMS Bethelsdorp institution soon after its formation, provides an instructive comparative prelude to a similar breakdown of relations on the northern frontier.

Bethelsdorp was founded by mutual agreement between government and the LMS to provide some security for landless Khoi in the aftermath of the Oorlam revolt of 1799.⁷⁷ It soon emerged that the government, concerned at this time with the pacification of a restless and labor-hungry white farmer population and with the security of the eastern frontier, believed that the way to Khoi 'civilization' lay through service to white farmers

Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 259; Anderson's Journals, 1805 – 8 [LMS Journals 1/2-1/20].

⁷⁶ C. Bird to Anderson, October 11, 1809 [LMS 4/1/C]. See also Caledon to Castlereagh, October 16, 1809 [Theal, *RecCC*, VII, 170-5]; A. Cowan and E. Donovan to Anderson, December 24, 1808 [Quoted in Anderson to Philip, February 13, 1823, LMS: PPapers 3/1/A].

⁷⁷ This, revolt has been inadequately studied; but see, for example, Marais *Maynier*, 104ff.

and induction in the Cape Hottentot Corps (in which the Khoi continued to play an indispensable role in frontier defense).⁷⁸ The missionaries, on the other hand, laid their stress on religious instruction, and the fostering of occupations which would give the Khoi economic alternatives to farm-labor: independent agriculture, herding, and ‘mechanical arts and little manufactures.’⁷⁹ Slow in producing demonstrable results of the ‘civilizing influence’ of such occupations, J. T. Van der Kemp, head of the institution and nominal directing missionary of the LMS in South Africa, and his young associate, James Read, were quick in resisting government. Their disgust at the ‘cruelty and injustice’ of the white colonists led them to dissuade the Khoi from labor service, while Van der Kemp also threatened not to release Khoi for military service.⁸⁰ The conflict, initially between the missionaries and local officials, soon escalated into a confrontation with the Colonial government itself. James Read called on the LMS Directors to secure intervention to remedy the injustice suffered by the Khoi, while the government threatened to deport Read and Van der Kemp and to close Bethelsdorp entirely.

The eruption of this open conflict between the LMS and the government was blamed by the LMS at the time, and by most subsequent historians, on the personality and views of Van der Kemp.⁸¹ Indeed, both Van der Kemp and Read had a philosophy ill-adapted to a society of white settlement. Their marriages with non-whites — Read with a Khoi woman and Van der Kemp with a freed slave — demonstrated their belief in practicing as well as preaching the equality of men under God. Their hatred of injustice did not permit them any expedient or pragmatic tempering of their criticisms of white colonists or government. But the conflict had two other aspects. That it occurred at Bethelsdorp was as much the result of the attitudes of the Khoi inhabitants of the institution as of Van der Kemp. The other missionary institutions established in the Colony for the Khoi, with which Bethelsdorp was often unfavorably compared, were, for the most part, based on Khoi communities still living a largely traditional life and keeping aloof from the farmers as much as was, under the circumstances, possible.⁸² The Khoi at Bethelsdorp were

⁷⁸ See Marais, *Maynier*, 53; *Cape Coloured People*, 131-4.

⁷⁹ See Van der Kemp to General Dundas, February 11, 1801 [Quoted in Philip, *Researches*, I, 71-6].

⁸⁰ See, for example, Van der Kemp to Janssens, April 18, 1804 [Clifton, *Melting Pot*, 54]; Van der Kemp to Janssens, April 19, 1805 [Philip, *Researches*, II, 444-7]. For analysis of the Bethelsdorp affair see particularly Clinton, *Melting Pot*, 52-63; Macmillan, *Cape Coloured Question*, Chs. VII, XI, XII, Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 116-131, 134-154 *passim*; H. A. Reyburn, ‘Land, Labour and Law,’ *The Critic*, October 1934, 40-56; Harry A. Gailey, Jr., ‘The London Missionary Society and the Cape Government, 1799-1828,’ PhD. Thesis, UCLA, September 1957. Much primary material is quoted in Philip, *Researches*; Bannister, *Humane Policy*; Theal, *RecCC*. Vols. VI-X.

⁸¹ See Campbell, *Travels*, 97 – 8, 393 – 4; Philip to Colonial Secretary [As quoted by Somerset in Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 245 – 6]. Also, for example, Martin, *Van der Kemp*, *passim*.

⁸² See, for example, Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 109-110; Macmillan, *Cape Coloured Questions*, 28.

‘Oorlams’: they had almost all been in service, and in service with farmers of the eastern districts where, as already noted, oppression seems to have been most severe. And all these Khoi had witnessed, if not participated in, a recent rebellion.⁸³ Besides Van der Kemp and the ‘Oorlams’, however the Bethelsdorp affair was the result of secondary ideological differences between missionaries and government over modes of civilization’. These may be seen clearly expressed in the views of Governor Cradock and John Campbell, LMS Director sent to investigate the Bethelsdorp crisis in 1812. Instruction of the Khoi, insisted Campbell, was the answer to the problem:

...[the Khoi] can be of comparatively little service to the government while they remain in [a] state...of ignorance and barbarism...to grant instruction to the Hottentots would certainly attach them more to the Government... Perhaps were the Hottentots better educated, they would be more respected by the Boors, and consequently be better treated.⁸⁴

Cradock did not agree. It was necessary to ‘unite some degree of activity and industry with the really venerated, if under due regulation, but otherwise specious and fallacious principles of the missionaries.’⁸⁵

...the exercise and sole display of religion alone, without aiding in the general task of labor and industry, the appointed lot of all mortals, must be prejudicial to any country, and especially to this colony, where from the want of sufficient population no man can be idle without positive injury...if idleness is allowed to prevail, or if the labors in the field, at the proper seasons of the year, are not cheerfully accorded to all the surrounding Farmers, to ensure industry in general terms, and most extensive usefulness, it would seem very injudicious to allot any considerable portion of lands to these institutions, that would render them independent of any connection with their neighbours.⁸⁶

In 1814 Cradock attempted to extend these principles to the extra-colonial missions, and specifically to William Anderson’s station on the Orange River. Anderson, the government demanded, was to make sure that no deserters — criminals, slave, Khoi or Bastards — escaped to the Orange, and was to secure the return of those that did. And he was to arrange the furnishing of twenty youths between the ages of 17 and 20 years old to

⁸³ See, for example, Report of Circuit Commissioners [1812?] [Theal, *RecCC*, 74-6] who found many ‘former robbers and murderers’ at Bethelsdorp. Besides the Stuurman family with whom Van der Kemp and Read had contact, other possible rebel leaders, or their relatives, such as one Boezak, were at Bethelsdorp: Read, January 1807 [LMS 3/4/A]; Marais, *Maynier*, 138; Clinton, *Melting Pot*, 68.

⁸⁴ Campbell to Cradock, [n.d.] [Theal, *RecCC*, IX, 310-2]. See also, for example, Hamilton, April 28, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C].

⁸⁵ Cradock to Bathurst, December 14, 1814, [Theal, *RecCC*, IX, 355-6].

⁸⁶ Cradock to Colonel Vicars, November 14, 1812 [Theal, *RecCC*, IX, 7-10]; Cradock to Campbell, February 10, 1814 [*ibid.*, IX 349-353]. And see Campbell’s concession-making reply, dated February 12, 1814 [*ibid.*, IX, 353-5].

join the Hottentot Regiment in the Zwartveld.⁸⁷ In part, no doubt, these demands were intended to test William Anderson's mission as the result of the discrediting of the LMS institutions by the Bethelsdorp crisis. But, as Anderson recognized, they were basically a result of the growing labor shortage in the Colony produced by the abolition of the slave trade in 1807.⁸⁸ This labor-shortage had already resulted in the strengthening of Colony authority over the Khoi, by means of the regulative and repressive aspects of the Caledon Code of 1809, whose slight provisions for Khoi protection were further outweighed by Cradock's apprenticeship amendment of 1812. These measures had, no doubt, led many Khoi and Bastards to flee to the north to escape the restrictions; probably the abolition of the slave trade had induced desertion by slaves as well. Further, the existing shortage of labor made it more difficult for the government to recruit soldiers for the Cape Hottentot Corps. Hence, through the missionaries who had thus far considered themselves 'completely under the control of the government,' the Colony sought to extend its authority to the Orange.

The Colony authorities from this time on, regarded the Bastards of the Orange as politically 'dependent' on the colony and, at least until alternative procedures were sanctioned, subject to Colonial law.⁸⁹ But the Bastards, who had removed themselves from the authority of the Colony in the eighteenth century explicit to avoid military service and labor demands, could not be expected to submit to the Colony unresisting, especially if they were to be placed on a level with non-whites in the Colony. Nor did the missionaries have the power of local officials. John Campbell, in drawing up a set of regulations for the Bastard state on the Orange in 1813, had carefully drafted the thirteenth regulation to provide that persons 'flying from justice' to Klaarwater (Griquatown) should be handed over 'to such persons as may be sent in pursuit of them': as he later pointed out, he had wanted to make it obligatory for them to be delivered to the Colony but realized that neither the missionaries nor 'a few simple Griqua' could succeed in this.⁹⁰ Similarly, Anderson was not able to persuade the Griqua to furnish recruits: despite government

⁸⁷ Meynell to Anderson, January 3, 1814 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/A and in Philip, *Researches*, II, 61-2]. The youths would serve for seven years and be discharged with a bounty of ten rix dollars if an equal number would replace them; while serving they would receive religious and secular education. The issue of deserters seems to have been first raised in the 1814 Campbell-Cradock correspondence: see Campbell to Cradock, January 28, 1814 [Theal, *RecCC*, IX, 318-9].

⁸⁸ See Anderson, November 15, 1814 [LMS 5/4/C].

⁸⁹ See, particularly, Anderson, November 15, 1814 [LMS 5/4/C]. In 1809 Adam Kok II and Berend Berends had been given Colonial sanction as chiefs of the Griqua state, but this, as with Khoi chiefs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was meant to guarantee independence rather than subjection.

⁹⁰ Campbell, *Travels*, 238; LMS Board Minutes, April 21, 1817 [LMS Archives]. See also 'Minutes of Conference of missionaries...August 1814 [LMS 5/2/E] for discussion of this point.

threats, the Griqua would not volunteer. 'The subject view'd on both sides is too hard,' they said.⁹¹

On the eastern frontier the Colonial government had successfully suppressed one rebellion by white frontiersmen by cutting their ammunition supply, and on other occasions had used military force or the threat of it.⁹² For the reasons already outlined, they were neither willing or able to do this in the north. Threats were indeed made. A military expedition was contemplated, and the Colonial Secretary wrote to Anderson that

...it is true that you may urge that your Institution is without the Colonial Border and therefore not properly subject to the Government of this Territory, but it is also to be remarked that you have on every occasion received protection from the Colony...If you then wish that this protection should be continued to you the Condition imposed must be that, by which every Society is bound, viz. that of contributing to the General protection. On the other hand should you continue to refuse the aid required...then all communication and connexion whatever will be considered as at an end between your Establishment and the Government of this Settlement.⁹³

But such threats were not enforced. Despite his inability to return deserters, despite his inability to raise military conscripts, despite the growing infuriation the new and autocratic Governor Lord Charles Somerset felt with the LMS, Anderson, after negotiations in the Colony in 1814-5, was able to resume his post and permitted to move freely between the Colony and the institution.⁹⁴ With respect to government, his position was thereby strengthened, for the government thus demonstrated that even if the missionaries could not be agents of enforcement, it preferred to have them beyond the Colony as a means of information rather than not at all. With respect to the Bastards of the Orange, Anderson's position was weakened since his conflict with government had exposed more clearly his previous role as, in some sense, an agent of the Colony government.

⁹¹ Anderson to Bird, July 10, 1814 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/A].

⁹² See Marais, *Maynier*, 90-3. The rebels responded with a threat to cut the cattle-supply to the Cape, but the embargo on ammunition was a stronger sanction.

⁹³ Bird to Anderson, May 27, 1814 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/A]. Bird also referred to Anderson being 'replaced in the situation from which you were driven' by government support. This, referring to the grant of powder in 1809 which was presumably used to repel the Xhosa raiders attack in 1812, was incorrect: the missionaries were not driven from the station.

⁹⁴ See Anderson to Meynell, March 26, 1814; Anderson to Bird, July 10, 1814 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/A]; 'Minutes of conference...August 1814 [LMS 5/2/E]; Missionaries at conference to Bird, August 25, 1814 [LMS 5/4/A]; Anderson, October 29, 1814 [LMS 5/4/B]; Anderson, November 15, 1814; December 1, 1814 [LMS 5/4/C]. Also Philip, *Researches*, II, 61-4, 447-50. The correspondence led to escalated missionary-government hostility, especially after the conference of missionaries called by Read requested the withdrawal of the order. Anderson's negotiations in Cape Town calmed the situation somewhat, though it was decided that the Bastards must 'in no case whatever' expect assistance or protection.

The non-enforcement of threats clearly strengthened the position of the Bastards. So long as the government was unable to place an embargo on ammunition by exerting control over the frontier farmers, so long as the government was restrained by logistic difficulties from the use of military force, the frontier states of the Orange retained room and time for maneuver. The government might regard them as subject to the Colony, but the gap between theory and practice allowed autonomous action. As late as 1834 in Transorangia Andrew Smith was told of the Kora, 'the system that was pursued by the Colonial Government of constantly sending messages...of a threatening character without ever going beyond that...made them...think that the Great Captain was afraid to go beyond words.'⁹⁵ In the time thus allowed, before the Colony was willing to impose effective authority, the non-white frontiersmen could strengthen their autonomy by the elaboration of an institutional base and thus, hopefully, place themselves in a better bargaining position for the future. It is the use made of this time which will be taken in the next chapter.

⁹⁵ Smith, *Diary*, I, 148-9. A *ibid.*, I, 151.

4 The Development of the Griqua State, 1800 – 1820

Except in a very formal sense, states, even miniature states like those of the South African frontier zone, do not come into existence overnight. They must establish their boundaries, their membership, their institutions; they must embody a legitimacy and a sense of identity. This makes the task of the historian hard. Observers of the early stages of a state's development may not yet recognize the structural transformations which are taking place, may not yet recognize the state's existence. Later writers, on the other hand, particularly those who are members of the state or closely associated with it, will tend to project too far back in time the contemporary institutions of the state in order to lend legitimacy.

The basic sociopolitical unit of the eighteenth century frontier has been characterized, in an earlier chapter, as the family on its farm or farms, with its Khoi or San dependents. This social unit, showing similarities to the Khoi 'tribe' except in its stratification, was common to white frontiersmen and the leading families of Bastards. And if, as has been argued earlier, the white frontier society had far less consciousness of group identity beyond the farm than has commonly been supposed, and few social or political institutions to support such identity, this was even more true of the Bastards. As they became separated from white society, however, they acquired a certain identity as 'Bastards', a name of which they became and remain proud. And increasingly through the century they must have hunted, traded or raided together, and looked among themselves for marriage partners. Increasingly the Bastards who had never been landholders would have gravitated to the wealthy landowning Bastard families. And at the same time there was a slow subtle alteration in the status of the dependents of the Bastards who, even while retaining a lower status, became their followers or subjects.

The ambivalence of the sociopolitical structure on the non-white frontier is clearly illustrated in the case of Cornelius Kok, as an earlier chapter showed, was both burgher and 'captain'. He was baptized, literate, had financial dealings in Cape Town; but he held also a staff of office as a Khoi captain from the Colony government.¹ By the end of the century Cornelius Kok and his sons were in possession of a series of farms scattered between the

¹ See Chapter 2. The date, and terms, of issue of this staff to Cornelius or Adam I should be available in the Cape Archives. The only possible mention of this particular staff in later sources is by Hendrick Hendricks, who distinguishes between a staff of chieftaincy (presumably that issued by Lord Caledon) and the 'family staff of de Koks...a cane with a golden knob' [Evidence of February 5, 1863, quoted in Lindley, *Adamantia*, 35]. See also the 1825 journal of Charles Warren which states 'Cornelius Kok the first captain, received his staff from ---- (obliterated)' [Quoted by his son, Sir Charles Warren, *On the Veldt*, 47].

Khamiesberg and the Orange, reaching almost as far up it as the present Upington: Olivenfontein, Silverfontein, Pella, the later Bethesda, and Kammas for example.² He was at once a wealthy land-holder and the ruler of a state structure, scattered around his various farms and lacking territorial integrity indeed, but a state nevertheless in which his Nama and San, Khoi and Oorlam dependents were subjects and in which his sons administered the outlying regions. 'He appeared not only to command love and respect,' it was said in 1801, 'but also...to maintain his directions by the good feeling and cooperation of those about him. His followers...bore him willing allegiance from affection; his interests seemed closely connected with theirs, and his superiority as chief or captain was tacitly acknowledged.'³

This scattered community under the leadership of Cornelius Kok overlapped with that among whom the LMS missionaries were established at Rietfontein in 1802. Perhaps half the latter group were Bastards and their following under the leadership of Solomon and 'Klein Adam', brothers of Cornelius, and Adam Johannes II, probably his eldest son.⁴ Another 200 or so were attached to the Berends family. Those Bastards who were not related to either family appear to have attached themselves in an informal manner to one or the other: Frans Jood, for example, or Hans Dreyer, or Hans Lucas or the Goeymans, the Hendricks and the Pienaars.⁵ No doubt this was because the Kok and Berends families were the first to arrive and the wealthiest, and because along the often-dry Orange there were few places where water could be found to pasture cattle and establish residence; the protection against San cattle-raids and after 1799, the raids of Afrikaner, would also have been factors. In addition to the Bastard families themselves, there were their servants, refugees from the raids of Afrikaner and, increasingly, those absorbed from the Kora and San populations of the Orange River valley itself.

By 1800, in fact, the middle Orange valley was becoming overcrowded. The increasingly density of population and, perhaps more important, an increasing concentration of wealth in cattle in the hands of the strongest which was leaving many without means

² See, for example, Albrecht and Seidenfaden [LMS Journals 1/6; 1/10; 1/15]; Borchers, *Memoir*, 91, 94; Anderson, September 13, 1802 [LMS 2/2B]; Abraham Kok in Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 153. Also Paterson, *Narrative*, 120-1.

³ Borchers, *Memoir*, 117-8.

⁴ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 252; Anderson, entries October 29, January 27 [LMS Journals 1/8]; Wright to Philip, November 9, 1831 [LMS; PPapers 3/1/B]. Adam Kok II appears to have remained further down the Orange, joining the Klaarwater settlement only in about 1806: see Albrecht and Seidenfaden, entry December 9, 1805 [LMS Journals 1/10]; Anderson, entry February 20, 1806 [LMS Journals 1/8].

⁵ See Jan Bloem in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 293; Theal, *RecCC*, IV, 404; Borchers, *Memoir*, 95ff; Burchell, *Travels*, I, 247, 251; II, 160; Wright to Philip, November 9, 1832 [LMS; PPapers 3/1/B]. Hans Dreyer had apparently been a follower of Afrikaners: see Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. V. See also, for the Goeymans, Campbell, *Travels*, 258-9; Albrecht, *et al.*, January 1813 [LMS 5/1/A].

of subsistence, demanded, a more structured political organization were serious conflicts to be avoided. A major step towards this was the insistence by the missionaries on the establishment of a settled community, deriving at least a part of its subsistence through agriculture. It was, of course as 'civilizing' influence that this measure was proposed by the missionaries: there were few doubts among the proponents of civilization that 'the advancement of a people from the pastoral to the agricultural state is the grandest and most important step in civilization.'⁶ Even so, the measure did at least provide an alternative means of subsistence.

The persuasion was not accomplished easily. Until mid-1804 Anderson and Kramer traveled with the Bastards on their perennial search for suitable pasture, in years of drought, attempting to win the confidence of an often-hostile community.⁷ No less than the white frontiersmen or the Kora and Nama, the Bastards were predominantly pastoralists. Their economy was supplemented by hunting and trade, through which they could procure more cattle, ivory, and other products to exchange for European goods in the south. Arable agriculture appeared to them neither necessary nor desirable: 'undisturbed from without and contented with few wants, they appear to enjoy a tranquility unknown to those engaged in the business and bustle of civilized society; to count over cattle and sheep on going to and returning from pasture seemed the chief occupation of the men.'⁸ Indeed agriculture could be positively harmful to the economy by absorbing time better spent in hunting and trade: among the Bantu-speaking communities agriculture was predominantly the province of the women. But to have encouraged the women to cultivate was totally against the principles of the missionaries. Nevertheless in August 1804, Anderson persuaded half of the community to plant seeds obtained from the Roggeveld over some fifteen acres of ground at a number of fountains around Klaarwater, and the results were sufficiently good for land to be allocated to some of the people after the harvest. In April 1805, Anderson began to encourage the construction of stone houses and to organize the building of a combined home and church.⁹ From then on Klaarwater would be the center of the developing Bastard state.

Amongst the members of this community there were vast differences of culture, wealth, and status. As Robert Moffat would later write, it was 'a mixed multitude of distinct tribes, having different language, customs and grades of honour, from that of the de-

⁶ Quoted approvingly by Philip, *Researches*, II, 57. On this question see also, for example, R. Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 188; J. Melvill, January 14, 1825 [LMS 9/3/a]; J. Melvill, October 17, 1825 [LMS 9/4/A]; Kolbe, October 20, 1835 [LMS 14/4/E].

⁷ For early hostility see Missionary Conference to Bird, August 25, 1814 [LMS 5/4/A]; Anderson, December 23, 1825 [538 of 1836, 608]; Philip, *Researches*, II, 101.

⁸ Borchers, *Memoir*, 117-8.

⁹ See Anderson [LMS Journals 1/2]; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 243-4, 258-9.

scendant of the colonial farmer to the very lowest state of degradation in the Bushmen. Their government, if they had any at all, was of a mingled character...each party having its claims, either of birth, power, number, or hereditary right.¹⁰ In terms of wealth, the Kok family was undoubtedly the richest, with Cornelius Kok owning at his different farms perhaps some 45,000 sheep.¹¹ Of the three thousand cattle estimated at Klaarwater in 1812, Adam J. Kok may have owned as many as 400, besides a thousand sheep, 800 goats and three of oxen. While a few families owned between 50 and 200 cows, many had only two or three cattle each.¹² Those who were in service would take charge of a few sheep or cattle, receiving for their labor perhaps only the milk obtained, but sometimes a portion of their offspring as well. In some cases Khoi dependents seem to have been paid in wages of the order of 6/- to 7/6 per month. The treatment of subordinates varied: while the Kok family were noted for their generosity, others among the Bastards acted 'with great severity, flogging and abusing them like slaves.'¹³

Gradations of wealth were complemented by gradations of status. The Bastard families, with their 'charter' of colonial descent, their guns, their horses, and in some cases wagons, regarded themselves as 'swarthy Hollanders.'¹⁴ 'In their behaviour there was a certain good-natured ostentation, a sort of vanity, which seemed to show, that they considered themselves as much superior to the rude Hottentots.'¹⁵ Better able to procure goods from the Colony, they flaunted their fine clothing and the manners of western Cape society. Conversely the Kora communities who had perforce become attached to the proto-state felt as yet no loyalty towards it. 'Their only idea was to live in indolence...they expected to be maintained entirely by the Bastards': when cultivation was begun, the Kora refused to participate unless they were paid as wage-labor.¹⁶

The area in which the Bastards, their dependents, and the refugees from Afrikaner had established themselves had previously been inhabited by San and Kora. The Klaarwater fountain was taken from the San, and Taaiboschfontein (as the name indicates) and Wit-

¹⁰ Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XIII. See also Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 242-3.

¹¹ Estimated by Borchers, *Memoir*, 118. See also Anderson, September 7, 1802 [LMS 2/2/B].

¹² See Burchell, *Travels*, I, 253-4; Anderson August 12, 1806 [LMS 3/3/B]; August 4, 1812 [LMS 5/1/D]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 277-8.

¹³ See Borchers, *Memoir*, 117 - 9; Kicherer in *LMS Transactions*, II, 1, 27. For Cornelius Kok's treatment of dependents see also Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 260, 265 - 7; A. Stokenstrom, September 13, 1820 [50 of 1835, 130-1].

¹⁴ See Anderson, August 12, 1806 [LMS 3/3/B]. Also entries January - February 1805 [LMS Journals 1/2] where Anderson remarks how the death of their horses changed 'the Hottentot who was an imaginary Dutchman in January...[to] a real Hottentot.'

¹⁵ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 244. For a description of similar 'social classes' in a contemporary 'Bastard' community see Carstens, *Social Structure*, Ch. VI.

¹⁶ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 242, 244-5, 261.

water had both been Kora sites.¹⁷ Now, as the frontiersmen entrenched themselves, and the state began to evolve a set of institutions and to define roughly its territorial limits, the Kora and San communities who were little more than accidentally encompassed within it were increasingly forced to choose between incorporation and escape. It had been a Kora community who had originally desired missionaries at the Orange, presumably as a protection against the San, and undoubtedly these who attached themselves to the settlement were augmented by others who sought protection or access to gunpowder.¹⁸ But other Kora groups, or parts of them, drifted away, it was at this time that a part at least of the Taaibosch firmly established themselves at the junction of the Harts and Vaal.¹⁹ The situation was similar for the San. Though some remained implacably hostile, and were dealt with by the Bastards as viciously as by white frontiersmen in the eighteenth century, others became incorporated in the community. We read of a San group being 'given permission' to settle at Ongeluksfontein in 1806, and another under 'Uil' not far from Kloof.²⁰ In 1813, at the settlement of Campbell, San were living peaceably side by side with Bastards, Khoi, and Tswana and John Campbell, describing the situation, commented how, despite the 'wildness' of the San, the people of Klaarwater preferred them above all others for herding cattle at a distance. By the 1820's it was quite common for San to enter contracts of hire with the Griqua, the men herding the cattle and the women guarding the cornfields. Some even held land, cultivating and owning the produce they obtained.²¹

The choice between incorporation and escape was forced on these communities by the increasing territorial definition of the state. In the years when the Bastards had been seminomadic like the Kora and San, each group could use the few scarce fountains successively or simultaneously with little problem. But by mid-1805 the state had taken permanent possession of the line of springs running some fifty miles south-west and north-east of Klaarwater, from Kloof near the Orange, through Rietfontein, Witwater, Taaiboschfon-

¹⁷ On this see particularly Anderson, December 6, 1801 [LMS 1/4/E]; Anderson in *LMS Transactions* (1804), 344 – 5; Anderson, August 12, 1806 [LMS 3/3/B]; Kramer [LMS Journals 1/7]; Burchell, *Travels*, I, 361; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 242-3; S. Kay, May 8, 1821 [MMS -1821/13]; Helm, December 27, 1822 [LMS 8/5/D]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 285; Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 32.

¹⁸ For Kora fear of the San see Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 255; Kicherer in *LMS Transactions*, II, 1, 27-8. For Kora additions to the community see Anderson and Kramer [LMS Journals 1/2-1/17].

¹⁹ See, for example, Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 253. The evidence from contemporary sources on Kora movements at this time is assessed in Maingard, 'Studies in Korana History...', 114-121; Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 32-5, 52. Less than adequate attention, however, is paid to the possibilities of incorporation in the Bastard state, and the effects of 'frontier zone disruption' during the period from 1780 onwards.

²⁰ Anderson, entry august 1805 [LMS Journals 1/2]; Campbell, *Travels*, 247-8.

²¹ Campbell, *Travels*, 227 – 9; Campbell, July 26, 1813 [LMS 5/2/D]; R. Moffat in [50 of 1835, 127-8]; Read, February 6, 1850 [LMS 25/2/B]; Stockenstrom, August 27, 1818 [Theal, *RecCC*, 34-6].

tein to Ongeluksfontein at the northern end. Before the settlement at Klaarwater, parties of Bastards and the missionaries had scouted out further fountains and found them: a number in Knoval Valley, which was later to become Campbell,²² the fountain at Daniels Kuil, which was named after the missionary Kramer.²³ The Langeberg may have been investigated for possible sites.²⁴ As numbers increased and the hegemony of the Bastard state expanded, it would be this area that the state would encompass. But despite the expansion, even by 1820 the northern limits of settlement did not trespass on the territory over which the Tlhaping claimed hegemony. Contemporary travelers describe the southernmost limit of Tlhaping territory as some eighteen and a half hours of Blinkklip (Tsantsabane) which, though temporarily occupied by Jan Bloem the elder some years before, was not settled by Griqua before 1820.²⁵ Much later in the century several Tlhaping royals were to describe a boundary line supposedly established between the Bastards and Molehabangwe (who died in 1812). Though rather south of that indicated by contemporary travelers, this line, running from a defined point in the Langeberg to Blinkklip, Daniels Kuil and to the Vaal a little below its junction with the Harts, lay north of the limits of Bastard settlement at the time.²⁶

The primary index of the establishment of a state is the emergence of a source of authority regarded as legitimate by its members. Prior to 1800 such authority as existed resided in wealthy Bastard families, pre-eminently the Koks and the Berends, and was, beyond the family and dependent unit, as loose as or looser than that in the Kora communities of the same period.²⁷ But with the establishment of a settlement, leadership involved more than the occasional commando against hostile neighbours or the resolution of a minor dispute. The population around Klaarwater included a variety of cultural

²² See particularly Burchell, *Travels*, I, 309 – 314; Waterboer to Wright, December 11, 1831 [425 of 1837, 150-1].

²³ See Anderson, entries July – December 1804 [LMS Journals 1/2]; Wright to Philip, November 9, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/B].

²⁴ See Jan Bloem in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 293-4. For other sites occupied at this period see Burchell, *Travels*, I, 251, 344, 436; II, 160; Campbell, *Travels*, 230, 242-3, 246.

²⁵ See Burchell, *Travels*, II, 208 who describes the 'Kamhanni mountains' as 'the middle of that neutral, or rather common, ground which intervened between on African nation and another, and is partly inhabited by both' (in this case 'Hottentots' and Tlhaping); Campbell, *Travels*, 165. Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 275 describes the 'Kamhanni mountains' as 'the middle of that neutral, or rather common, ground which intervened between one African nation and another, and is partly inhabited by both' (in this case 'Hottentots' and Tlhaping); Campbell, *Travels*, 165. Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 275 describes Blinkklip as the southernmost limit of Tswana 'wanderings.'

²⁶ See evidence of Jantje Mothibi, 'Kokoe', 'Matuare' son of Mothibi, Mooi (a Rolong), and Mahura in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 98, 100, 129, 134, 293-5. See also Nicholas Kruger in *ibid.*, 5; J. Ludorf in *Diamond News*, Pniel, August 1870 [Quoted in *ibid.*, T9 – 20].

²⁷ See, for example, for the Kora chiefs authority, Borchers, *Memoir*, 119; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 254; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 345; Thompson, *Travels*, 268, 372; B. Shaw, *Memorials*, 35.

groups, many with some loose leadership, and the community had goals which included the defense of an increasing territory, and the inculcation of such 'civilized' habits as cultivation, the building of European-style houses, and the spread of European customs. Thus when the population became settled in villages, Lichtenstein relates, 'the persons of most distinction among the Bastard Hottentots were appointed as magistrates to inspect and take care of the rest. Anderson, with Kramer, performed the office of pastor.'²⁸ Who 'appointed' the magistrates? Most subsequent historians, taking their cue from the claims of the missionaries themselves, have argued that it was the London Missionary Society who created the Bastard state. But the names of the available officials — Piet Berend (until his death in 1807), Klaas Berend, Hans Lucas (an associate of the Kok family), Jan Hendrik (closely associated with the Berends family), Solomon Kok and 'Kort Adam' Kok — suggests that it was still the prestige of the Kok and Berends families which counted.²⁹ However, in the absence of a figure of the stature of Cornelius Kok, the magistrates acting in their separate villages left a vacuum of indigenous authority at the center which was for some time filled by the missionaries.

Thus we can read in the journals of Anderson and Kramer how they allocated and redistributed land and water resources, negotiated with groups hostile to the settlement, and, sometimes in cooperation with the people, adjudicated disputes and punished crimes.³⁰ In March 1806, for example, one Jacob Cloete was sentenced by the missionaries to be beaten after the people had found him guilty of raping a nine year old girl.³¹ The powder supplies obtained from government were distributed to ensure the loyalty of those at the settlement and to encourage others to join it. Some Kora living to the north-east, for example, were given powder, ostensibly, to use against cattle-raiders but more probably in an inter-necine dispute, on condition that they came to settle near Klaarwater.³²

The access to the Colony which the missionaries could ensure, and in particular the essential supplies of powder to secure for the Bastards their superior status, their protection and, when hunting, their subsistence, was of course a major source of the authority

²⁸ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 243.

²⁹ See Andries Waterboer, 'A short account of some of the most particular and important circumstances attending the Government of the Griqua people,' c. November 1827, [LMS 10/3/D]. For these see footnote 5 and also Anderson, entry May 16, 1807 [LMS Journals 1/17]. Waterboer asserts that the magistrates 'governed...in the name of old Cornelius Kok, as his deputies'; no doubt Cornelius retained influence, but the Berends family, despite intermarriage, was as the previous chapter illustrated, clearly a separate grouping.

³⁰ Anderson, April 1806 [LMS Journals 1/14]; November 28-9, December 27, January 3, February 14 [LMS Journals 1/8]; February – March 1807 [LMS Journals 1/17].

³¹ Anderson, March 22, 24 [LMS Journals 1/8]; Kramer [LMS Journals 1/7].

³² Anderson, entries October – January [LMS Journals 1/8].

enjoyed by the missionaries. Anderson and Kramer were well aware of this: they warned dissidents that any separation between missionary and people would mean the loss of their guns and of access to the Colony.³³ Though this was not strictly true, in view of the possibilities of Bastard trade with frontier farmers, undoubtedly the presence of the missionaries made the trade easier, less costly, and legal. Similarly, the missionaries were glad to have verification of their status, as when they were visited by the newly-appointed Landdrost of Tulbagh, who was able

...to recommend the instructions of the worthy missionary in the strongest manner to the attention of his pupils, and to enforce upon them obedience to him as one of their first duties; assuring them that the neglect of it would be considered as an offence against government, and would be punished accordingly. The diligent were encouraged to occupy themselves still more assiduously with husbandry, and hopes were given them that the government would lighten the taxes upon the produce of their land, and endeavour to have them supplied with European commodities as an easier rate. The slothful were admonished to forsake their bad habits, and imitate the industrious, otherwise they were threatened with being sent away for ever from the institution.³⁴

Anderson and Kramer soon made use of this recommendation, threatening their charges with government retribution when they refused to work on the missionary's house, and reading to a public meeting the Edict of Janssens which laid down strict conditions under which missionary institutions outside the Colony could pursue their work.³⁵

But if the influence of the missionaries originated largely out of the temporal benefits they could bring the Bastards and their followers, and was sustained initially by their relationship with the government of the Colony, it could take root only through the establishment of a church. In this context the attraction of the Christian religion for the Bastards should not be underestimated. It was, nominally at least, conversion to Christianity which opened the way to full incorporation in the Colony society. And those who no longer wished to return to the Colony could note that the white frontiersmen had found in the Christian religion an ideology to sustain their frontier society, a fundamentalist creed which explained frontier existence and justified their relations with non-whites. Even for the Khoi, as has recently been noted, 'the traditional conceptions of God and the Devil were close enough to Christian ideas to enable these pagans to grasp the new reli-

³³ Anderson, January 1805 [LMS Journals 1/2]; February 24, 1806 [LMS Journals 1/8].

³⁴ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 260 – 1. See also Anderson, June 1805 [LMS Journals 1/2]. On his return to Tulbagh, Van de Graaff wrote a letter of support to Anderson, dated August 16, 1805 [see Anderson, LMS Journals 1/14].

³⁵ See Anderson, entries November 1805 – January 1806 [LMS Journals 1/8]; Anderson, August 12, 1806 [LMS 3/3/B].

gious concepts easily...[and] traditionally Khoi Khoin chiefs and captains had few ritual functions so that in the field of religion the possibility of rivalry was unlikely.³⁶

Besides the few who had been converted at the Zak River, the church at Klaarwater was begun by the baptism of Bastards in 1807. Church membership had reached 26 adults and 46 children by 1809, and 42 adults by 1813.³⁷ Some of these were members of the Kok and Berends families. But there were also those for whom membership of the church offered an increased status, those who would develop the greatest interest in the stable continuation of the Klaarwater community, those who would work most closely with the missionaries. Among them were Piet Pienaar and others of his family, Peter Goeyman, Peter David, Adam Balie, Jan Hendrick, Hendrick Hendricks, and Andries Waterboer, 'a truly serious young man' who had 'distinguished himself above all our people in receiving instructions.'³⁸ Or there was Moses Adam Renoseros, who by mid 1805 had a neat house and a garden of maize and tobacco and led Lichtenstein to comment that 'the greatest industry and spirit of order reigned in this household, more than is often to be found in African [i.e. white colonist] farms.'³⁹ As another example, there was Willem Fortuin, married to a San woman. He had been Kicherer's interpreter at the Zak River where he was described as 'rather more civilized than the people in general,' had learned in the Colony to repair and build wagons, and was in 1812 'the most industrious man' at the village of Kloof.⁴⁰

It is possible, however, that some of the population resented the fusion of church and state implicit in the existence of converted 'magistrates' who were under the overall authority of the missionaries. Between 1807 and 1809, at any rate, the existing 'magistrates' were replaced by Adam J. Kok II and Berend Berends, the former being the eldest son of Cornelius Kok and the latter the son of Cornelius' sister.⁴¹ And when Anderson journeyed to the Cape in 1809, he obtained the sanction of Lord Caledon for these appointments,

³⁶ Carstens, *Social Structure*, 20.

³⁷ See Anderson and Jansz, October 1807 – February 1808 [LMS Journals 1/18]; February 1808 [LMS Journals 1/20]; Anderson, August 31, 1809 [LMS 4/1/C]; Campbell, *Travels*, 239.

³⁸ Anderson and Jansz, entry October, 1807 [LMS Journals 1/18]. Peter Goeyman disappeared in the interior with Dr. Cowen's expedition, as did another church member, Jan Kok: see Anderson and Jansz, entry January 1809 [LMS Journals 1/20].

³⁹ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 258-9; Anderson, January 3, 1814 [LMS 5/3A].

⁴⁰ Burchell, *Travels*, I, 235; II, 154; Campbell, *Travels*, 240-1; Kicherer in *LMS Transactions*, II, 1, 10. Willem Fortuin appears to have died in 1827; his son will later emerge as an important Griqua leader: see Sass, September 28, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C]; Wright, September 25, 1835 [LMS 14/4/E]; Warren, 1825 Journal, in Warren, *On the Veldt*, 355.

⁴¹ Andries Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D]. Waterboer claims that the magistrates became unpopular, and a letter from Cornelius Kok secured the transfer: again one must insist that Cornelius was only one factor of influence. The existence of dissension for unspecified reasons is evident from Anderson, September 1, 1807 [LMS 3/4/C].

recognized by the granting of staffs of office.⁴² Power now rested explicitly in the hands of the two leading Bastard families, as ‘chiefs’ rather than ‘magistrates’ and, apart from their own wealth and status, under the auspices of the Colony government rather than the mission. But their power remained as slight as had been the case before 1800: ‘[it] extends, wrote Burchell, very little beyond a voluntary submission on the part of the people. It is confined principally to that of ordering out the force of the tribe to attack and enemy, or to take up arms in defence of the settlement... But in ordinary cases, their power does not seem to be so strong, as the good of their society requires,’ Burchell instanced the case of a man tried before Adam J. Kok and ‘several of the head people, as his council’ who was sentenced to be beaten. ‘During the infliction of the sentence, the friends and relations of the criminal, who were standing by, were bestowing their imprecations on the captain, in the most horrid terms, and behaving in a menacing manner with sticks in their hands.’⁴³ This intrusion of family solidarity into the administration of justice would long continue to affect the Klaarwater state. The later Griqua states were similarly affected: at Philippolis in particular it was impossible at times for relatives of the Chief to be punished.⁴⁴

Four years after the official sanctioning of Kok and Berends as chiefs, the political structure of the community was again changed by the regulations and institutions proposed by John Campbell, Director of the London Missionary Society, who was touring the stations in South Africa. “It is not necessary to trace the fortunes of this ‘constitution’, writes Marais.⁴⁵ But though in many aspects its implementation would be delayed, there can be no doubt that this ‘constitution’ set the tone for the subsequent political development of the state. Its spirit was more significant than its detail.

In the first place Campbell suggested the establishment of a set of thirteen laws, which did little more than codify what were already considered offenses: matters for which either the missionaries or the chiefs had sought to impose penalties. Punishments varied from execution in the case of murder, to flogging, hard labor, or restitution in cases of

⁴² The only contemporary reference to ‘two captains’ is in Jansz, June 3, 1810 [LMS Journals 2/29], and then in Campbell and Burchell. The first official mention I have traced is in the Instructions to John Melvill, appointed Government Agent at Griquatown, March 21, 1822 [50 of 1835, 2112]. A contemporary record should appear in the Cape Archives. For descriptions of the staffs issued at this time see J. Archbell, ‘The Question of Daniel’s Kuil Farm, 1830-1838’ [MMS: XI, Document D]; H. Hendricks in Lindley, *Adamantia*, 35; A. Bain in *ibid.*, 120; W. Corner in *ibid.*, 123; L. Jansz in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 13.

⁴³ Burchell, *Travels*, I, 253. Berends, according to Burchell, was ‘more resolute’ with ‘a spirit better fitted for maintaining his authority.’

⁴⁴ See, for example, Wright, July 19, 1836 [LMS 15/3/B]; A. Smith to Governor, September 17, 1834 [Quoted in Kirby, *Smith*, 144–151]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 128-9; Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 216].

⁴⁵ Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 36.

housebreaking, stealing or harming livestock or produce in the ground, bribing magistrates, or preventing implementation of the law. Further regulations in 1816 imposed fines for failing to clean irrigation channels or failing to cultivate land, which would be lost in the third year of failure.⁴⁶

More significant than the laws was to be the method of enforcement. The powers of the two chiefs were limited to what they effectively had been: 'to continue to act as commanders in things requiring the public safety' besides functioning along with the missionaries as a court of appeal. Enforcement was to be by nine magistrates, elected by the people. Stress was laid on making more egalitarian the newly codified laws: they were to be applied equally to Bastards, Kora and San. Not only did this political structure mark the first step towards undermining the power of the two leading Bastard families, especially the Koks, but it also ensured the direct influence of the church in the political system. Thus when a general meeting of the people was called to elect magistrates some months after Campbell's departure, at about the same time that the church members first elected deacons, several people were elected to both offices: Jan Hendrick, Pieter Pienaar, Willem Fortuin and Peter David. At least three of these were close associates of the Berends family which, along with the fact that Berend Berends, one of the chiefs, was elected deacon while Adam J. Kok II, the other chief, was rejected, suggests that at this time it was the Berends party who were the warmest supporters of the church.⁴⁷

Two other proposals made by John Campbell were to have an equally, if not more, important effect in the direction both of breaking down status differences in the community and increasing the political role of the church; in short, of strengthening the state. The first of these, the institution of a 'native agency', may perhaps be attributed to James Read, who had accompanied Campbell: it was modelled on the Bethelsdorp experience. Van der Kemp had realized that Christianity would take root among the Khoi largely to the extent that the Khoi themselves became not only church members, but active agents of its propagation, active participants in the building of the Church. He had encouraged Khoi 'to speak publicly, to read and exhort in the church services, to discharge various important offices in the church, such as that of deacon and treasurer, and...as assistant-schoolmaster.'⁴⁸ Further, in extending evangelical activity beyond Bethelsdorp to farms and Khoi kraals, these Khoi converts were employed as itinerants as well as the white

⁴⁶ See Campbell, *Travels*, 236-9, 244, 282; Campbell, May 5, 1813 [LMS 5/1/C]; Anderson, January 18, 1816 [LMS 6/3/A].

⁴⁷ See Anderson, January 3, 1814 [LMS 5/3/A]. The other magistrates elected were Jacob Cloetes, Willem Visser, Klaas Barend, Mose Adam Renoseros and Klaas Pienaar, Cupido Kok was the only other deacon and the only representative of the Kok family: Adam M. Kok (presumably 'Kort Adam' Kok) was, like Adam J. Kok, rejected as deacon.

⁴⁸ See Clinton, *Melting Pot*, 43-4.

missionaries. Van der Kemp had indeed recognized the limitations of such persons in the absence of intensive formal instruction, but the plan was sufficiently successful to commend itself to Campbell.⁴⁹ Indeed Campbell saw the role of the missionary as temporary: 'when the people in any place are effectually converted to the Christian faith, and have natives among them capable to carry on the work then the Society's and the missionary's object is attained; he will then leave them, and proceed higher up the country, in search of new and uncultivated fields.'⁵⁰ An informal 'native agency' was indeed already in operation in the Klaarwater state by 1813: 'several of the members endeavour to teach others the things of God, especially on their journey. Likewise at different outposts there are members of the church who meet with the people...to converse with them, to read the scriptures, and to unite in prayer and praise.'⁵¹ Now, at Bethelsdorp and Klaarwater, the institution was formalized. In August 1814, at Graaff-Reinet Jan Hendrick, Berend Berends, Peter David and Andries Waterboer were appointed together with Jan Goeyman and Cupido Kakkerlak of Bethelsdorp as lay preachers, to receive one rix-dollar subsistence per annum.⁵²

Between 1813 and 1820, these 'lay preachers' would be joined, officially or unofficially, by others. Some, initially instated by the missionaries, soon lost their approval. Others acted in effect independently of the Klaarwater church. The degree to which they 'preached' or practiced the Christian religion varied. But their association with the mission, perhaps simply the acquisition of skills in reading, writing or agriculture, even if they were not formally 'converts', performed one of two functions, and sometimes both. As they dispersed from the main settlement to outlying villages, they established a stronger spine for the frontier state, so long as they remained attached to the Klaarwater church. In this sense then, they functioned as political agents, sustaining and advancing the interweave of spiritual and secular concerns, church and temporal power, in the state. And, whether those who gathered around them were Bastards, Kora, Nama, San, Sotho-Tswana or a mixture, they ensured an extension of the acculturative processes of the frontier zone even if they detached themselves from both the church and the state of Klaarwater. The establishment of the native agency, then, whatever its purely religious effects, provided a potential strength for the Bastard state as well as expanding the frontier zone.

The second of these important proposals of Campbell was that the Bastards change their name to 'Griqua' and that Klaarwater become Griquatown. This was because 'on

⁴⁹ See Van der Kemp in *LMS Missionary Register*, II, 150 [Quoted in Phillip, *Researches*, I, 110-1].

⁵⁰ Campbell to Cradock, February 12, 1814 [Theal, *RecCC*, IX, 353-5].

⁵¹ Campbell, *Travels*, 239-240.

⁵² 'Minutes of conference...of missionaries,' Graaff-Reinet, August 1814 [LMS 5/2/E]; Report of LMS Directors to 21st General Meeting, 1815 [Quoted in Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 1516].

consulting among themselves they found a majority were descended from a person of the name of Griqua.⁵³ It is immaterial whether or not the Khoi ancestry of the Bastards was predominantly /Karihuri ('Charigriqua'): the significance of this step was twofold, it tended to foster the group consciousness of the members of the frontier state, gradually breaking down the distinction between those who were in fact 'Bastards' by blood, and those who were not. Thus in contrast to the rather sharp contrasts noted by Lichtenstein in 1805, by the 1820's we are told that though there was a slight difference in status between 'descendants of the colonists and of the aboriginal tribes,' there was a tendency in both to assimilate.⁵⁴ Secondly, it encouraged those who were emigrants from the Colony to concentrate more on the building of a separate frontier state than on regretting their status as 'second class citizens' of the Colony frontier society.

The change of name, in fact, permitted the strengthening of the state through absorption of people from two directions: Bastards, Oorlams, and slaves from the Colony on the one hand, and indigenous Kora, Nama and San on the other. It is very hard from the evidence available to give specific indications of the proportions of such modes of absorption into the 'Griqua', since the figures are either very general, referring to the whole northern frontier, or else confined to the mission and neglecting such incorporation as was occurring away from it. On April 20, 1806, for example, Anderson took a census of the population around Klaarwater and found 784 Bastards, Kora and Nama, apparently including in the latter two categories only dependents of Bastards and refugees from Afrikaner and excluding the Kora and San 'living within the Klaarwater district, [who] cannot be considered as belonging to the establishment.'⁵⁵ In 1813 Campbell estimated 1266 Griqua and 1341 Kora in the Griquatown area; of the 291 Griqua men 'who are descended from

⁵³ Campbell, *Travels*, 235-6. See also Smith, *Diary*, I, 178; Warren, *On the Veldt*, 29, 368; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 242-3; L. Jansz in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 16.

⁵⁴ R. Moffat in [50 of 1835, 127]. For an interesting comparative analysis of the influence of missionaries on tendencies towards Bastard-Khoi assimilation or separation see Carstens, *Social Structure*, 235-240. At Griquatown some differences, indeed, remained or returned: two of the leading counselors of Nicholas Waterboer were Nicholas Kruger and Lambert Jansz, both first generation Bastards. Some indications on assimilation would be given by language, but the evidence is slight: for 'Griqua' speaking Khoi as opposed to Dutch see, for example, Baillie, September 30, 1830 [LMS 12/1/C]; Lemue, March, 23, 1831 [JDM, VI, 312]; Pelissier, *et al.*, January 27, 1831 [JDM, VII, 226ff]; S. Broadbent, June 8, 1823 [MMS: II – 1823/5].

⁵⁵ See Anderson [LMS Journals 1/14]; Burchell, *Travels*, I, 251-2. The expedition under Van de Graaff, Landdrost of Tulbagh, in 1805, took a complete inventory of the heads of families, places of their birth, their former modes of life, their children, livestock, guns, and who had sown corn, which I have recently learnt is in the Janssens Collection in The Hague. Lichtenstein provides only an incomplete accounts: 15 Bastard families and 15 Nama and Khoi families at Kloof; an unspecified number at Rietfontein; one Bastard family and some Khoi at Rietfontein; an unspecified number at the 'smallest' village, Taai-boschfontein; 3-400 persons at Klaarwater; some Nama and Kora at Ongeluksfontein; with other Kora communities intervening: *Travels*, II, 240-263 *passim*.

Dutchmen and Hottents, Koranas and Bushy women, tho' I did not enquire where they were born, yet from the impression on my mind from things which accidentally occurred, I should hardly think 30-40 were born in the Colony under 30 years of age, perhaps not near so many. A considerable portion of the others are aged people.⁵⁶ By 1818 Anderson is reported to have estimated that there were 1500 arms-bearing men at the Institution (which would appear to be exaggerated), and two years later he claimed the Griqua numbered 'from 2 to 3000.'⁵⁷ In 1823 George Thompson assessed there were 1600 in the area of Griquatown, about 1800 Kora, and on the lower Orange perhaps another 1000.⁵⁸

Certainly, then the Griqua population, increasing from about 800 to at least 3000 over twenty years, gained numbers by incorporation as well as natural increase. A part at least of this is almost untraceable absorption of Khoi and even San peoples of the Orange, at first probably as servants and then by marriage. But, particularly in the second decade of the state, there was considerable increase from the Colony. By 1814 Anderson could list only three cases of increase through deserters from the south; in addition, he said, some Bastard families of a missionary killed by San had joined him.⁵⁹ This was, no doubt, an underestimate for the benefit of a perturbed government, for one can trace other cases of desertion, though few.⁶⁰ But the bulk of the increase came later. "The restrictions made relative to Hottentots leaving the Colony have been made within a few years," wrote Anderson, 'since slavery in the Colony had decreased'; and indeed it was as a result of more stringent discriminatory legislation in the Colony that Griquatown, and the Orange River in general, became a pole of attraction, and that the government concern increased.⁶¹ 'By far the most numerous class of free labourers has been found among the people known by the name of Bastards,' wrote Somerset in 1817, 'and among this class also are the most

⁵⁶ Campbell, *Travels*, 239, 246; Campbell to Cradock, January 28, 1814 [Theal, *RecCC*, IX, 318-9]. Campbell estimates 445 Griqua and 400 Kora at Hardcastle (Kloof) though it is unclear whether these are included as well in the Griquatown district total. Since Anderson told government in 1814 that his numbers had hardly increased since he arrived, one should presume they were so included: 'Minutes of Conference...of missionaries,' August 1814 [LMS 5/2E].

⁵⁷ Stockenstrom, August 27, 1818 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 34-6]; Anderson in Baird, April 20, 1820 [CO 2625/34]. In 1814 Anderson told government he had only 300 able-bodied men; Anderson, October 29, 1814 [LMS 5/4/B].

⁵⁸ Thompson, *Travels*, 84; Philip, *Researches*, II, 99; Thompson in [50 of 1835, 134]. See also 'Answers to LMS Queries,' Griquatown, August 2, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C] which estimates 210 Griqua families in the district (by which time there had been 'fission'); Macmillan, *Cape Colour Question*, 266fn where Melvill reports the 'total in his scattered district' as 3000.

⁵⁹ See 'Minutes of conference...of missionaries,' August 1814 [LMS 5/2/E]; Anderson, November 15, 1814; December 1, 1814 [LMS 5/4/C]; A. Albrecht, [LMS Journals 1/15].

⁶⁰ See, for example, Kramer, entry October 6 [LMS Journals 1/7]; Burchell, *Travels*, I, 343 - 4.

⁶¹ Anderson, November 15, 1814 [LMS 5/4/C]. But see Edict of Janssens (1085) in Du Plessis, *Christian Missions*, 426.

intelligent and useful. These people have for some years past flocked to the Institutions without the Settlement, where they are under no control whatever.⁶²

The Bastards, many of them slave-Khoi mixtures rather than white-Khoi, came from such isolated areas on the outskirts of the Colony as the Zak River, the Ghoup and Nieuwveld areas of the Tulbagh district, the Khamiesberg and Little Namaqualand, some drifted to Griquatown from lower down the Orange itself.⁶³ Many would remain, forming petty frontier communities graphically described by George Thompson (1823) and Andrew Smith (1828) in the Little Namaqualand area,⁶⁴ and a number of others, particularly those from the northern parts of Graaff-Reinet district, would establish themselves on the Orange east of its junction with the Vaal. We read of Jacobus Van Wyk, born in the district of Beaufort West, who moved with his parents to Griquatown at this time,⁶⁵ or the six or seven Bastards named Visagie, from the Ghoup-Nieuwveld area, who arrived at Griquatown in about 1818 and expected 'a great number' from the Colony would soon follow.⁶⁶ And it was in 1816 that Cornelius Kok himself, after contemplating departure from the Colony for some years, finally took his following, numbering perhaps 500, from the Khamiesberg to the settlement of Campbell.⁶⁷ So far as relations between missionaries and the government were concerned, other instances were even more provocative. In 1816 some ten slaves deserted from the Graaff-Reinet district to Bastard kraals already in existence high on the Orange. Though not all reached the destination — one returned and some were killed by San — a commando was sent out to recover them. From the slave who returned it was learned that the scheme had supposedly originated from dis-

⁶² See Somerset to Bathurst, January 23, 1817 [Theal, *RecCC*, XI, 252-6]. Also Somerset to Bathurst, December 28, 1818; June 30, 1819 [*ibid.*, XII, 111-2, 242-8].

⁶³ See, for examples of such communities and their movement to the Orange, Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 185; Campbell, *Travels*, 258-260; Somerset to Bathurst, December 28, 1818 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 111-2]. See also Van der Merwe, *Trek*, 207; Theal, *RecCC*, XXVII, 128, 382-3.

⁶⁴ See Thompson, *Travels*, 217-309 *passim*; Thompson in [50 of 1835, 133-9]; Kirby, *Smith*, 67-76; Theal, *RecCC*, XXIX, 379-382.

⁶⁵ Jacobus Van Wyk, Evidence of May 31, 1873 [Quoted in Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 195-6].

⁶⁶ Stockenstrom, August 27, 1818 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 35-6].

⁶⁷ For Cornelius' intentions, the numbers of his followers, and his move, see C. Albrecht, April 10, 1812 [LMS 5/1/C]; C. Sass, April 10, 1812 [LMS 5/1/B]; February 5, 1814 [LMS 5/4/A]; Helm and Sass, January 19, 1816 [LMS 6/3/A]; Hamilton, entries August 22, October 11 [LMS Journals 2/55]; Anderson, September 17, 1816 [LMS 6/4/B]; Campbell, *Travels*, 261-4, 298-303; Campbell, May 5, 1813 [LMS 5/1/c]; Abraham Kok in Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 153. One can visualize the removal of the Kok family and their followers as gradual one, beginning before 1800, and continuing, as various of his sons took parties to Griquatown, until about 1820 when Christopher Sass moved with a last section from Bethesda to Griquatown and Campbell.

cussion held in Graaff-Reinet at the missionary meeting of 1814 between Griquas and non-whites in the area.⁶⁸

The 'Hartenaar' Rebellion

But despite, and in many ways because of, this series of reforms to strengthen the autonomy and the structure of the Griqua frontier state, the Griqua community had still to endure much internal crisis. Until 1813 the pressures operating on the community from outside had tended to hold it together. On the one hand they were subject to raids by the San groups who were incensed at the invasion of their territory, and by the Xhosa-led raiders who had been in the area since 1805 and had in 1812 attacked Griquatown itself.⁶⁹ On the other hand Anderson had worked to keep a harmonious and beneficial relationship with government. But now, when Campbell's proposals had intensified the spirit of autonomy, yet before they had had the time to become institutionalized, their relationship with government deteriorated. In 1814 came the request from the Government for conscripts, which the Griqua, having indeed left the Colony partly to avoid such military service, had no intention of fulfilling. The refusal meant that the 'privileges' they had secured through Anderson's mediation were removed, and that they no longer had legal access to the Colony.

'If you deprive a pastoral people of their herds, you instantly convert them into banditti...they have no resources left, and they inevitably...attempt to live by plunder,' wrote Phillip later with reference to the Xhosa.⁷⁰ It was equally true that to deprive the Griqua of their legal trade with the Colony — which, as the next chapter will show, had been flourishing since the arrival of the missionaries — was to encourage them to leave the mission, which no longer represented secular advantage, and return to illegal trade with frontier farmers. When Anderson returned to Griquatown in February, 1815 from the

⁶⁸ See Stockenstrom to Anderson, December 12, 1816; Stockenstrom to Burgers, December 12, 1816; Stockenstrom to Bird, December 14, 1816 [Theal, *RecCC*, XI, 224 – 230]; G. Thom, January 25, 1817 [LMS: PPapers 1/1/D]; Clinton, *Melting Pot*, 105 – 6.

⁶⁹ For the threats on Griquatown, and the attack, see Albrecht, *et al.*, entry January 1813 [LMS 5/1/A]; Jansz, June 3, 1810 [LMS Journals 2/29]; Anderson, June 30, 1810 [LMS 4/3/B]; Jansz, February 22, 1811 [LMS 4/4/B]; Anderson, June 17, 1811 [LMS 4/4/D]; Missionaries at conference to Bird, August 25, 1814 [LMS 5/4/A]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 287; Anderson to Philip, February 13, 1823 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/A]. Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XIII, believed the attack was in 1810. It is interesting that there is no contemporary mention of it by Anderson, Burchell, or Campbell.

⁷⁰ Quoted in Macmillan, *Cape Colour Question*, 114. Among the Griqua, Campbell attributed the failure to lead a settled life to the presence of firearms, as did the government. The more cynical Burchell pointed out that with their firearms they would soon eliminate all the surrounding game, and have to return to agriculture. See Campbell, 'Griquatown Mission' [LMS 8/3A]; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 525.

negotiations over the conscript issue, he found just such a change in atmosphere. Few more permanent houses had been built. Cultivation had declined, particularly of corn, and consisted chiefly of tobacco and dagga, trade goods which the Griqua had been accustomed to plant before the arrival of missionaries: there were very few vegetable gardens.⁷¹ The 'wandering' and trips to and from the Colonial border, which Anderson found so distasteful, had been resumed. There was a general disregard of the regulations established by Campbell, and of the authority of the two chiefs. Soon after Anderson's return a few among the Griqua⁷² moved away from the settlement entirely, and within months there had been a substantial exodus to the Harts River which, it was clear, amounted to a rebellion. Their declared intention was, 'when they had been joined by many more still among us but equally disaffected towards me, to have attacked the station, become masters of the Gunpowder, and shoot me [Anderson] and the Captain A. J. Kock, with one Piet Pienaar, the father-in-law of my deceased Brother Jansz.'⁷³

The Hartenaar rebellion was, at its most general level, a classic instance of the revolt of frontiersmen against the attempt to impose a system of authority on them: 'none will be in a state of subjection to the others, but be his own master,' wrote Anderson.⁷⁴ But, in that sense, it also expressed a spirit of autonomy. The Griqua had replied to the government request for conscripts that they would serve the government if they were not required to 'leave their native place.'⁷⁵ And in the negotiations between Anderson and the government, it is clear that he was expressing Griqua views in his insistence that the Griqua were *not* Colony subjects, but 'independent of this settlement and its Government,' and that therefore the Colony had no right to cut them off from free access.⁷⁶ The Hartenaar rebellion, then, had close affinities with Afrikaner's revolt of 1798 and the revolts on the eastern frontier between 1795 and 1805. It is significant, for example, that Coenraad Buys, a major participant in the white revolts in the east, should have crossed the northern border in late 1814 and become involved in the Hartenaar rebellion.⁷⁷

⁷¹ See, for the development of the Griqua economy, Anderson, entry February 1807 [LMS Journals 1/17]; entry May 1808 [LMS Journals 1/20]; August 31, 1809 [LMS 4/1/C]; August 4, 1812 [LMS 5/1/D]; Anderson, etc., September 5, 1812 [LMS 5/1/E]; Burchell, *Travels*, I, 253-6; II, 155; Campbell, *Travels*, 240-1; Jansz, December 2, 1814 [LMS 5/4/C]; Anderson and Helm [LMS Journals 2/53].

⁷² See Anderson and Helm, March 1815 – December 1815 [LMS Journals 2/53], Anderson, January 18, [LMS 6/3/A].

⁷³ Anderson, April 19, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C].

⁷⁴ Anderson, January 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/A].

⁷⁵ Anderson to Meynell, March 26, 1814 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/A]

⁷⁶ See, in particular, Anderson, December 1, 1814 [LMS 5/4/c]. But see, in contrast, Burchell, *Travels*, I, 366.

⁷⁷ See Anna Schoeman, *Coenraad de Buys*, esp. 86ff. This account of Buys may be supplemented with the LMS letters from Griquatown. Anderson, January 24, 1815 [LMS 5/4/C] gives the first mention of Buys north of the Orange. From then until perhaps 1817-8 he was in the vicinity of the Harts River: see

But, paradoxically, just when Anderson was incurring the anger of government for defending the interest and the independence of the Griqua, the rejection of the authority of the Colony extended to a revolt against the missionaries too. In the eyes of the rebels he was still the old Anderson, who had invoked government authority to rebuke and punish them, to be blamed along with Campbell both for the introduction of the onerous laws, 'or rather the punishments' as they were generally regarded, for the Government attempt to requisition conscripts, for the lack of gunpowder, for their prohibition on entering the colony legally.⁷⁸ Interestingly enough, the stringency of the missionaries at Griquatown had been remarked on by the Bethelsdorp converts who accompanied Campbell in 1813: 'were they in the place of the Bastards and Mr. Anderson attempted any exercise of authority with them, they would stop his mouth with their fist,' they are reported to have told the Griqua.⁷⁹ This view was confirmed and articulated by Buys, no doubt with the memory of Maynier and Van der Kemp. 'They are a free people,' he told the Griqua as he might have told his farmer colleagues.

...and ought not to submit themselves to laws made by Englishmen, that Mr. Campbell came here with a view to betray them by the government, That he was the cause of the late requisition for their children made by the Government — That the keeping of an account of the Births is only to betray the number of Males to the Government — That the preaching of the Gospel has only reference to the Soul — and does not concern the moral conduct, etc.⁸⁰

The rebels, therefore, rejected the laws, the missionaries, and religion. 'You may compel me to stay but you can't compel me to work,' said one leader to Anderson. 'As to losing their teachers they did very well before they came and could do again as well without them.' said another. At the Harts, it was reported, "they had given up all religious worship, had meetings for the purpose of introducing such things as might tend to testify their aversion [sic] to it...one was heard to say, 'my Soul is for the Hell, to Burn to Burn.'"⁸¹

The revolt, furthermore, extended to a rejection of the traditional system of authority based on the wealthy Kok and Berends families, especially since the status of these fami-

also Chapter 5.

⁷⁸ See Anderson, April 19, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C]; Read November 12, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C]. Also Hamilton, March 27, 1816 [LMS 6/4/B]; September 17, 1816 [LMS 6/4/b]; January 1, 1817 [LMS 7/1/A]; Anderson and Helm [LMS Journals 2/53].

⁷⁹ Quoted in Baird, April 21, 1820 [CO 2625/34].

⁸⁰ Anderson and Helm, entry June 23 [LMS Journals 2/53]. See also Anderson, January 1, 1816 [LMS 6/3/A]; Stockenstrom to C. O., March 22, 1816 [Quoted in Schoeman, *De Buys*, 89-90]. As a result of Buys' accusations, there was a refusal to register births and deaths until at least 1819: see Anderson and Helm, July 5, 1819 [LMS 8/1/B]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 268-9.

⁸¹ Anderson and Helm, entries April 12, November 12, November 1, 1815 [LMS Journals 2/53]; Anderson, April 19, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C].

lies had been given sanction by Lord Caledon and by their continuation in the position of chiefs under the Campbell regulations. Berend Berends, indeed, a shrewd politician managed, despite his leading role in both secular and church affairs, to remain aloof from the revolt and retained sufficient authority to mediate between Anderson and the Hartenaars. But Adam J. Kok found himself powerless, 'scarcely know[ing] who to confide in or trust.'⁸² In this sense the revolt played a major part in fostering the process of 'democratization' implicit in the replacement of the term 'Bastard' by the term Griqua for the community. Those who left the settlement appear to have been drawn from among the young, the less wealthy families, and even from the dependents. Moving to the Harts, they sought recruits from among the Kora and the San, furthering the 'acculturation' of the frontier society by giving them access to guns or horses. Rebelling against the government, and against those at Griquatown who still looked on themselves as 'colonial subjects', they fostered a sense of Griqua identity. At the Harts, we are told, 'they had bound themselves not to speak Dutch, nor to ask after each other's welfare.'⁸³ Later, these and the rebels of the 1820's would be remembered by the Griqua as the 'Patriots'.⁸⁴

The Demise of the Traditional Chiefs at Griquatown

Not until 1820 was some degree of temporary tranquility restored at Griquatown. Anderson's initial attempts, with the support of A. J. Kok II, to bring back order by the old threats of loss of their guns deterred only a few faint hearts.⁸⁵ For trade was always possible with the frontier farmers, especially with the assistance of Buys in exchanging cattle and possibly captured San for the precious gunpowder.⁸⁶ Not even the arrival of Cornelius Kok from the Khamiesberg in mid-1816, determined to use his authority to enforce the regulations, had much effect. Indeed Anderson claimed that 'he had great influence among the people here,' and Cornelius did threaten to lead a commando against the Hartenaars who had recently gone with Buys to raid some Tswana. A party of the rebels, perhaps those led by A. N. Kok (who may be Kort Adam Kok) returned to Griquatown

⁸² Anderson and Helm, entry September 16, 1815 [LMS Journals 2/53]. Also Anderson, April 19, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C]. Berends moved from Hardcastle lower down the Orange in July 1815, and he and his people spent most of their time during the revolt in hunting: see Anderson, entry July 1815 [LMS Journals 2/53]; Hamilton, entry July 29, 1816 [LMS Journals 2/55]; Anderson, January 18, 1816 [LMS 6/3/A].

⁸³ Anderson, April 19, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C].

⁸⁴ See, for example, Nicholas Kruger in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 350; Jan Pienaar in *ibid.*, 19-21.

⁸⁵ See Anderson and Helm, entries September 16 – November 1, 1815 [LMS Journals 2/53]; Anderson, April 19, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C].

⁸⁶ See particularly Stockenstrom to C.O., August 27, 1818 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 34-6].

at this time.⁸⁷ But very soon Cornelius I and his son Cornelius II retired to Campbell, where some minor members of the Kok family were already settled: he went 'as a private individual merely,' as Andries Waterboer was later to stress, indicating that his authority had atrophied with that of his eldest son Adam J. Kok II.⁸⁸

The return of the bulk of the dissidents to Griquatown was achieved only when Anderson himself turned against the traditional chiefs, or at least against A. J. Kok II. Early in 1817, Jacob Cloete, a major rebel leader, visited Christopher Sass at his station of Bethesda lower down the Orange. At the request of Sass, Anderson met with Cloete and found his heart 'overcome with affection towards him.' Assured by Cloete that the reports of the anti-religious activities of the rebels had been exaggerated by the traditional chiefs, and that the Hartenaars intended to return the cattle they had raided from the Tswana, Anderson took it upon himself to plead for the pardon of those who remained in rebellion. He refused to allow Adam Kok II to lead a commando against Cloete and his Kora allies, even after Kok brought him a San with wounds which Kok claimed had been inflicted by Cloete. Anderson would not countenance the banishment of the Hartenaars. And when, after having supposedly returned the cattle, the Hartenaars returned to Griquatown, Anderson pressed for their readmission to the church. A General Meeting, claims Anderson, applauded his conduct, but the chiefs were not pleased at this 'check to their authority.'⁸⁹

No doubt simple Christian charity was a prime motive force for Anderson. But this alone cannot explain his dramatic reversal of attitude, nor the support which it gained. The explanation lies in the fact that the rejection of the traditional chiefs extended to a much larger section of the community than those who had gone into rebellion. It had been demonstrated over the previous decade that there was an alternative to the order where power rested in the hands of the wealthiest families. Power in the community could depend on status in the church; status could rest on achievements in agriculture, as an artisan, in bartering. Some, having seen this, had come to believe that the missionaries, the chiefs, and the government were an obstacle to it: Jacob Cloete, a rebel leader, had been a convert and elected magistrate in 1814. A. M. Kok, another leader of the Hartenaars, may be the same man who had served as an official in the early days of the settlement. These were the 'resisters'. But others, equally dissatisfied with the traditional chiefs, believed that

⁸⁷ See Anderson, July 31, 1816 [LMS 6/4/A]; Hamilton, entries August 22, October 11 [LMS Journals 2/55]; Anderson, September 17, 1816 [LMS 6/4/B]; June 27, 1817 [LMS 7/1/B].

⁸⁸ Waterboer to Wright, December 11, 1832 [538 of 1836, 624 – 5]. See also Philip in *ibid.*, 624; Abraham Kok in Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 153; Cornelius Kok II, January 25, 1848 in *ibid.*, 186–7.

⁸⁹ Anderson, June 27, 1817 [LMS 7/1/B]; Stockenstrom, September 13, 1820 [50 of 1835, 130].

the state had viability in its present form and, even while sympathizing with the resisters, would not go so far as to join them. Families were divided over this; the Goeymans and the Hendricks, for example, split between close support for the missionaries and active participation in the revolt.⁹⁰ Others, of course, tried to keep aloof from the whole affair.

Prime among the group of ‘accommodators’ — those who disliked the traditional chiefs but wished to reach some favorable arrangement with both missionaries and government — was Andries Waterboer. Born in 1789, he was of San extraction with apparently no white ‘blood.’⁹¹ Some accounts maintain that he came to Griquatown as an ‘Agterrijder’ or groom of Adam Kok II.⁹² Baptized in 1807, he became the missionary’s interpreter, and was ‘set apart’ as a native preacher in 1814.⁹³ But when the Hartenaar rebellion broke out, he was ‘found to have connected himself with those who are a cause of much sorrow to us and taken a leading part.’ Accused also of adultery, he was separated from the church and was not readmitted until February 1818. At that time Anderson estimated him as the most able of the native teachers, with the best knowledge of scripture and the ‘clearest view’ of the Gospel, though having a certain ‘hardness’.⁹⁴

It was the ‘accommodators’ such as Waterboer who, dismayed by the fragmentation of the state and its deteriorating relations with government, must have persuaded Anderson that the major task was to bring the dissidents back to Griquatown. Waterboer’s later account of the rebellion supports this interpretation: ‘very shortly after their appointment to office,’ he writes, it emerged that Kok and Berends had ‘the greatest possible unfitness for their great work.’ They harboured runaways; they allowed Buys to ‘lead astray’ all the young men ‘till at last they rebelled against the Captains, their laws, and the Gospel itself.’ The attempt by the chiefs to persuade the Hartenaars to return was a failure: ‘everyone supported his friend, not excepting the Captains. Through neglect of duty in the Captains, in this case, the rebellion of the subjects was greatly increased... If the Captains

⁹⁰ See Anderson and Helm, entries April 5, June 19, September 7, November 1 [LMS Journals 2/53]; Albrecht, etc. [LMS 5/1/A]; Schmelen [LMS Journals 2/38]; Campbell, *Travels*, 258-9; J. Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 213]. These sources mention Jacob Cloete, the Goeymans and the Hendricks. For A. N. Kok who appears to be the same as ‘Klein Adam’ (and hence Kort Adam?) see Anderson and Helm, entry April 12 [LMS Journals 2/53]; Anderson, April 19, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C]; July 31, 1816 [LMS 6/4/A].

⁹¹ Hughes, January 3, 1853 [LMS 28/1/A]; Thompson, *Travels*, 79; D’Urban to spring Rice, December 12, 1834 [252 of 1835, 114-5]. See also Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 213]; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 111; Warren, *On the Veldt*, 338-352.

⁹² See H. Hendricks in Lindley, *Adamantia*, 37; Abraham Kok in *ibid.*, 140. He also appears to have married a cousin of Adam Kok’s: Nicholas Kruger in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 6.

⁹³ See footnotes 38, 52. See also Anderson and Jansz, January 1808 [LMS Journals 1/18].

⁹⁴ Anderson, July 31, 1816 [LMS 6/4/A]; September 17, 1816 [LMS 6/4/B]; Anderson and Helm, entry April 22 [LMS Journals 2/53]; Read, November 12, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C]; Anderson, February 2, 1818 [LMS 7/4/B].

attempted, in any case, an examination, the rebel party have at different times surrounded their Houses to take them.⁹⁵ Unable at the time he wrote this document to condone the rebellion, since he was by then the ruler of the state and facing rebellions himself, he blamed the chiefs who were, in objective terms, perhaps the least responsible for the situation. (Indeed the chiefs themselves were to accuse Anderson of leniency, of favoring the ‘opposite party’: ‘his system is contrary to the Bible and he wishes to be a terror to them that do evil.’⁹⁶)

Within a month after Anderson had begun to ‘check’ their authority, both Adam Kok and Berends were investigating removal from the neighbourhood of Griquatown.⁹⁷ Before they departed, Waterboer tells us, they had been summoned several times before the council of magistrates and reprimanded for their neglect of duty until ‘they became dissatisfied, went from the presence of the Council, and Capt. A. Kok threw away his Captain’s Staff and immediately removed from the place, with his whole family, to the Great River. B. Berends also left the place, with a small following.’⁹⁸

Fission Among the Griqua

Until this time authority had been, at least nominally, centered around Griquatown. True, Berend Berends’ settlement at Kloof had been semi-autonomous, but he had been a major figure in church and state at Griquatown. Now, as the Hartenaars returned to Griquatown and the traditional chiefs left, several centers of authority developed. Until 1820 Berend Berends remained the nominal chief of the Griquatown state; in practice, however, he moved to Daniels Kuil with a part of his following. Similarly Adam Kok II joined the bulk of his family at Campbell, though he appears to have kept separate from them to some degree.⁹⁹ Elsewhere other Griqua groups were settled, also in semi-autonomy from Griquatown.

⁹⁵ A. Waterboer, ‘A short account...’ [LMS 10/3/D].

⁹⁶ Read, May 23, 1817 [LMS 7/2/A]. See also Read, March 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/C]; Stockenstrom, September 13, 18120 [50 of 1835, 129-133]. Anderson was later to claim, largely on the basis of being shown Read’s May letter which reported the chief’s views of him, that Read had fomented their dissatisfaction: but Anderson himself had encouraged the separation of the old chiefs. See Anderson, August 24, 1820 [LMS 8/2/D]; Moffat, Apprenticeship, 5-6.

⁹⁷ Read, entries February 24, March 29, 1817 [LMS Journals 3/64]; March 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/C]. Read unsuccessfully tried to persuade Adam Kok to settle on the Kuruman River to evangelize among the Tswana.

⁹⁸ Waterboer, ‘A short account...’ [LMS 10/3/D]. See also Abraham Kok in Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 154.

⁹⁹ Read, May 23, 1817 [LMS 7/2/A]; Hamilton, entry November 13, 1818 [LMS Journals 3/68]; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XI, XIII.

This dispersal had both its political and its economic aspects. In one sense it was simply a response to ecology. The growing Griqua numbers and the increasing dessication of the territory to the west forced the occupation of increasing territory to the east and the north. It was this, in part, which had caused many Griqua to abandon the area around Bethesda and Pella; and already in 1805 the missionaries had commented on the drying up of the fountains around Griquatown.¹⁰⁰ By 1816, Campbell, as a settlement, had a greater population than Griquatown itself, and then and later many observers would comment that Campbell was more favorably situated for agriculture than Griquatown.¹⁰¹ Indeed it is significant that, despite the political factors involved in the dispersal, the population of Griquatown remained almost constant from 1801 until 1824, at around 7-800; apparently the fountains there could not support more than that number.

Nevertheless the 'class conflict' among the Griqua meant that the dispersal could not take place within the framework of the Griqua state. Instead Berends, the Kok family, and others concentrated on building up autonomous settlements, though along the same lines as that attempted at Griquatown until the revolt. At Daniels Kuil Berends continued in some measure the evangelization that he had been conducting at Kloof, and his following included Nama, Tswana, and 'Damara' as well as Griqua and San.¹⁰² He, as well as his follower Jan Karse at Kramer's fountain, who had been given permission to move there in 1816, cut irrigation canals and were supporting San dependents by hunting while the San looked after their cattle. Berends in fact sent an invitation to Jager Afrikaner, his old enemy and now a Christian convert, to join him at Daniels Kuil.¹⁰³ Similarly at Campbell the Kok family had a following of 354 Griqua, 165 San and 450 Kora, and were growing corn by irrigation. Cornelius I had more or less handed over power to his sons Adam II, Cornelius II and Abraham, and the two former, as well as Adam Balie, were conducting worship.¹⁰⁴ As would be expected, too, both Berends and Kok wished to 'ratify' their separation by having missionaries of their own: hopefully this would lead to the estab-

¹⁰⁰ See Kramer [LMS Journals 1/7].

¹⁰¹ See, for example, Read, November 12, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C]; Baird, April 4, 1820 [CO 2625/34]; Sass, September 19, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C]; Melvill, January 3, 1826 [LMS 10/1/A]. Also R. Moffat, March 28, 1850 [LMS 25/1/B]; J. Moffat, February 6, 1850 [LMS 25/2/B]; Warren, *On the Veldt*, 329-330, 333-4.

¹⁰² For his earlier evangelical activity, see Anderson, February 28, 1814 [LMS 5/3/C].

¹⁰³ Moffat, August 20, 1818 [LMS 7/5/A]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 231-241, 248-250; Campbell, 'Griquatown Mission' LMS 8/3A; Campbell, August 13, 1820 [LMS 8/2/C]; Wright to Philip, November 9, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/B]. For the extent of their agriculture in the 1820's see Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 71, 188, 190; Thompson, *Travels*, 91, 135; Warren, 1825 Journal, in Warren, *On the Veldt*, 353.

¹⁰⁴ Campbell, *Second Journey*, 249-253, 277-8; Waterboer to Wright, December 11, 1832 [425 of 1837, 150-1].

lishment of independent churches. Henry Helm had intended to join Berends when the latter was still at Hardcastle (Kloof), and remained at Griquatown only because Berends left for Daniels Kuil. After Berends was removed from the chieftainship at Griquatown in 1820, he asked James Read, recently suspended from the mission at Dithakong, to come to Daniels Kuil to work with his people. In 1820, the Kok family asked John Campbell for a missionary, and soon afterwards Christopher Sass moved to their settlement.¹⁰⁵

There were other less important centers of Griqua power. A few Griqua were in the Langeberg, gathering Kora or San adherents and in close touch with the Tlhaping, as well as some still on the Harts River, for whom there was talk at one time of appointing a chief.¹⁰⁶ At Hardcastle Peter Davids and Willem Fortuin were evangelizing the Kora in semi-autonomy from Griquatown: by 1822 David would move to Daniels Kuil some followers to join Berends, while Fortuin remained behind.¹⁰⁷ At Ramah on the upper Orange was Piet Sabbah, a Nama, appointed to start a San mission in 1817. Gradually the Griqua replaced the San — in 1820 there were 50 San instead of the original 200, and 31 Griqua — and Anderson withdrew his support of the mission. Sabbah continued to work there, however, until he moved to Philippolis in the 1820's.¹⁰⁸ Then there were the cluster of native agents who had accompanied or followed James Read when he came, in late 1816, to establish a mission among the Tlhaping. Cupido Kakkerlak from Bethelsdorp had begun with Read at Dithakong, but was appointed to the Taaibosch Kora kraal on the Harts where he was forced to trek with them up and down the river.¹⁰⁹ At Konnah on the Orange were two more Bethelsdorp converts preaching to San and Kora, and nearby them Gert Engelbrecht, an Oorlam from the Khamiesberg, working with Kora.¹¹⁰ Though the

¹⁰⁵ Helm, March 7, 1818 [LMS 7/4/C]; September 2, 1822 [LMS 8/5/B]; December 27, 1822 [LMS 8/5/D]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 256 – 7. Helm arrived at Griquatown from Bethesda in April 1815, and Sass, with visits to Griquatown, followed him there and to Campbell in 1820-1.

¹⁰⁶ Read, entry January 7, 1817 [LMS Journals 3/64]; May 23, 1817 [LMS 7/2/A]; Hamilton, entry October 15, 1818 [LMS Journals 3/68]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 155.

¹⁰⁷ Campbell, 'Griquatown Mission' [LMS 8/3A]; Helm September 2, 1822 [LMS 8/5/B]; 'Answers to LMS Queries,' Griquatown [LMS 9/2/C]; Sass, September 28, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C].

¹⁰⁸ Campbell, 'Ramah Missionary Station' [LMS 8/3A]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 301-3; Helm September 9, 1822 [LMS 8/5/B]; Melvill, March 26, 1824 [LMS 9/2/B]; Melvill, October 29, 1829 [LMS 11/4/A].

¹⁰⁹ Anderson, April 19, 1816; Kakkerlak, May 29, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C]; Read, November 12, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C]; Hamilton, May 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/D]; Read, May 20, 1817 [LMS 7/2/A]; May 23, 1817 [LMS 7/2/A]; June 12, 1817 [LMS 7/2/B]; Hamilton, entry November 27 [LMS Journals 3/75]; March 1, 1820 [LMS 8/2/A]; Campbell, 'Mobatee' [LMS 8/3A]; *Second Journey*, I, 125; II 21 – 4, 140 – 1. Kakkerlak married Anna Waterboer: see Hamilton, entry September 1, 1816 [LMS Journals 2/55]; Read, entry February 20 [LMS Journals 3/64].

¹¹⁰ Campbell, 'Konnah' [LMS 8/3A]; *Second Journey*, II, 244, 28 – 90; Helm, entry October 14, 1822 [LMS Journals 1/79]; Sass, December 13, 1825 [LMS 9/4/A]. Engelbrecht may have begun work only after 1820.

two missions to the San on the upper Orange, at Hephzibah and Tooverberg, were closed by the government in 1818, the Bethelsdorp native agent situated there, Jan Goeyman, appears to have remained when the other missionaries returned to the Colony.¹¹¹

These centers remained semi-autonomous because the feeble structure of the Griquatown state had virtually collapsed. The return of the Hartenaars did not lead at Griquatown to the return of harmony. Gardens were destroyed, the sinews of cattle severed, and the threats on the life of Anderson, still trying to wield political influence, renewed.¹¹² He and his colleague Henry Helm wrote despairingly of the spiritual and temporal backsliding and the degeneracy of the youth:

Parents do not pay that regard they ought to their children...no economy in their houses, even no suitable habitation, little ambition to excel, immoral conduct in both sexes is thought little of, and then a Modest woman has no more respect paid her than an immodest, and in general the entire want of Civil Order, together with an easy and indolent way of life, which the most are accustomed to.¹¹³

Yet the situation should not be exaggerated. Though Anderson was to complain in 1820 that 'not one-fifth' of the suitable land was being cultivated, there was much cultivation and good harvests in 1817 and 1818.¹¹⁴ There was, at least nominally, a chief and council at Griquatown. In the practical absence of Berends it appears to have been 'Kort Adam Kok', probably the former rebel leader, a blacksmith, who was the chief.¹¹⁵ If Waterboer's account is correct, there was a council, and one may presume that those of the 1814 council who still remained in the area — Piet and Klaas Pienaar, Moses Adam Renoseros, Willem Visser, the rebel leader Jacob Cloete — were its members.¹¹⁶ In 1818 the Griquatown state exerted its autonomy by ordering the execution of a murderer at Griquatown itself instead of sending him to the Colony.¹¹⁷

¹¹¹ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 19 and fn, 20; Campbell, 'Alterations in the arrangement of missionaries' [LMS 8/3A] Goeyman was supposed to transfer to the San at Koningfontein, but instead remained at Philipopolis, where he would conduct trade with the Colony and neglect his preaching: see Chapter VIII. Also Philip, *Researches*, II, 20; Read, January 8, 1814 [LMS 5/3A].

¹¹² Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D].

¹¹³ Anderson and Helm, July 5, 1819 [LMS 8/1/B]. Though the missionaries do not paint as serious a picture as Waterboer, Anderson wrote only five times to the LMS between mid-1817 and mid-1819, less than usual.

¹¹⁴ Anderson, June 27, 1817 [LMS 7/1/B]; Helm, March 7, 1818 [LMS 7/4/C]; Baird, April 21, 1820 [CO 2625/34].

¹¹⁵ See Helm, entry April 10, 1820 [LMS Journals 3/72]; Hamilton, entry April 30, 1820 [LMS Journals 3/75]; H. Hendricks, Abraham Kok, Dirk Kok, in Lindley, *Adamantia*, 37, 140, 137. See also footnotes 5 and 90. 'Kort Adam' died in 1825: see Melville, October 17, 1825 [LMS 9/4/A].

¹¹⁶ Willem Visser was appointed as a third captain in 1816 but never appears to have acted in the role: Read, November 12, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C].

¹¹⁷ See Hamilton, entry November 13, 1818 [LMS Journals 3/68]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 393; Nicholas Kruger in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 5-6; Anderson to Stockenstrom, March 24, 1819 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 160-2];

In 1820 the situation was resolved still further. That February, William Anderson, who had several times threatened to remove himself, finally left Griquatown in despair at being able to continue, and reversing his previous attitude, called for Colony intervention to redeem the situation.¹¹⁸ Six months later Robert Moffat arrived at the station to join the weak and elderly Henry Helm: Moffat, as the man credited by the government with ‘pacifying’ Jager Afrikaner by converting him, as the missionary who had already turned down a government missionary post, was the person best calculated to assuage the growing anger of government at the Griqua situation.¹¹⁹ Moffat’s first step was to dissociate the mission from secular affairs:

...in order to save a mission from ruin [he wrote later] it was necessary to make a vigorous stand against interference on the part of the missionaries with the government of the people. My appointed sojourn...was intended to assist in abolishing a system which had thus burst asunder the sacred ties between pastor and people... The task was a hard one...[but] eventually crowned with success.¹²⁰

The ‘success’ consisted in the final demise of the traditional chiefs at Griquatown. Andries Stockenstrom, who visited the state in August, and who supported the ‘hereditary’ right of the Kok and Berends families to rule, had obtained their promise to resume their offices under certain conditions, including the appointment of other chiefs to represent other elements of the community.¹²¹ But for the most of the Griqua still at Griquatown it was a question of capturing, not broadening, the chieftainship. On December 20, 1820, Berend Berends failing to fulfill ‘his promise in taking better care of his office,’ Andries Waterboer was elected chief. ‘Those individuals among us who were descent characters,’ Waterboer wrote later ‘had come to the determination to quit these parts.’ But as a last means of effecting change, they had decided to elect another chief, ‘and the universal voice of the people fell on me.’¹²²

The fabric of the state was still weakened by the events since 1813. The church was dissolved by John Campbell, who had accompanied Moffat to the station as a part of his second tour of South Africa, and by 1826 had only regained twenty-five members.¹²³ The

Somerset to Bathurst, June 30, 1819 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 247]. The victim was the daughter of Berend Berends and the murder occurred at Daniels Kuil. This was later taken to prove Berends was not ‘independent’, but of course at that time he was still officially chief of Griquatown.

¹¹⁸ Anderson, April 19, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C]; Kakkerlak, May 29, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C]; Hamilton, entry January 1, 1819 [LMS Journals 3/68]; Helm, entry February 22, 1820 [LMS Journals 3/72].

¹¹⁹ See Chapter 9.

¹²⁰ Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XIII. See also *Apprenticeship*, 7, 10, 11.

¹²¹ Stockenstrom, September 13, 1820 [50 of 1835, 129-133].

¹²² Helm, entries Mach 6, December 20, 1820 [LMS Journals 3/72]; Waterboer, ‘Short account...’ [LMS 10/3/D].

¹²³ Campbell, August 13, 1820 [LMS 8/2C]; Wright, August 26, 1827 [LMS 10/3/A]; December 18, 1827

native agents, on whom John Campbell and Read had placed such high hopes for evangelization, and who had begun to play a political role of sorts, were gradually ousted from their positions: Robert Moffat, both while at Griquatown and later at Dithakong among the Tlhaping, campaigned mercilessly against them, arguing that they were insufficiently instructed in the Gospel.¹²⁴ Those that remained autonomous would, indeed, continue to contribute to acculturation of Kora and others. But it would be ten or more years before they would again play a significant political role in the structure of the Griquatown state. Meanwhile, it would appear, Waterboer governed with the assistance of a council and by the appointment of Field-Cornets.¹²⁵

The social significance of Waterboer's election is really apparent. A person of San extraction had replaced two bastard families. And, as was later argued, Waterboer was an independent chief while Kok and Berends could be said to have been British subjects.¹²⁶ The election of Waterboer was a victory for the 'Griqua' over the 'Bastards': it was a victory for the mission party too.

Since this has taken place [wrote Moffat of the election] affairs go well. Gardens and corn fields which were formerly destroyed with the cattle now remain unmolested; the owner must pay for whatever damage his cattle, etc. do. Instead of the commandos brutally murdering whole kraals [of San] who had stolen cattle, they bring whole kraals, in which the guilty are found, to Griqua Town, where they must remain free to live by themselves or serve the Griquas. All this is done without the interference of the missionaries. Is this not very pleasing?¹²⁷

Indeed the Griqua state had come of age, but how long this 'pleasing' state of affairs would remain unanimously approved by the inhabitants will emerge in a later chapter.

[LMS 10/3/C]; February 24, 1839 [LMS 16/3/B]. See also Helm, January 26, 1821 [LMS 8/3/A]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 247; 'Answers to LMS Queries,' Griquatown, August 2, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C].

¹²⁴ See, for Moffat's hostility to the native agents and the effects, Helm, September 2, 1822 [LMS 8/5/B]; Moffat, January 24, 1823 [LMS 9/1/A]; Melvill, March 26, 1824 [LMS 9/2/B]; 'Answers to LMS Queries' [LMS 9/2/C]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 18 40, 64, 79, 87, 89; Thompson, *Travels*, 91, 135. For the attitudes of Read and Anderson to native agents see Read, June 12, 1817 [LMS 7/2/B]; Anderson, February 2, 1818 [LMS 7/4/B].

¹²⁵ See Moffat in [50 of 1835, 128]: 'the chief is invested with full authority to execute the laws, but with no discretion to depart from them: he derives this authority from the people, by the election of the elders. The laws are made by the council of elders, and alterations may be proposed by any of them, or by the chief.' For a mention of one of the Field-Cornets see E. Edwards, January 8-9, 1825 [MMS: III - 1825/2]; but also Burchell, *Travels*, I, 357.

¹²⁶ Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 8.

¹²⁷ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 11-2.

5 The Frontier Zone in Transorangia, 1800 – 1820

By 1800, as an earlier chapter illustrated, the frontiersmen of the eighteenth century Cape Colony had begun to develop a network of ties with the Khoi, Khoi-Bantu and Bantu-speaking communities settled in the valley of the Orange and northwards to the line of Molopo. Trade had commenced, and mutual acculturation was under way.

Between 1800 and 1820, with non-white southern frontiersmen settled in the valley of the Orange, these processes were intensified. The existence of frontier states such as that of Jager Afrikaner and other Oorlam groups on the lower Orange, and the Griqua on the middle Orange, facilitated and promoted increased contact among southern frontiersmen, Khoi, and Bantu-speakers. Indeed it was during this period that missionaries, representatives rather of the Colony itself than of frontier society, first began their work among the Sotho-Tswana.

It was, perhaps, the intensification of trade which was most significant during this period for the incorporation of much of Transorangia within the southern frontier zone. For the Sotho-Tswana and the Nama and Kora communities around their southern and western periphery, this represented a major re-orientation. Previously, it has been argued, the trade on the High Veld was directed predominantly towards export outlets in the north-east. The integration of this economy with that of the southern frontier zone, with that essentially, of the Cape market, entailed from successive Sotho-Tswana communities a willingness to send ivory south instead of north, to export cattle rather than import them from the Khoi, and to accommodate themselves to the products sent northwards from the Cape. The fact that southern frontiersmen could hunt ivory themselves rather than barter it, raid cattle rather than trade them, did not make any difference to the structural shift in trading patterns: only to the role the Sotho-Tswana would play in them. Similarly, unless the Khoi communities on the periphery retreated beyond the growing 'catchment area' from which the southern frontiersmen drew their products, they too found themselves integrated in the southern exchange system. Further, the political weakness of the Khoi made it likely that they would play a role in this system subordinate to whites, Bastards, and Sotho-Tswana alike.

The process had begun before 1800. By then, the cattle of the Nama and Kora were, through raiding more than trading, moving to the south rather than the north, though as late as 1820, Kora communities would still provide the Sotho-Tswana with cattle

usually trained for draught and riding.¹ Within a short time after the turn of the century, too, the search for ivory by southern frontiersmen had been sufficiently successful to make elephants scarce along the valley of the Orange, and especially around Klaarwater.² Before 1800, the Bastards had bartered with the Sotho-Tswana, but now they did so on a larger scale. At first the major items given by the Bastards in exchange for ivory were dagga and tobacco, presumably the Virginian kind grown in the Cape, as well as sheep and other animals. Now beads came to play an increasing part, with the southern frontiersmen discovering that the Sotho-Tswana were very selective in their choice.³

That the 'reversal' of the trading networks was not far advanced in the first decade of the nineteenth century can be seen by the mistakes made by those from the south. Unfamiliar with Sotho-Tswana customs, the Bastards tried to barter with the Tlhaping before the crops had been harvested.⁴ The government expedition which traveled to the Tlhaping in 1801 found that, although advised by frontier farmers and Bastards, most of its goods were unacceptable. The Tlhaping were not interested in looking-glasses, tinderboxes or linen handkerchiefs. And why, they argued, should they buy single-bladed knives when theirs were of superior quality and sharp on both sides?⁵ A few years later Lichtenstein commented that travelers should bring steelware to beat the quality of Tlhaping metalwork: in fact Sotho-Tswana groups were still able to exchange their manufactures such as knives and hatchets with the Bastards.⁶ Furthermore, the Tlhaping were selective in their exchanges. Ivory and ornaments could be obtained for tobacco, which the Tlhaping did not grow.⁷ But generally speaking, cattle could be purchased only with beads, raw iron in the form of beads or nails, or cloth.⁸

¹ See, for example, Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 276; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II 253-4.

² Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 259; Anderson, August 21, 1809 [LMS 4/1/C].

³ See Anderson, entry April 21, 1806 [LMS Journals 1/14]; entry May 11, 1807 [LMS Journals 1/17]; August 12, 1806 [LMS 3/3/B]; Burchell, *Travels*, I, 253-4; II, 196, 280ff, 368, 379-80. Sheep were a new introduction for the Sotho-Tswana and seem to have been bartered exclusively to the chiefs. The Cape Virginian tobacco was long-leaved, as opposed to the round-leaved variety introduced by the Portuguese from the north: see Burchell, *Travels*, II, 230.

⁴ See, for example, Anderson, entry February 22, 1806 [LMS Journals 1/7]; Burchell, *Travels*, I, 332-3.

⁵ See Theal, *RecCC*, IV, 380-6; Barrow, *Chochin-China*, 403; Borchers, *Memoir*, 82-5. For similar problems later among other Sotho-Tswana groups see Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 246-7, 277.

⁶ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 308-310; Broadbent, *Narrative*, 108; Anderson, entry March 1808 [LMS Journals 1/20].

⁷ See Burchell, *Travels*, II, 414; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 216; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 187; Smith, *Diary*, I, 251 for the Tlhaping and tobacco. Although Smith argues that the Tlhaping did not grow tobacco so as to retain friendly trade in it with the Griqua, a more likely explanation is that of Moffat, that the Hurutsche were the nearest group having the 'superstitious right' to grow it. See also W. Edwards, July 27, 1802 [LMS 2/2/A].

⁸ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 308-310; Burchell, *Travels*, I, 253-4; II, 196.

How far to the north did the 'southern catchment area', the hinterland from which products obtained by bartering and hunting, were taken predominantly to the south, extend? For the Bastards (Griqua) this was influenced by a desire to remain as near their settlements as possible which, of course, became progressively more difficult in the case of the ivory trade. On the Sotho-Tswana side, each group with the political power to do so tried to prevent traders from the south from proceeding any further. Thus in 1801 we find Molehabangwe, the Tlhaping chief, dissuading the government expedition from continuing to the Rolong: there was, he said, an impassable desert in between, the way across which was known by none of his people, and besides, the Rolong were of a 'suspicious and ferocious disposition.'⁹ A few years later four missionaries encountered similar problems:

[Molehabangwe] through fear of deterring other white men from visiting him in future, did not chuse to prevent them by force; but took steps to frustrate their plan, by representing to them, that certain danger of their lives would be incurred if they persisted in going to the Barolongs, and assuring them of his having heard that Makrakki [Mokalaka, the chief] would put to death every Colonist who came into his country. At the same time he sent private information to Makrakki, that a party of white men was coming to murder him, and that he must without delay adopt measures for his safety. The consequence of this double-dealing was, that on their first arrival, Makrakki's manners towards them, wore a very suspicious appearance, until the parties came to an explanation and the truth was at last discovered.¹⁰

It may be assumed that, until they became familiar with the routes themselves, the Griqua also found it difficult to proceed from route to route.

But even if dangers were exaggerated by the Sotho-Tswana chiefs, they were not entirely absent.¹¹ David and Jantje Berghover, two Bastard brothers from the Cedarberg who had accompanied the missionary J. M. Kok to the Tlhaping and assisted him in trade and preaching, were killed by San as they followed him towards the Colony in 1805.¹² Dr. A. Cowan and E. Donovan, leaders of an official expedition to explore the northern interior at the same time that Colonel Collins was investigating the Colony's north-east frontier, disappeared, last heard from at the Molopo River. Though it was thought for some time that they had been killed by the Ngwaketse, it later transpired that they had passed the Ngwaketse, the Kwena and the Ngwato and turned eastwards along the Limpopo, pos-

⁹ Barrow, *Cochin-China*, 403. Also Borchers, *Memoir*, 85; Theal *RecCC*, IV, 384-5.

¹⁰ Burchell, *Travels*, II, 379. See also, for example, Bain, *Journal*, 16-18.

¹¹ For comparative estimates of factual and fictional dangers, see Burchell, *Travels*, II, 160; Campbell, *Travels*, 181-2.

¹² See Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 265 – 271; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 264-5; Campbell, *Travels*, 159-160, 164; Anderson, entry July 1805 [LMS Journals 1/2].

sibly headed towards Inhambane.¹³ William Burchell, who had intended to go as far the Portuguese settlements, was deterred for some unknown reason not far north of the Tlhaping capital.¹⁴ Mishandling by Sotho-Tswana communities was, however, far less likely than raids from the San, of from the Xhosa-led raiding group that reached the High Veld in 1805 and menaced the area west of the Vaal until at least 1815.

The fact that the direct evidence comes from white sources, anxious to maintain that they were 'explorers' of the unknown, inhibits a detailed chronology of the extension of the southern catchment area. Nevertheless it is clear that by 1801 the Bastards settled along the Orange were familiar at least with the Tlhaping and Rolong as well as the peoples of the Langeberg, who were mainly Tlharo, though also Tlhaping, Kora and probably Kgagaladi/Lala-type clients.¹⁵ By about 1806, five missionaries, J. M. Kok, William Edwards, Van der Lingen, William Koster, and Lambert Jansz, were temporarily established with the Tlhaping and engaged as much in the frontier activities of hunting and trade as extension of the Gospel. They had been on expeditions to the Rolong-Mariba, recently separated from the Tlhaping, as well as to the Tlharo, and a Kora community on the Harts which was probably that of the Taaibosch.¹⁶ We may presume that their visits were roughly contemporary with the extension of Griqua activities to the same area. By 1813, at least one trading trip had been made to the Ngwaketse, by Jan Hendrick, William Edwards, and other Griqua. But this journey, made in 1808, which reached the Ngwaketse at Kanye via the Thamaga and the Rolong at Khunwana and had returned by the Rolong-Mariba settlement, would seem to have been exceptional.¹⁷ The area familiar to the Griqua at this time was still confined by and large to south of the Molopo and west of the Vaal and Harts. This was the area about which Campbell could obtain detailed information from the Griqua in 1813, and Burchell, some months earlier, was unable

¹³ See Burchell, *Travels*, I, 50; Anderson, November 15 – January 3 [LMS Journals 1/20]; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 253; Campbell, *Travels*, 171; Caledon to Castlereagh, May 21, 1809 [Theal, *RecCC*, VI, 507-9]; Anderson to Phillip February 13, 1823 [LMS: Papers 3/1/A]. For the accepted version of their death see Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 41, 138, 141; Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, 12.

¹⁴ Burchell curtails his account of his travels at Dithakong, the Tlhaping capital; but see Schapera in Introduction to Burchell, *Travels*, I, xiv-xv; Campbell, *Travels*, 181-2.

¹⁵ See particularly Barrow, *Cochin-China*, 404 and Theal, *RecCC*, IV, 404, in which 'Hans Luyken' (probably Hans Lucas) describes a journey he had made 'some years past' with Cornelius Kok through Patanie and Dithakong to the Rolong, exchanging a few hundred cattle for beads.

¹⁶ Burchell, *Travels*, II, 379-380. Burchell's chronology is confusing: reference to LMS letters allows one to infer that Jan Kok and Van der Lingen made a first journey to the Rolong-Mariba, and Kok, Van der Lingen, Koster and Jansz made the second. Probably Kok alone (besides Griqua) had visited the Kora of Taaibosch: see Burchell, *Travels*, I 298; II, 342-3; Anderson, entry November 1805 [LMS Journals 1/8].

¹⁷ Anderson, entry November 1808 [LMS Journals 1/20]; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 379; Campbell, *Travels*, 201-2. See also Thompson, *Travels*, 91.

to obtain any information on communities north of the Ngwaketse from Berend and Jan Hendrick, two of the more adventurous hunter-traders.¹⁸ Indeed even the Vaal River between its junction with the Harts and its confluence with the Modder and Orange was almost unknown territory to the Griqua at this time.¹⁹ However, trading relationships with the Tlhaping had become more institutionalized. The more enterprising Griqua such as Jan Hendrick had established *maats* or trade-partners at Dithakong, the Tlhaping capital, and perhaps indeed elsewhere. This institution, symbolized by the pulling of noses as a greeting, involved not only a trade relationship, but the sharing of wives and, in cases of need, property as well.²⁰

Nor was there much extension of the 'catchment area' between 1813 and 1820. It should be mentioned that certainly at this time, and perhaps earlier, Jager Afrikaner had established trade relationships across the barren southern Kalahari with the Tlharo of the Langeberg.²¹ But so far as northward or eastward extension was concerned, there were only a few isolated frontiersmen such as Coenraad Buys and Joseph Arend. When Campbell crossed the Molopo in 1820 to visit the Hurutshe at Kaditshwene, it was Sotho-Tswana and not Griqua who guided him, and indeed the Griqua (or Khoi?) companions that he had with him felt insecure so far in the interior.²² It was the Lynx Kora who gave Campbell information on the Ghoya communities living on the Vet and Sand rivers; and the fact that the Lynx Kora were bartering skins with the Tlhaping and Ghoya for corn and tobacco indicates that they were still on the periphery of the northward-oriented trade network rather than reoriented towards the south.²³

How much did the Griqua benefit from this trade? They found it, apparently, extremely profitable.²⁴ Burchell seems to imply that cattle could be sold in the Colony for 20 rix dollars, while bartered in the north for goods equivalent to 12 rix dollars. Ivory was

¹⁸ See Campbell, *Travels*, 240-6; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 334-5; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 114. Jan Hendrick, appointed a native agent in 1814, would join James Read at Dithakong in 1816 and remain there until, lacking Moffat's confidence, he moved to Kramer's Fountain to join Jan Karse and Berend Berends.

¹⁹ Campbell, *Travels*, 225-6, 231.

²⁰ See Burchell, *Travels*, II, 329, 391. Also Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 23, 274; Smith, *Diary*, I, 332, 408-9; J. Melvill, April 2, 1827 [LMS 10/2/B].

²¹ See, for example, Hamilton, entry September 2, [LMS Journals 3/68]; Moffat, April 16, 1819 [LMS 8/1/A]; Moffat, August 20, 1818 [LMS 7/5/A]. See also B. Shaw, September 29, 1821 [WMN, III, 214].

²² See Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 117-322; II, 1-54 *passim*. Especially *ibid.*, I, 200, 210, 252-3.

²³ *Ibid.*, II, 348-351. See also S. Kay, May 28, 1822 [MMS: II – 1822/13]; N. Kruger in *Bloembhof Blue-book*, 7; Stockenstrom, *Autobiography*, 213.

²⁴ See, for example, Burchell, *Travels*, II, 284. Besides the profit they were able, though legal and illegal trade, to increase their supply of firearms from about 60 in 1801-5 to 300 in 1820, and 500 in 1823: see Borchers, *Memoir*, 117; Baird, April 21, 1818 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 34-6]; Campbell, 'Griquatown' [LMS 8/3A]; Thompson, *Travels*, 84; Thompson in [50 of 1835, 134, 139].

still better: a sheep, purchased in the Colony for 2 rix dollars would be bartered for a tusk of ivory, fetching some 1-2 rix dollars a pound in the Colony, and tusks could weigh anything up to 100 pounds.²⁵ It is in fact from the missionaries engaged in trading that we obtain some idea of the profits involved. Thus the missionary party which traded with the Rolong-Mariba obtained four wagon-loads of ivory in exchange for 200 sheep and some beads.²⁶ By 1806, J. M. Kok, who had been in the north only since 1800, and had begun hunting possibly as late as 1804, had netted 3000 rix dollars from selling ivory. By the same year William Edwards had made 3200 rix dollars in two journeys to the Cape, and within a couple of years had saved sufficient to retire and buy a wine farm near Tulbagh.²⁷ William Anderson, entering the business at a time when ivory was in scarcer supply, obtained 269 rix dollars worth of ivory for the expenditure of 20 rix dollars of beads.²⁸ When John Melvill became Government Agent at Griquatown in 1822, his father-in-law approved because of the fortune he believed he could make.²⁹

So long as direct Griqua access to the market in the Cape was possible — in other words during the first twelve years or so of missionary presence north of the Orange — the Griqua could benefit equally. Thus we find Berend Berends with twenty followers and their families in Cape Town early in 1811, exchanging 1000 pounds of ivory for clothes, horses, wagons, flints, knives, beads — and arms and powder which he could not have obtained without official sanction. By the end of the year he had shot another twelve elephants, bringing in a further 200 pounds of ivory, and in May 1812, was off again to hunt and barter. In July, Burchell met Berends, with Jan Hendrick and a party of fourteen others, having shot another 39 full-grown elephants besides some younger ones. Having run out of ammunition, they had come to barter with the Tlhaping before returning to Cape Town: in the meantime Klaas Berends was on his way south. And besides the ivory, they could sell cattle in the Colony on their way to the Cape market itself.³⁰ It is little wonder that Burchell should have argued strongly in his account of his travels that ‘an authorized body of traders’ or a ‘joint-stock company’ should try to obtain control of this profitable trade, traveling from Port Elizabeth and Graaff-Reinet to the Sotho-Tswana

²⁵ Burchell, *Travels*, I, 253-4, 112; II, 196, 380.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 379.

²⁷ Anderson, entry November 1804 [LMS Journals 1/2]; August 22, 1806 [LMS 3/3/B]; June 30, 1810 [LMS 4/3/A]. See also Burchell, *Travels*, II, 283; Campbell, *Travels*, 317.

²⁸ Anderson, entry May 11, 1807 [LMS Journals 1/17]; September 1, 1817 [LMS 3/4/C]; August 31, 1809 [LMS 4/1/C]. Though some missionaries disapproved of such trading, Campbell, as late as 1820, was in favor of using it to help finance the missions: see Campbell, September 5, 1821 [LMS 8/3A].

²⁹ See Mrs. Philip to Mrs. Moffat, March 8, 1822 [Quoted in Apprenticeship, 62fn].

³⁰ Burchell, *Travels*, I, 112, 261-2, 332-3; II 154, 329-338.

but bypassing the existing trade network between Griquatown and Dithakong.³¹ From the 1820s, hunter-traders did indeed begin to cross the Orange, usually by precisely that route, but it was not until the second half of the century, when the main 'catchment area' was well north of the Molopo, that the Griqua faced serious competition from whites.

It was this legitimate trade, rather than the trade with frontier farmers, which Anderson wished to foster. He noted with pride that over the twelve months prior to August 1812 the Griqua had supplied the colony with, in addition to ivory, 500 cattle in exchange for wagons, horses, sheep, and other European articles. His opposition to Burchell's journey from Griquatown to Graaff-Reinet in that year was no doubt stimulated by fear that the Griqua would use this new route to trade with colonists.³² His fears were realized soon afterwards, when the Colonial government response to the Griqua refusal to send conscripts was severely to limit the access of Griqua to the Colony. Hunting continued for those not involved in the Hartenaar revolt, with the goods stockpiled until an opportunity arose for exchange: the Hartenaars themselves, with the assistance of Buys, traded with frontier farmers via the lower or upper Orange.

Even during this period, it would seem, the occasional farmer would call at Griquatown with goods to exchange for oxen.³³ But legitimate intercourse was resumed only in 1819, when Lord Charles Somerset ordered an annual fair to be instituted at the newly-created sub-magistracy of Beaufort. To the first fair, in August 1819, came Berends and Kok, with a party 'in number one hundred and twenty souls, with twenty-five wagons and about fifty teams': they brought with them 200 ivory tusks, 700 cattle as well as skins, soap and 38 muids of salt.³⁴ The business done amounted to 15,000 rix dollars (Philip later exaggerated this to 37,000 rix dollars).³⁵ The following year the number of tusks, the product of a year's rather than five years' hunting, was reduced to 39, but besides another 700 cattle there was an increased quantity of skins, soap and salt as well as various manufactures of the Tlhaping party who accompanied the Griqua.³⁶ The fairs, however, were less than satisfactory. Anderson had sent a list of the articles required by the Griqua, including cloth and clothes, implements for agriculture and carpentry, and beads; but

³¹ *Ibid.*, II, 380-2.

³² Anderson, August 4, 1812 [LMS 5/1/D]; Burchell, *Travels*, I, 357-8, 363-4, 368, 379-80; II, 158-9.

³³ See Field-Cornet H. J. Van der Walt to Landdrost, November 24, 1814 [G. Rt. 162] [Quoted in Schoeman, *De Buys*, 87]; Hamilton entry June 29, 1816 [LMS Journals 2/55].

³⁴ J. Baird, August 19, 1819 [Quoted in Bannister, *Humane Policy*, 118 - 9]. See also *ibid.*, 120-1; Proclamation of Lord Charles Somerset, November 27, 1818 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 62-4]; Anderson, March 24, 1819 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 160-2]; Anderson, July 12, 1819 [LMS 8/1/C]. For the Saltpan near Griquatown, see Baird, April 21, 1820 [CO 2625/34].

³⁵ Philip in [538 of 1836, 610].

³⁶ Baird, May 4, 1820 [Quoted in Bannister, *Humane Policy*, 119-120]; *ibid.*, 120-1.

the farmers who came to the fair brought with them chiefly fruits and brandy. Indeed, the only articles of real attraction to the Griqua were wagons, selling at between 300 and 700 rix dollars a piece, horses, and perhaps tobacco.³⁷ The Tlhaping party of 1820 were equally dissatisfied, while the missionaries disliked the fairs because the large numbers involved and the free-flowing brandy caused drunkenness and disorder.³⁸ The fairs were discontinued soon after 1820.³⁹

Instead, the 'market' would move steadily northwards to the Griqua. In the early 1820s, the appointment of a Government Agent at Griquatown allowed him to give 'passes' to 'orderly' Griqua to trade in the Colony, but the outbreak of the Bergenaar revolt negated this system in favor of a return to direct illegitimate contacts between the Griqua and the farmers now settled close to the Orange. From 1825 onwards the shift began: traders with passes were now authorized to cross the Colony boundary and trade north of the Orange. From 1825 onwards the shift began: traders with passes were now authorized to cross the Colony boundary and trade north of the Orange. The illegitimate trade still intensified, but as well such persons as Andrew Bain began to make hunting-trading expeditions to the Griqua and the Sotho-Tswana. In the late 1820s and 1830s, the number of such persons would slowly increase, while at the same time the more enterprising traders began to set up stores: by 1830 there was one at Robert Moffat's mission at Kuruman, and by 1831 there was a store at the Wesleyan mission to the Rolong at Platberg.⁴⁰ In the 1830s, further stores would begin to function elsewhere in Transorangia. At Griquatown itself there does not seem to have been a store until at least 1840, but by the 1830s those Griqua principally engaged in hunting and trading had moved away from Griquatown, and the people of Waterboer's state were directing their energies, as will be seen, in other directions.

³⁷ See Anderson to Stockenstrom, April 12, 1819 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 167-8]; Bannister, *Humane Policy*, 123, 125, 126, 129-130; Philip in [538 of 1836, 610]. Philip reports that the colonists made profits of 200 to 500 per cent on their sales.

³⁸ See Helm, June 21, 1821 [LMS 8/3/B]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 138-140; 'Griquatown Mission' [LMS 8/3A]; Helm, entry August 7, 1820 [LMS Journals 3/72]; R. Moffat in [50 of 1835, 128]; *Apprenticeship*, 14.

³⁹ See Bannister, *Humane Policy*, 123, 134ff; Helm, January 26, 1821 [LMS 8/3/B]; Chapter VI. A fair was supposed to have been instituted at Ramah on the Orange in 1827, because of the abuse by traders of their privileges of crossing the border, but there is no evidence that it materialized: see Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 235.

⁴⁰ See, for example, S. Rolland, July 27, 1830 [JDM, VI 44]; J. Archbell, August 28, 1831 [MMS 1831/29]. Rolland reports that goods from these merchants cost double what would be paid in the Colony. For further details on trade after 1820 see Chapters VII, VIII, X, etc.

The Extension of the Frontier Society in Transorangia, 1800 – 1820

Trade, it has been argued, while having the potential for inducing acculturation itself, is most important in providing a framework of interaction within which other agencies of acculturation can operate. Such acculturation took three forms in Transorangia in the first two decades of the nineteenth century. Firstly, the influences emanating from the frontier state at Griquatown drew Kora, and to some extent San and Sotho-Tswana, into the culture of the southern frontier. Secondly, some individual frontiersmen, as well as some Xhosa offshoots from the coastal areas, continued the pattern of gathering a mixed following, raiding with them, intermarrying with them, which had been established by Jan Bloem and others in the eighteenth century. Thirdly, and most importantly, missionaries established a station among the Tlhaping which was in time to have a profound effect on the culture and sociopolitical organization of that community.

The settlement of Bastards and missionaries at Rietfontein and then at Klaarwater encouraged, as noted in the previous chapter, the incorporation into their society of Kora and San, as dependents and then as members. Until about 1813, the effects of this were concentrated around Klaarwater itself, but as the Griqua dispersed after that time, and as 'native agents' from Bethelsdorp and a few of their friends moved to the upper Orange, the process spread more widely though less intensely. Almost by definition, of course, it is hard to discover those who were most effectively incorporated. Absorbed into the frontier state itself, or its outlying sub-communities, they would have become 'Griqua'; and at this stage the absorption would have been of individuals (particularly women) and isolated families rather than identifiable groups. In some cases, though, individuals or groups were subjected to influences — learning to read a little for example — and then for one reason or another drifted away from the frontier society where later they were encountered by missionaries to whom they related their experiences: these, in a small way, themselves diffused the influences of the southern frontier.⁴¹

Apart from such fragments as joined the Griqua state, the Hartenaars, or the native agents on the Orange, it would seem that the bulk of the Kora sought to avoid the influences of the southern frontier for as long as possible. At all times between 1800 and 1820, however, as the contemporary sources indicate, there were Kora groups living in the area embraced by Griqua settlement, many of them coming under the influence of native agents. The Springbokke, for example, of whom Jan Bloem, Jr. became chief at some time during this period, were consistently near Kloof between 1813 and 1821.⁴² Others, at

⁴¹ See, for example Hughes, February 6, 1827[LMS 10/2/A]; *Journal des Missions*, XII, 198; Jenkins, September 30, 1834 [MMS VII UnN]. Also Campbell, *Travels*, 158, 147.

⁴² See Campbell, *Second Journey*, I 44-5; Helm, entry September 23 [LMS Journals 3/72]; Jan Bloem in

various points, moved out of the region to the Harts and Vaal, and the tributaries flowing eastward from the Vaal.⁴³ By 1820, there were several communities of the Taaibosch Kora on the Vaal, with the Lynx Kora living beyond them.⁴⁴ Some groups may have moved from the Klaarwater area only after 1820: the Toowenaars for example.⁴⁵ Or there is the case of the Kora group under 'Philip'. First mentioned in 1786 near the Orange-Vaal junction, they were in 1813, downstream from Kloof. By 1820, 'Philip' ruled three separate settlements, one at the Orange-Vaal junction, one higher up on the Orange, and one near Kloof.⁴⁶ By 1829, 'Old Philip', 'a man superior to the generality of this Native tribe' was living in the Griqua state of Philippolis.⁴⁷

Amongst the second category of extenders of the frontier zone in this period, perhaps the most prominent was Coenraad Buys, who by early 1815 had left the Colony and was apparently living on the Harts River, from where in 1815-16 he had considerable communication with the Hartenaars.⁴⁸ In the second half of 1816, he and the Hartenaars raided a Rolong or Ghoya community to the east of the Tlhaping at Dithakong.⁴⁹ After this Buys appears to have separated from the Hartenaars, and joined the Tlhaping (with whom he had had some contact) on a battle against the Fokeng-Motlala. The Tlhaping had been invited to join in this expedition by the Rolong-Seleka, but were so disgusted by their defeat by the well-defended Fokeng that they raided the Rolong-Seleka on their return, but were again defeated as a result of Buys warning the Rolong.⁵⁰ Shortly after this commando, in fact, Buys, pursued by a rather half-hearted commando dispatched from Griquatown on the orders of Andries Stockenstrom, joined the Rolong-Seleka. He was accepted by the community on the condition that his herds (large in number despite his occasional trips to the Colony for cattle) 'should remain his if he continued to live with

Bloembhof Bluebook, 293-4.

⁴³ See, for example, Read, May 23, 1817 [LMS7/2/A]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 273-4; 'Answers to LMS Queries', Griquatown, August 2, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C]. See also Campbell, *op. cit.*, II 244; Kay May 8, 1821 [MMS 1821/13]; Thompson, *Travels*, 138-142, 272.

⁴⁴ See, for example, Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 22-3, 289, 348-352.

⁴⁵ See Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 49-50.

⁴⁶ Smith, *Diary*, I, 203; Campbell, *Travels*, 256-7; *Second Journey*, II, 284, 290, 348; 'Konnah Missionary Station' [LMS 8/3A].

⁴⁷ Melvill, October 29, 1829 [LMS 11/4/A].

⁴⁸ See Anderson and Helm, entries April 15, June 23, October 2, October 26 [LMS Journals 2/53]; Anderson, April 19, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C]; Corner, April 24, 1816 [LMS Journals 2/55]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 268-9.

⁴⁹ Anderson to Stockenstrom, November 25, 1816 [Theal, *RecCC*, XI, 229]; Read, November 12, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C]; Anderson, June 27, 1817 [LMS 7/1/B].

⁵⁰ See Read, entry March 30, 1817 [LMS Journals 3/64]; Hamilton, May 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/D]; Read, May 20, 1817 [LMS 7/2/A]. See also Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 177, 357; Molema, *Moroka*, 6-8; Smith, *Diary*, I, 337; Breutz, *Ventersdorp*, 75ff; *Rustenburg*, 60-1; Massie, *Short History*, 16-17, 21.

him, but if he left, they should remain.⁵¹ Although Buys seems to have built a house at the Rolong-Seleka settlement of Thabeng, he was still restless, and within the next two years had lived among, or raided in the company of, the Hurutshe, the Ngwaketse, the Kwena-Modimosana, and the Kwena of Sechele.⁵² After 1820, he traveled northwards, was among the Ngwato in 1821, and later vanished even further in the north.⁵³

Like Bloem, Buys took a number of wives north of the Orange: including his earlier ventures among the Xhosa he is reputed to have had 51 children apart from those by his Dutch wife.⁵⁴ Like Bloem, he preserved his contacts with Colony frontiersmen: it is reported that the farmer who informed on Buys to the government in 1815 was still shunned by his neighbours twenty years later.⁵⁵ He did not, however, build up such a following as Bloem, being more restless, and even found it hard to retain the support of the runaway slaves and occasional white deserters who joined them, although he divided his spoils among them: 'he gave to each a portion of cows...and always told them they must never in any attacks give up but rather die.'⁵⁶ Buys' influence on frontier society in Transorangia was thus transitory: although some of his sons later joined the Bergenaars, most of them would end up in the Northern Transvaal where their descendants still, indeed, exist as a separate community, the 'Buys people.'

An early colleague of Coenraad Buys north of the Orange was a slave deserted from a Sneeuwberg farmer. This slave, Joseph Arend, left the Colony by 1816 at the latest.⁵⁷ Living for a while in the Langeberg, he joined Buys before 1818, and when a while later Buys fled from the Rolong-Seleka to escape a rumoured second Griqua commando (which never appeared), Arend was instructed to try and replenish their meager powder supply by reaching the Portuguese at Delagoa Bay. Although Arend probed further in that direction than any previous southern frontiersmen, and incorrectly believed he was within a

⁵¹ Smith, *Diary*, 356. See also Hamilton, entries August 31, September 6, 1818, May 30, October 15, 1819 [LMS Journals 3/68]; Stockenstrom to CO, August 27, 1818 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 34-6]; Anderson to Stockenstrom, September 2, 1818 [Schoeman, *De Buys*, 93]; Broadbent, June 8, 1823 [MMS II – 1823/5]; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XVII.

⁵² See Anderson to Stockenstrom, June 7, 1819 [Schoeman, *De Buys*, 95]; S. Hofmeyr, *Twintig Jahren*, 6-14; Stockenstrom, September 13, 1820 [50 of 1835, 132]; Hamilton, entries January – October, 1820 [LMS Journals 3/75]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 312, II, 141-3; Smith, *Diary*, I, 356-7, II, 75-6, 206, 219. See also Ellenberger, 'Lete...'; Jensen, 'Hurutshe...'.
⁵³ See for example Kay to Stockenstrom, August 9, 1821 [Schoeman, *De Buys*, 98-9]; C. Fuller, *Louis Trigardt*, 26; Schoeman, *De Buys*, 96-9.

⁵⁴ Smith, *Diary*, I, 121-2.
⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 95.

⁵⁶ J. Arend in *ibid.*, I, 355. When Arend joined Buys, the latter had 1500 black cattle, 300 milk cows and large flocks of sheep and goats.

⁵⁷ See Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 130-1, II, 356-7; Thompson, *Travels*, 111, 149; Arend in Smith, *Diary*, I, 355.

day or so of the Bay, he was forced to return.⁵⁸ Shortly after this he separated from Buys to trade on his own account. Living on the Harts in 1820, he joined Campbell's expedition to the Hurutshe. By 1823, he was living at Nucuning, near the Old Dithakong site, had visited Makaba several times, and had accumulated ninety head of cattle and a wagon, sufficient, with a loan from the traveler George Thompson, to allow him to purchase his freedom.⁵⁹ Arend had married a Khoi wife, and his father-in-law had also joined him in Transorangia: Arend would later become the first convert at the Kuruman mission, and his son would be personal secretary to the Tlhaping chief Mahura.⁶⁰

'Frontiersmen' who has a more immediate impact on Transorangia during this period were groups of raiders led by offshoots from the Xhosa chiefdoms of the eastern frontier. By 1805, there were at least two such groups: one living at the 'sources of the Chamka' (the Karreebergen) under a chief Hendrick, and the other under 'Oalela' and 'Gola', nephews of Ndlambe, on the Orange. Both had been in the area some time: a Xhosa named 'Danster' for example, who had served in the Colony and also been for a while a follower of Afrikaner, and who was now in effective control of the second group, had been with them since at least 1797.⁶¹ By 1805 these people already had firearms, and were to acquire more; in addition they were accumulating the usual mixed following of Kora, San, and so on.⁶² In 1805, some of these, perhaps 3 – 500, crossed the Orange, and from then until 1815 there are frequent mentions of them in contemporary sources, raiding or threatening to raid the Kora, various Sotho-Tswana groups, and the Griqua themselves.⁶³ There was, clearly, more than one group, and some remained south of the Orange: we hear of Xhosa parties in the Karreeberg, in the Langeberg, 'behind the Snow mountains', high up on the Orange.⁶⁴ In 1824, indeed, George Thompson found a part

⁵⁸ See Hamilton, entry May 30, 1819 [LMS Journals 3/68] for Read's encounter with Arend and companions three days north-east of 'Malapeetsee' shortly after their return from this expedition. See also Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 357-9, Smith, *Diary*, I, 3567; Thompson, *Travels*, 117-9.

⁵⁹ See Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 130-1; Thompson, *Travels*, 111, 118-9; Hamilton, February 17, 1823 [LMS 9/1/B]. When Wesleyan missionaries went to the Rolong-Seleka in 1823, Sefunelo, chief of the community, sent to Arend to ask whether they should be allowed to remain: see B. Shaw, July 13, 1823 [WMN, IV, 167].

⁶⁰ See, for example, Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 106, 290, 292; L. Jansz in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 14.

⁶¹ Borchers, *Memoir*, 93, 96; Theal, *RecCC*, IV, 406, 417; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 175-6, 225-8; Smith, *Diary*, I, 308. See also Theal, *RecCC*, XXXI, 27-8.

⁶² See Burchell, *Travels*, I, 341, II, 382 – 3; Campbell, *Travels*, 234; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 178; J. van der Westhuizen to Landdrost, June 23, 1817 [Schoeman, *De Buys*, 92]; H. J. Van der Walt to Landdrost, November 24, 1814 [*ibid.*, 87]; Anderson, August 26, 1810 [LMS 4/3/B]; Missionaries at Conference to Bird, August 25, [LMS 5/4/A].

⁶³ See Anderson, entries October 1805 in [LMS Journals 1/8]. Also Chapter IV, 69 and below, footnote 88.

⁶⁴ See, particularly, Kramer, entry October 29 [LMS Journals 1/7]; Anderson, entry March 5, 1806 [LMS Journals 1/8]; Anderson and Jansz, entry June 1808 [LMS Journals 1/20]; Burchell, *Travels*, I, 49, 134,

of them peacefully settled in the Under Roggevelt-Hantam area with 1100 cattle and 2100 sheep.⁶⁵ Danster, the most effective leader, in fact returned to the Colony in c.1805-6 after dissension with other leaders, and was deported by the government to Xhosa territory. From here he returned to Transorangia, perhaps as early as 1811, though certainly by late 1814, and he and Gola were for a while associated with Coenraad Buys.⁶⁶ In 1816 and 1817, Danster and/or Gola were threatening the LMS San missions on the Orange, but some time after this Danster moved north-east to the valley of the Caledon where, by 1835, he had 'about 200 or 300 Caffers under him and lives as an independent chief upon the territory of Moschush.'⁶⁷

The Tlhaping 'Confederation' and the Frontier Zone, 1790 – 1820

The raids of Jan Bloem and other southern frontiersmen on the Sotho-Tswana communities from 1780 onwards produced considerable temporary dislocation. The Tlhaping claimed to later travelers that they were 'reduced to the necessity of living upon roots and whatever game they could occasionally kill.'⁶⁸ These raids also disrupted the harmonious co-existence of Tlhaping, Kora, Tlharo and others in the Langeberg, and induced the Tlhaping to move from Nucuning to a series of sites along the Kuruman, until they settled at Dithakong some time prior to 1801.⁶⁹

Despite the repeated assertions by the Tlhaping of the seriousness of these raids, which continued into the 1790s, a remarkable recovery had been made by 1801. At Dithakong itself, under the rule of the Tlhaping chief Molchabangwe, were living some 7000-8000 Tlhaping and perhaps the same number of Rolong-Mariba in a settlement 'in circumference as large as Cape Town.'⁷⁰ Beyond the main settlement, the hegemony of the Tlhaping extended well into the Langeberg in the west, and as far in the Harts River in the east. In

202, II, 38, 382-3; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 287.

⁶⁵ G. Thompson, *Travels*, 223-4; evidence in [50 of 1835, 139]. See also Anderson and Helm, entries April-August 1815 [LMS Journals 2/53]; Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 18, 85-93 *passim*.

⁶⁶ Burchell, *Travels*, I, 49, 134; H. J. Van der Walt to Landdrost, November 24, 1814 [Schoeman, *De Buys*, 87]; Anderson, in Jansz, December 2, 1814 [LMS 5/4/C].

⁶⁷ Smith, *Diary*, I, 108. See also Fischer to CO, January 28, 1815; Van der Westhuizen to Landdrost, June 23, 1817 [Schoeman, *De Buys*, 88, 92]. This 'Danster' should not be confused with David Danster, a Kora or San chief who was established by the late 1830's just east of the Vaal, between the Modder and Sand Rivers: see Treaty of May 18, 1839 between David Danster and D. S. Fourie [*Bloemhof Bluebook*, 266-7]; Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 18, 38, 46, 54.

⁶⁸ Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 172. See also *ibid.*, 80, 88, II, 185, 18, 261; Borchers, *Memoir*, 82; Theal, *RecCC*, IV, 381; Smith, *Diary*, I, 358, 396; II, 267-8; Mosweu Taaibosch in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 290. See also Chapter 3.

⁶⁹ See particularly Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 172. Also Chapter 1.

⁷⁰ See Theal, *RecCC*, IV, 379-381. For Rolong-Mariba numbers see Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 301.

1801 a brother of Molehabangwe was settled near the source of the Kuruman, in a village of perhaps 2000 Tlharo and Kora, governing the mixed Tlharo and Kora population spread down the Kuruman.⁷¹ 'It seems...that weak tribes voluntarily put themselves under the protection of a stronger' wrote Burchell in 1812, 'as in the instance of the [Tlharo] whose numbers were too few to exist as an independent town, and who have therefore submitted to the authority of the chief of the Bachapins [Tlhaping] their nearest neighbours.'⁷² To the east, the Tlhaping were 'in alliance with' at least some of the Kora communities in the region of the Harts and Vaal, in particular some of the Taaibosch settled near Taungs.⁷³ Besides such free subject groups, for whom alliance with or incorporation in the Tlhaping 'confederation' involved no more than participation in raiding, the sending of tribute or 'presents', and allowing the Tlhaping to exert overall judicial authority, there were also the usual dependents and clients.⁷⁴ Towards the Kalahari, the leading Tlhaping royals had their 'Kgalagadi' groups whom they would visit once or twice a year.⁷⁵

The Tlhaping, Molehabangwe's son and successor was later to tell Moffat, 'had never been so rich or so numerous as at the Kuruman under the rule of his father.'⁷⁶ Indeed, the Tlhaping confederation had been able to secure control over much of the area previously dominated by the Rolong. They functioned as intermediaries in trade between the Sotho-Tswana groups to the north, the Ngwaketse and Hurutshe in particular, and the Kora along the southern fringes of Sotho-Tswana settlement. They had control of the important *sibello* quarry near Blinkklip (Tsantsabane), and — a further indication that they had previously been a scattered collection of clients — had by 1812 acquired one blacksmith, who had gone to the Ngwaketse to learn the art.⁷⁷ Molehabangwe himself was regarded as 'a superior man, distinguished as a statesman as well as a warrior.'⁷⁸ Yet this prosperity, based as it was on the customary traditional way of life of the Sotho-Tswana, was illusory.

⁷¹ Theal, *RecCC*, IV, 377-8, 387-391; Borchers, *Memoir*, 77-80, 86-88; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 325; Burchell, *Travels*, I, 242, II, 375-6.

⁷² Burchell, *Travels*, II, 386. See also Campbell, *Travels*, 204.

⁷³ See, particularly, Thompson, *Travels*, 272. Also *ibid.*, 92fn; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 294-5; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 178; Mahura, *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 295.

⁷⁴ For the requirements imposed on the Tlharo see, for example, Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 69-72. 75, 78-9, 108, 110-1.

⁷⁵ See, for example, Campbell, *Travels*, 240-5; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 335, 375, 386.

⁷⁶ Moffat, November 23, 1836 [LMS 15/2/D].

⁷⁷ For the blacksmith, see Burchell, *Travels*, II, 340, 420-1. For Tlhaping control of the *sibello* quarry see particularly Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 194-6. The claims later in the century that the Tlhaping controlled the territory around Griquatown as well, which they lent to the Bastards, may be discounted: see for example Mahura and Jantje in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 292-3; J. Ludorf, *Diamond News*, August 1871 [Lindley, *Adamantia*, 18-19].

⁷⁸ Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XIV. See also Borchers, *Memoir*, 81, 132-3; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 291-3. At this time Molehabangwe was about 50-55 years old.

Though the Tlhaping had restored their situation after the raiding by southern frontiersmen, they were after 1800 subjected to even stronger influences from the south, which produced crises within the confederation sufficient eventually to tear it apart.

A part of this transformation was the result of the reorientation of trade patterns. Though the Tlhaping continued to trade with the northern communities, they became, after 1800, increasingly a part of the southern trade network. By 1820, as has been seen, Tlhaping themselves were attending the Beaufort fair and no longer using the Griqua traders as intermediaries. By 1820, some among the young had already abandoned their traditional dress for European clothes.⁷⁹ But the major agents of the new crises among the Tlhaping confederation were missionaries of the London Missionary Society. It was in 1801 that these first went among the Tlhaping, when Jan Matthias Kok, a colonist of German descent associated with the South African Society, crossed the Orange to Dithakong, and soon afterwards persuaded William Edwards, LMS missionary at the Zak River, to join him in settling among the Tlhaping.⁸⁰ Although both of these devoted a large part of their energies to hunting and trading, and Edwards was dismissed from the LMS, they both considered themselves missionaries, and evangelized to the extent that was permitted them. Molehabangwe, possibly, had been discouraged from accepting missionaries by the Government expedition that had visited him in 1801; but within the next four years, Kok, at least, had won Molehabangwe's confidence and was engaged in demonstrating improved methods of agriculture to the chief.⁸¹ Kok and Edwards were joined in about mid-1803 by A. A. Van der Lingen, and early in 1805 by William Koster and Lambert Jansz.⁸² Within a few months the two latter had fallen out with the earlier arrivals as well as with Molehabangwe. Jansz wrote that the Tlhaping were

...very much prejudiced against the gospel and it appeared as if they had a mind to kill us...a fear [came] into the mind of the king and the great multitude with him who were armed and had surrounded us...by [our] curing some sick persons [the king] became our friend...but with all this we were obliged not to speak of the gospel.⁸³

⁷⁹ Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 64. For the fair see above and *ibid.*, I, 56, 59-60.

⁸⁰ See Borchers, *Memoir*, 61, 71, 75; Barrow, *Cochin-China*, 377; Edwards, July 22, 1802 [LMS 2/2/A]; Anderson, December 6, 1801 [LMS 1/4/E]; Du Plessis, *Christian Missions*, 95-6, 103-7, 110-2, 422; De Villiers, *Genealogies*, 408; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. IV, XIV.

⁸¹ Edwards, November 20, 1801 [LMS 1/4/E]; Schoonberg, October 15, 1802 [LMS 2/2/C]; S. A. Society, November 26, 1802 [LMS 2/2/D]; Edwards, July 22, 1802 [LMS 2/2/A]; Edwards, November 22, 1803 [LMS 2/3/C]; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 292, 297. also Pacalt and Wimmer, October 9, 1809 [LMS 4/1/C].

⁸² See Mellet, September 30, 1805 [LMS 3/2/A]; Anderson, entries March, May 1805 [LMS Journals ½].

⁸³ L. Jansz, March 14, 1806 [LMS 3/2/C]. A journal sent by Jansz in November 1805 and a letter from Van der Lingen in October 1804 are not in the LMS archives: they might be with the papers of the South African Society. For this dispute see also Read, October 7, 1805 [LMS 3/1/D]; Mellet, September 30,

Rather than hostility to the gospel or to whites as such, however, it would seem that Molehabangwe's anger was directed at what Van der Lingen called the 'thirst for rule' of Koster and Jansz. What this implied is obscure, though it may refer to attempts by the two to prevent the Tlhaping from waging war against the Rolong-Mariba, who had left the Tlhaping confederation probably in mid-1802: the departure was amicable, but disputes over trade had led to conflict.⁸⁴ At any rate when Kok returned later in 1805, conducting the Landdrost of Tulbagh to the Tlhaping, Molehabangwe told the latter that he would welcome white missionaries, if they could support themselves. William Edwards, absent during the affair, returned from the Cape some months later to find the Tlhaping delighted to see him; he was in fact able to mediate with some success between the Tlhaping and the Rolong-Mariba.⁸⁵ Not long afterwards, J. M. Kok was murdered at Dithakong by some Tlhaping in collusion with his own Khoi followers; and within a few years Edwards returned to the Cape to buy a farm. But a readiness among the Tlhaping and others to accept missionaries had been demonstrated: 'several Tribes...are desirous to have *wit* people among them,' reported Edwards on his return the Cape.⁸⁶

By the time that fresh attempts were made to place missionaries among the Tlhaping, Molehabangwe had died (in March 1812) and been replaced by his 35 year old half-Kora son Mothibi.⁸⁷ During Molehabangwe's reign the Tlhaping adopted an essentially defensive attitude towards influences from the south. Indeed they were trading with the Griqua, and it is possible that their move from Dithakong to the Kuruman further south between 1801 and 1805 was designed to put them in closer touch with the Klaarwater settlement. But soon after 1805, they began to suffer raids from Jager Afrikaner and from the group of Xhosa marauders who had crossed the Orange at about that time, and when a request for Griqua assistance was refused (by the missionaries rather than the Griqua) the Tlhaping returned north again to Dithakong.⁸⁸ Here, at the site which will be referred to as Old Dithakong (to distinguish it from New Dithakong on the Kuruman River)

1805 [LMS 3/2A]; Schoonberg, March 24, 1805 [LMS 3/2/C]; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 235-7, 245-7.

⁸⁴ For the secession of the Rolong-Mariba see Borchers, *Memoir*, 132; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 301, 306, 325; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 361, 375; Campbell, *Travels*, 179, 205.

⁸⁵ Edwards, July 26, 1806 [LMS 3/3/A]; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II 292, 297.

⁸⁶ Pacalt and Wimmer, October 9, 1809 [LMS 4/1/C]. For the murder of Kok see Anderson, September 1, 1807 [LMS 3/4/C]; entries November-December [LMS Journals 1/17].

⁸⁷ See Burchell, *Travels*, II, 153, 388; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 291-2.

⁸⁸ For the Xhosa raids on the Tlhaping see Anderson and Jansz, entry July 1808 [LMS Journals 1/20]; Anderson August 10, 1808 [LMS 3/5/B]; October 9, 1809 [Contained in LMS Journals 1/20]; June 30, 1810 [LMS 4/3/B]; Jansz, June 3, 1810 [LMS Journals 2/29]; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 382-3; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 178-180.

they remained until 1817.⁸⁹ Molehabangwe, in fact, was as much preoccupied with the secession of the Rolong-Mariba during this period as with influences from the south, and before his death at least one and possibly more campaigns had been waged against them.⁹⁰ By the time of Molehabangwe's death, the Tlhaping had become alarmed by the growing power of Makaba of the Ngwaketse (to whom the Rolong-Mariba had fled) who was to remain the most-feared leader of the region until his death in 1824.⁹¹

On his accession, Mothibi adopted a much more positive approach to the existence of the southern frontier zone. He immediately sent two oxen to Adam Kok II as a token of their continued friendship, and added his own support to Kok's request for an official investigation into the treatment of some of Kok's dependents by farmers in the Colony in 1812.⁹² Furthermore, he began immediately to make strenuous efforts to procure firearms for the Tlhaping. This had not been done before, Mothibi told the traveler Burchell, because

...he was at that time only a young man, and under Mulihaban, he had no authority to act in such an affair, and could not presume to interfere in matters of business; otherwise the Bachapins would have been long before now in possession of firearms.⁹³

Told by the Griqua that firearms could be obtained only in Cape Town, Mothibi wished to send his elder brother Molema to the Colony to get some from the Governor.⁹⁴ Meanwhile, since the Griqua were naturally unwilling to trade their scarce firearms, Mothibi and his councilors engaged in lengthy bartering with Burchell at the end of which, with the exertion of sophisticated forms of pressure, they obtained a gun, some powder and

⁸⁹ For the moves of the Tlhaping capital between 1801 and 1816 see Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 301-2; Jansz, August 3, 1810 [LMS Journals 2/29]; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 217-8, 253; Campbell, *Travels*, 168; Evans etc., May 27, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C]. In 1817 the settlement moved again, southwards to the Kuruman, and it was eight miles higher up the Kuruman river from the 1817 site, at Seoding, very close to where Edwards had established himself in 1801, that the Kuruman mission station was built: Read, September 5, 1817 [LMS 7/2/D]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 60, 107, 116; Borchers, *Memoir*, 80; Smith, *Diary*, I, 241.

⁹⁰ See Anderson, September 1, 1807 [LMS 3/4/C]; entry July 21, 1807 [LMS Journals 1/17]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 173-5, 187. Also Campbell, *Travels*, 199, 202, 205. During one Tlhaping attack the houses in which the Rolong-Mariba kept their ivory were burnt down, suggesting possibly that the Tlhaping were attempting to prevent the Rolong-Mariba entering the southern ivory trade. Other causes of conflict are also mentioned however.

⁹¹ See Burchell, *Travels*, II, 312, 336, 378-9; Campbell, *Travels*, 200; *Second Journey*, I, 317.

⁹² Burchell, *Travels*, II 153-4; Campbell, *Travels*, 196. See also 'Minutes of first conference of missionaries...', August 1814 [LMS 5/2/E].

⁹³ Burchell, *Travels*, II, 276.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 241, 249, 301.

some lead. Several months later Mothibi told Campbell that he needed another gun because the one he had obtained from Burchell was poor in quality.⁹⁵

Mothibi's diplomacy, moreover, was conducted with an awareness of the policies of the Colonial government. Anxious to inflict defeat on Makaba, he and the communities associated with the Tlhaping assiduously fostered a story which they must have known to be false, that Cowen and Donovan had been murdered by the Ngwaketse; the Tlhaping, said Mothibi, would be willing to 'assist' a Colonial military expedition sent to punish Makaba.⁹⁶ His knowledge that Jager Afrikaner was already supplying the Tlharo with firearms was a further element in Mothibi's policy formulation.⁹⁷ It may have been because of this that he expressed the intention of moving the elements of the Tlhaping confederation back into the more-defensible Langeberg, where he would also have better access to Griqua trade and protection. In 1816, Mothibi told Adam Kok that if Cornelius Kok intended to move to the area from the Khamiesberg, the Tlhaping would certainly move to Nucuning; under this situation, with the old friend of the Tlhaping Cornelius Kok settled between the Langeberg and Makaba, and with Klaarwater (Griquatown) to the south-east of the Tlhaping, Mothibi would have been in a safe strategic position.⁹⁸

It was in line with this policy that Mothibi was willing for renewed settlement by missionaries: from whites he hoped to get firearms, and through missionaries he could strengthen his ties with the Griqua state. Visited in 1813 by John Campbell and James Read, he promised them, we are told, 'Send instructors and I will be a father to them.'⁹⁹ Yet Mothibi could not act unilaterally in inviting missionary settlement: it was necessary for him to take account of, and to some extent articulate, the views of elements of the confederation who were hostile to a white missionary presence. Thus when LMS missionaries were in fact sent from England, arriving north of the Orange in 1816, they found themselves rebuffed on two occasions during the year by the Tlhaping. Although they were accompanied by Griqua friendly to the Tlhaping, the missionaries were told by Mothibi himself that he would 'take flight from Latakoo with his people' rather than that they should settle amongst his following. Twice, with the popular refrain 'the learning must not come here' echoing in their ears, the missionary party was forced to return from Old Dithakong to Griquatown.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ Campbell, *Travels*, 197; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 267-289 *passim*.

⁹⁶ See, for example, Burchell, *Travels*, I, I, 344; II, 197, 337, 348-351, 354-6; Burchell to CO, April 5, 1813 in *ibid.*, II, 427-8; Campbell, *Travels*, 171, 182, 184, 198-200; 216-8; Campbell, April 8, 1820 [LMS 8/2/A].

⁹⁷ Burchell, *Travels*, II, 267.

⁹⁸ Hamilton, April 28, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C]. See also Chapter 4.

⁹⁹ For the discussion see Campbell, *Travels*, 194-8.

¹⁰⁰ For the two visits by the missionaries, see Anderson, April 19, 1816; Hamilton, April 28, 1816; Evans,

This resistance to the missionaries was not to white presence as such. The Tlhaping emphasized to Campbell and the 1816 party that they could come if they settled at a distance from Old Dithakong on the Kuruman River as Kok and Edwards had done.¹⁰¹ It was expected that they would devote much of their attention to trading and ‘whenever they have got enough, they shall be at liberty to depart.’ If they were to teach at all, it should be instruction in the Dutch language. In some instances, no doubt, the resistance was inspired by the conflicts ten years earlier between Koster and Jansz (now at Griquatown) and Molehabangwe. But for the most part it was a much more sophisticated appraisal, based on Tlhaping observation of the Griquatown mission, and exacerbated by the Griqua discontent which had flared into revolt in 1815. It was reported that the change in Tlhaping attitudes (and particularly that of Mothibi) was not due to Coenraad Buys’ influence, as William Anderson believed, but ‘that it was the result of their own councils among themselves in the intermediate time of Mr. Campbell’s being there and the arrival of the Brethren.’¹⁰² What were the difficulties? Evans and Robert Hamilton, two of the missionary party, were told by an elderly Tlhaping that the missionaries ‘would change their old customs like the people at Griquatown, who once wore a Corass but now wear Clothes, once had two wives but now one. This he said the Boochuannas will not submit to.’¹⁰³ Or, as Read wrote,

They believe that the very day they give their consent to receive the Gospel they that moment must give up their manner of dress, marriage, circumcision, etc and although we affirm to the contrary they say they have eyes to see how it has gone at Griqua Town.¹⁰⁴

Moreover, said Read, ‘I found that on account of Missionaries at Griqua Town having the chief management I perceived that a great jealousy existed especially among the chiefs that it would be the same at Lattakoo.’¹⁰⁵

The missionaries attempted to reassure the Tlhaping. Campbell had told Mothibi that the ‘instruction would not interfere with industry...that his people would not be compelled to receive instruction...and they would not interfere with his government.’ and Evans and Hamilton went even further. ‘It was not our intention to interfere with

et al., May 27, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C]; Hamilton, [LMS Journals 2/55]; Hamilton, November 13, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C]. Where otherwise unattributed, quotations are from these letters. See also Smith, *Diary*, I, 268 – 9.

¹⁰¹ In 1812, however, Mothibi had apparently told Burchell that he wished missionaries to settle at the capital, as Kok and Edwards had been too far from him: see Read, May 18, 1813 [LMS 5/1/C].

¹⁰² Anderson, April 19, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C].

¹⁰³ Hamilton, entry September 26, 1816 [LMS Journals 2/55].

¹⁰⁴ Read, March 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/C]. See also Read, ‘A short account of the commencement, progress, and state of the Mission at New Lattakoo with some remarks,’ July 12, 1820 [LMS 8/2/B].

¹⁰⁵ Read, ‘Short account...’ [LMS 8/2/B].

their customs. It was so far from our intentions that we did declare he [Mothibi] would be at full liberty to dismiss us from them if we did.' On their second visit they sought permission simply to live at Old Dithakong 'and to say nothing about teaching.'¹⁰⁶ But the Tlhaping were well aware that the missionaries would not refrain from acting as they had at Griquatown. They were well aware that, whatever the missionaries said openly to them, that the missionary belief was that 'if the roots be eradicated, the tree must naturally cease to bear.'¹⁰⁷

Evans and Hamilton had abandoned their attempts at establishing the mission at the first cold shoulder. The attitude of James Read, who followed the missionary party north towards the end of 1816, was much more persistent. Considering that Mothibi's promise to Campbell, which he himself had witnessed, was sufficient permission for settlement, he merely asked Mothibi where he should build and where he could obtain the necessary materials. Ignoring the 'preaching' aspect, he stressed to Mothibi the secular modernizing benefits which the mission would bring: ploughs, iron and wooden implements, people skilled as smiths and carpenters, in general 'articles to keep the people happy.' Such instruction as was to be done he left almost entirely to Jan Hendrick, who moved to Dithakong, and Cupido Kakkerlak, a Bethelsdorp convert who had accompanied Read.¹⁰⁸ No person could have been more suitable, indeed, to gain the confidence of the suspicious Tlhaping than the patient, egalitarian Read, with his high degree of humility, his faith in indigenous converts, and his ability to rely on persuasion rather than anger or coercion.

By continuing to emphasize the secular rather than the spiritual side of missionary enterprise, Read was able to develop a remarkable relationship with the Tlhaping during the succeeding years. He and Robert Hamilton, one of the few missionaries self-effacing enough to be able to collaborate with others of different personalities, established a forge, built a water-mill, made ploughs, and repaired the Tlhaping tools. By the third year, reported Read, people were coming from 'distant towns' to have their hoes repaired. 'No handicraftsmen can be more useful to them than smiths,' he wrote, and although the Tlhaping were ironworkers, the whites could use more modern and efficient methods.¹⁰⁹ He emphasized the greater productivity which ploughing and irrigation could bring to

¹⁰⁶ Campbell, *Travels*, 196; Hamilton, November 13, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C].

¹⁰⁷ Hamilton, April 28, 1816 [LMS 6/3/C].

¹⁰⁸ See, in particular, Read, 'Short account...' [LMS 8/2/B]; November 12, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C]; January 1, 1817 [LMS Journals 3/61]; March 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/C]. Read had not accompanied the missionaries north to 'settle them in' as had originally had been intended because, between April 1 and May 16, he was in Xhosa territory conducting Joseph Williams to a mission there. He left Bethelsdorp for the north in August, arriving at Griquatown to find that Evans had resigned from the Tlhaping mission, and that Hamilton had gone to the Colony for supplies.

¹⁰⁹ See also Hamilton, May 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/D]; Read, May 20, 1817 [LMS 7/2/A].

agriculture, and when the Tlhaping moved to a new settlement on the Kuruman in 1817, a four mile water-ditch was soon built.¹¹⁰ His successors attempted to devalue his success in fostering such secular activities, but if Read may have exaggerated his impact, his intentions were probably for his work to bear fruit only over a rather longer time-period than he was in fact allowed.¹¹¹

By the judicious distribution of presents, furthermore, Read managed to build a substantial base of support among the leading Tlhaping royals: Read specifically recommended this as a means of winning esteem. At least one man, 'Maklak', was converted from intense hostility to the mission by this means. Not did Read hesitate to bribe children to attend his school or the church services.¹¹² It was not the method to make converts, and Read did not pretend that it was: when Read was replaced at the station there was but one convert.¹¹³ But Robert Moffat, Read's successor, who condemned the practice of present-giving, was not immune from it himself; nor did Moffat win any converts for eight years after his arrival, and even then they were not Tlhaping.¹¹⁴

Read's measures, however, did not bring unanimity on the question of missionary presence. There was, indeed, a faction strongly in favor of the missionaries. This included Molala, the brother of Mothibi, and Shaka, Mothibi's cousin and brother-in-law, the most energetic in inducing the missionaries to come to Old Dithakong.¹¹⁵ There was also the initially hostile Thaiso, third in rank of the Tlhaping royals, whose son later became one of the first Tlhaping native agents. Though many of these who supported the mission saw in it only the strategic and secular advantages which it gave, some, such as Molala in a speech which Read said 'would have done honour to a speaker of the House of Lords' argued for benefiting from the teaching of the missionaries and abandoning aggressive commandos.¹¹⁶ But there were others — some Tlhaping royals and, more importantly,

¹¹⁰ See Mrs. Hamilton, February 16, 1818 [LMS 7/4/B].

¹¹¹ Thus Moffat in 1820 claimed to have found many tools and implements lying rusting and unused: *Apprenticeship*, 9-10. However, during 1818 – 1820 Read was in a state of suspense because of the accusations of adultery against him and his dismissal as directing missionary: see Chapter VI.

¹¹² See in particular Read, entries December 28-30 [LMS Journals 3/61]; 'Short account...' [LMS 8/2/B]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 74.

¹¹³ See Hamilton, entry January 16, 1820 [LMS Journals 3/75]; March 1, 1820 [LMS 8/2/A]; August 31, 1820 [LMS 8/2/D]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 21; Melvill, July 24, 1821 [LMS 8/3/C]. See also Campbell, April 8, 1820 [LMS 8/2/A]; Moffat, *op. cit.*, 8-10.

¹¹⁴ See Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 9-10, 26, 66; *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XIV. In one letter Moffat, Having written that 'the affections which the Bootchuanas had to Mr. Read originated in the favours he had done them' continued in a postscript, 'I wish you would send me some old clothes for Natebee, and any other thing of a tempting nature.'

¹¹⁵ See, for Shaka, Anderson, February 18, 1814; February 28, 1814 [LMS 5/3/C]; January 18, 1816 [LMS 6/3/A]; Read, November 11, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C].

¹¹⁶ Read, 'Short account...' [LMS 8/2/B]. Also Read, entries January -March [LMS Journals 3/64]; March 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/C]; May 20, May 23, 1817 [LMS 7/2/A].

other elements of the confederation — who were equally opposed to Read's presence. Almost unanimously these believed that, as at Griquatown, the missionaries would exert political influence: 'there was no more king in the city, that what had never been permitted under former sovereigns was now permitted, that the Nation was ruined and that the King would soon be without people.'¹¹⁷

Under these strains, the recently-constituted Tlhaping confederation began to crumble. Too weak to offer united resistance to missionary enterprise, but strong enough and too large to come under uniform missionary influence, the confederation could do little else. The anti-mission Tlhaping were inclined to lay all the blame on Mothibi, whom they accused of weakness, and of undue influence from his wife Mahutu. Undoubtedly Mahutu exerted a considerable influence on Mothibi.¹¹⁸ It would seem, too, that Mothibi was by no means as firm a ruler as Molehabangwe.¹¹⁹ But Mothibi was faced with a developing situation which the previous Tlhaping rulers had not had to face in the same form, and was forced to take cognizance of irreconcilable views within his councils. Furthermore, the confederation was culturally plural: it included Kora elements, and a whole generation of Tlhaping had grown up in close contact with Khoi peoples and culture. This means that there was only a fragmented cultural tradition on which the Tlhaping could rely in resisting missionary influence. Mothibi himself confided to Read that, having 'grown up among the Corannas,' he was skeptical of many Tlhaping customs.¹²⁰

Mothibi, having allowed the missionaries into the settlement, was bound to defend them. 'The King is my friend,' wrote Read in March 1817.

...and the promise...he gave to Mr. C[ampbell] and myself has been and as yet is fulfilled, nor is his mind so much prejudiced against the Gospel as many of the old chiefs who have great influence with the people, he therefore hesitated giving his consent to his people receiving the word by which many are kept back from coming to hear...and the children for the same reason kept from school...to our knowledge no great opposition has been shown to those that like to come to hear.¹²¹

Demonstrable results, however, were what counted with Mothibi. When Read gave the chief a gun, he 'cried out where are all my opposers they will not believe your good inten-

¹¹⁷ Read, March 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/C]. See also Read, entry January 6 [LMS Journals 3/64]; September 5, 1817 [LMS 7/2/D]; Mrs. Hamilton, February 16, 1818 [LMS 7/4/B]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 157.

¹¹⁸ See particularly Read, entry February 11, 1817 [LMS Journals 3/64]; Philip, *Researches*, II, 134; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XV; Edwards, September 24, 1841 [LMS 18/2/A].

¹¹⁹ See, for example, Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 100, 163; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 57; Baim, *Journal*, 12 – 13; Edwards, September 24, 1841 [LMS 18/2/A].

¹²⁰ Read, March 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/C]. See also Read, entries January 11, February 19, 22 [LMS Journals 3/64].

¹²¹ Read, March 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/C].

tions my forefathers never had what I have got.' He urged Read to move to the Kuruman and, with Mahutu's assistance, to demonstrate the beneficial effects of agriculture by irrigation.¹²² Mothibi placed considerable trust in Read, When in mid-1817 the Tlhaping confederation went on the disastrous commando against the Kwena-Motlala, Read was left in charge of the town, repaying the confidence by sending to warn Mothibi of an Ngwaketse counter-attack.¹²³ To charges that Read sought political power, Mothibi answered that 'on the contrary he showed more subjection than any of his own chiefs' by asking permission for everything.¹²⁴ Robert Hamilton was told by Mothibi that 'he must consider this land as his own and live and die among them,' and Mothibi hoped that Read's son would 'become a man' among them and succeed Read.¹²⁵

But the traditionalists were not satisfied. Soon after Read's arrival, a section of the Rolong-Maribu who had returned from the Ngwaketse joined with the Maudi section of the Tlhaping to call for a commando against Makaba.¹²⁶ Makaba was afraid that Mothibi would be able to persuade southern frontiersmen to join in a commando against him, and no doubt the Rolong-Maribu wished to prove him correct by compelling Read to accompany them.¹²⁷ The pro-missionary element resisted the attempts to involve Read, and the commando, sent against the Kwena-Motlala instead, was a disaster. But when Mothibi decided to move southwards to the Kuruman to try for a while the life of peace recommended by the missionaries, the Rolong-Mariba and the Maudi remained adamant: they stayed behind at Old Dithakong. Within a short while, Mothibi was attempting to prevent those at Old Dithakong from access to the *sibello* quarry, and from trading with the Griqua:

[The Griqua] must first bring their beads to him [said Mothibi] and should they not be satisfied with [his offer] nor with what any of his people offered, they might then go to [the

¹²² Read, entry March 8 [LMS Journals 3/64]. Also Read, March 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/C]; entry December 30 [LMS Journals 3/61]; 'Short account...' [LMS 8/2/B]. See also Hamilton, entry April 8, 1818 [LMS Journals 3/68]; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XV.

¹²³ Read, entry March 30 [LMS Journals 3/64]; Hamilton, May 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/D].

¹²⁴ Read, September 5, 1817 [LMS 7/2/D]. Also Campbell, 'Report on Mr. Read' Case' [LMS 8/3A]; *Second Journey*, I, 70-1, 158-9, 175-6, 262-3.

¹²⁵ Hamilton, May 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/D]; Read, September 5, 1817 [LMS 7/2/D]. For Hamilton's arrival among the Tlhaping see also Hamilton, September 4, 1834 [LMS 14/2/F].

¹²⁶ The Maudi appear to have been a semi-autonomous section of the Tlhaping from early on, and may perhaps have been another chiefdom of clients who became associated with the Tlhaping after the collapse of the Rolong state. See particularly Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 178-180; Read, May 20, 1817 [LMS 7/2/A]; Language, 'Herkoms en Geskiedenis...', 122; Breutz, *Kuruman*, 155-6.

¹²⁷ For Makaba's attitude see Campbell, November 12, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C]; Anderson, January 18, 1816 [LMS 6/3/A]; Read, entry January 28 [LMS Journals 3/64]; Hamilton, entry November 9 [LMS Journals 3/68].

Tlharo] but he wished to deprive of all privileges Mahoomoo-Peloo [the Maidu chief] and the people with him, because they would not move to the Krooman River.¹²⁸

At the same time the Tlharo, perhaps influenced by Afrikaner, turned against the missionaries, and appear to have begun independent trading with the north.¹²⁹ By the early 1820s even the Kgalagadi found themselves sometimes able to trade directly with the Griqua instead of complete subjection to the Tlhaping.¹³⁰

At the other end of the spectrum, others among the Tlhaping and Tlharo appear to have believed that the pace of Tlhaping 'modernization' was too slow. Molala, the firm pro-missionary royal, and Mahura, a thirty year old brother of Mothibi's went to the Langeberg where they lived most of the time with the Griqua William Jephtah and his Kora and San following. The two claimed that they were looking after cattle, but also asked Mothibi if New Dithakong 'were worthy the name, if there was either food, or order, or anything else to induce people to live in it.' Some of the older royals saw in this friction between Mothibi and Mahura, correctly as it transpired, a possibility of fission.¹³¹ Meanwhile a Tlharo headman named Seretse had by 1820 constructed a European-style house modeled after that of the missionaries, was wearing 'European' clothing and a hat bought from the Griqua, and was growing tobacco and maize contrary to established custom.¹³²

Thus Mothibi found that significant numbers of his following were deserting the confederation because of missionary presence, but had to face also the danger that were he to leave, he might lose his power to his brothers or the Tlharo who might be able to construct a new confederation around a more complete pursuit of 'modernizing' policies. His dilemma was temporarily resolved when, in 1820, John Campbell and Robert Moffat arrived at New Dithakong to arrange the transfer of James Read to the Colony as a result of his adultery and suspension as a missionary.¹³³ Campbell and Moffat found immense

¹²⁸ Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 195-6. For the Rolong-Mariba and Maidu attitudes and movements over this time see Read, 'Short account...' [LMS 8/2/B]; entries January 1817 [LMS Journals 3/64]; May 20, 1817 [LMS 7/2/A]; September 5, 1817 [LMS 7/2/D]; Anderson, January 18, 1816 [LMS 6/3/A]; Hamilton, entries October -November 1818 [LMS Journals 3/68]; February 12, 1821 [LMS 8/3/A]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 124-132 *passim*.

¹²⁹ See Read, 'Short account...' [LMS 8/2/B]; November 12, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C]; March 15, 1817 [LMS 7/1/C]; entries February 4, 16 [LMS Journals 3/64]. Also Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 79.

¹³⁰ See Thompson, *Travels*, 91.

¹³¹ Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 154-7; Thompson, *Travels*, 105. See also Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 171; Smith, *Diary*, I, 280. Mahura had earlier been impressed by Coenraad Buys: see Read, November 12, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C]; entry February 8 [LMS Journals 3/64].

¹³² Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 76, 81-2, 84-5; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 47-8; Kay June 20, 1821 [MMS: 1-1821/21].

¹³³ See, for Read's adultery, etc., Chapter VI.

resistance among the Tlhaping to the removal of Read, transcending the small number of ardent mission supporters, and indeed reuniting all those who had remained at New Dithakong. 'We have confidence' in him, Campbell and Moffat were told at a Tlhaping pitso,

...he has sent presents to kings beyond us, and *they* have confidence in him — he is our friend, and is kind to us... When strangers come [he finds] out their object, and lets us know it, and this keeps our minds easy.¹³⁴

Read, said one man, was like 'breasts' to them. Campbell postponed the decision to remove Read by taking the missionary with him further into the interior, and during their absence the Tlhaping made renewed overtures to Andries Stockenstrom, Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet, who paid a visit to Dithakong.

As to Mr. Read [wrote Stockenstrom] it is quite extraordinary how much he has gained the affections of these people. They unanimously declare that they will move higher up the country, unless he comes back. They agree to receive to receive any number of missionaries, provided he be one of them, and prayed most urgently that he might be allowed to return. He certainly can do no harm, and as it is his anxious wish to stay among those savages. I am of opinion that he can be of great benefit.¹³⁵

Nevertheless, despite the opposition of the Tlhaping, of Stockenstrom, and of Robert Hamilton, James Read was removed and from August 1820 until May 1821, Robert Hamilton and his wife laboured at New Dithakong alone. In May 1821, they were joined by the Moffats, who had been in the interim at Griquatown, as well as by Wesleyan missionary, Stephen Kay, who was looking for an opening in the interior.¹³⁶

Disgusted with the missionaries, Mothibi was still determined to procure firearms: indeed, with Read removed, firearms were even more essential for protection. Mothibi implored Stockenstrom to allow the Tlhaping free access to arms and powder, on the condition that they gave up aggressive commandos, particularly against the San, and he raised the same issues with John Campbell.¹³⁷ From Campbell he unavailingly requested

¹³⁴ Campbell, 'Report on Mr. Read's Case' [LMS 8/3A]. See also Campbell, March 30, April 8 1820 [LMS 8/2/A]; Hamilton, August 31, 1820 [LMS 8/2/D]; entries January-December 1820 [LMS Journals 3/75].

¹³⁵ Stockenstrom, September 13, 1820 [50 of 1835, 132]. See also Campbell, March 30, April 8, 1820 [LMS 8/2/A]; Hamilton, August 15, August 31, 1820 [LMS 8/2/D]; entry August 17, 1820 [LMS Journals 3/75].

¹³⁶ Stephen Kay had been inspired by Campbell's account of the interior: see Kay, January 30, 1821 [MMS: I-1821/2]; March 23, 1821 [MMS: I – 1821/7]; May 8, 1821 [MMS: I-1821/13]; June 20, 1821 [MMS: I-1821/21].

¹³⁷ Stockenstrom, September 13, 1820 [50 of 1835, 132]; Hamilton, August 15, 1820 [LMS 8/2/D]; Hamilton, entries August 17-19 [LMS Journals 3/75]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 73-6.

a gun for his brother, and in 1821 he asked Hamilton for a gun for his son and heir Phetlu.¹³⁸ Furthermore, as soon as it was known that Read was going to leave, Mothibi started to ask Hamilton to assist them on commandos, which he had refrained from doing before.¹³⁹ Hamilton, of course, would not do this, and so Mothibi tried another tactic. Invited by the Rolong to join a commando, he refused, saying that the Tlhaping intended to 'trade with beads in place of Commandos.' And in 1821 he sent a message to Stockenström that he had been treating the San with leniency, and wished the Landdrost to fulfill his promise to send guns and horses so that the Tlhaping could follow up their cattle if they were seized.¹⁴⁰

But while Mothibi tried so unsuccessfully to break the arms blockade which it was so easy for the Griqua to evade, his people's resentment against the missionaries grew more intense. In the winter, the 'rainy season' of 1820, the crops failed, and the Tlhaping for the most part left the area, threatening not to return, and blaming the failure on the missionaries.¹⁴¹ The following year, with the Moffats there, the same occurred, and it is significant that this is hardly mentioned by Moffat in his letters or journal. Leaving towards the end of 1821 for Griquatown, Stephen Kay, completely disillusioned with the prospects of missionary endeavour among the southern Sotho-Tswana, wrote that

For several months previous to our leaving that part of the country, the Natives had been in a very unsettled state indeed. The greatest part of those who resided immediately upon the Institution, were about to forsake it...doing all that in them hath to banish the Gospel from amongst them. Being led by their superstition, and superstitious teachers, to think that the presence of white men, and the preaching of the Word amongst them was the grand, and sole cause of all their misfortunes, they threatened, with savage fury, to drive us all out of the country.¹⁴²

On December 3, reported Kay, Moffat had visited Mothibi and heard that the report of their departure was true. 'My people are all determined to go and can I remain alone?' Mothibi told Moffat, and Moffat 'must leave us or we must leave you.' Moffat made no mention of this in his journal of the same date.¹⁴³

¹³⁸ Campbell, *op. cit.*, I, 108-9; Hamilton, February 12, 1821 [LMS 8/3/A].

¹³⁹ Hamilton, August 15, 1820 [LMS 8/2/D]; entry August 15 [LMS Journals 3/75].

¹⁴⁰ See, particularly, Hamilton, February 10, 1821 [LMS 8/3/A].

¹⁴¹ See Hamilton, February 12, 1821 [LMS 8/3/A]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 12 – 14.

¹⁴² Kay, May 24, 1822 [MMS: II-1822/12].

¹⁴³ Kay, May 28, 1822 [MMS: II – 1822/13]. Compare Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 36. See also for this period Moffat, *op. cit.*, 35-42; Hamilton, February 28, 1822 [LMS 8/4/B]; Hodgson, June 3, 1822 [MMS: II-1822/15]. It is significant that when, in 1817-18 some of Mothibi's headmen had been discontented about crop failure, they had been told by Mothibi that they should remove further north: Mrs. Hamilton, February 16, 1818 [LMS 7/4/B]. See also Moffat, *op. cit.*, 51, 55-6, 57, 63, 70-1.

In time the Moffats would restore to some extent the confidence of the Tlhaping in the missionaries, though it is understandable why Mothibi could have said that ‘he saw that the white people were not his friends, that he could believe them no more.’¹⁴⁴ In the meantime, the Moffats took a rather less subordinate position towards Tlhaping government and Tlhaping custom than had Read. In 1820 the LMS formally purchased some land from Mothibi, an unprecedented transaction of whose implications he was no doubt unaware.¹⁴⁵ Soon after their arrival, the Moffats came into dispute with Mahutu over rights to water for their gardens.¹⁴⁶ Further, they were not able to preserve the same harmonious relations as Read with the Khoi assistants the latter had brought from Bethelsdorp, and in the case of these, and of an interpreter name Cedras (Setlhodi), a former client of the Tlhaping, began to operate as a ‘government,’ somewhat in opposition to that of the Tlhaping.¹⁴⁷ If Read had been content to wait patiently until the Tlhaping sought things from him, the Moffats were of a stronger evangelical stripe. Missionary presence since 1816 had begun the political erosion of the Tlhaping confederation: the Moffats were beginning the process of cultural erosion.

Prior to the *Difaqane*, only one further mission was established among the Sotho-Tswana. Kay, retiring to Griquatown, was joined by Samuel Broadbent who had come to reinforce the Wesleyan mission to the Sotho-Tswana. Kay’s disillusionment, and the illness of Broadbent, forced the two to retire to Graaff-Reinet in 1822. Towards the end of that year, however, Broadbent, joined by Thomas Hodgson, returned northwards with the intention of establishing a mission either among the Dighoya or the Rolong-Seleka, whom they appear not to have distinguished too clearly.¹⁴⁸ During 1823, the pair found Sefunelo, chief of the Rolong-Seleka, retreating from the first impact of the Difaqane, and persuaded him to settle at Maquassie. Here, as at his former settlement of Thabeng, Sefunelo appears to have ruled a confederation somewhat similar to that of the Tlhaping.¹⁴⁹ In February 1824, with the two Wesleyans joined by a third, Edward Edwards,

¹⁴⁴ Hamilton, February 28, 1822 [LMS 8/4/B].

¹⁴⁵ Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 148-9. For other ‘cultural’ innovations see *ibid.*, II, 60, 215-6.

¹⁴⁶ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 22-23; Hamilton, February 17, 1823 [LMS 9/1/B].

¹⁴⁷ See particularly Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 21-2, 27, 30-1, 32, 36, 39-43. For Cedras (Setlhodi), see also Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 188, 192; Campbell, November 12, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C]. Some of these assistants who left the Kuruman would join one of the Griqua states, or at least remain in Transorangia. Knecht, for example, mentioned by Moffat, is probably Knecht Windvogel who was to be found in the Caledon valley in the 1830s: see Chapter X.

¹⁴⁸ See particularly Helm, December 27, 1822 [LMS 8/5/D] who says Hodgson and Broadbent asked him if they should go ‘to the Gokas of which Cebenel is the chief.’ See also Moffat, January 24, 1823 [LMS 9/1/A]; Sass, February 14, 1823 [LMSS 9/1/B].

¹⁴⁹ On this see particularly Broadbent and Hodgson, July 1, 1823 [WMN, IV, 199-201]; Hodgson, entry March 1 [MMS: II-1823/10]; Broadbent and Hodgson, January 1, 1824 [MMS: II – 1824/2].

Thomas Hodgson took his leave, and shortly thereafter Edwards himself left Maquassie to establish a station among the Links Kora somewhat lower in the Vaal.¹⁵⁰ These missions, however, were of too recent establishment to have much impact before the Missionaries retired to Griquatown in mid-1824: the Wesleyans began their work again only after the major impact of the *Difaqane* had passed in Transorangia.

¹⁵⁰ The establishment of the Wesleyan mission is dealt with in Broadbent, *Narrative*, 7-68; Mrs. Hodgson, *Memorials*, 120-158; B. Shaw, *Memorials*, 295-312. These sources, however, tend to neglect Edward Edwards, like Stephen Kay, because both of them abandoned the area. For the role of Edwards see particularly Edwards, January 10, 1824 [MMS: II – 1824/6]; Broadbent, March 31, 1824 [MMS: II-1824/23]; Edwards, May 6, 1824 [MMS: II-1824/36]; Broadbent, July 1, 1824 [MMS: II-1824/45]; Edwards, January 8, January 9, 1825 [MMS: II-1825/2]; April 28, 1825 [MMS: IV-1825/14].

6 The Griqua and the Colonial Government, 1815 – 1826

The harmonious relations between Griqua and the Colony government which had been fostered by William Anderson in the decade after 1805 had broken down by 1815. The British administration in the Colony was seeking gradually to reincorporate into the Colony the frontiersmen who had evolved in semi-autonomy in the eighteenth century, and was particularly concerned about the desertion to the north of non-whites whose labor as dependents was essential to the Colonial economy. The Griqua, on the other hand, used to their frontier semi-autonomy, were developing institutions to safeguard and promote their independence from the Colony. Antagonism between the two was inevitable, and was increased by the Hartenaar rebellion. William Anderson, his role as mediator between the Griqua and the government already weakened by his clash with Somerset over the issue of Griqua conscripts and deserting dependents, and then almost destroyed by the loss of Griqua confidence in his capacity to represent their interests to government, tried to keep the news of the revolt from government for as long as possible. Finally he was induced by Adam Kok II and Berend Berends to write, in June 1816, to Andries Stockenstrom, Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet. Asking that only Griqua with passes from the missionaries be admitted to the Colony, he hoped that 'in case measures were adopted to prevent those who did not belong to the station from getting arms and gunpowder they might be of that nature as not to prevent our going forward in our Missionary endeavours.'¹ Reprimanded by government for allowing the revolt to occur, Anderson would from now on concentrate on regaining the favor of government. He modified the policy laid down by Campbell on refugees: he would, as government wished, try to return them to the Colony by force if necessary. In 1818, at the instigation of Stockenstrom, he arranged for a Griqua commando to set out to capture Coenraad Buys and, when this was unsuccessful, he wrote letters to Government reporting on Buys' movements.²

Anderson's attempt at a rapprochement with government was not calculated to improve Somerset's views of the Griqua, but neither did it alter the Governor's hostile attitude towards the extra-colonial missions of the LMS. Soon after he received a series of

¹ Anderson, September 17, 1816 [LMS 6/4/B]; Anderson to Landdrost of Tulbagh, June 5, 1816 [Quoted in Schoeman, *De Buys*, 90]. The letter was passed on from Tulbagh to Stockenstrom at Graaff-Reinet.

² Anderson to Stockenstrom, November 25, 1816 [Theal, *RecCC*, XI, 229]; CO to Anderson, January 17, 1817; Anderson to CO, March 20, 1817; Stockenstrom, August 17, 1818; and various letters of Anderson to Stockenstrom, etc., in 1818-9 [Quoted or cited in Schoeman, *De Buys* 91-6]; Hamilton, entries August 31 – October 15 [LMS Journals 3/68]. The Government wrote to Anderson that this event 'had been anticipated from collecting so many indolent and ill disposed people together where there was no sort of social compact to restrain them.'

letters from Stockenstrom dealing with the desertion of slaves and Bastards to the Orange River, Somerset wrote a long letter on the issue to Lord Bathurst, the Colonial Secretary.

[The deserting Bastards and slaves, wrote Somerset] if they now and then visit the Missionary Establishments...are considered members or followers of them, although they receive no instruction or benefit from the religious exhortations of the brethren; part of these men, expert in the use of firearms, subsist in great measure from the game they kill, but to procure firearms and ammunition they must revisit the Colony and bring with them something which will induce the itinerant traders to supply them with these prohibited articles. The consequences is that they plunder the distant tribes and traffic with the booty... The Missionaries settled beyond the Colony do not consider themselves liable to Colonial interference... That English Establishments shall exist upon our Border, not liable to the Colonial laws and regulations, cannot be satisfactorily explained to the Colonists, who are themselves strictly prohibited from passing that frontier, which they daily see the native Bastards do unrestrained, and to which their Slaves desert with impunity.³

The issues, then, had become broader than simply the pole of attraction which the frontier state exerted for deserters from the Colony, broader than the refusal of the Griqua to consider themselves a part of the Colony by providing conscripts. The Griqua were now accused of encouraging insubordination in the Colony by promoting illegal trade. They were creating disorder by their raids on the 'distant tribes,' and were soon, in fact to be regarded as a potential menace to the Colony itself in view of the number of firearms they possessed.⁴ Further, the white frontiersmen apparently had a natural resentment at the fact that the non-white frontiersmen had managed to create institutions to support a greater freedom from the Colonial government than was enjoyed by the whites.

Hardly any of these problems could be blamed on the missionaries. Indeed it could be said that the missionaries had played a large part in the formation of the Griqua frontier state, and the government was annoyed that Campbell's regulations had been instituted at Griquatown, quite independently of colonial law, and without even being formally communicated to Government.⁵ But, as John Philip was later to point out, the illegal trade, the desertions, the disorder, had been in existence before the arrival of missionaries and continued despite, rather than because of, missionary presence.⁶ The first actions of Somerset, however, were directed against the missionaries. At the same time that he wrote to Bathurst, Somerset refused permission to four newly arrived LMS missionaries, including Robert Moffat, to leave for stations beyond the northern border.⁷ Within a

³ Somerset to Bathurst, January 23, 1817 [Theal, RecCC, XI, 252-6]. See also Thom, January 25, 1817 [LMS: PPapers 1/1/D].

⁴ See, for example, Campbell, 'Griquatown' [LMS 8/3A].

⁵ See Anderson, November 15, 1814 [LMS 5/4/C]; Thom, January 25, 1817 [LMS: PPapers 1/1/D].

⁶ See Philip, 'A brief view of the state of the missions...' [LMS: PPapers 1/1/D]; *Researches*, II, 235-240.

⁷ Taylor to Burder, January 26, 1817 [Northcott, *Moffat*, 33]. See also Thom, appended note to Evans, *et*

year the government had ordered the two missions for the San established by the LMS at Tooverberg and Hephzibah on the upper Orange to be closed down, and commanded the missionaries there, William Corner (originally from the West Indies) and Erasmus Smit, to return to the Colony.⁸

That Somerset should have directed his first actions against the missionaries rather than the frontiersmen is to be explained partly by events within the London Missionary Society itself, to which we must now briefly turn. From almost the inception of LMS activity in South Africa, its workers has begun to divide into two factions. One was represented by Van der Kemp and James Read, with their willingness to take issue with farmers, government, and even other missionaries over the conditions of the Khoi and the tolerance of the institution of slavery. The other faction consisted of those whose evangelical zeal was tempered by their absorption of the colonial attitudes of a society of white settlement: some of them indeed, members of the South African [Missionary] Society which had been formed under the stimulus of Van der Kemp, were themselves both colonists and slave-owners. They were scandalized by the marriage of Read and Van der Kemp to non-white women, and outraged by the controversy which the Bethelsdorpers set in motion over the treatment of Khoi in the Colony.⁹ After the death of Van der Kemp, the cleavage crystallized. James Read, the successor to Van der Kemp as directing missionary, led one faction, though his influences was minimized by his departure from Bethelsdorp to establish the Tlhaping mission in 1816. The other faction collected around George Thom, a capable and efficient Scots missionary intended for India, who had come with Campbell to the Cape and remained to preach to soldiers and take charge of the muddled financial affairs of the Society. Thom had rapidly absorbed the views of the colonial faction: very soon after arriving he wrote to the LMS that 'I think...with many here also that every reflection on the government here or even on the slave trade should be avoided. I have therefore crossed with red ink a part or two of Read's Journal.'¹⁰

Thom and Read represented the extremes of attitude which a missionary in a white settler society could take. Thom was cautious, even obsequious, to established authority

al., May 23, 1815 [LMS 6/3/B].

⁸ For the closing of these mission stations see Macmillan, *Cape Colour Question*, 128-132; Clinton, *Melting Pot*, 103-6; H. Reyburn, 'Tooverberg,' *The Critic*, July 1935, 204-9; Philip, *Researches*, II, 23-8, 276-283; Stockenstrom, *Autobiography*, I, 212 - 3. Also Corner, September 2, 1816 [LMS 6/4/A]; Read, September 7, 1816; October 12, 1816 [LMS 6/4/B]; Anderson, June 27, 1817 [LMS 7/1/B]; Campbell to Stockenstrom, September 25, 1820 [LMS 8/2/D]; Stockenstrom to Campbell, September 25, 1820 [LMS 8/2/E].

⁹ See, for example, Read and Van der Kemp, December 1805 [LMS 2/3/D]; Read, January 1807 [LMS 3/4/A]; Read, January 30, 1808 [LMS 3/3/B]; Van der Kemp, May 1808 [LMS 3/3/B]; Pacalt, September 18, 1809 [LMS 4/1/C]; April 7, 1810 [LMS 4/2/C]; Read, January 25, 1812 [LMS 5/1/B].

¹⁰ Thom, February 23, 1813 [LMS 5/2/B].

because of his recognition that missionary endeavour in South Africa could succeed only with the goodwill of government. Read was generous, open, and imaginative, and too deeply committed to the principles of social equality which he had learned from his mentor Van der Kemp; too involved in establishing relationships with his Khoi 'flock' in terms of those principles, to place any demands of the state above the stand of individual conscience. Read has often been accused of naivete because on two occasions, in 1808 and in 1821, his accusations of Khoi mistreatment by colonists could not be fully sustained in court.¹¹ This in itself is an unfair charge, and if Read could be naïve in other respects then it was simply that his order of priorities was different. About missionary work itself he was not naïve: hardships, he insisted, should not discourage missionaries.

I hope...the directors will urge the necessity [to prospective missionaries] of being ready to suffer bereavements. Necessaries cannot immediately be had and such Brethren are disappointed some think they are coming to a paradise and expect to meet and associate with Dukes, Dutchesses [sic] Lords, Ladies and I don't know what else.¹²

The hostility of Lord Charles Somerset to the LMS missions in the north, then, cannot be divorced from the fact that James Read, prime instigator of the Bethelsdorp accusations against government, was now himself in that area. This hostility, extended by Somerset's actions to missionaries of the 'colonial faction' such as Robert Moffat, who intended to 'teach the people...to submit to the powers that be,'¹³ led George Tom to search for an issue to dissociate Read from the LMS. Read's indiscretion provided a volatile one. Before leaving Bethelsdorp for Dithakong, Read had committed adultery with the daughter of a San convert named Andries Pretorius, and Pretorius and his family had traveled northwards to the Orange River shortly before Read.¹⁴ Though it was clear that Read had confessed to the Bethelsdorp church, been forgiven, and had no further contact with the girl, Thom summoned a meeting in Cape Town to consider this case, as well as other financial and administrative grievances of the missionaries. Moral irregularities by other

¹¹ See, for example, *Cambridge History*, VIII, 288 – 293 *passim*. But see Read's recognition that his charges were unlikely to stand up because of the defects of the courts: Read, November 7, 1809 [LMS 4/1/D]; August 8, 1812 [LMS 5/1/D].

¹² Read, June 12, 1817 [LMS 7/2/B]. See also Read, July 29, 1813 [LMS 5/2/D]; January 1811 [LMS 4/4/A]; January 9, 1812 [LMS 5/1/A].

¹³ Taylor to Burder, January 26, 1817 [Northcott, *Moffat*, 33].

¹⁴ For the evidence on this affair, see the following: Thom, April 29, 1817 [LMS 7/1/D]; 'Minutes of Missionary Deputies...Cape of Good Hope, August 1817' [LMS 7/2/C] which contains verbal or written testimony by J. G. Messer, J. Evans and E. Evans; (J or E?) Evans, July 7, 1817 [LMS 7/2/B]; Messer, December 12, 1817 [LMS 7/3/C]; Moffat, June 28, 1817 [LMS 7/2/B]; Thom, July 11, 1817 [LMS 7/2/B]; Thom January 1, 1818 [LMS 7/4/A]. Read's defense is contained in Barker, May 28, 1818 [LMS 7/4/D]; Mrs. Hamilton, April 20, 1819 [LMS 8/1/B] (with enclosure by Read April 5, 1819); Mrs. Smith, February 15, 1818 [LMS 7/4/B]; Mrs. Hamilton, September 24, 1818 [LMS 7/4/A].

missionaries, for the most part no more serious than marrying themselves to Khoi women when Colony clergymen refused to participate, were also lumped in. The meeting and Thom's correspondence with the Directors vastly exaggerated the scope of Read's guilt, and he was suspended as a missionary as well as relieved of his official post. So 'criminal' did the LMS Directors regard his conduct to be that they confirmed the action of this strictly illegitimate meeting.¹⁵

The consequence of these events, for the LMS, was the decision to find a suitable man to act as Resident Superintendent of the LMS at the Cape, who would not himself have missionary duties: this led to the appointment of John Philip.¹⁶ But the expulsion of Read did at least restore the 'colonial faction' to favor. The four newly arrived missionaries were permitted to proceed to their stations. Within a year Thom himself, and three other missionaries had resigned from the LMS to take up missionary posts where they would be financially supported by government.¹⁷ Robert Moffat himself, highly estimated by government because of his active part in the 1817 meeting, returned a while later from his station in Namaqualand to the Colony with Jager Afrikaner, now converted to Christianity, retired from his raiding activities, and desirous of moving to Griqualand or the Zak River. Moffat, too, was requested by government to enter its service, and though he maintains he had no intention of doing so, Philip wrote that it was necessary to argue Moffat out of such intentions.¹⁸

With Read thus purged (temporarily at least) from the LMS, and the remaining missionaries of the society subdued or entering government service, Somerset directed his attention to the Griqua mission and the Griqua state itself. In the 1814 conflict with Anderson, Somerset had threatened to bring the Griqua back within the limits of the Colony by force, and he now renewed this policy. The proclamation establishing the sub-magistracy of Beaufort not only was concerned to set up a fair where the Griqua and others could trade with colonists, but required the magistrate to establish a mission station providing facilities for instruction of the Bastards which, it was hoped, would at least prevent further exodus even if it did not as yet attract back those who had left.¹⁹ By June

¹⁵ 'Minutes of Missionary Deputies...' [LMS 7/2/C]. See Thom, July 11, 1817 [LMS 7/2/C]; LMS Board Minutes, October 8, November 24, 1817.

¹⁶ See Chapter 9.

¹⁷ Presumably these missionaries ceased to be attached to any evangelical society, though they retained the denominational affiliations they had previously held.

¹⁸ See J. Moffat, *Lives*, 28-47, 62-5, 77; Northcott, *Moffat*, 33-58 *passim*; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 1-4, 53-4, 62-3; Campbell, 'Alterations in the arrangement of missionaries...' [LMS 8/3A]; Philip, 'A brief view...' [LMS: PPapers 1/1/D]; *Researches*, II, 226; Bird to Brownlee, December 30, 1818 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 118-124]; also *ibid.*, XII, 86.

¹⁹ Proclamation of Somerset, November 27, 1818 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 62-4]; Somerset to Bathurst, December 28, 1818; Colonial Secretary to Baird, December 4, 1818; Somerset Bathurst, June 30, 1819

1819, he went further. In an interview with John Philip, newly arrived as Superintendent and still on good terms with the Governor, Somerset argued that Anderson's mission should be broken up 'and that he should be settled either within the Colonial Border or at least so close to it as to be considered under the control of the Colonial government and the people attached to his subject to the local law of this place.'²⁰ Nothing more was attempted, however, until Anderson, leaving Griquatown in disgust in February 1820, told the magistrate at Beaufort, Baird, that 'were some measures not adopted to crush the existence of the Bastard Independency, it would prove ruinous to them, and most detrimental to the prosperity of the Colony.'²¹ Donkin, Acting Governor in the absence of Somerset in Britain, forthwith wrote to Stockenstrom to prepare to surprise Griquatown with a force of two companies of Cape infantry and a burgher commando, to seize the Griqua, their firearms, and their cattle, and to return them to the Colony.²²

Stockenstrom rejected this unrealistic military plan: it would be impossible to take the Griqua by surprise, and they would simply flee further into the interior were a military expedition to approach.²³ But several months later he paid his second visit to Griquatown and submitted a report which was to provide the framework of government relations with the Griqua for some time. His report of his first visit, in August 1818, had indeed been more favorable than could have been expected in the disturbed conditions of the time.²⁴ This can be explained (apart from the fact that dissensions are likely to have been suppressed during his visit) by the friendly relations he established with Berends and Adam Kok II, by his realization of the role that the Griqua could play as a 'civilizing influence' on the communities beyond with whom they were in contact, and by his recognition that the government did not have the power to do more than influence the Griqua by more

[*ibid.*, XII, 111-2, 242-8]. The mission, established at Kookfontein, was placed under the charge of Erasmus Smit, but did not survive more than a few years.

²⁰ Somerset to Bathurst, June 30, 1819 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 242 – 8].

²¹ Baird, April 21, 1820 [CO 2625/34].

²² Bird to Stockenstrom, April 21, 1820 [Stockenstrom, *Autobiography*. I. 177-9].

²³ Stockenstrom to Bird, May 5, 1820; Stockenstrom to Donkin, May 10, 1820 in *ibid.*, I, 170-183. Shortly before the letter to Stockenstrom was written, Philip was summoned by the Colonial Secretary Bird to be informed of the decision. Philip's account appears to confuse this interview with a similar one in 1819 with Somerset, but during the interview(s) and in a subsequent Memorial to the Governor, Philip argued against attacking the mission for similar reasons. However, though Stockenstrom received a copy of the Memorial, it was not Philip's views which were decisive as Philip would, characteristically, claim later. See Philip, 'a brief view...' [LMS: PPapers 1/1/D]; Memorial to Sir Rufane Donkin, quoted in Philip, *Researches*, II, 72 – 5. See also Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 57; Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 3-4; Philip, 'Summary of relations with government...' March 1825 [LMS: PPapers 2/1/B]; Bathurst to Somerset, September 28, 1819 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 249-50].

²⁴ For his reports see Stockenstrom, August 27, 1818 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 34-6]; September 13, 1820, in [50 of 1835]. Also Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 245ff; Anderson, February 22, 1819 [LMS 8/1/A]; Anderson and Helm, July 5, 1819 [LMS 8/1/B].

stringent control of trade. Thus he argued in 1820, with some disregard for historical fact, that the Griqua had been 'allowed' to leave the Colony to obtain better pasturage for their cattle, but had abused this privilege by their lack of order and their occupation of San territory. If bringing them back into the Colony was impractical, and if they were yet to be regarded as emigrant British subjects, the logical conclusion was to appoint a Landdrost at Griquatown; and indeed this was Stockenstrom's original suggestion, turned down on grounds of expense.²⁵ But, argued Stockenstrom, in the absence of a Landdrost, the Colony presence could not be left to the missionaries. In the past, he claimed, it was only the knowledge that the missionaries had been under government patronage which had given a semblance of Colony authority, but the missionaries were 'destitute of the abilities, as well as the authority, support and influence' necessary to enforce government policy.²⁶ Stockenstrom's answer (before the election of Waterboer) was for Kok and Berends to resume their offices on the understanding that government would make renewed attempts to regulate Griqua access to the Colony and control the arms trade. At the Griquatown end this would be accomplished, following a recommendation made as well by William Anderson, by the appointment of a Government Agent and the establishment of new regulations for the Griqua government.²⁷

Despite its independent endorsement by Anderson, there was division among the missionaries on the question of an Agent. Philip, like Stockenstrom, wanted the appointment of a Landdrost and thought, quite correctly as it transpired, that any lesser measure would increase rather than lessen Griqua divisions.²⁸ John Campbell who, with Moffat, was in Griquatown at the time of Stockenstrom's visit, appears to have favored the idea.²⁹ Moffat, on the other hand, was wholeheartedly against it: with his fanatical insistence on the separation of church and state, he does not appear sufficiently to have distinguished missionary interference in Griqua politics from the question of a Government Agency

²⁵ In 1817 Somerset had intended something of the same sort by proposing that Griquatown should form 'part of the nearest district...under the control of the local Magistracy, and [be]...amenable to Colonial law,' though this did not accord the same stature to the Griqua as a separate magistracy: see Somerset to Bathurst, January 23, 1817 [Theal, RecCC, XI, 252-6].

²⁶ Campbell wrote of Anderson that he was 'evidently...fond of temporal power; and yet reluctant to execute anything...a nervous, timid man.' (Campbell, 'Griquatown' [LMS 8/3A]; also Read, May 23, 1817 [LMS 7/2/A]).

²⁷ See Baird, April 21, 1820 [CO 2625/34]; Helm, entry August 7 [LMS Journals 3/72]; January 26, 1821 [LMS 8/3/D].

²⁸ Philip, *Researches*, II, 78 – 9, 297 – 8; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 61-2. Philip's reasons for opposing the measure may have been added with the benefit of hindsight. See also his much later claim that from 1819 onwards he would have recommended an extension of the Colony over the Griqua, 'but the minds of the Griqua were not ripe for the measure.'; Philip to Napier, August 25, 1842 [LMS 18/1/D].

²⁹ Campbell, August 13, 1820 [LMS 8/2/C]; Moffat to Philip, September 19, 1820 [*Apprenticeship*, 6-7].

which, of course, should have eliminated the need for such ‘temporal’ activity by the missionaries.³⁰

Griqualand [wrote Moffat when the Agent was appointed] is now in the hands of John Bull. Mr. C[ampbell], I believe, never saw the propriety of his being kept out of it, and never viewed his introduction in a comprehensive way. While at G.T. he recommended my endeavours to conciliate the hostile and hush the turbulent passion with political advice, to which I replied, that I should use every possible means to sweep state affairs entirely out of the Church and Mission... In the meantime, the subject of an agent at Griqua Town became the hobby at the seat of Government, proposed to by one of the clerical order (Mr. Anderson). From the diffidence of Government to proceed, it was evident that some one was busy enough to push it forward... I have nothing to do with Government, which Lord Charles knows too well to be my sentiment to make any proposals. The business of G. T. has nothing whatever to do with this station [the Tlhaping mission]. What influence it may have we may see in the future.³¹

What Moffat would have liked to see governing the relations between the Griqua and the Colony is unclear, though there is no evidence that the Agency was pushed by Anderson or anyone else on a ‘diffident’ government. The government appears eager to have had some Colony presence at Griquatown at minimum expense. Thus when Anderson in Cape Town suggested the scheme to one John Melvill — government surveyor and inspector of building who had accompanied Latrobe on his travels, and had offered himself as a lay assistant to the LMS in 1819 — Melvill volunteered with alacrity. Melvill paid an exploratory visit to Griquatown and Dithakong in 1821 and reported that there was a ‘unanimous’ desire for an Agent both at Griquatown and Campbell: Henry Helm, the missionary, spoke more cautiously of many ‘many, if not all’ desiring an Agent.³² Returning to Cape Town, Melvill received his official appointment and his Instructions on March 21, 1822, and returned to take up the post in June.

The Instructions were ‘an historical document,’ though one cannot agree with the further assessment by Orpen that ‘all Griqualand was already, before the instructions were issued... a British Colony with special institutions and some measure of self-government.’³³ Melvill was to be Agent to ‘tribes who have invariably been considered as dependent on

³⁰ See, for example, what Anderson told Melvill in 1820, that the latter as Government agent, ‘could be made useful to the Missions in the Country by relieving the missionaries from a painful interference in political and civil matters’: Melvill, December 26, 1825 [LMS 9/4/C].

³¹ Moffat to James and Mary Smith, August 20, 1822 [*Apprenticeship*, 61-2]; Moffat, February 17, 1823 [LMS 9/1/B].

³² H. Helm, June 21, 1821 [LMS 8/3/B]; Sass to Melvill, May 9, 1821 [50 of 1835, 212]; Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 212ff]; Melvill, December 26, 1825 [LMS 9/4/C]. Also Theal, *RecCC*, XX, 80, XXII, 436-7.

³³ J. M. Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 109-110. Orpen’s work, based partly on access to unpublished archival documents, is an important source for the Griqua in this period.

this Colony' and was to persuade them to move in the direction of adopting a system of colonial laws. The irony was that he was to implement this policy of gradual reincorporation of the frontier state into the Colony with no more power than Anderson had had. His ability to issue passes to 'orderly' Griqua to enter the Colony was, when he was unable to prevent 'disorderly' Griqua from continuing to trade with the white frontiersmen, an imposition on those who were law-building rather than a reward for them. The power of the Agent depended, in fact, on the power and attitude of the Griqua state, the only agency capable of enforcing government policy.

The instructions, furthermore, took cognizance of the argument which had been made by Stockenström and was later to be fully articulated by Philip, that despite Griqua disorder, they were potentially a 'civilizing' force on surrounding communities.³⁴ 'Assuming that the limits of the Griqua country and possessions are regularly defined,' said the Instructions, 'there remains no doubt but that all tribes residing within them should be considered subject to the laws of the Griqua whether they be Boshuannas, Corrannas, or others.'

The Instructions, in fact, intended to define a policy which would bring greater Colonial control over the Griqua, both encouraged the strengthening of the Griqua state as the only means of enforcing the policy, and provided a potential charter for the extension of that state over surrounding communities.

The Bergenaar Rebellion

Even before John Melvill took up his post at Griquatown, resentment against his appointment had emerged. This stemmed from two sources. The old chiefs were naturally angered at their replacement by the upstart Waterboer, despite the formal division of Griqualand into three parts in January 1822, Kok and Berends were forced to conceal their resentment to some extent at this time only because 'they cannot do otherwise, as Govt. acknowledges [Waterboer] as captain.'³⁵ 'I found their principal ground of complaint,' wrote Thompson in 1823, 'was [Mr. Melvill] making a chief of Andries Waterboer, and

³⁴ See Stockenström, September 13, 1820 [50 of 1835, 130]: 'the removal of the Griquas would generate the entire dissolution of the shadow of restraint which, little as it is, keeps the Corannas (a tribe far more populous than, and equally expert in the use of arms with, the Griquas) from those depredations which the colony formerly had to complain of.' Also Memorial of LMS to Bathurst, November 3, 1818 [Theal *RecCC*, XII, 55-7]; and Chapter 11.

³⁵ Helm, entry January 7, 1822 [LMS Journals 3/79]. Melvill, however, wrote later that 'soon after this arrival' (on his May 1821 visit?) a General Meeting divided the country, and this was confirmed by him in a letter to government of October 4, 1821: Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 212]. See also addition by A. Faure, April 6, 1822 (?), to Hamilton, July 10, 1821 (?) [LMS 8/3/A].

his wishing, through him (as they alleged) to control them, the real hereditary chiefs. This they considered as a sort of usurpation or infringement of their privileges, not to be tolerated.³⁶ But the discontent was not confined to the old chiefs and their following. Even some of the 'new Griqua' were quickly disillusioned with Waterboer. Those who preserved to the fullest the 'frontier spirit' of resistance to authority soon found that Waterboer intended to govern the Griqua state by more stringent enforcement of the regulations that even the old chiefs. And now his authority was to be augmented by a Government agent, whose appointment quickly aroused the old fears that Griqua would be ordered into the Colony army.

The disaffected soon found excuses for leaving Griquatown. In 1821 Jacob Cloete departed, perhaps to the Langeberg.³⁷ Early in 1822 Gert Goeyman was given permission to pasture his sheep across the Vaal on the Modder, where he was joined by others who had not received Waterboer's permission. Some of these, such as A. Hendricks and his brother Hendrick, had specific grievances against Waterboer: the former, a Council member, had been prevented from trading in the Colony, and Hendrick Hendricks blamed Waterboer for a bad deal on a wagon sale.³⁸ The 'Bergenaars', as they were soon to be called, collected on the Modder River, numbering at first only 10-15 according to Melvill, but considerably more, perhaps because of Kora and San who joined them, by the evidence of others.³⁹ Within a few months an armed party had visited Griquatown and, believed Melvill, had laid a 'diabolical plot...to fall upon himself, Waterboer, and their principal adherents, when in the chapel, and massacre the whole lot of them in cold blood.'⁴⁰

This initial sally, it emerged later, was probably an attempt at reprisal by Gert Goeyman for an attack that Waterboer had made on his brother.⁴¹ But it was blamed by Melvill, Waterboer and others on the old chiefs. Indeed the Koks and Berends had intrigues with the Bergenaars: Berends is reported to have instigated a Kora community, perhaps Jan

³⁶ Thompson, *Travels*, 79. See also Warren, 1825 Journal, in Warren, *On the Veldt*, 355.

³⁷ Helm, entry December 7, 1822 [LMS 8/5/D]: 'Last year' Jacob Cloete became enemies with Waterboer and left, but was caught and punished.

³⁸ Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 213]; Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D]; Helm, entries January 7, April 12-13 [LMS Journals 3/79]; September 2, 1822 [LMS 8/5/B]; December 27, 1822 [LMS 8/5/B]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 281. Some who left, such as Hans Goeyman and one of the Hendricks, Hendricks, had been accused of rape.

³⁹ Melvill, September 9, 1825 [50 of 1835, 223]; and, for example, S. Broadbent, entries December 10, 28, 30, 1823 [MMS: II-1823/5]. Also Philip, *Researches*, II, 79.

⁴⁰ Thompson, *Travels*, 81, though he is skeptical of the report. See also Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 213]; Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D]; Sass, March 29, 1823 [LMS 9/1/B].

⁴¹ Smith, *Diary*, I, 199-200. Adam Kok II and H. Hendricks told Smith this; Jantje, Gert's brother, had been accused by Waterboer of adultery. For Bergenaar grievances see also Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 213-5, 219]; Helm, December 27, 1822 [LMS 8/5/D]; Sass, March 29, 1823 [LMS 9/1/B]; Broadbent, entry December 10 [MMS: II - 1823/5].

Bloem's, to join the rebels, and Abraham Kok is said to have promised to join them himself.⁴² But if the old chiefs saw the rebellion as providing potential support for their own return to power, their aims were not identical with the extreme anti-authoritarianism and the possible hostility to religion of some of the Bergenaars.⁴³ One cannot accept Melvill's remark that the Koks and Berends were 'enemies of the missionaries,' and still less that of Sass that they 'cannot bear the thought of being in some measure subjected to government, and they fancy, that, if there had never come teachers, they would have remained entirely independent.'⁴⁴ For Kok and Berends rejected not Waterboer's exertion of authority but what they saw as his abuse of it: 'he was without experience, headstrong and fiery to the extreme...wherever he thought blame lay he punished without enquiry just on mere belief,' Adam Kok II was to say later.⁴⁵ Berends wanted to secure James Read as a missionary, and the Kok family wanted William Corner: they cannot be accused of being against 'teachers'. Sass was forced out of the Campbell settlement by the Kok family, but this was because he had supported Anderson, and now Waterboer and Melvill, in their hostility to the old chiefs.⁴⁶

Moreover, too much encouragement to the Bergenaars by the old chiefs could react against them. Although some dissidents from Griquatown joined the Campbell and Daniels Kuil settlements, others appear to have left these places to join the rebels. This may explain why at the start of 1823 there was a renewed attempt at unity: Waterboer, Adam Kok II and Berends met in a General Meeting at Griquatown, adopted plans for the government of the country, and laid down regulations (which were later approved by the Government). When the Bergenaars did not turn up at the meeting, Waterboer asked Kok and Berends to mediate on his behalf with them, going so far as to admit that the complaints against him were true and that he would submit to the judgment of 'those who had always been his enemies in secret.' A meeting was arranged at Campbell by the old chiefs, but Waterboer turned back on the road, refusing to attend, when he heard that the rebels were coming armed. One more joint attempt was made. In March, Kok and Berends agreed to a commando with Waterboer against the rebels. But this time Water-

⁴² See Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 213]; Waterboer, 'a short account...' [LMS 10/3/D].

⁴³ Robert Moffat wrote in 1824 that 'it is well known that missionaries are not the object of their [the Bergenaars'] displeasure. It is the chief on whom they wish to vent their rage,' but no more than two months later he was accusing them of anti-missionary feelings: *Apprenticeship*, 170, 177. See also Sass, October 17, 1823 [LMS 9/1/D].

⁴⁴ Melvill, May 28, 1823; Sass, March 29, 1823 [LMS 9/1/D].

⁴⁵ Smith, *Diary*, I, 199-200.

⁴⁶ See Helm, December 27, 1822 [LMS 8/5/D]; October 20, 1823 [LMS 9/1/D]; Sass, March 9, 1823 [LMS 9/1/B]; October 17, 1823 [LMS 9/1/D]; Melvill, May 28, 1823 [LMS 9/1/B]; Broadbent, entry December 6, 1822 [MMS: II-1823/5]. The opposition to Sass was voiced only after the death of Cornelius Kok I in 1822.

boer, far from being severe, was indecisive. No doubt he was influenced by the fact that, as in the Hartenaar rebellion, families were divided between 'loyalists' and 'rebels'.⁴⁷ He had in fact allowed Jan Hendricks, brother of two of the leaders, and others with Bergenaar relatives to go ahead and try to persuade them to submit. But Hendricks returned with messages from the Bergenaars clearly indicated to redivide the united chiefs: how, said the Bergenaars, could Waterboer act like Jehosaphat, the good king of Judah, in allying himself with Ahab, the wicked king, in the persons of the old chiefs? Kok and Berends had indeed incited them to revolt, and if they did submit and return it would be to Waterboer, who was more impartial in his decisions than the old chiefs. It was, no doubt, sufficient inducement for Waterboer to detach himself once more from Kok and Berends and seek to woo the Bergenaars independently. But it revived the hostility of the old chiefs to Waterboer, for they had destroyed their alliance with the Bergenaars for no gain.⁴⁸

Kok and Berends threatened Melvill to leave the area entirely but they were, soon afterwards, persuaded by the traveler George Thompson, on his way north, to try once again to settle their differences with Waterboer. Thompson's promise to intercede with government on their behalf must have assuaged their feelings to some extent, for when they arrived with him at Griquatown to hear the news of the 'Mantatees' threat to the Tlhaping, they joined with Waterboer in the famous commando which fought at Old Dithakong, submitting themselves to his leadership.⁴⁹ In fact, with the Bergenaars now suspicious of them, and more of their subjects leaving to join the rebels, they had little option. Adam Kok himself, returning from a trip to Graaff-Reinet, was temporarily besieged by a Bergenaar party.⁵⁰ In March 1824, in a phrase strictly incorrect and which he was later to regret, Melvill described Adam Kok II and Berends as 'quite under his [Waterboer's] control'.⁵¹ Two months later this apparent unity among Griqua chiefs was strengthened when a General Meeting at Campbell elected as chief there, in place of Adam Kok II, Cornelius Kok II, who, from the point of view of the missionaries and Waterboer was more suitable: he was, as one said, 'more active and of better principles than his brother'.⁵² But the unity was illusory. Displaced at Campbell, Adam Kok II was free once more to

⁴⁷ See, for examples of this, Helm and Sass, entry June 8 [LMS Journals 4/84]; Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 214]; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 116.

⁴⁸ Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D]; Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 213-4]; Sass, March 29, 1823; Melvill, May 28, 1823 [LMS 9/1/B].

⁴⁹ See Thompson, *Travels*, 78-90 *passim*. For the commando see Chapter VII.

⁵⁰ Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 215].

⁵¹ Melvill, March 26, 1824 [LMS 9/2/B]. see also Melvill, February 16, 1824 [LMS 9/2/A]; Helm, October 10, 1823 [LMS 9/1/D]. In a later letter Melvill was forced to concede that the old chiefs had not submitted to Waterboer; that they were 'all three independent'; Melvill, July 6, 1826 [LMS 10/1/D].

⁵² Helm and Sass, entry May 11, 1824 [LMS Journals 4/84]. See also Sass, September 19, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C]; Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 215].

form an alliance with the Bergenaars, and Berends as well was on the move from Daniels Kuil and possibly making overtures in that direction.⁵³

But it was not only the old chiefs and the Bergenaars who were disgruntled with the situation. The only chance for success for the 'accommodationist' Waterboer, when his severity and his cooperation with the Colony were clearly unpopular, lay in a demonstration that this policy would benefit those Griqua who remained loyal to him. And the chief benefits that could be secured were free access to the Colony, a supply of arms and ammunition, and colonial support for punitive action against the disloyal. Despite Melvill's endeavours, none of these were forthcoming. Waterboer claimed that the farmers would trade with loyal Griqua only at the fair, while the rebels had constant communication with colonist contacts. Melvill's request in 1822 for special rights of access for loyal Griqua was met with an unsatisfactory government reply that the Griqua might go freely to Graaff-Reinet or to Beaufort, but not to Tulbagh. In the same year Melvill asked Stockenstrom to send military assistance to subdue the rebels, but the latter, who had not met Waterboer and whose news of developments probably came from his friends the old chiefs, declined to interfere.⁵⁴ Again in 1823 Melvill pressed for government intervention and loosening of conditions of access for the loyal. But when Moffat brought the government reply, on May 12, 1824, that the Beaufort fair would be stopped and Griqua with passes might enter the Colony when they liked, Waterboer's supporters remained unreconciled: they 'set no value on it and did not apply for certificates to obtain gunpowder.'⁵⁵ Just a day before Moffat's arrival, in fact, Waterboer and his counselors had complained about the situation to Henry Helm. However much the restrictions were lifted, they said, the Bergenaars had easier access to the Colony than the loyalists and, what is more, Colonial Field-Cornets were themselves implicated in this illegal trade. Waterboer and his supporters had to suffer unpopularity and abuse not only from other Griqua, but from white farmers as well. They intended, they said, to resign their offices and move away from Griquatown. To the missionaries they issued a veiled warning that 'the few people who dwell in this place [Griquatown itself] remained here for the sake to protect the missionaries,' which was certainly the reverse of what Helm and Sass believed. But the two missionaries persuaded Waterboer to hold off his resignation until John Philip was able to make his intended visit to Griquatown. In the meantime

⁵³ For Berends, see, for example, Sass, October 17, 1823 [LMS 9/1/D].

⁵⁴ Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 213-4]; Thompson, *Travels*, 45, 78; Melvill, May 28, 1823 [LMS 9/1/B]; Baird to CO, October 17, 1822 [Theal, *RecCC*, XXII, 208]; CO to Stockenstrom, August 27, 1823 [*ibid.*, XVI, 223-4].

⁵⁵ Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 213-4]. Also Helm and Sass, entry May 12, 1824 [LMS Journals 4/84].

Waterboer, strengthened by the support of Cornelius Kok II at Campbell, decided to take vigorous action on his own.⁵⁶

Recognizing that his leadership of the commando against the 'Mantatees' at Old Dithakong in 1823 had brought him some acclaim in the Colony through the missionary reports on the battle, Waterboer must have decided, or been influenced by his supporter Melvill, to undertake another such dramatic venture. Rumours of another excursion southward along the Vaal by an alliance of some of the marauding groups of the *Difaqane* had already reached Griquatown in 1824, when there came the definite news that Sefunelo, the Rolong-Seleka chief at Maquassie among whom the Wesleyans had recently established a mission, had been attacked.⁵⁷ Waterboer and Cornelius Kok II gathered a commando at Campbell, including San, Tswana and Kora as well as Griqua, and were joined by Melvill and Edward Edwards, the Wesleyan missionary whose scouting up the Vaal had provided the most definite information (Edwards and Broadbent having shortly before abandoned the mission station due to the illness of Broadbent). The commando set off on July 5 or 6 and met Sefunelo on July 12 at his retreat near the junction of the Harts and Vaal. On their way the Griqua had heard evidence that Sefunelo had not in fact been attacked, but had himself destroyed the mission station at Maquassie after the departure of Edwards and Broadbent. These reports, as would emerge quite soon, were wholly without foundation, but they were sufficiently convincing at the time to induce Edwards to leave the commando since 'it would not look well for a Missionary to have his hands in a business of such a nature.'⁵⁸ On the day that Edwards left, Sefunelo was brought before a Griqua court, found guilty of destroying the mission, and fined 600 cattle. There was indeed some circumstantial evidence of guilt, and Sefunelo's testimony showed prevarication, perhaps because he had in fact been engaged in raids against his neighbours either shortly before or shortly after the attack on Maquassie.⁵⁹ The evidence was not sufficiently convincing, however, for such rapid sentencing or such severe punishment and later, when this became clear, both Melvill and Waterboer would claim that they had attempted to persuade the other towards leniency.⁶⁰ But at the time neither of them

⁵⁶ Helm and Sass, entry May 11, 1824 [LMS Journals 4/48].

⁵⁷ See particularly Helm and Sass, entries May 25-July 4 [LMS Journals 4/84]; Broadbent, July 1, 1824 [MMS: II-1824/45]; Broadbent, *Narrative*, 128-131.

⁵⁸ Edwards, January 1825 [MMS: III-1825/2].

⁵⁹ See Moffat, May 8, June 6, 1824 [*Apprenticeship*, 117-8]; January 10, 1824 [MMS: II-1824/6]; January 8, 1825 [MMS: III-1825/2]. These indicate that, besides provoking the Taung by an unsuccessful attack on them in February 1824, Sefunelo was planning, even had he not made, an attack on a Kora group (Moswen Taaibosch's?) who were related to Mothibi: it was from Kora that much of the evidence hostile to Sefunelo came. See also Chapter 7.

⁶⁰ For the episode see Edwards, January 8-9, 1825 [MMS: III-1825/2]; Melvill, 'Journal of an expedition...' [LMS Journals 4/86]; Broadbent, *Narrative*, 131-2; Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/

either went to Maquassie to investigate the extent or nature of the damage, or attempted to discover whether or not there were in fact 'Mantatees' groups in the neighbourhood. This could be taken to indicate simply the impetuosity of Waterboer at this time, though in the light of his subsequent career, it may be possible to trace here the beginning of his attempts to secure hegemony over the peoples of Transorangia.⁶¹

While Melvill returned to Griquatown after the trial, Waterboer and Cornelius Kok II proceeded against the Bergenaars, fighting a major engagement against them at their hill encampment of Sluitel's Poort, near the present Fauresmith.⁶² The Bergenaars, refusing to submit, were surrounded, and two of them killed and four wounded in the battle which followed. In the night the remaining Bergenaars managed to slip through the siege lines, perhaps simply because of the rain, or perhaps, as Waterboer claimed, because of 'unfaithfulness' on the part of some of his forces. Their 4000 cattle were, however, left behind and seized by Waterboer.⁶³ After this victory, which had at one stroke deprived the Bergenaars of all their major exchangeable goods, Waterboer returned to Griquatown, bringing with him chiefs and people from refugee Sotho-Tswana communities who had lost their cattle to *Difaqane* marauding groups or to the Bergenaars. These, amongst them the 'Mokohai' of Khatlane and the 'Baramonaki' under the chief 'Rantsani', were settled in the neighbourhood of Griquatown or of Campbell.⁶⁴

Despite these two assertive actions by Waterboer, the situation in Transorangia appeared, to the missionaries and Melvill at least, extremely grim. Rumours of impending new invasions by 'Mantatees' were abundant, and though the main thrust of the *Difaqane* so far south was in fact over, sporadic attacks continued. Though the Bergenaars were without their cattle, they were still at large and some of them — the 'Klein Bergenaars' — had in fact begun to raid the Tlhaping.⁶⁵ It was necessary, thought the missionaries and

D]; Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 215-6]. For the cumulative and convincing evidence of Sefunelo's innocence see Moffat, Journal July-August [*Apprenticeship*, 132, 144-154]; Edwards, entries December 17, January 15 [MMS: III-1825/2]; Hodgson, January 6, 1825 [MMS: IV-1825/1]; Archbell, January 15, 1825 [MMS: IV-1825/33]; Broadbent, *Narrative*, 165-6; Hodgson, entry December 20, 1825 in letter of June 23, 1827 [MMS: IV-1827/21]. Also 'Statement drawn up at the request of Chief Molitsane' [*Theal, Basutoland Records*, I, 517-532].

⁶¹ See Chapters 9-12. See also Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 217, 219] speaking of the Sotho-Tswana, who 'look to the Griqua chiefs [Waterboer and Cornelius II] as their friends and benefactors.'

⁶² For the position of the Bergenaar camp see Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 113; Smith, *Diary*, I, 199-200.

⁶³ For descriptions of the attack, see Helm and Sass, entries July 22, 31 [LMS Journals 4/84]; Sass, entry August 3 [LMS Journals 4/87]; Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 215-6]; Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 281.

⁶⁴ Besides the sources listed, see Archbell and Hodgson, March 31, 1825 [MMS: IV-1825/74]; Hodgson, entry April 3, 1826 [MMS: IV-1826/13]; Mahura, February 19, 1845 [*Bloemhof Bluebook*, 126-7].

⁶⁵ See Chapter 7.

Melvill, for the Colonial government to take strong measures in Griqualand, preferably annexation.

Our hopes and expectations are now turned to the Colony; [wrote Mary Moffat] under God, we now look to government for protection. It is the opinion of some that Griqua Land will be disregarded and laid aside, but Robert thinks differently on the subject. They, by their interference, having made things worse than they would have been, they cannot now reasonably give it up; and again the Griquas (if so cast off) would soon become an object of terror to the Colony independent of the foreign tribes... One thing we can say, if Government should give up Griqua Land, and withhold all supplies from the people, *we cannot* stop in the country. Were there nothing but the numerous tribes of marauders in the interior it would be impossible, as nothing can stand before them but powder and lead; and, independent of them, were missionaries the only persons in the country who had ammunition (upon which they depend not only for protection when traveling, but in many instances for support), they would become a butt for all the villainous part of the Griquas, and our lives would be in constant jeopardy.⁶⁶

Melvill was completely frustrated by the impotence of his role as Government Agent, which he now recognized, like Mary Moffat and Philip as well, was worse than no Colony presence at all. He left Griquatown for the Colony on the day that Waterboer returned. He intended, so far as one can determine, to press for annexation or resign.⁶⁷ What Waterboer's attitude to this was at the time is unclear, though the fact that Melvill did not wait for Waterboer (who, with Khatlane, followed Melvill south a few weeks later) as well as some other evidence suggests that they may have quarreled.⁶⁸ Perhaps Waterboer was opposed to a policy of annexation which might well have eroded his power, and considered that his forcible actions in July and August had demonstrated that, given more support, he could in fact control the situation.

In Cape Town, however, John Philip was able to patch up any differences which might have occurred between Melvill and Waterboer. Philip, unlike Moffat, had changed his attitude to the Agency and, warming in his relationship with Melvill, was able to guide the negotiations of Melvill and Waterboer with government in November and the latter's written statement of affairs in December.⁶⁹ The government did not approve annexation:

⁶⁶ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 175. See also Sass, entry November 17 [LMS Journals 4/87]; January 12, 1825 [LMS 9/3/A]; Hodgson, January 6, 1825 [MMS: IV-1825/1]; Edwards, entries August 4, December 17 [MMS: III-1825/2]; Hodgson, entry December 30, 1824 [MMS: IV-1826/13].

⁶⁷ See Melvill, December 26, 1825 [LMS 9/4/C]; Melvill, May 28, 1823 [LMS 9/1/B]; also Edwards, entries August 6, August 26, 1824 [MMS: III-1825/2].

⁶⁸ Waterboer later accused Melvill of taking with him from Griquatown all the available ammunition, including some *en route* to Griquatown which Melvill commandeered further south, and leaves the impression that he (Waterboer) went south initially only to recover some ammunition: see Waterboer, ; 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D].

⁶⁹ See Philip. *Researches*, II, 293-4, 297-9; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 199-200; Melvill's report of December 17, 1824 appears in [50 of 1835, 212-9].

in September 1824, the territory up to the Orange was annexed further east, where white frontiersmen were occupying farms right up to the river, but the boundary was allowed to curl away south-westwards from Ramah, leaving an 'unclaimed' strip of 'Bushmanland' between the Griqua state and the Colony.⁷⁰ Instead, on January 27, 1825, Lord Charles Somerset issued a new and more stringent set of regulations on trading between frontier farmers and the Griqua. Trading outside the Colony was prohibited except with a pass, and even in such cases it could not be trade in arms or ammunition and was to be conducted in the presence of the Government Agent. Griqua 'of good character' could obtain passes to travel anywhere in the Colony, but not for trade in arms. The Government Agent at Griquatown would have ammunition at his disposal, and more would be lodged at Graaff-Reinet. Further, the Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet was instructed to inform the Bergenaars that

...nothing is further from the intention of the British Government than the idea (which they have got into their heads) of taking away their Children, as Soldiers; or of interfering with them in any way contrary to their own inclinations, and that it has no interest whatever in its conduct towards them but that of securing their own peace and happiness.⁷¹

Armed with these regulations, which did indeed increase his authority in legal if not practical terms, Melvill was persuaded by Philip to try again his post, and he accompanied Waterboer back to Griquatown in April 1825.

The two had left Griquatown without a chief, without an Agent, and with the elderly and weak Christopher Sass as the only missionary present; indeed Waterboer had departed ignoring reports of renewed 'Mantatees' attacks, leaving battle to be done with them by Berend Berends and his followers.⁷² It is hardly surprising that within a month of Waterboer's departure there had been an attack on Griquatown itself by a Bergenaar party including Jan Bloem and A. Hendricks. A woman was burnt in her house and two men were shot, but after prolonged negotiations with Sass, the Bergenaars withdrew. They had intended, no doubt, to recover their cattle and seize whatever arms and ammunition they could find, but were deterred by the presence of a missionary (realizing that reprisals were likely to occur if a white were even accidentally killed), and by the summoning of reinforcements from Cornelius Kok II at Campbell.⁷³ But not all the Bergenaars participated in this attack. At least since Waterboer's seizure of their cattle, they had been divided on

⁷⁰ Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 118; Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 130-5.

⁷¹ Proclamation of Somerset, January 27, 1825 [Theal, *RecCC*, 227-230].

⁷² This battle was waged against the Taung, at the request of Moffat: see Chapter 7.

⁷³ See, for this attack, Sass, September 28, 1824 [LMS Journals 4/872; Edwards, entries August – October [MMS: III-1825/2]; Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 217-8]; Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D].

how to prolong the rebellion. While some continued raiding, others wished to return to Griquatown or Campbell, to join Adam Kok II or Berends, or even to return to the Colony.⁷⁴

The indecision of the Bergenaars stimulated Adam Kok II and Berends to renewed activity to win support, and from the time of Waterboer's departure for Cape Town they began again to negotiate with the Bergenaars.⁷⁵ They were sustained in their attempts by the support given them by Andries Stockenstrom, whose influence on government may well have been (besides the usual financial considerations) decisive in preventing the annexation of Griqualand under Waterboer. In the second half of 1824 Stockenstrom had crossed the Orange to visit the Bergenaar party under Hendrick Hendricks, established in the area of the Modder River and Philippolis, and hear their grievances. Still favorable to the traditional chiefs Kok and Berends, whose authority he believed Waterboer had usurped, Stockenstrom reported to the government that Waterboer was unpopular, and that the Bergenaars were the 'majority' party. He also dispatched to Cape Town Captain Bonamy, his assistant in surveying the new colonial border, to defend the position of the Bergenaars.⁷⁶ It was for this reason that Stockenstrom was entrusted, by the January 1825 proclamation, with restoring peace between the Bergenaars and the remaining Griqua, a mission which he undertook in June 1825. He was told by H. Hendricks that this Bergenaar party had refrained from raiding from the time of his last visit until Waterboer had returned with renewed colonial support, but that they were willing to stop active measures against Waterboer if they could settle where they now were under the chieftaincy of Adam Kok II. Stockenstrom, reporting once more to the government, laid the blame for the rebellion securely on Waterboer and the 'bad management' of Melvill, and attempted (or so Melvill believed) to secure government support for Adam Kok.⁷⁷ It is little wonder

⁷⁴ See particularly Sass, September 28, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C]; November 11, 1824 [LMS 9/2/E]. Also Archbell and Hodgson, March 31, 1825 [MMS: IV-1825/74].

⁷⁵ See Andries Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D]; Hodgson, entry February 24, 1824 [MMS: IV-1825/35]; entry February 6, 1825 [MMS: IV-1826/13]; Melvill, May 23, 1825 [50 of 1835, 220-221].

⁷⁶ Stockenstrom, October 22, 1824 [Extracts in Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 114-5; Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 58]; Philip, *Researches*, II, 294; Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 217].

⁷⁷ Stockenstrom, June 1, 1825 [Extracts in Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 114-5]; Melvill, June 22, 1825 [50 of 1835, 221-2]. For negotiations between the Bergenaars and the old chiefs in July 1825, mediated by Carel Kruger, white son of the Krugers of the eighteenth century who was trading with the Bergenaars, perhaps because his half-brother, Abraham Kruger, was leader of some Kora who had joined them, see Archbell and Hodgson, October 4, 1825 [MMS: IV-1825/49]; November 1, 1825 [MMS: IV-1825/58]. See also Warren, entry July 1825 [in Warren, *On the Veldt*, 46-7]: 'at present the old captains of the Griquas or Bastards have let them [the Bergenaars] join them, in consequence of quarrels between them and Waterboer, and of the government Agent wishing to make them prevent the Burgonars going on commandoes against the Bosjesmen and other tribes to steal their cattle.'

then that Kok and Berends, much to the disgust of Melvill, should have refused to come to Griquatown to hear the new regulations announced in April 1825.⁷⁸

Melvill and Waterboer continued to believe that the Griquatown state could still recapture the Bergenaars, and that the regulations issued by the government could be used to achieve this end. Melvill reported at the beginning of August that the principal Bergenaars had returned to Griquatown, confessed, and been pardoned, and that Adam Kok II had submitted to his brother Cornelius; but that these events were genuine, even if they occurred, is not supported by other evidence.⁷⁹ At about the same time the two succeeded in arresting an illicit trader (could this have been Carel Kruger?) but received no government backing for this action.⁸⁰ Melvill was pressing for greater powers for Waterboer and Cornelius Kok: that they themselves should receive authorization to punish misdemeanours by colonists. Such authority, could Cornelius and Waterboer have exerted the power to implement it, would indeed have strengthened their hand and revolutionized the relationships between the Griqua state and the Colony. But even as Melvill was pressing these measures, he and Waterboer were undercut by John Philip who, crossing the Orange for the first time on August 18, 1825, was to find that Stockenström's appraisal of the situation had been, in fact, more realistic than Melvill's. From Philippolis, Philip went to Ramah, and then to the Modder River to meet with Adam Kok, 30-40 Bergenaars, and some of their Kora allies (possibly those under Abraham Kruger). It was arranged that all these would come to Griquatown for a General Meeting, to begin on September 20 on the return of Philip from his visit to Dithakong. The results of the meeting are described by Philip in his characteristic optimistic hyperbole:

...the first three days were spent in hearing their differences, and in endeavouring to reconcile the parties to each other. After this difficult task had been effected, in a manner which exceeded my previous expectations, a few simple regulations congenial with their own notions, and the progress they had made in civilization and general knowledge, were proposed at a meeting of all the parties, discussed, and adopted by acclamation... The scene was altogether one of the most solemn and interesting I have ever witnessed; and the manner in which the people were affected, after this public expression of their sentiments, may be conveyed in the language of a Coranna chief, who exclaimed, 'My heart is glad! A few days ago when we saw each other at distance...we were afraid to meet, but now we can travel over the country in peace...and in every house meet with friends.'⁸¹

⁷⁸ See Melvill, May 23, 1825 [50 of 1835, 220-1]; Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D].

⁷⁹ Melvill, August 2, 1825 [50 of 1835, 222-3]. See also Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D].

⁸⁰ See Philip, *Researches*, II, 240; Melvill, May 23, July 1, September 5, 1825 [50 of 1835, 220-4]. Also below, footnote 88.

⁸¹ Philip, *Researches*, II, 103-4. Also *ibid.*, II, 87-100 *passim*.

The meeting ratified the separation between Waterboer and the old chiefs, and in so doing merely added weight to what had been in *de facto* operation since at least 1818, and in *de jure* operation since 1821-2. The new factors were that Philip had placed his influence behind the measure, thus in effect supporting the old chiefs and Stockenstrom against Melvill and Waterboer, and that Philip agreed with Adam Kok II that, if he allowed his eldest son (Cornelius III) to assume the chieftaincy, he could move with Berend Berends and the Bergenaars to the LMS mission station at Philippolis, which had been in existence since 1821.⁸² Further, there was to be some sort of cooperation among the Griqua chiefs: 'an agreement was entered into' Andrew Smith was later told by Hendrick Hendricks,

...that yearly they should assemble and regulate the general affairs of the nation, hear cases of murder, etc. It was also agreed that if a man belonging to either chief should wish to leave one chief to another that a written pass should be granted and without such a pass it should not be received.⁸³

Others were more skeptical, or even cynical, about the results of the meeting. Though there may have been 200-300 people present, Melvill claimed that only 5 Griqua and 20 Kora among these had been with the Bergenaars; and certainly a Bergenaar party was away at the time on a plundering expedition against the Taung of Sefunelo.⁸⁴ At the most, therefore, it was the Bergenaars attached to Hendrick Hendricks (and perhaps Abraham Kruger) who ratified the agreement. Further, the manner of the discussion is reported very differently by Moffat:

...as the Grikwas themselves remarked, grievances could not be settled without first being heard, and plastering over a sore was not healing it. The Dr., feeling that one mean [sic] could not succeed, had recourse to another, and endeavoured to persuade the party disaffected that all was settled. 'But on what ground' enquires a chief, which threw the Dr. back to where [he] began.

Further, relates Moffat, these discussions, unauthorized by the government or the agent, could be concluded in agreement only in a heavy drinking party one evening in Philip's room.⁸⁵

If Moffat was a relatively disinterested observer, Melvill and Waterboer were not.

Without my being made further acquainted with anything that was about to take place [wrote Waterboer] or whether I was willing or not that Dr. Philip should interfere between me and the other parties, or whether I would sanction the proposals that were about to be

⁸² See Chapter 8. Also Philip to Wright, [n.d.] in Wright to Archbell, December 1, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/B].

⁸³ Smith, Diary, I, 213-4.

⁸⁴ Melvill, October 17, 1825 [LMS 9/4/A]. See also Chapter 7.

⁸⁵ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 204-6.

made or not, I was called into the Church, where all the Mountaineers were assembled, to defend myself against several ungrounded complaints...[made by] individuals...employed and prompted by Adam Kok and Berend Berend...[who] took good care not to come into the meeting during the time these complaints were brought forward.

It was, believed Waterboer and Cornelius Kok II, 'an outrage upon Captainship, and Government, and on all laws or proposals.' The two refused to sanction the meeting, the mediator, or the proposals, and were especially angered by Philip's endorsement of a separate chieftaincy for Adam Kok II:

...thus were our own People encouraged in their rebellion against us, and in an unlawful, and never before heard of improper way, torn out of our hands. We can well appreciate the good intentions of our friend, Dr Philip...but he was much too ignorant of the real state of things among the Griquas.⁸⁶

The prospects for cooperation among the three chiefs in the enforcement of the regulations were, therefore, not good. Berends and Kok had, indeed, an interest in keeping the agreement which assured them their independence, but Waterboer did not. Melvill and Sass were skeptical, speaking of the 'deep-rooted internecine enmity' and the fact that the chiefs now disliked one another 'more than formerly,' and Melvill seems still to have hoped that the separation between Waterboer and Cornelius II on the one hand, and Berends and Adam II, on the other, would finally convince a government of the merits of the former. In October he was still railing against Stockenstrom who, 'no doubt provoked that Government had attended to any suggestions in assisting Waterboer and cutting off the Bergenaars from trafficking with the Colony which had been encouraged by him,' had prohibited *all* trade in cattle, a measure which as usual affected the 'orderly' Griqua but not at all the Bergenaar followers.⁸⁷ But by the end of the year, convinced that his position was futile, he had submitted his resignation. It would seem that he was having slight regrets at having thrown his full support behind Waterboer and his followers, 'the strongest and most respectable Party, who are connected with the Mission, and with whom I must necessarily have more intercourse than with the other party.'⁸⁸ Melvill sent a request to the LMS to be admitted as a lay assistant and, his resignation accepted by March, remained at Griquatown until at least the end of 1826 (with perhaps an intervening visit to Graaff-Reinet and Stockenstrom), when he moved to Philippolis to await the LMS reply to his request. His hesitations over his policy, or perhaps his resignation, led to a rupture with Waterboer which almost forced a rapid departure from the station.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D].

⁸⁷ Melvill, October 17, 1825 [LMS 9/4/A]. See also Melvill, October 18, 1825 [50 of 1835, 224].

⁸⁸ Melvill, December 26, 1825 [LMS 9/4/C].

⁸⁹ See Sass, May 23, 1826 [LMS 10/1/C]; Wright, November 30, 1826 [LMS 10/1/E]. The only reason

Thus ended a second attempt at an agency of mediation between the Colonial government and the Griqua state. As he left, Melvill offered some reflections on his failure. It was basically, he argued, a result of lack of government support, which had given him 'almost less influence than a private individual and much less than any connected with a Missionary Society would have.' The Griqua realized that the government Agency 'could do nothing for us, and the Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet can do everything.'

I am now fully persuaded [continued Melvill] that except the Griquas become entirely subject to the Colonial Government, it is better to have no connection with it whatever - In the present state of things, duly qualified Missionaries seem to be the only persons by the influence they possess capable of preserving some degree of order in this country... It is the opinion of the Missionaries that an interference in political matters is injurious to a Missionary's usefulness - There is some truth in this [and it?] deserves consideration - but much will depend upon precedents - it is said that Mr. Anderson interfered more than was necessary... It does not do for Missionaries to assume authority over chiefs - but if they have their confidence — their advice will always be asked and taken.⁹⁰

This proposed return to the pre-1820 situation was qualified by Melvill after conversation or other communication with Stockenström. Discovering the concern of government at 'political meddling' by missionaries — Philip was at the height of his advocacy of Khoi rights in the Colony — Melvill wrote again to the LMS suggesting that they instruct their agents to abstain from political intervention between government and Griqua or among the Griqua themselves, and confine themselves to spreading the Gospel, for which, in the aftermath of the *Difaqane*, there were great possibilities.⁹¹

But even this qualification failed to reach the root of the problem. The missionary at Griquatown, argued Melvill in this revised suggestion, should 'preserve the confidence' of both Griqua and government 'by evincing a disposition to promote the public good and the interests of the Colony — so far as is consistent with the nature of their office and jealousy of the Natives.' But Melvill and Anderson had failed, had lost the 'confidence' of both parties, precisely because of inconsistencies between the 'interest' of the Colony and the 'jealousy' of the natives. Until there were no more 'resisters' among the northern non-white frontiersmen, or until the government could be induced to give unqualified support to the 'accommodationists', such inconsistencies, such conflicts, would remain.

given by Waterboer for a disagreement with Melvill was the latter giving ammunition to Adam Kok because Waterboer would not take prisoner Karel Kruger, who was trading with the Bergenaars. But this can only be correlated in Melvill's correspondence with the incident the previous July or August referred to in footnote 80, with the implication that Melvill was pressing Waterboer to take this action, which the latter was unwilling to carry through without explicit Colonial sanction.

⁹⁰ Melvill to Burder, and Melvill to Philip December 26, 1825 [LMS 9/4/C].

⁹¹ Melvill, July 6, 1826 [LMS 10/1/D]. but see Stockenström in [538 of 1836, 184 – 7].

Until an argument could be elaborated to demonstrate to both government and the frontiersmen that their interests were in harmony, no mediator, missionary or government agent, could hope for success. Such an argument would be elaborated in the 1830s. In the meantime Andries Waterboer, as well as Adam Kok II at Philippolis and Berend Berends at a third center of Boetsap, would deal directly with the agents of government in the Colony. Ironically, the failure of the intermediaries had placed the Griqua frontier states in a stronger position, for it was now their chiefs that dealt with government. But the emergence of two new centers of Griqua power dealing with government on the same terms as Waterboer, weakened for the first time the relative position of the original Griqua state.

7 Dislocation in Transorangia, 1820 – 1826

For the peoples of Transorangia, the decade which followed 1820 was a traumatic one. During the decade the eastern part of Transorangia became incorporated into the southern frontier zone: from Campbell and Daniels Kuil the two incipient states under Adam Kok II and Berend Berends moved their headquarters to Philippolis and Boetsap, the Kora who lived predominantly on the Vaal dispersed along the rivers to the east with newly-acquired guns and horses, and a fresh trickle of Bastard immigration, largely from the Graaff-Reinet district, crossed the Orange northwards. The penetration of frontier society among the Tlhaping and Rolong became deeper and wider. But at the same time the ripples spreading outwards from the explosive rise of Shaka's Zulu state had their effect on Transorangia. From the time, early in 1822, when Mpangazita crossed the Drakensberg to fall upon the Tlokwa of Mmanthatisi, the dislocating effects of southern frontier extension interacted with those of the *Difaqane*. In terms of the continuity of political order and political allegiances the results were dramatic. For several years there was great bloodshed and profound hardship for large numbers of people: some indeed were driven to the desperate resort of cannibalism. Hierarchies and alliances were shaken up and destroyed. Some communities never recovered themselves, and in this sense were 'exterminated' though this by no means implies that all their members were destroyed.

The combined effects of the *Difaqane* and the comparable, though usually less cataclysmic, tensions engendered by the spread of the southern frontier were indeed profound for the peoples of Transorangia.¹ Yet it is possible to exaggerate the destructive side of these two simultaneous processes and neglect the recovery, the regrouping, the search for a new stability, which began to take place almost immediately. The success of Moshweshwe in protecting a growing following based on his redoubt of Thaba Bosiu is well-known. But between his territory and the Langeberg others, in various ways, and with greater or lesser success, were trying to achieve the results. It is an account of these two processes, the dislocation and the first steps of the quest for a stable order, that this chapter provides.

The Difaqane in Transorangia, 1822 – 1825

The Sotho-Tswana groups living along the Vaal River valley as far south-west as its junction with the Vet River, and between there and the upper Caledon, in other words the

¹ Melvill, July 6, 1826 [LMS 10/1/D] indeed estimated that, without missionary presence, the Bergenaars would have done more damage than the *Difaqane* groups.

south-eastern fringe of Sotho-Tswana settlement, were perhaps more isolated than the remainder of the Sotho-Tswana before the nineteenth century.² Although by 1820 there were Khoi pasturing their cattle along the Modder and Vet Rivers and trading with these Sotho-Tswana, this move had occurred since 1800, and previous to this there had been none but San to resist the slow territorial expansion of these Sotho-Tswana groups.³ Nevertheless, there is some tenuous evidence that, despite their isolation, despite their freedom to expand southwards, these communities were moving towards enlargement of political scale: it was on a society in flux, perhaps, and not one in stable equanimity, that the *Difaqane* erupted.⁴

Between the upper Caledon and the Vaal the arrival of the Hlubi in 1822 led three main groups into careers of devastation until 1825. Though the evidence on the activities of these groups, derived largely from oral traditions, does not permit a precise chronological narrative, it is possible to be firm on the limits of their movement.⁵ The Tlokwa of Mmanthatisi, unwilling to ally with their neighbours against the Hlubi onslaught, moved westwards from their ruined homes on the upper tributaries of the Vaal to defeat a Sotho-Tswana community at Kurutkele Mountain near the Sand River.⁶ Retiring from here as the Hlubi advanced, the Tlokwa continued their course, dividing their attention between raids on the Sotho-Tswana for food, and contests for supremacy with the Hlubi who had based themselves at Mabolela on the upper Caledon. For about two years, until perhaps the beginning of 1824, these groups raided along the Caledon River valley and across Transorangia to the Vet-Vaal junction, driving settled communities from their homes and depriving them of their cattle. The remains of the devastated groups sought some form of escape. Some attached themselves to the Tlokwa, the Hlubi, or stronger communities. Others sought refuge in caves and mountains, sometimes managing to hold on to a few cattle. Still others banded together and crossed the Vaal to take their revenge on still undisturbed chiefdoms to the north of them.

In perhaps 1824, the Tlokwa retired from this uncertain raiding existence. After an unsuccessful siege of Moshweshwe's mountain stronghold of Butha-Buthe clearly aimed

² See Chapter 1.

³ Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 293; Broadbent, June 8, 1823 [MMS: II-1823 /5].

⁴ For this evidence, see Martin Legassick, 'The Sotho-Tswana before 1800,' in Thompson, *Forgotten Factor*.

⁵ The present account is drawn largely from two recent syntheses: William F. Lye, 'The Difaqane: the Mfecane in the Southern Sotho Area, 1822-4,' *JAH*, VIII, (1967), 1, 107-131; J. D. Omer-cooper, *The Zulu Aftermath*.

⁶ This is variously described as Ghoya, and as the Fokeng-Patsa from whom Sebetwane came; the group was situated in precisely the area described in 1820 as inhabited by Ghoya: see Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 350-1; also Arbousset, *Narrative*, 104ff.

at driving him from the mountain and seizing it for themselves, the Tlokwa, now led by Sekonyela, took possession of Kooaneng and Yoalaboholo, mountains to the west of Butha-Buthe. These they fortified, and set about gathering refugees and building a state, in the same manner as Moshweshwe, who was soon to move southward from Butha-Buthe to Thaba Bosiu. Meanwhile the position of the Hlubi had been challenged by their old enemies, the Ngwane of Matiwane, who had originally driven the Hlubi across the Drakensberg. The date at which Matiwane and his followers took the same road across the mountains is uncertain, though the best version suggests that they arrived at Butha-Buthe in time to relieve the Tlokwa siege of Moshweshwe. Within the next year, at any rate, Matiwane's people had fought a decisive engagement against the Hlubi at Mekuatling, severely defeating the latter and leading many to fly to the Cape Colony.⁷ The battle established Matiwane, along with Moshweshwe and Sekonyela, as a dominant leader in the north-eastern part of Transorangia. He would remain so until, deterred by the rising power of Moshweshwe and Mzilikazi, he took his followers south-east across the Orange to quite accidental disaster in 1828.

Meanwhile the turmoil caused by the Tlokwa and Hlubi, reinforced by the Bergenaar raids which began at the same time, had driven a number of eastern Transorangia groups across the middle Vaal to the north and west. Some of these had no doubt already suffered from attacks, while others retreated before disaster occurred. New leaders emerged to group together the weakened refugees. As these people crossed the Vaal northwards, the first chiefdoms that they encountered were the several Kwena communities of the Vaal valley, the Rolong-Seleka to the west of them at Thabeng, and their clients.⁸ By January 1823, in fact, the Rolong-Seleka had retired southwestwards along the Vaal to escape from the invaders, one group of which was placed quite near to them, and one must presume that other settled chiefdoms had already been attacked.⁹

The movements of the raiding groups who crossed the Vaal northwards are almost as hard to trace as those south of the river. Early in the year, however, one such group had

⁷ It would seem to be the site of this battle which provoked some of the most lurid descriptions of the *Difaqane* devastation. See, for example, J. Edwards, March 17, 1836 [WMN, VIII, 349-351]; December 16, 1836, 'An account of the Umpukani station...' [MMS: VII]; T. Jenkins, March 26, 1836, [MMS: VII; WMN, VIII, 348-9].

⁸ For such client groups in this area see S. Broadbent, June 8, 1823 [MMS: II-1823/5]; March 31, 1824 [MMS: II-1824/33]; Hamilton, June 12, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C]; Matlaba in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 263, 265; Moilwa in *ibid.*, 316.

⁹ See Broadbent, June 8, 1823 [MMS: II-1823/5]; Narrative, 12ff; Broadbent and Hodgson, July 1, 1823 [WMN, IV, 199-201]. See also T. Hodgson, Journal, 1822-3 (extracts of which may be found in Mrs. Hodgson, *Memorial*, 120-160; WMN, IV, 227-231, 244-6; Hodgson, August 9, 1823 [MMS: II-1823/10]).

encountered their first serious resistance at Molokwani (west of the present Rustenburg), the settlement of the Kwena-Mmatau.¹⁰

The chief collected a very strong force, repelled the [invaders] in two serious battles, and took their oxen. The third day the [invaders] resumed their courage, and drove the inhabitants from their possessions. From thence they divided their immense company, which consists of men, women, and children.¹¹

Deterred, perhaps, by the Kwena-Mmatau from continuing to the north and east, at least one part of this group turned westwards, 'conquered or drove many towns east of' Kaditshwene (the Hurutshe capital) and then attacked the Hurutshe, killing their regent Diutwileng. By mid-April they had reached the Ngwaketse and forced them to flee to a retreat further west. Before mid-May, however, Makaba had recovered his forces and beaten off the invaders, who turned south across the Molopo to Khunwana and inflicted a severe defeat on the Rolong-Ratlou and Rolong-Tshidi.¹²

Towards the end of May, Robert Moffat, on his way to visit Makaba, heard that the invaders were at Khunwana and turned back from Old Dithakong to the Kuruman. Consulting with the Tlhaping as to what should be done, Moffat obtained Mothibi's encouragement in summoning aid from Griquatown. Moffat arrived in Griquatown simultaneously with George Thompson who, as related in the previous chapter, had brought Adam Kok II and Berends to Waterboer's capital to negotiate their differences with the Griquatown leader. In this rare moment of cooperation among the three chiefs, the request of Mothibi was granted, and Waterboer was elected leader of a joint Griqua commando numbering about 100 men which arrived on the Kuruman on June 22. Four days later the Griqua, supplemented by a commando of Tlhaping, Tlharo, and others under Mothibi encountered the invading force, some 40-50,000 in all, at Old Dithakong. After abortive attempts at parley, the Griqua attacked that part of the invading force which remained outside the town, first driving them back on their allies within the town, and

¹⁰ For this community whose chief was Kgaswane, see Breutz, *Rustenburg*, 106-122. Three other closely related communities were living at the same site or nearby; in their oral traditions, however only one group retains traditions of attacks by *Difaqane* raiders (*ibid.*, 429-30) while the other groups remember Mzilikazi alone: the raiders remembered were the Hlakwana, the 'Tlhomego' and the 'Ratsebe', i.e. Phuthing. Andrew Smith in 1835 described the deserted kraals of these people; according to tradition, however, most had fled to the Free State and had not, as he relates, been 'destroyed and scattered by the Mantatees': Smith, *Diary*, II, 83.

¹¹ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 85-6.

¹² *Ibid.*, 73, 77-8, 102, 160; Smith, *Diary*, II, 250; Molema, *Montshiwa*, 11-12; Schapera, 'Ngwaketse...', 6; Melvill, April 28, 1823 [WMN, IV, 167]. Moffat implies that the departure of the invaders from their homes was c.September-October 1822. The Rolong-Tshidi had been living had been living at Phitsane, but fled from there to Khunwana from the invaders, only to find they had flown into rather than away from danger.

then the whole army off to the north-east. The invaders were pursued some way in that direction by the Griqua, and it was later discovered that the retreat had been caused by the death of two of their chiefs.¹³

Undoubtedly this battle prevented an attack on the Tlhaping confederation which would have been as disastrous as the raids which the marauders had conducted on other communities. Undoubtedly it was Griqua firearms which were the major element in the defeat. But it would be a mistake to attribute the victory either to missionary presence among the Griqua or specifically to the leadership of Andries Waterboer, as both contemporary and later writers would do.¹⁴ The Griqua fought to defend themselves and to aid Mothibi; they might well have fought had it been Mothibi alone and not Moffat who asked them. Cornelius Kok, after all, had assisted the Tlhaping before.¹⁵ As to Waterboer's contribution, it was later argued that Kok and Berends had contributed more followers than Waterboer.¹⁶ Further, on several later occasions (in 1823, 1824 and 1825), Waterboer refused assistance to the Kuruman despite missionary requests, and on one occasion it was Berend Berends who led a commando against the invaders instead.¹⁷ Lastly, the argument later made by John Philip, that the Griqua had 'saved' the Colony, is difficult to sustain. There is little evidence that the *Difaqane* groups had designs south of the Orange, and some which suggests they had specifically repudiated such ideas; after all, the crops and rich herds of cattle of the Sotho-Tswana settlements were a greater prize to dispossessed people than the possessions of the scattered white frontiersmen would afford.¹⁸

The groups involved in the battle included the Hlalkwana, who had borne the brunt of the fighting, the Phuthing, and possibly the Kololo of Sebetwane. The defeat suffered by the two former was aggravated by a conflict which broke out between them soon after, and which resulted in the Hlalkwana struggling southwards across the Vaal to end up later at Philippolis, while the Phuthing moved east and up the Vaal; the Phuthing would

¹³ The main primary sources for these are Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 87-103; Melvill and Moffat in Thompson, *Travels*, 162-185; also *ibid.*, 90-135; Moffat in Smith, *Diary*, I, 359-361; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, XXI-XXII. See also S. A. Commercial Advertiser, January 7, 1824 [Theal, *RecCC*, XVI, 497-505]; Hodgson, August 9, 1823 [MMS: II-1823/10].

¹⁴ See Chapter 9.

¹⁵ See Chapter 3. In 1808 it had been the Griquatown missionaries who turned down a request by Molehabangwe for assistance against the Xhosa marauders, since they had come 'to preach peace and tranquility but not to fight': Anderson and Jansz, entry 1808 [LMS Journals 1/20].

¹⁶ Lemue, July 2, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A].

¹⁷ See below, and, for the refusal of Tlhaping requests, Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 98-9, 182-3; Hamilton, August 5, 1824; Helm, August 8, 1824 [both quoted in MMS: III-1825/2]; Sass, entry August 8, 1824 [LMS Journals 4/87]; June 22, 1825 [50 of 1835, 221-2].

¹⁸ See, for example, Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 150; Hamilton, entry January 27 [LMS Journals 3/83]; April 12, 1824 [LMS 9/2/B].

eventually join the Tlokwa state on the upper Caledon.¹⁹ But besides these participants in the Dithakong battle, and 'two other tribes' apparently following them, there was a major new group set on the raiding path, the Taung:

...one great division of the enemy, who separated before the Grikwas attacked them, is sat down about three or four days journey from us [ie from Maquassie]; and have driven a tribe called Bataune [the Taung] from their territory — the Bataune came and attacked the Baquains [the Fokeng-Motlala east of the Rolong-Seleka] and plundered them of their cattle and are now living in their town — and the Boquains as a tribe are broken and scattered, three of their chiefs have come to [Sefunelo] and others have joined other tribes.²⁰

The Taung appear to have remained just north of the Vaal and east of the Rolong-Seleka for some while: it may have been them, as at least one other group, who are reported to have attacked Kora and Rolong along the Vaal in January 1824.²¹ Meanwhile, other groups were active rather more to the north and east among the various Kwena settlements. In March 1824, Robert Hamilton, visiting Phitsane, heard that an alliance of five groups, including a Phuthing section under an uncle of the chief killed at Dithakong, were at Molokwani (Kwena-Mmatau settlement) and preparing to move west to attack the Hurutshe.²² By July, they appear to have been defeated by the Hurutshe and returned to Molokwani itself or to a settlement nearby.²³ At about this time the Taung, in retaliation at an attack made on them by the Rolong-Seleka, advanced on the latter group's settlement at Maquassie: Samuel Broadbent, poor in health, and Edward Edwards had just departed for Griquatown. The Taung, under their formidable chief Moletsane, were allied with (or included) groups by the name of 'Bamolopo, Bamokel, Moopeto, Soogharanna and Gaasapan.' They attacked Maquassie 'before daylight. After having made all the resistance in his power, [Sefunelo] was obliged to retreat, leaving the Town and much

¹⁹ For reports of groups moving south of the Orange, and Sefunelo moving to avoid one such group, see Hodgson, entry August 9, 1823 [MMS: II-1824/7]; August 9, 1823 [MMS: II-1823/10]; Broadbent, December 31, 1823 [MMS: II-1823/13]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 109.

²⁰ Broadbent, December 31, 1823 [MMS: II-1823/13]. Also Hodgson and Broadbent, January 1, 1824 [MMS: II-1824/2]; Hodgson, entry December 26 [WMN, IV 347 – 9]; Molema, *Moroka*, 16. Broadbent's chronology is confusing, but the other letters suggest that the attack occurred in December 1823 and not August as his letter might imply. The group who separated before the Dithakong battle may have been the Kololo, or possibly a part of the Phuthing (under Ratsebe?): see Hodgson, August 9, 1823 [MMS: II-1823/10].

²¹ Hamilton, entries December 1 – February 8 [LMS Journals 3/83]; Edwards, January 10, 1824 [MMS: II-1824/6]; Helm, February 14, 1824 [LMS 9/2/A]. See also Edwards, May 6, 1824 [MMS: II-1824/36]; entries March – May 1824 [MMS: III-1825/2].

²² Hamilton, April 12, 1824 [LMS 9/2/B]; June 12, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C]. Also Melvill, March 26, 1824 [LMS 9/2/B]. The chiefs were 'Ramalootsetsee' (Ramabutsetse), 'Sebelehamareta', 'Malahowhanna', 'Sebooque' and Ratsebe of the Phuthing: compare the list of *Difaqane* chiefs in Smith, *Diary*, II, 277-8 obtained from a 'Mantatees'.

²³ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 117-8, 130, 131-2; Melvill, May 19, 1824 [LMS 9/2/B].

cattle in the hands of the enemy. The dwelling houses of the Missionaries were broken open and everything found therein was destroyed or taken away.’²⁴

It was this attack on Sefunelo, and the associated rumor that the Taung following was moving down the Vaal towards Griquatown, which initiated Waterboer’s July commando described in the previous chapter. Sefunelo, after being unjustly ‘sentenced’ by Waterboer and his Griqua court, retired with his people to join the Rolong-Ratlou and Rolong-Tshidi at Phitsane on the Molopo. Arriving here in early August, Sefunelo and the Rolong-Seleka found the Taung close on their heels, determined to press home their partial victories against the three Rolong sections together. Once again, by chance, Robert Moffat was on the scene, returning from a visit to Makaba; and he was closely followed by Berend Berends and a Griqua party who had been hunting and trading with the Ngwaketse. Some scouting elicited the information that the Taung

...have at present many fat cattle and sheep; are themselves not so very numerous. It is their intention to take the Barolong town and remain there till the corn is already sown to be harvested, and then they will proceed to attack [Makaba] and eventually return to their own country when they are completely enriched with spoils. They are much afraid of guns; have heard of the defeat of Chaane at Old Latakoo. They were formerly twice the number that they are now; that after the first attack upon Sabinell they became two parties, when a savage and bloody battle ensued. The other party, who were conquerors, returned eastward.²⁵

On August 20, 1824, Berends and his party, joined by some 11, 000 Rolong and others, fought an engagement against the Taung and beat them off. Once again it was Griqua firearms that made the difference, as all the Rolong but Sefunelo’s followers fled at the first onslaught. So many of Sefunelo’s brothers and sons, and so many equally important figures among the Taung, probably including Moletsane’s father, were killed in the bat-

²⁴ Evidence of Sefunelo in Edwards, January 8, 1825 [MMS: III-1825/2]. See also Mary Moffat, July 12, 1824 [*Apprenticeship*, 157-8]; Edwards, January 10, 1824 [MMS: II-1824/6]; January 9, 1825 [MMS: III-1825/2]; Broadbent, July 1, 1824 [MMS: II-1824/45]. Ellenberger places the attack on April 24, though Broadbent and Edwards were at Moos, not far from Maquassie, until May 7, and would presumably have had news of the attack had it occurred before this. Further, the suggestion by many that Moletsane was for a while in alliance with Sebetwane *before* the attack on Maquassie is inconsistent with the contemporary evidence, particularly Mary Moffat’s statement that the invaders had ‘all along remained a little above [Sefunelo’s] place’: compare ‘Statement...of Chief Moletsane’ [Theal, *Bas Records*, I, 517-532]; McGregor, *Basuto*, 62-6; Ellenberger, *Basuto*.

²⁵ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 150. Others reported also that after the battle of Dithakong the invaders had become afraid of firearms and that, conversely, the Sotho-Tswana were seeking white missionary presence: see Broadbent, June 8, 1823 [MMS: II-1823/5]; September 30, 1825 [MMS: II-1823/10]; March 31, 1824 [MMS: II-1824/3]; Broadbent and Hodgson, December 1, 1824 [MMS: II-1824/2]; Hamilton, April 12, 1824 [LMS 9/2/B]; Moffat, *op. cit.*, 109. But there are other suggestions that the marauders wanted revenge for the Old Dithakong defeat: see Helm February 14, 1824 [LMS 9/2/A]; Moffat, *ibid.*, 98; Edwards, entry June 22 [MMS: III-1825/2].

tle that it became known as the 'Battle of the Chiefs.' When it was over, Berend Berends divided the cattle that has been captured between Sefunelo and the Rolong-Tshidi chief Tawana. So far as Sefunelo was concerned, this action was in pleasing contrast to the fine levied on him only two months before by Waterboer and Cornelius Kok II.²⁶

By the latter part of 1824, then, the firearms of southern frontiersmen had twice defeated *Difaqane* marauders and put them to flight. As will emerge later in this chapter, the military balance was reversed in 1825, when on two occasions Kora forces, armed with guns and mounted, would suffer defeat at the hands of *Difaqane* groups. But by then many such groups had been deterred from further activity in Transorangia, and had moved into the area of the present Western Transvaal and Botswana, with occasional thrusts against the Rolong south of the Molopo. By early 1825, a new assault on the Ngwaketse had left their chief, Makaba, the most feared leader of the region, dead on the field of battle.²⁷ Through 1825 and 1826 there are reports of such marauders established at Kaditshwene but, apart from the movements of the Kololo of Sebetwane, our information on these groups is sparse.²⁸ They included the followings of the enigmatic figures of 'Ratsipip' [Ratsebe of the Phuthing?] and Ramabutsetse, as well as, for a short period in 1824-5, the Taung.²⁹ Their raiding activities would appear to have been curtailed by the settlement of Mzilikazi on the Apies River in 1825, from where he attacked the Kololo and the Taung, and absorbed into his state for some time 'Ratsipip' and Ramabutsetse.³⁰ By 1826 Mzilikazi's *impis*, scouting westward across the Highveld, had made their first raids on the Hurutshe and Rolong.³¹

²⁶ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 144-154; *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XXIV: Molema, *Montshiwa*, 14-15; *Moroka*, 16-23; *Moroka*, 16-23; *Moroka* in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 139. There were also Hurutshe and Ngwaketse refugees at Phitsane, though the Rolong-Rapulana were not apparently there: see Matlaba in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 262. For the immediately subsequent movements of the Taung see Hughes, August 10, 1824 [LMS9/2/C]; Edwards, entries August-November 1824 [MMS: III-1825/2].

²⁷ See Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 172, 174. Also the factually incorrect letter of Hodgson, November 12, 1825 [MMS: I- 1825/61]; Schapera, 'Ngwaketse...', 6.

²⁸ Hamilton, April 25, 1825 [LMS 9/3/B]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 197, 223-4, 227, 229, 231, 235; Hughes, February 6, 1827 [LMS 10/2/A]; Bain, *Journal*. See also, for Sebetwane, E. Smith, 'Sebetwane and the Makololo...'; Livingstone, *Private Journals*, 18-22. One attack in 1826 went as far south as the Maidu (at Old Dithalong?).

²⁹ If the Taung were in the north, they, or at least a part of them, had returned to the area north-east of Maquassie by July 1825, when Sefunelo was planning to attack the. Perhaps Moletsane was in the north, since the chief mentioned near Maquassie is 'Mapeete': he, Mophethe, however, is regarded by other sources as having died in 1824. See Archbell and Hodgson, October 4, 1825 [MMS: IV-1825/49]; Molema, *Montshiwa*, 14, *Moroka*, 23.

³⁰ For Ramabutsetse and 'Ratsipip' see Smith, *Diary*, I, 266, 292, 207; II, 117, 119, 136, 170-1, 174, 205, 214; also Arbousset, *Narrative*, 105; Omer-Cooper, *Zulu Aftermath*, 96-7, 116ff, 131-2.

³¹ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 212, 215-6.

The Bergenaars in Transorangia, 1822 – 1826

During the first years of the *Difaqane* not all the southern frontiersmen were engaged, like the Griqua chiefs in 1823 and Berend Berends in 1824, in protecting the southernmost Sotho-Tswana communities against invading groups. It was just as the first invaders crossed the Drakensberg into Transorangia that the Bergenaar revolt broke out at Griquatown, and the exodus of the rebels was no doubt stimulated by the prospects of a rich booty from the chiefdoms already dislocated by the Hlubi, Tlokwa and others.³² Until 1824 the Bergenaars seem to have confined their attention to precisely those communities, Sotho-Tswana and possibly Kora, which had already been attacked by the Tlokwa and Hlubi. One such chief later told the Kuruman missionaries how he had been attacked first by the 'Caffers' and then by the Bergenaars.³³ In 1829, some Sotho-Tswana families living near Philippolis told Melvill a similar story, and the previous year Melvill and Kolbe had traveled to the Caledon River and encountered numerous such refugee groups with 'no other means of subsistence than the wild animals found in these parts.'³⁴ By mid-1824, when Waterboer attacked the main Bergenaar encampment, 4000 cattle had been seized from such communities between the Vaal valley and the Caledon River, besides those cattle that had already passed into the Colony in exchange for other goods.

By the time of Waterboer's attack, the raiding prospects in this area must have diminished. The cattle belonging to Caledon valley communities had either been seized or had been taken by refugees to be protected by such leaders as Moshweshwe, Sekonyela, Matiwane or even Moletsane who could offer stouter resistance to Bergenaar attack. Nor did the Bergenaars take advantage of the dislocation created by the *Difaqane* groups north of the Vaal. This territory was much less familiar to the Bergenaars, and there was the possibility that they might meet and be outfought, far from their home base, by one of the raiding groups still in action. But with their cattle gone, the Bergenaars could not remain inactive: either they would have to resume a more settled life, or find other sources of supply. It was indeed at about this time that the Bergenaar faction under Hendricks began the negotiations with Adam Kok and Berend Berends which would lead eventually to the establishment of the Griqua state at Philippolis. But others, particularly the Kora

³² What appears to be the first contemporary written intimation of the *Difaqane* can be found in S. Kay, May 28, 1822 [MMS: II-1822/13] who, at Griquatown in January 1822, wrote 'the tribes of the Interior are...at present at war with one another.'

³³ Moffat and Hamilton, March 6, 1829 [LMS 11/3/B].

³⁴ Melvill, January 1, 1829 [LMS 11/3/A]. Also Melvill, entry June 22 [LMS Journals 4/92]; Melvill and Kolbe [LMS Journals 4/100]. For other more general indications of raiding in this area see chapter VI, footnote 63; Philip to Wade, October 10, 1833 [425 of 1837, 144]; Hodgson, entry September 21, 1823 [MMS: II-1824/7]; Sass, September 28, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C]; Edwards, entry May 26, 1824 [MMS: III-1825/2].

and Bastards who had by now become associated with the Bergenaars, and for whom the raiding activity was an adventurous and lucrative form of frontier existence rather than a revolt against Waterboer, sought for other communities rich in cattle.³⁵

Foremost among such communities were the elements of the Tlhaping confederation who had until 1824 been protected from attack by 'loyalist' Griqua firearms. Even before the irreconcilables from the main Bergenaar camp joined them, rebel Griqua had been settled in the Langeberg, joining the long time resident William Jephta. By August these 'Klein Bergenaars' (as they were called), including Jacob Cloete, were raiding the Tlharo. In November the Tlhaping themselves were attacked and, despite a respite in the horse-sickness season between January and May, the raiding was resumed in the latter month. Some who joined the Klein Bergenaars had motives other than a desire for cattle. One Klaas Dreyer, for example, a follower of Berends, returned to the Langeberg to take his revenge on Mahura, who appears to have been his *maat* but who had violated the agreement by abducting Dreyer's wife altogether.³⁶ These attacks were, as will be seen, the death-blow to the fragile Tlhaping confederation and, coupled with the sporadic *Difaqane* raiding on the Rolong from the north, produced a dislocation and regrouping among these south-westerly Sotho-Tswana communities comparable to that which was occurring in eastern Transorangia.

After mid-1825, with the Tlhaping and their associates fleeing in various directions, the Bergenaars seem to have diverted their raiding to the Orange River valley below Griquatown, where Nama and Kora communities were still clinging precariously to their herds. The untapped cattle supplies in this direction were an irresistible temptation to the Bergenaars, but also they may have been deterred from further activity in Transorangia itself by defeats inflicted on groups using firearms. Early in 1825 a Kora group, possibly the Links, suffered a severe defeat from a *Difaqane* group against whom they had previously won a victory. The enemy threw out wings and surrounded the Kora, killing some 40 -50: only some of the Kora on horseback managed to escape.³⁷ No doubt this Kora group had little experience of fighting on horseback, and possibly only few had guns, though they had at least a few Griqua and Bastards with them. But in September 1825 a similar event occurred. Sefunelo and a Bergenaar party whom he had persuaded to join him suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the Taung.³⁸ It is possible that the first defeat was inflicted by

³⁵ See also Chapter 6.

³⁶ See Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 171, 280; Smith, *Diary*, I, 362, 371. For these raids see also below.

³⁷ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 172, 174, 195; Edwards, entries November-January [MMS: III-1825/2]; Melvill, April 6, 1825 [50 of 1835, 220]; Archbell and Hodgson, March 31, 1825 [MMS: IV -1825/14]; Hodgson, entries January 27-February 6, 1825 [MMS: IV-1826/13].

³⁸ Archbell and Hodgson, October 4, 1825 [MMS: IV-1825/49]; Hodgson, November 12, 1825 [MMS: IV-1825/61]; Archbell, November 29, 1825 [MMS: IV-1825/67]; Hodgson, entries July 24, 28, Sep-

the Taung as well; in any case, the latter battle was a demonstration that the Taung were consolidating their power on the Vaal north-east of Maquassie, and that the Bergenaars could no longer raid there with impunity. These confrontations, too, were indicative of the challenge which was soon to be presented to Transorangia by the martial Ndebele.

The Hartenaar rebels of the previous decade had depended for the most part on traveling to the Graaff-Reinet district or the Khamiesberg and Little Namaqualand in order to exchange their cattle for ammunition and other goods. In the early stages of the Bergenaar revolt this was also the pattern, though the rebels had the advantage of the cooperation of the LMS native agents established at missions along the Orange. Those at Konnah, wrote Melvill in 1824,

...very frequently take with them disaffected Griquas without passes who by that means have an opportunity of gathering ammunition — The Gunpowder procured on a visit to Bethelsdorp in company with one in the service of the [London] Society is now employed by the Party of Griquas who have become a Banditti.³⁹

In 1821 the Rev. A. Faure had established a mission station for the San at Philippolis, at the most important ford across the Orange. This soon became the major artery for trade between the Colony and the Bergenaars, with the Bethelsdorp native agents Andries Pretorius and Jan Goeyman (related to the Bergenaar leaders) playing the leading role in it.⁴⁰

In one important respect, however, the situation was now different from the Hartenaar revolt. 'Bushmanland', which had previously separated white Colony society from the Griqua on the Orange, had partly disappeared. Between Ramah and Philippolis white settlement was moving towards the Orange, and had reached it in some cases. By the time that the colony boundary was extended to the Orange as far west as Ramah in September 1824, white farmers had been grazing their cattle across the river for some time on the basis of temporary permits issued by Stockenström.⁴¹ This fact had a number of important

tember 18, 1825 [MMS:IV-1826/13]; Broadbent, *Narrative*, 169-170.

³⁹ Melvill, March 26, 1824 [LMS9/2/B].

⁴⁰ For the establishment of the Philippolis mission see Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 117; Philip, 'the tenure by which the Griquas hold the lands of Philippolis,' [1842?] [LMS 18/1/D]. For Goeyman and his activities there see Chapter IV, footnote 111; Philip, *Researches*, II, 90-91; Smith, *Diary*, I, 199-200; Melvill, March 26, 1824 [LMS 9/2/B]; Warren, 1825 Journal, in Warren, *On the Veldt*, 46-7; Philip, correspondence with Goeyman, Clark and Faure, 1825 [LMS 9/3/C]. For Pretorius see Chapter 4, footnote 110; Wright to Clark, May 16, 1827 [LMS 10/1/C]: Pretorius was in 1827 1600 rix dollars indebted to white farmers for trade in horses and 'contraband articles' for the Bergenaars.

⁴¹ See, for a scholarly and systematic account of white colonist expansion and government attitudes in this period, Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, Chapters IV, VII. See also Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 60-65; and, for mentions of such farmers, also Melvill, April 2, 1827 [LMS 10/2/B]; Melvill, entries June 24, 27 [LMS Journals 4/92]; Hodgson, March 16, 1828 [MMS: IV]. The expansion is

consequences. Firstly, it was an indication of growing land-shortage for pastoral farmers in the Colony which, together with the perennial labor-shortage, was making life more difficult for Bastards in the Colony. A contemporary report, speaking of 'the Hottentots, in which Class generally included the mixed race of Hottentots and the white and free coloured Inhabitants denominated "Bastaards,"' gives an indication that the relatively privileged status accorded 'Bastards' in the Colony was coming to an end.⁴² Secondly, the trade between frontier farmers and Griqua was shifting its center of gravity. As white colonists crossed the Orange, so the 'market' crossed the Orange to where illegal trade could be conducted more clandestinely. This meant that for the first time the Kora and even the San, and a little later the Sotho-Tswana, had increasingly ready access to these weapons.⁴³ Finally, as the result of these tendencies taken together, the Bergenaar raiders, initially Griqua rebels, were increasingly joined by Bastards, Kora, and even whites. Eventually, in fact, the Kora were to become the predominant raiding force.

Some, though not necessarily all, of the Bastards who began to drift across the Orange at this time, were landholders in the colony who had 'received orders to quit that part of the country' where they had lived.⁴⁴ Others, as Edward Solomon later commented, were 'what are familiarly called...Apprentices,' that is, Bastards or even Khoi who had been in service and for whom life north of the Orange represented a less repressive existence.⁴⁵ The first of these emigrants may indeed have been the five or six families who accompanied Jan Goeyman to Philippolis in 1821, and who were to become known as the 'Old Inhabitants' in contrast to the Griqua.⁴⁶ Amongst the 'Griqua' described by the Wesleyan missionaries in late 1822 as living at Philippolis, between Philippolis and the Modder, on the Modder itself ('a large number'), and around the junction of the Harts and Vaal Rivers there would appear to have been both Bastards and Kora as well as rebels from Griquatown.⁴⁷ Four years later Hodgson, at Platberg, would write of Bastards settled between him and the Orange 'in which Class of Men this Country is rapidly increasing.'⁴⁸ By 1834, another missionary estimated that there were 400 such persons near new Platberg (in the Caledon valley) along, and at about the same time Arbousset spoke of 'some

graphically illustrated by the fact that Hephzibah, a San mission in 1814-18, became a white farm in the 1820's: Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 118.

⁴² Report of Bigge on Courts of Justice [Theal, *RecCC*, XXVIII, 37].

⁴³ In 1820 Stockenström had claimed that the Kora were 'equally expert in the use of arms to the Griqua': this must have been a small minority. See Stockenström, September 13, 1820 [50 of 1835, 130].

⁴⁴ Philip, *Researches*, II, 303-4 describing the situation of some Bastard families in the Beaufort district in 1825.

⁴⁵ Solomon, *Two Lectures*, 19.

⁴⁶ See Helm, December 27, 1822 [LMS 8/5/D]; Melvill, April 2, 1827 [LMS 10/2/B].

⁴⁷ Broadbent, June 8, 1823 [MMS: II-1823/5]; Mrs. Hodgson, *Memorial*, 120-130.

⁴⁸ Hodgson, January 7, 1828 [MMS: IV]. See also Baillie, September 30, 1830 [LMS 12/1/C].

thousands' of Bastards along the valley of the Caledon.⁴⁹ During the same period there is evidence of other such persons moving legally or illegally to the Philippolis state.⁵⁰

Particularly as the onslaught of the Difaqane waned in eastern Transorangia, the Bastards would settle down within or without the area encompassed by the Philippolis state to keep cattle, hunt, or trade, their 'infusion' being 'productive of much good to the whole body' of Griqua.⁵¹ But the first to cross the Orange had a different influence:

...the strong spirit of independence among the Griquas [wrote Melvill in January 1824] with the strong prejudice in the minds of some against the Colony, appears to be occasioned in great measure by their connexion with the 'Bastards' of the Colony, who live all along the Orange River, and in different parts of the country, and who seem at present to acknowledge no authority whatever.⁵²

A few months later two such people, named Jan and Ruyter, originally from the Bokkeveld, were caught returning from seven months with the Bergenaars during which time they had acquired seventeen head of cattle.⁵³ And from 1824 onwards there are frequent in the sources to Bastard participation in Bergenaar raids.⁵⁴

Simultaneously with the Bastards there moved the first white farmers into Transorangia: the frontier settlement which had expanded to the east from the Cape and then turned northwards to 'outflank' the Xhosa was merging with the other stream of settlement, predominantly non-white, which had gone northwards to the Orange and up the Orange River valley. The white colonists who secured temporary permits to cross the Orange did not go there only to pasture their cattle, as many accounts would suggest, but also to engage in illegal trade and cattle-raiding. On their way to Cape Town in 1824, for example, Melvill and Andries Waterboer encountered not only the servant of a Stellenbosch district farmer returning from the Bergenaars with cattle belonging to the Southern Sotho chief Khatlane, but also a farmer named Scholtz who had been trading guns with the Bergenaars at eight oxen apiece.⁵⁵ Such trade should have been prevented

⁴⁹ Edwards, July 18, 1834 [MMS: VII]; Arbousset, *Narrative*, 10. See also Archbell, May 19, 1835 [MMS: VII]; Atkinson, February 29, 1840 [LMS 17/1/B].

⁵⁰ See, for example, Clark to Philip, April 2, 1830 [Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 61]; Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 273.

⁵¹ Solomon, *Two Lectures*, 19.

⁵² Melvill to Bird, January 22, 1824 [Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 55fn]. Some of the Bastards, however, assisted Waterboer in his commando against the Bergenaars, though he accused them of 'treachery': Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D].

⁵³ Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 215].

⁵⁴ See, for example, Melvill, April 1, 1825; June 22, 1825; September 5, 1825 [50 of 1835, 219-223]; Waterboer to Stockenstrom, July 21, [LMS 10/3/D].

⁵⁵ Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 216-7]. The exchange rates were later confirmed by Smith, who says, also that one ox fetched 3-4 lbs. gunpowder: Smith, *Diary*, I, 232-3.

by Somerset's regulations of January 1825, requiring traders to have permits and to proceed only to Griquatown. But, as Joseph Orpen wrote later after surveying the archives, 'it does not appear that such was ever done to hinder such traffic.'⁵⁶ Through 1825 Melvill complained continually of white farmers trading with the Bergenaars, Kora and Sotho-Tswana.⁵⁷ In 1827, Waterboer wrote to government that the Bergenaars had just received ammunition from Guys de Beer, a colonist, and that farmers from the Nieuwveld, Rauwveld and Bokkeveld were 'assisting' the rebels.⁵⁸ Whether in this case the 'assistance' extended to participation in the raiding is unclear, but in other cases there is evidence of this as well. Even before 1824, for example, it was reported that white farmers had been present in the raid against Khatlane.⁵⁹ When the Bergenaars divided after mid-1824, those in the Langeberg began to attract white followers, and in the raids against the Tlhaping and Tlharo in 1824-5, the participation of white farmers in addition to 'colonial Bastards' is noted in the sources.⁶⁰

The allure of this trading and raiding for the white farmers were partly the prospect of a booty in cattle. Furthermore, captives from the dislocated Sotho-Tswana and Kora communities were taken to the Colony as slaves, or at least 'apprentices', if not for the first time, at least on a greater scale than before. In some cases these were seized by force; in others destitute peoples offered their children or the children of others for sale. Moffat, offered two children in exchange for an ox or a sheep and some beads when among the Rolong in 1824, believed that it was the Griqua who had initiated this practice among the Sotho-Tswana by 'accepting such offers or, more probably, prompt[ing] the owners, for there is nothing of the kind carried on between the Bechuanas.'⁶¹ Perhaps Moffat exaggerated, for as Burchell had pointed out some years before, the custom of ransoming war captives to their relatives for a few cattle 'stands precisely at that critical point where all which is wanting to ripen it into perfect slave-trade is the presence of...unfeeling Europeans.'⁶² If the Griqua had encouraged such exchanges, they had probably for the most

⁵⁶ Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 113.

⁵⁷ Melvill, May 23, 1835; June 22, 1825; July 1, 1825; September 5, 1825 [50 of 1835, 220-3]. Indeed Melvill believed that Stockenstrom and his associates (such as Captain Bonay) and local field-cornets were in collusion in this trade: see also Chapter 6.

⁵⁸ Waterboer to Stockenstrom, July 21, 1827 [LMS 10/3/D]. Stockenstrom claimed to have investigated the charges and found no proof, but his reply was evasive: Stockenstrom to Waterboer, August 21, 1827 [LMS 10/3/D].

⁵⁹ Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 217].

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 219; Melvill, April 1, 1825; June 22, 1825 [*ibid.*, 219-222]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 167-8, 272-4; Smith, *Diary*, I, 371.

⁶¹ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 131.

⁶² Burchell, *Travels*, II, 377-8. See also Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 315-6; Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 214; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XXIII.

part incorporated such children as their own dependents. But with the dislocated state of Transorangia in the 1820's, the lack of colony authority, and the continual labor-shortage in the Colony, there was every inducement for Griqua to sell to white farmers, and for white farmers to seize or barter children themselves. To avoid problems of illegality, it is related by Philip, the children (males under 15 and females under 20) were given as 'presents' by Bergenaars to white farmers in exchange for 'presents' of gunpowder.⁶³ 'Powder and lead, guns, horses and brandy,' wrote Melvill, 'they [the Bergenaars] get enough from the Bastards and farmers for cattle and *men*.'⁶⁴

The Difaqane, the Bergenaars, and the Kora, 1822 – 1826

The combined impact of the *Difaqane* and Bergenaar raiding completed the fragmentation and reconsolidation of the Kora of Transorangia which had begun when southern frontiersmen first began to raid them in the 1780's. Since that time, the center of gravity of Kora settlement had moved steadily north and east, along and up the Vaal and its eastern tributaries; though in the process, Kora groups had been left behind on the middle Orange, Kora had been incorporated into the Griquatown state, and some others had at least acquired firearms, or horses, or an introduction to education and the gospel.⁶⁵ But it was in the 1820's that the Kora found escape from the frontier zone no longer possible. Prevented by existing Sotho-Tswana settlement from moving much further north and east, and subject to raids by *Difaqane* groups as well as Bergenaars, they had no choice but to arm themselves or be exterminated.

The consequence was a dramatic transformation in the leadership and structure of the Kora communities. Formerly collected in groups largely if not exclusively of kin, under the loose leadership of a hereditary lineage, the Kora now banded together under leaders who had shown their ability in raiding or defense, or who had access to firearms and horses. In some cases Kora groups became attached to the Bergenaars to avoid being raided or to acquire firearms: in January 1824, Helm noted that the rapid increase in Bergenaar numbers was occasioned by 'several kraals of the Corannas' having joined them, and when in the middle of that year the Griquatown missionaries reported a general exodus of Kora from the Orange to the Harts it can be presumed that the removal

⁶³ Philip, *Researches*, II, 91.

⁶⁴ Melvill, December 17, 1824 [50 of 1835, 217] (my emphasis). For other mentions of trading in or raiding slaves see Sass, September 28, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C]; Broadbent, *Narrative*, 97, 107; Broadbent, entry January 30, 1823 [MMS: II-1823/5]; September 30, 1823 [MMS: II-1823/13]; Baim, *Journal*, 136; Rolland, March 28, 1837 [JDM, XII, 301-7].

⁶⁵ See Chapters 3, 4, 5.

was in part for these purposes.⁶⁶ Probably the Katse and Seekoie joined the Griquatown rebels at this time, and the evidence is firmer for the Toowenaars, who were settled for a time at Fauresmith.⁶⁷ Jan Bloem and his Springbokke certainly became attached to the Bergenaars: Bloem was one of the leaders of the 1824 attack on Griquatown, and shortly thereafter considered separating himself from the Springbokke and returning to the Colony. Instead, after a period with Berend Berends, he returned to the Griquatown state, made his peace with Waterboer, and settled for a while on the Orange below Griquatown.⁶⁸ In other cases, the origins of the leaders or the antecedents of their following are not so readily identifiable. Piet Witvoet, for example, who became perhaps the most notorious of Kora raiders, emerged in 1825 from an unknown origin to be a leading figure in the combined Rolong-Seleka and Bergenaar attack against the Taung.⁶⁹ Later, he established his headquarters on the Upper Riet River, having in 1834 about 200 followers, with whom he raided in the Caledon valley.⁷⁰ ‘Whenever a civilized man wishes to become a plunderer,’ Andrew Smith wrote, ‘he separates himself from his own caste and unites himself to the Corannas and takes a wife from amongst them; he then stirs them up to all sorts of mischief.’⁷¹ One such was Abraham Kruger, ‘Bastard’ son of the early northern frontiersman Jacob Kruger. Abraham Kruger was the instigator of a raid on San living near the Orange in about 1825 and was summoned by John Philip to negotiate the return of the cattle stolen.

I expected a horde of naked savages [wrote Philip of Kruger’s Kora colleagues] and I found a number of smart young men, dressed quite in the style of the most respectable farmers of the colony. The young men had generally white fustian jackets, leather pantaloons, striped waistcoats, white hats, with broad edges, shirts, neckcloths stockings and shoes.⁷²

⁶⁶ Helm, January 5, 1824 [LMS 9/2/A]; ‘Answers to LMS Queries,’ Griquatown, August 2, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C]. See also Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 289-290.

⁶⁷ Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 30, 40-1, 50. See also Smith, *Diary*, I, 281.

⁶⁸ See Andries Waterboer, ‘A short account...’ [LMS 10/3/D]; Sass, September 28, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C]; Jan Bloem, Jr. in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 294; Evidence of Zerwick and Klaas Jager to 1875 Griqualand Land court [Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 57-58fn].

⁶⁹ See Omer – Cooper, *Zulu Aftermath*, 98 citing Hodgson and Archbell, October 4, 1825 [MMS: IV-1825/49]. I did not record Witvoet’s name in notes on this letter describing Sefunelo’s attack: the earliest mention I have traced of Witvoet is Melvill, October 29, 1829 [LMS 11/4/A]. See also Smith, *Diary*, I, 151.

⁷⁰ For Witvoet’s settlement area and numbers see Smith, *Diary*, I, 157, 174, 182, 194-5; Casalis, *Basuto*, 68; Rolland, April 20, 1835 [JDM, X, 302]. See also Clark, February 23, [1832?] [Quoted in Engelbrecht, *Korana*]; and *ibid.*, 51-2. Witvoet’s successor as chief was Goliath Yzerbek, whose mother was married to Abraham Kruger, suggesting overlap, in the followings of the two groups.

⁷¹ Smith, *Diary*, I, 232.

⁷² Philip, *Researches*, II, 334. See generally *ibid.*, II, 332-344.

Abraham Kruger was soon to assume the leadership of this Kora group, which appears to have consisted in part at least of the Regshande. In 1827, he was settled with about 21 Kora families within a day's journey of Philippolis.⁷³

It was, however, not all the Kora who were able to ally themselves with the Bergenaars. The evidence of *Difaqane* and Bergenaar raids against Kora communities suggests that those living on the Vaal between the Harts and the Vet Rivers were the main victims.⁷⁴ Here, though not exclusively here, had been living Links and Taaibosch Kora communities up to the time of the *Difaqane*.⁷⁵ The hereditary leaders of those groups appear to have survived the onslaught, though at a price: they were forced to seek the protection of better-armed or more secure communities. Thus in 1824, the Kora who had for some time been in alliance with Mothibi fled to the Tlhaping to seek their protection.⁷⁶ If, as seems likely, this was the Kora of Mosweu Taaibosch, then they did not remain long, for a few years later both Jan Taaibosch and Mosweu Taaibosch were back in the area between the Harts and Vaal, where they would fall under the protection of Berend Berends when he moved to Boetsap.⁷⁷ Meanwhile the Links had, by 1826, attached themselves in alliance to Moletsane, who was at that time established north of the Vaal, rather further to the north-east.⁷⁸

The Difaqane, the Bergenaars, and the Southern Sotho-Tswana, 1824 – 1828

By 1824 all the important southern Sotho-Tswana communities, except those of the Tlhaping confederation, had suffered raids from *Difaqane* marauders. Diutwileng, the

⁷³ Melvill, entry July 27 [LMS Journals 4/92]. See also Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 50-2; Philip to Wade, October 10, 1835 [425 of 1837, 144]. Abraham Kruger may also have had some following of Links Kora.

⁷⁴ See Hodgson, entries May 1, July 11-19 [MMS: II-1823/10]; Edwards, January 1, 1824 [MMS: II-1824/6]; Helm, February 2, 1824 [LMS 9/2/A]; Broadbent, July 1, 1824, [MMS: II-1824/45]; Hodgson, entry February 1824 [MMS: IV-1825/35]; Edwards, entries August 9, November 29, [MMS: III-1825/2].

⁷⁵ For Kora groups in this area, see Broadbent, entries January 2, 2-11 [MMS: II-1823/5]; Hodgson, January 12, 1824 [MMS: II – 1824/7]; Edwards, May 6, 1824 [MMS: II-1824/36]; Broadbent, May 1825 [MMS: III-1825/17]. Some, though not all, these Kora were Links, and Engelbrecht suggests that one chief may have been Toownaars or Regshande: see Smith, *Diary*, I, 150, 152; Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 43, 56; Maingard, 'Studies in Korana History...', 122-3. See also Chapter V.

⁷⁶ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 117-8, 158.

⁷⁷ See Jan Pienaar in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 19; 'Mooi' in *ibid.*, 135; Moroka in *ibid.*, 137; Matlaba in *ibid.*, 263; Petrus Rooy and Johannes Links in *ibid.*, 291-2; Andries in *ibid.*, 300; Moilwa in *ibid.*, 316-7; Magaal in *ibid.*, 326 – 8; Mosweu Rijt Taaibosch in *ibid.*, 291-2 and in Lindley, *Adamantia*, 12. See also Lemue, March 23, 1831 [JDM, VI, 311]; Lemue, April 8, 1836 [JDM, XI, 332]. The oral traditions indicate that the settlement was at Taungs.

⁷⁸ See Hodgson, August 18, 1826 [MMS: IV-1826/39]. Also Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 355; Maingard, 'Studies in Korana History...', 123.

regent of the powerful Hurutshe, had been killed, and his people had retreated from their age-old capital of Kaditshwene to Mosega. The Ngwaketse had already suffered in raids and before the end of 1824 had suffered the loss of their chief Makaba. The Rolong-Ratlou and Rolong-Tshidi had been attacked at Khunwana and driven to seek refuge on the Molopo at Phitsane: the Ratlou chief of 1820, Kgosi, had proved ineffective in the circumstances and been replaced by Gonnitse.⁷⁹ The Rolong-Seleka had been driven from Thabeng, and then from Maquassie, and had sought refuge at Phitsane only to be forced to fight their third battle with the Taung and lose their second most influential personage, Tshabadire, brother of Sefunelo.

Meanwhile, in these first two years of the *Difaqane*, the slow decay of the Tlhaping confederation was arrested.⁸⁰ By late 1822 the Moffats had overcome the strains imposed on the confederation by the dismissal of Read, and were beginning to gain the confidence of the chief Mothibi.⁸¹ The battle of Old Dithakong in 1823, with its message of Griqua protection, was a boost to missionary prestige, and also induced the dissident elements of the confederation to return to the Kuruman. In late 1823 and 1824, the Tlhaping were joined by Thamaga and Mothibi's Kora allies, as well as by the previously hostile Maudi and Rolong-Mariba: 'thire former petty quarrels among themselves seem all blotted out,' wrote Robert Hamilton.⁸² The missionaries took advantage of this new pro-missionary mood and the feeling of unity to persuade Mothibi to move the whole settlement to a new station higher up the Kuruman, at which Hamilton was engaged in building missionary houses during 1824. At the same time, Robert and Mary Moffat journeyed to Cape Town with Thaiso, the warm friend of the missions, and Mothibi's heir, Phetlu, who were duly impressed with the sights of the Colony.

On our return and removal to the new station [wrote Mary Moffat from Beaufort], [the Tlhaping] are wishing to grow wheat and tobacco, and each individual is to purchase his own ground, the missionaries having set an example. Muteebe says no one shall have any who does not pay a price, and some of them were talking that they would have a good piece while they were buying, for, when the other towns saw how well they were doing, they would want to join them.⁸³

⁷⁹ For contemporary eye-witness reports on the Rolong see Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 169-189, 300-303; Kay, *Travels*, 218-222; Kay, August 20, 1821 [MMS: II-1821/38]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 85-6, 129-132, 144-153; Hamilton, April 4, 1824 [LMS 9/2/B]; June 12, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C]; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Chs. XXI, XXIII; Baim, *Journals*, 41-5. For the Ratlou at least there are discrepancies between the chiefs mentioned in oral traditions and contemporary reports: for the oral traditions see Breutz, *Lichtenberg; Mafeking*, 102-3, 128, 146-7, 153; Molema, *Montshiwa*, 8-17.

⁸⁰ For the decay, see chapter 5.

⁸¹ See, particularly, Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 66, 70-1, 96-7; Smith, *Diary*, I, 288. Although there was drought in the rainy season of 1822-3, this was not blamed on the missionaries as in the previous year.

⁸² Hamilton, April 12, 1824 [LMS 9/2/B]. Also Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 110, 113, 117.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 111. See generally, *ibid.*, 110-8.

It is not hard to predict that such a radical attempt to alter the property relations of the Tlhaping would have led, if implemented, to renewed dissension. But the experiment was not even given the chance. Within months of the return of the Moffats, first the Tlharo, then the Tlhaping, and then again the Tlharo, were raided by the Bergenaars in the Langeberg, and it became apparent that the new unity of the confederation was almost wholly on the surface. When Mothibi sent a commando to assist the Tlharo against the first Bergenaar attacks, the Maidu section of this commando used the opportunity to seize Tlharo cattle. Although displeased, Mothibi was unable to have the cattle returned, and soon the Tlharo were counter-raiding the Tlhaping settlement as well as 'mocking' Mothibi in their dances. Such a blow to his prestige could not go unpunished, and Mothibi authorized a raid on the Tlharo which was promptly followed by a new Bergenaar attack, this time on the Tlhaping, in which the Tlharo appear to have joined.⁸⁴

But the divisive effects of the attacks themselves were the least of the renewed strains on the confederation. Mothibi, unable to obtain more than a token number of firearms from the missionaries, had gambled his prestige on the policy of Griqua protection. Now not only did Waterboer, beset by troubles of his own, refuse the Tlhaping protection, but it was Griqua themselves, people, as he told Moffat, 'brought up in Griqua Town...nurtured under the Gospel,' who were using firearms against him.⁸⁵ Furthermore, Mothibi began once more to feel that, far from helping him, the missionaries were undermining him. The Tlharo were so scornful of his threats against them, Mothibi said, 'on the ground that we (the missionaries) would keep him back from harsh measures, and that he was determined to show his power.'⁸⁶ When the Bergenaar attacks had come, furthermore, the missionaries, save Robert Hamilton, had retired to Griquatown. 'Where were the white people whom he had followed from Old Leetakoo?' asked the Maidu chief, 'they had now all left him in time of need.'⁸⁷ The anger of the Tlhaping, moreover, soon escalated from the Griqua and the missionaries to the Colonial government itself:

Not understanding, or rather not believing that from political intrigues among the Griquas many had broken off all connection and become abandoned characters, the Bechuanas naturally believed, nor could we convince them to the contrary, that the Government at the Cape connived at such iniquitous proceedings, and that their ruin must be the ultimate ob-

⁸⁴ For these attacks, see Mary Moffat, July 12, 1824, July 28, 1824 [*Apprenticeship*, 158-9]; *ibid.*, 154-5, 162-175, 182-3, 196-7, 272-5; Melvill, April 1, 1825; June 22, 1825 [50 of 1835, 219-222]; Hamilton, April 25, 1825 [LMS 9/3/B]; December 15, 1825 [LMS 9/4/B]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 362-7; Sass, entry November 21, 1824 [LMS Journals 4/87]; Hughes, December 17, 1824 [LMS Journals 4/89]; Edwards, January 8-9 [MMS: III-1825/2]; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XXV.

⁸⁵ *Apprenticeship*, 165. Also Hamilton, April 25, 1825 [LMS 9/3/B].

⁸⁶ *Apprenticeship*, 165.

⁸⁷ Hughes, December 17, 1824 [LMS Journals 4/89].

ject of the Governor!! They frequently interrogated us as to where the Corannas procured their guns, horses, and ammunition. We, of course, could not deny a fact so notorious, that they purchased these articles from the farmers on the northern limits of the Colony.⁸⁸

With such tensions, the confederation could hold together no longer. The Maudi and the Rolong-Mariba dispersed, the former to Old Dithakong and the latter apparently to the Morokweng area, north-west towards the Kalahari. Even the Tlharo, the most autonomous group in the confederation, left their settlements along the Kuruman to take refuge more to the north; though some later returned to the mission, it was a long time before the bulk of the Tlharo would resettle in their traditional sites.⁸⁹ The Tlhaping themselves split in two parts under the effects of the crisis. Mothibi himself moved with a following south-eastwards to the Harts river near Boetsap, 'not far from the boundaries of Griqua country' and later, in 1825, went to Griquatown itself where he 'entered into an alliance with the chief Waterboer who engaged to afford him every protection in his power.'⁹⁰ For a short time, between January 1826 and mid-1827, Mothibi did return to the Kuruman, but when Bergenaar attacks on the Tlhaping were renewed he very quickly moved southwards again, this time to Musiep on the Vaal River well within Waterboer's territory.⁹¹ Mahura, his brother, remained for the time being at the Kuruman, but another Tlhaping section of about 2000 under one Lepui, who cannot be identified in Tlhaping royal genealogies, moved at this time to Philippolis, where other southern Sotho-Tswana refugees were gathering.⁹²

Mothibi no doubt had come to believe that, if Griqua protection were necessary, it was essential for him to go to the Griqua rather than expect the Griqua to come to him. Mahura, his brother, disagreed. 'I was afraid to go with my brother,' Mahura was to say

⁸⁸ Apprenticeship, 274.

⁸⁹ Hamilton, December 13, 1824 [Quoted in Hughes LMS Journals 4/89]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 183-5, 197, 242, 250-1.

⁹⁰ Melvill, October 17, 1825 [LMS 9/4/A]. Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XXV, claims that in 1824 he suggested that Mothibi take shelter in the Griquatown area, but there is no contemporary evidence of this.

⁹¹ For Mothibi's movements see *Apprenticeship*, 184, 187, 209-210, 230, 269, 231; Hughes, May 3, 1826 [LMS 10/1/B]; February 6, 1827 [LMS 10/2A]; Lemue, November 27, 1830 [JDM, VI, 292-3]; Nicholas Kruger, Klaas Hendricks, Jantje Mothibi in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 4, 22, 103-4. Jantje, son of Mothibi, claimed that Musiep 'had been Batlapin country in olden times' and said that they lived three years on the south side of the Vaal before crossing to the north. While still near the Harts Mothibi was visited by John Philip: see *Researches*, II, 114, 124-42 *passim*.

⁹² See Pelissier, November 19, 1833 [JDM, IX, 131 - 4]; November 1, 1834 [JDM, X, 129ff]; May 1, 1835 [JDM, X, 290-1]; June 1, 1836 [JDM, XI, 339]. Also Language, 'Tlhaping...', 126 who claims Lepui was an 'uncle' of Mothibi's.

later, 'because of the Griquas beating the Kaffirs with ox-whips...and I feared they would beat me.'⁹³ Or, as one of his followers put it at the same period,

Mothibi asked Mahura to accompany him; but which he declined doing, saying that there was no enmity between them, for that if he went to Griqualand the Griquas might expect him to submit to their laws, which he would not do, and Mothibi might say why he acted so.⁹⁴

The missionaries interpreted this split between the two Tlhaping leaders in a different way. Moffat wrote that Mahura had reproved Mothibi for leaving 'the missionaries, who were his most faithful and most constant friends,' and continued that

...the way Mahura has behaved, and his strong predilection for civilization, gives us some hope. He with his attendants are always seen in European dress so far as is practicable. They have also commenced planting maize and tobacco, a thing before unknown among these western tribes.⁹⁵

But Mahura's policy was less naïve than this. He was more interested in preserving the independence of the Tlhaping by restoring their power without submitting to the Griqua than he was in 'civilization' as such. At the same time another such 'modernizer', the Tlharo headman Seretse, of whom the missionaries also had some 'hope', contemplated asking Jonker Afrikaner, newly set on a raiding career after the death of his Christian father, to join in the destruction of the Kuruman mission.⁹⁶

The *sine qua non* of an autonomous restoration of the power of the Tlhaping was the acquisition of firearms and horses. Without these the Tlhaping were defenseless, and with them they would be able not only to protect themselves but to restore their depleted cattle herds at their neighbors' expense. The Tlharo had already shown the way. In May and June of 1825, provoked by the killing of their chief Lehesie by the Bergenaars, the Tlharo had succeeded in seizing powder from a Bergenaar wagon, and had gone on to recapture some cattle as the Bergenaars retired with them through the desert west of the Langeberg.⁹⁷ In January 1826, the Tlhaping sent out a commando against the Ngwaketse, armed with two or three guns and some powder which Molala and bought from a traveling merchant. Advised by Gonnitse against attacking either the Ngwaketse or the Rolong-Tshidi, who

⁹³ Mahura in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 302-3.

⁹⁴ Gert Molehebangwe in *ibid.*, 90. For Mahura's movements see also Massa, Rarapulan, Mankurwane in *ibid.*, 62-3, 65, 300, 379.

⁹⁵ *Apprenticeship*, 187. See also *ibid.*, 198, 224; Hamilton, December 15, 1825 [LMS 9/4/B]; Philip, *Researches*, II, 114-120; Smith, *Diary*, I, 337.

⁹⁶ *Apprenticeship*, 171.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 186. In June 1826, in response to a fresh attack, they killed 7-8 Bergenaars and seized their weapons: *ibid.*, 230, 274-5; Bain, *Journal*, 21-2.

had now separated from the Ratlou, the commando treacherously seized Gonntse's cattle, as well as some from the Maidu on its return. This blatant breach of trust with Gonntse, who was a cross-cousin of Mothibi's, led Mahura to refuse to accept any of the cattle which had been brought, allowing Mothibi (temporarily at the Kuruman) to keep the spoils.⁹⁸ That the cause of this refusal was not the policy itself is indicated by the fact that in November of 1826 both Mothibi and Mahura sent out commandos against the Rolong-Tshidi and the Maidu.⁹⁹ By this time the Tlhaping were managing to obtain regular supplies of powder and arms, and the missionaries were no longer, as before 1823, a possible means of supply, but rather a positive hindrance:

...we have every reason to believe [wrote Moffat in November 1826] that the ostensible cause of these evils [renewed commandos] among the Batlapees is the introduction of muskets, ammunition, and horses. As to the former, they do procure them from different quarters, illegal of course, and as to powder, certain it is that they do obtain it by means the most illicit. They view us as a barrier to their obtaining a rich supply by every merchant, and, of course, think it is in their interest to keep the thing a perfect secret (though in vain) from us. Were it not [for] these means, the success of their arms would be entirely reversed.¹⁰⁰

The access to Transorangia allowed traders by Somerset's regulations of 1828, in fact, was beginning to bear fruit. The first recorded journey by such persons as far north as the Tlhaping was that of 1826 by Andrew Bain and Biddulph. Before long the route from Grahamstown through Philippolis to the Sotho-Tswana communities of the High Veld was becoming well-traveled: one reads of such persons as Davidson, Gill, and Ward. Hugh Millen, sent to the Kuruman by John Philip in 1825 to erect buildings, was soon engaged in trading as well: he would die of fever in Mzilikazi's country in 1834. By 1829, it would appear, David Hume knew 'the country about the Vaal well enough to be guide to Archbell' on a visit to Mzilikazi, and in that same year Robert Schoon and William McLuckie had visited the Ndebele. In the 1830's Hume would establish a store at the Kuruman.¹⁰¹ Not all these traders necessarily were willing to trade in firearms, but insofar as they did, there is unlikely to remain any record of such illicit traffic, and they would especially have sought to hide it from the missionaries.

⁹⁸ *Apprenticeship*, 130, 210, 226, 234; Bain, *Journals*, 18.

⁹⁹ *Apprenticeship*, 231-2.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 232. See also *ibid.*, 235; Bain, *Journal*, 14.

¹⁰¹ Moffat, *Matabele Journals*, 2fn. For these traders see, for example, *Apprenticeship*, 182, 190, 221, 247-262, 265-6; Hamilton, April 25, 1825 [LMS 9/3/B]; Moffat and Hamilton, March 6, 1829 [LMS 11/3/B]; Moffat, February 22, 1832 [LMS 13/2/D]; Kuruman missionaries, July 2, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XXXII; Smith, *Diary*, I, 329, II, 165, 219, 259-260; Lemue, June 1, 1834 [JDM, X, 14].

The immediate effects of this acquisition of firearms by the Tlhaping were, like those of the Bergenaar raids, divisive. The Tlharo were set against the Tlhaping and *vice versa*; the Tlhaping had attacked their potential allies the Maidu and alienated their erstwhile friend Gonntse of the Rolong-Ratlou. Tswana, of the Rolong-Tshidi, coming in 1826 to ask protection for his people (who were still suffering *Difaqane* attacks) was raided also.¹⁰² As Moffat perceptively commented,

The comparative peace and union which formerly existed between these...tribes have been turned into enmity and revenge, for the enemy sometimes compelled one tribe to assist them against another, and one party, being robbed of all they possessed, had not alternative to supply the imperious pangs of hunger, but to fall on their neighbour's cattle.¹⁰³

By the end of the decade, however, Mahura was beginning to look beyond the immediate needs of the Tlhaping. Moving from the Kuruman back to Old Dithakong between 1828 and 1830, Mahura had gathered around him by the latter year some 10,000-12,000 refugees, mainly Tlhaping, but including Maidu, Rolong, and others. It was a start towards the reconstruction of the Tlhaping confederation on a basis different than before.¹⁰⁴

The elements of the Tlhaping confederation were not the only communities who dispersed to seek shelter or protection at this time. The Hurutshe and the Ngwaketse, too, began to scatter, as did the Rolong. From the Rolong settlement at Phitsane, Gonntse moved to Kongke, further west; Tawana and the Tshidi seem to have fled at least temporarily to the Vaal River in 1826. Not until about 1829 would the bulk of the Rolong-Tshidi and Rolong-Ratlou regather at Khuwana.¹⁰⁵ The dispersal occurred in various directions: many small groups moved southward at this time to seek Griqua protection near Griquatown or Philippolis.¹⁰⁶ Another favorite area of refuge was in the dry and isolated region around Morokweng, towards the Kalahari. In 1826, Bain, traveling from Kuruman to the Ngwaketse, found Tlharo and Rolong-Mariba groups spread throughout this area. At Kongke was Molala of the Rolong-Mariba, asking Bain for firearms, and governing a settlement of Rolong, Tlharo, and Kgalagadi with 'not a single house or hut, nothing but a number of Kraals for the cattle and similar ones for the people divided into

¹⁰² Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 212, 215-6, 231-2, 235. The Ratlou (and Tshidi?) had also been attacked by *Difaqane* raiders in November 1824, which had led Gonntse to come and seek Tlhaping assistance: *ibid.*, 171.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 277.

¹⁰⁴ See Lemue, November 27, 1830 [LDM, VI, 299-303, 305]; Kuruman missionaries, December 26, 1831 [LMS 12/4/D]; Moffat, *Matabele Journals*, 5.

¹⁰⁵ Bain, *Journals*, 40-6; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 258; *Matabele Journals*, 5; Hughes, February 6, 1827 [LMS 10/2/A]. See also Molema, *Montshiwa*, 17.

¹⁰⁶ See, for example, Rolland, April 20, 1835 [JDM, X, 301]; January 18, 1836 [JDM, XI, 62ff], June 28, 1836 [JDM, XII, 19-20]; Report on Mekuatleng [JDM, XIV, 185]; Wright, September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B]; Arbousset, *Narrative*, 106. See also Chapter 6.

several different wards.¹⁰⁷ In the following year Moffat spent several weeks in the same area and found that Molala had been joined by Gonnitse as well as some Hurutshe. 'The number of the Barolongs who live here is considerable,' wrote Moffat, 'there are seven different villages lying scattered. One of these villages is principally Batlarus, of whom there appear to be good numbers. There are also many Baharutse, who seem to be chiefly engaged in iron and copper work.'¹⁰⁸ Not far away, at Tswaing, was another such refugee settlement, under Bogatsu of the Rolong-Seleka, and including four 'villages' of Hurutshe, Tlharo, and Rolong.¹⁰⁹ Shortly after Moffat left the area, it began to be harassed by the Bergenaars and the Kora. Its inhabitants were forced once more to flee. While some probably rejoined Mahura at old Dithakong, or the Rolong at Khunwana, others fled far across the Kalahari, probably to Lehututu, where they must have lived for at least two years.¹¹⁰ In 1831 the Morokweng area was almost deserted.¹¹¹

Though the effect of the two-pronged onslaught of raiding had been to disillusion the Tlhaping with missionaries, other chiefs sought anxiously for these whites who would, they believed, protect them from further attack. At Tswaing in 1827, Moffat had conversations with a Hurutshe headman who urged the establishment of the LMS mission which John Campbell had promised the Hurutshe in 1820. Moffat, himself eager to lead such a venture, wrote that

...were it not for the present unsettled state of the interior, now would be an important time to commence a mission among that people. They have been, and are still, scattered and peeled, and comparatively free of that independent and proud spirit which often characterizes such tribes when their state is prosperous.¹¹²

At the same time Moffat received a quite unprecedented visit from Sebegu, Makaba's successor as chief of the Ngwaketse: only the continual attacks suffered still by the Ngwaketse from the north and east could have induced a chief to leave his country. Sebegu pleaded for Moffat to join him, and disparaged the idea of a mission to the Hurutshe. 'I...took the opportunity of informing him,' wrote Moffat, 'that we as missionaries came for the purpose of instructing them about God and their immortal souls, and not to give, or be

¹⁰⁷ Bain, *Journals*, 18-32.

¹⁰⁸ *Apprenticeship*, 242, 251.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 241, 262.

¹¹⁰ Smith, *Diary*, I, 277-9; 407-8. The refugees, mainly Rolong-Mariba, appear to have encountered and defeated a Kwena refugee group who then fled to the Ngwato. See also *ibid.*, I, 283, 299.

¹¹¹ Lemue, October 15, 1831 [JDM, VII, 196 - 201].

¹¹² *Apprenticeship*, 357-8, 241, 244; Smith, *Diary*, I, 347. For Moffat's zeal to go to the interior, see *Apprenticeship*, 234, 282; R. Moffat [c. January 1828] [LMS 11/1/A]. Isaac Hughes, who arrived at the Kuruman in August 1824, had in fact been intended for the Hurutshe; but as a result of delays and his differences with Moffat, he transferred to Griquatown in late 1827.

the means of giving or procuring for them, either guns or ammunition.¹¹³ Guns and ammunition were, of course, what Sebege wanted, though he and the other chiefs should be credited with subtlety enough to know that, where missionaries came, white traders would surely follow, who would not always follow missionary wishes. By 1831 Mahura himself, ensconced in autonomy at Old Dithakong, was trying to persuade the newly-arrived Paris Evangelical missionaries to settle with him.¹¹⁴

With the departure of Mothibi and Mahura, the Kuruman mission station became a center of refuge for isolated refugee families. By the end of the decade the only Sotho-Tswana *chief* who had managed to secure a permanent missionary presence was Sefunelo of the Rolong-Seleka. The Wesleyan mission to the Rolong, abandoned at the time of the attack on Maquassie by the Taung, was refounded by Thomas Hodgson and James Archbell in 1825.¹¹⁵ Sefunelo's situation at this time was precarious. He had been attacked three times by the Taung in 1824, and his attempt to secure revenge against Moletsane in 1825, with the assistance of a Bergenaar party, had ended in disaster. Many of his people were scattered, among the Rolong or even as servants to the Kora.¹¹⁶ Sefunelo was, after the 'sentence' and fine of 1824, still afraid of Waterboer, yet he could not avoid the Griqua chief by settling at Maquassie for this area was still dominated by the Taung.

In mid-1826, however, Sefunelo was persuaded by Hodgson and Archbell to establish himself at Platberg (Motlhanawapitse), just south of the Vaal and at no great distance from where Berend Berends had taken up his residence at Boetsap.¹¹⁷ In essence under the protection of Berends, and with the Wesleyan missionaries in support, Sefunelo remained here for seven years. During that time he was rejoined not only by his own followers, but by refugees from other communities of the area. Like Mahura, he was reconstructing a confederation on a new basis, but unlike Mahura he had both Griqua and missionary

¹¹³ *Apprenticeship*, 256; also *ibid.*, 250, 254-7. For attacks on the Ngwaketse see *ibid.*, 229, 247; Smith, *Diary*, II, 218-9; Hughes, February 6, 1827 [LMS 10/2/A].

¹¹⁴ See Lemue, November 27, 1830 [JDM, VI, 298-303]. See also Rolland, July 5, 1831 [JDM, VII, 14 - 17]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 347.

¹¹⁵ Broadbent had returned to the Colony, too ill to continue, while Edward Edwards had submitted his resignation. Edwards had fallen out with Hodgson, who blamed him for starting a station among the Kora and leaving the frail Broadbent alone at Maquassie, and blamed Edwards also for deserting Maquassie when Sefunelo was being threatened by the Taung. Sefunelo indeed believed that the Taung would not have attacked Maquassie had the missionaries remained; Archbell and Hodgson, October 4, [MMS: IV-1825/49].

¹¹⁶ See, for example, Hodgson, January 6, 1825 [MMS: IV - 1825/1]; Archbell and Hodgson, March 31, 1826 [MMS: IV-1826/11].

¹¹⁷ For the establishment at this site see Hodgson and Archbell, June 6, 1826 [WMN, V, 213-4]; Hodgson, August 18, 1826 [MMS: IV-1826/39]; Archbell and Hodgson, September 30, 1826 [MMS: IV-1827/34]; Hodgson, Journal, 1825-6 [Contained in MMS: IV-1826/13, 1826/51; 1827/21; unnumbered letter March 19, 1828; Broadbent, *Narrative*, 167-172]. See also Bain, *Journals*, 9-11.

support. The recovery of the Rolong-Seleka is graphically illustrated by the letters of the Wesleyan missionaries. When they returned in 1825 Sefunelo's following consisted of 327 houses, perhaps 1200-1500 people. But, as Archbell wrote,

...if we consider that three important chiefs with their people are residing in the Vaal River, and that an immense number...of men and Captains have been slain at three different times since the former residence of Brother H[odgson] at Maquassie, as well as the numerous individuals and parties who have separated themselves in search of food, to double the present number of Houses...is no extravagant calculation.¹¹⁸

By March 1827, six 'chiefs' (probably ward headmen), with perhaps forty families each under them, had joined Sefunelo, and Hodgson had visited the Taung and their allies the Links to ensure that Platberg would not be attacked.¹¹⁹ Six months later the population was estimated at 5000-6000. When the Wesleyans returned to Sefunelo they wrote of his reduced power, but by late 1827 they were commenting that 'our chief is rising in importance and an increasing disposition to settle with him shows itself among the Natives scattered in small parties at a distance. The [Taung] have removed a little nearer us.'¹²⁰

Instead of the series of powerful chiefdoms, each centered around a main settlement, which had characterized the southern Sotho-Tswana area before the Southern frontier and the *Difaqane* had made their impact, there was now a situation of flux. The Tlhaping confederation had disintegrated, while the Rolong, Ngwaketse, Hurutshe and southern Kwenia were all partly or totally scattered as a result of *Difaqane* raids. The impact of entering the southern frontier zone had been partly responsible for this, and yet many features of this new culture — guns and missionaries in particular — had acquired added attraction. Only guns and missionaries, together or separately, appeared to offer a defense against the unprecedented warfare and slaughter. Some had chosen to place themselves wholly under Griqua protection. Others were seeking to remain autonomous yet acquire missionaries or firearms. Sefunelo had the best of all worlds: semi-autonomy with the protection of both missionaries and Griqua. These different policy decisions by the southern Sotho-Tswana were soon tested. From 1828 onwards the Ndebele of Mzilikazi, state-builders rather than half starved marauders, interjected themselves into the balance of power in Transorangia. The degree to which they were able to secure hegemony over the southern Sotho-Tswana communities was affected by these different choices which

¹¹⁸ Archbell, November 1, 1825, [MMS: IV-1825/58]. See also Archbell and Hodgson, October 4, 1825 [MMS: IV-1825/49]; Hodgson, November 12, 1825 [MMS: IV-1825/611].

¹¹⁹ Archbell and Hodgson, March 31, 1827 [MMS: IV-1827/11].

¹²⁰ [Archbell and Hodgson?], October 22, 1827 [MMS: IV-1827/39]. See also Archbell and Hodgson, March 31, 1826 [MMS: IV-1826/11]; Hodgson, August 18, 1826 [MMS: IV-1826/39]; September 30, 1827 [MMS: IV-1827/32].

the Sotho-Tswana had made. It was also affected by the diplomacy and military action of the Griqua, as well as missionaries and, to some extent, traders. It depended, in other words, on the new balance of power which emerged in Transorangia in the aftermath of the *Difaqane*.

8 The New Balance of Power, 1826 – 1832

By 1826, there were in Transorangia three distinct nuclei of Griqua power. John Philip's settlement of September 1825 had given LMS ratification to the de facto separation between Waterboer on the one hand, and Adam Kok II and Berend Berends on the other. The original intention may have been for Adam Kok II and Berends to exercise joint leadership at the LMS San mission at Philippolis, as they had done at Griquatown from c.1809-1818.¹ In fact Berends returned to Daniels Kuil, from where he shortly transferred his headquarters to Boetsap on the Harts River, not far away.² These three Griqua centers were not, however, the only foci of power. Along the Caledon valley Moshweshwe, Sekonyela, and Matiwane (until 1827) were established in defensible positions and gathering supporters. Near Maquassie on the Vaal was Moletsane who had already defeated a force of southern frontiersmen. Besides these major leaders, there were the chiefs of the southern Sotho-Tswana communities that had been weakened to a greater or lesser extent by the events of the preceding four years. In addition, throughout Transorangia were scattered white farmers, Bastards and Kora who had, or were acquiring, the essential attributes of frontier culture, as well as a *melange* of refugees, 'Bergenaar', San, Kora, and Sotho-Tswana, for the most part seeking a new stability.

A new stability demanded the consolidation of states, not only by the major Sotho-Tswana leaders around the fringes of Transorangia, but by the three Griqua leaders through the central part of the area. This was no easy task. In 1823 it was estimated that there were 2600 Griqua in Transorangia.³ At the end of the decade it would appear that there were at Griquatown itself some 800-850 Griqua, and at Philippolis some 120 families (perhaps 500 people).⁴ Including the followers of Berend Berends, this indicates a

¹ See Philip to Wright, [n.d.] in Wright to Archbell, December 1, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/B]; Wright to Clark, May 10, 1827 [LMS 10/1/C]; Kok to Stockenström, October 1825 [Theal, *RecCC*, XXIX, 227-8]; Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 248-9. For a while previous to September 1825, Adam Kok II had been intending to settle in the Fauresmith area with his followers: Melvill, October 17, 1825 [LMS 9/4/A]; October 18, 1825 [50 of 1835, 224].

² See Andries Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D]; Melvill, July 6, 1826 [LMS 10/1/D]; Bain, *Journals*, 11.

³ Thompson, *Travels*, 84.

⁴ 'Reply to Colonial Office Circular,' Griquatown, December 1830 [LMS 12/4/C]; Melvill, July 1, 1828 [LMS 11/1/C]; Steedman, *Adventures*, II, 39; Melvill, April 2, 1827 [LMS 10/2/B]. In 1831, however, Kolbe estimated the Griqua population of Philippolis as 1604, of whom 304 were adult males: 'Schedule of Returns,' October 7, 1831 [LMS 12/4/E].

maximum of 700 adult Griqua males available as a military force, attempting to establish Griqua authority over an area inhabited by, at the minimum, 15,000 people.⁵

The conditions under which this new Griqua consolidation were attempted were far less favorable than they had been during the period when the Griquatown state itself had been born. No longer did the Griqua have a monopoly on the use of firearms or the acquisition of gunpowder. The missionaries, for the most part, were neither willing or able any longer to secure for the Griqua gunpowder which could be used as an inducement to attract followers to the states.⁶ Substantial numbers of Kora and Bastards, some Sotho-Tswana and perhaps a few San, already had firearms and could procure more from white farmers or perhaps from the traders who were beginning to cross the Orange. Each small Kora community, each family of Bastard emigrants, felt, and was more or less able to sustain, that unwillingness to submit to authority which characterized the frontier society. The turbulence of the previous four years had, indeed, evoked clearly the disastrous potential of an unordered society. But for some, appetites had been whetted for a career of continued raiding. With a few exceptions, such raiding was no longer directed against the frontier states themselves. It is necessary to distinguish the warfare characteristic of the frontier zone, which had been in existence from the 1780's, from the periods of revolt, when raiding by frontiersmen became more intense and involved an assault on the state-building of their own colleagues. But with the revolts more or less at an end (except for Griquatown in 1827-8 and Philippolis in 1837-8), the weakened condition of many communities and families encouraged the continuation of cattle-raiding by the more adventurous.

Two other factors were introduced for the first time. White frontiersmen were now across the Orange, pasturing their cattle, and on occasion trading and raiding. And, partly for this reason, the Colonial government itself was more watchful of events in Transorangia than in the formative years of the Griquatown state. The Colony was not yet willing to intervene directly to advance its interests. But it was perturbed by disorder, especially on the rare occasions when raiding groups entered the Colony and attacked white farmer families. Such attacks do not appear to have involved any notions of hostility to the Colony itself — it seems more likely that the few of which there is evidence were personal quarrels with farmers with whom the raiders were accustomed to trade — but

⁵ Thus the above sources indicate 800 Sotho-Tswana at Griquatown itself, besides at Campbell, Musiep, Tsantsabane, etc.; and at Philippolis some 1500 Sotho-Tswana. Besides these there were the Rolong-Selaka (at least 7000), the Kora associated with Berends, and distributed along the Riet and Modder Rivers, and so on.

⁶ Melvill was however told at Philippolis in 1829 that two missionaries had recently bought gunpowder for 'their chiefs' (the Wesleyans?) and asked why he would not do the same: Melvill, entry May 13, 1829 [LMS 11/4/A].

the Colony could not ignore them.⁷ And the Colony authorities, even without intervening directly, could exert any manner of indirect influences to affect the fortunes of the incipient Griqua states.

The First Years of the Philippolis and Boetsap States: The 'Old' Chiefs, Missionaries, and Government, 1826 – 1832

Irksome but necessary steps in the establishment of new Griqua states at Philippolis and Boetsap were securing missionary presence and government support. While, in the political conditions at that time, such measures were necessary for the ratification of the autonomy of the new states, at the same time of course they posed obvious limits on that autonomy. In 1825, Adam Kok II and his followers addressed letters to Stockenstrom requesting government sanction of his chieftainship, and at the same time 108 Bergenaars requested 'the Governor to confirm this our choice, having chosen Adam Kok our former Captain to direct us after having made peace with all the other captains by name.'⁸ This government sanction was obtained in January 1826, at a time when Adam Kok and his followers were still distributed along the Modder and Riet Rivers, almost to their sources.⁹ Some months later, however, Adam Kok II moved to Philippolis, which station Philip had offered him on condition that he protected the San. The station, it is important to note, was ceded directly to Adam Kok and his people by the missionary James Clark, though Philip would later argue that the LMS retained the title to it: James Clark remained as missionary to the Griqua.¹⁰ Berend Berends was rather slower in acquiring

⁷ In the first part of 1828 the son of Jan David and a party killed some members of the Lubbe family: see Wright, entry June 10 [538 of 1836, 616]; September 10, 1828 [LMS 11/2/B]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 288. In 1832 Stuurman, a former follower of Cornelius Kok's, killed members of the Faber and Van der Merwe families and as a result a Colony commando and Waterboer cooperated in an unsuccessful expedition against him: Philip in [538 of 1836, 616-8]. For another such incident see Casalis, October 4, 1833 [JDM, IX, 138-141].

⁸ Bergenaars to Council, [n.d.] [Theal, *RecCC*, XXIX, 228]. See also Adam Kok to Stockenstrom, October 14, 1825; Anon to Council, October 1825 [Theal, *RecCC*, XXIX, 226-8]; Melvill, September 5, 1825, October 18, 1825 [50 of 1835, 223-4].

⁹ Minutes of Council, January 10, 1826 [Theal, *RecCC*, XXIX, 231]; Melvill, July 6, 1826 [LMS 10/1/D]; Philip, 'The tenure by which the Grikas hold the lands at Philippolis' [1842?] [LMS 18/1/D].

¹⁰ See Clark, July 22, 1826 [CO 512: Incoming letters from Graaff-Reinet, enclosed in No 104] [Cited by Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*]. This letter, cited also by Wright to Clark, May 10, 1827 [LMS 10/1/C] is important in view of Philip's later claims. See also Melvill, July 26, 1826 [LMS 10/1/D]; April 2, 1827 [LMS 10/2/B]; Miles, October 27, 1830 [LMS 12/3/B]; Philip to Wade, October 10, 1833 [425 of 1837, 144, 150]; Philip in [628 of 1836, 622-3]; Lindley, *Adamantia*, 24-8 and H. Hendricks in *ibid.*, 39. Also Stockenstrom in [628 of 1836, 216-8] who claimed that in 1830 (it was almost certainly 1827) Melvill showed him a document by which 'possession of the soil was ceded by Dr. Philip to the Griqua from the Bushmen...in the name of the London Missionary Society the establishment was ceded to be a Griqua establishment.'

these attributes of independence. By 1827, however, he was in association with the Wesleyans who were at Platberg and, as the Wesleyans relate, 'the Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet has requested him, on behalf of the Colonial Government, to exercise his authority in this part and preserve peace.'¹¹ Whether Berends obtained the same formal sanction as Adam Kok II from government is unclear.

With these steps taken, whole-hearted cooperation among the Griqua chiefs might have been able to strengthen each of their states. As it was, there was mutual suspicion and bitterness, with Waterboer in particular resenting the independence of the 'old' chiefs. The regulations of 1825 provided that murder cases should be judged jointly, and that persons could not leave one state for another without written permission. Both provisions had soon been violated.

In February 1826, four Kora followers of Berends attacked an outpost of Cornelius Kok and went off with the guns they had acquired to steal cattle from the Tlharo. Berends arrested them, and dispatched them to Cornelius Kok under so weak a guard that two escaped. Berends did not himself attend the trial and Cornelius Kok ordered the two executed.¹² Several months later a follower of Adam Kok's left him and raised a party of 'dissident Oorlams, Corannas, and Bushmen belonging to no captain' with the intention of stealing Griqua cattle. In June, these attacked the outposts of Griquatown, joined apparently by Jan Bloem and some of the Berends family. Of course this did not mean, as Waterboer alleged, that Berend Berends himself was implicated. The leaders, including one Piet Berends, were captured, but except for five Kora managed to escape on the way back to Griquatown. The Kora were sentenced to one hundred and fifty lashes each from which two of them died.¹³ Whether, as Waterboer alleged, Berend Berends and Adam Kok refused to attend in these two cases, or whether they were not invited as they themselves claimed, the two 'old' chiefs certainly did not participate in the sentencing.¹⁴ The consequence was increased estrangement among the chiefs, with Waterboer imposing severe unilateral measures on malefactors. So far, indeed, did Waterboer ignore the agreements that when a number of the Bergenaars deserted Adam Kok in 1826 because they did not like the transfer of the chieftaincy to Adam's son, the unpopular Cornelius III, Waterboer did not return these men to Kok. When Melvill, no longer Government Agent, refused Waterboer's request to mediate between him and Adam Kok II on the

¹¹ [Hodgson and Archbell?], October 10, 1827 [MMS: IV-1827/39]. See also Archbell, 'Question of Daniels Kuil' [MMS: XI-Document D].

¹² A. Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 211, 223, 230, 275.

¹³ A. Waterboer, *op. cit.*; Sass and Wright, August 29, 1826 [LMS 10/1/D]; Hodgson, entry June 14, 1826 [MMS: IV-1827/21]; Stockenström, August 29, 1826 [Quoted in Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 122]; Jan Pienaar in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 17-8.

¹⁴ Smith, *Diary*, I, 214.

affair, Waterboer went himself to the Bergenaars and persuaded some to move to Griquatown.¹⁵

Under the conditions described, it was Adam Kok II who attempted the most formidable task of state-building. From Philippolis, whose spring was not sufficient to support more than a handful of families, his state claimed jurisdiction over a territory and a following spread as far as the Riet and even the Modder Rivers, and from about Ramah in the west 'as far as the Caledon' in the northeast.¹⁶ Within this area were Kora, San, Sotho-Tswana, a growing number of white farmers, Bastards and Bergenaars, as well as Adam Kok's closest Griqua associates.¹⁷ Though many of these people had 'heard the Gospel' at some time, very few were church members, and there was little possibility that the church could perform the type of integrative function in the state that it had in the early years of Griquatown.¹⁸ Instead, the administration of the Philippolis state, as was also by then the case with Griquatown, was carried out by field-cornets, and there was also a 'legislative council, consisting of the chief of the chief and a certain portion of the people.'¹⁹ Infringement of regulations agreed to by the council were adjudicated by a 'magistrate's court', which appears usually to have imposed fines.²⁰

But as Andrew Smith wrote, 'most of the regulations which occur in this country are passed without punishment, not because they are considered as not meriting punishment but because the Govt. of the country are afraid of the offenders.'²¹ Perhaps a part of this can be attributed to the weakness of the leadership. Cornelius Kok III died in late 1828 and his father Adam II resumed the office which there is no evidence that he relinquished save in name. But Melvill wrote disparagingly that 'our chief has scarcely the vestige of power...he often acknowledges his unfitness for the office he holds and expresses his wish to give it up.'²² In 1829 there was talk of joining forces with Cornelius Kok II at

¹⁵ Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D]; Wright, 30, 1826 [LMS 10/1/E]; Melvill, January 16, 1826 [Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 121-2]; Sass, February 17, 1827 [LMS 10/2/B].

¹⁶ Stockenström, May 14, 1827 [Theal, *RecCC*, XXVII, 435-7]. See also Melvill, April 2, 1827 [LMS 10/2/B]; July 1, 1828 [LMS 11/1/C]; January 1, 1829 [LMS 11/3/A]; October 29, 1829, [LMS 11/4/A]; Miles, October 27, 1830 [LMS 12/3/B] for the Philippolis springs and habitation. In 1829, after much acrimonious dispute, the main site was moved to a better spring nearby.

¹⁷ Very few of these appear to have been from his family. His counselors in 1829 appear to have been Hendrick Hendricks, Piet Sabbah, Klaas Pienaar, Kobus (?) Pienaar, G. Sayers, Jager Boer, A. Constabel as well as Willem Kok and Gert Kok: see Memorial to Sir Lowry Cole, January 23, 1829 [LMS 11/3/A]. But Willem Kok had been until 1827 in the Griquatown area, down the Orange from Kloof, while Gert Kok had been at Campbell for some time after 1825: see Abraham Kok in Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 153-4; Wright, entry August 13, 1827 [538 of 1836, 615].

¹⁸ Melvill, July 1, 1828 [LMS 11/1/C].

¹⁹ Smith, *Diary*, I, 181.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 180-1; Backhouse, *Narrative*, 352.

²¹ Smith, *Diary*, I, 182.

²² Melvill, January 1, 1829 [LMS 11/3/A]. also Melvill, entry May 12, 1829 [LMS 11/4/A].

Campbell, whose alliance with Waterboer was cooling. Again in 1831 Kok was thinking of moving 'he knew not whither.'²³

But Adam Kok II must also have often despaired before an impossible task. In the first place, it was hard for him as it had been for Waterboer to ensure that he secured a monopoly of the gunpowder supply in the state. While his followers had access through trade, Melvill was not authorized to provide any — being longer a Government Agent — and Stockenström preserved for the time being a benevolent neutrality towards the old Griqua chiefs, a policy which did not include supplying them with gunpowder.²⁴

More formidable still, though, were the cleavages within the membership of the state itself. Though, of course, it is an over-simplification, it is possible to distinguish two continuous pressure groups in the Philippolis state. One group was composed of the Bastards, recent emigrants from the Colony, who had left because dispossessed of their land, or because they resented discriminatory treatment or having to enter service with farmers. These, as Smith found later, said 'if they had farms within the Colonial boundary they would prefer living there to their present situation because they [would] have laws to protect them.'²⁵ In Transorangia the Bastards were still insecure, fearing that their land rights would once again be jeopardized by white settlement expansion, fearing 'lest they should by a step of Government lose both labour and property' were they to put substantial investment into their holdings, fearing that continued raiding by the Kora would bring government intervention to the detriment of all Griqua.²⁶

So sharply were Bastard attitudes separated from those of the Kora, and to some extent to the Griqua, that contemporary observers sought for 'ethnic' distinctions: 'the characteristics of the Hottentot predominate in [the Griquas]; those of the Dutch race in the [Bastards],' wrote Arbousset. 'The Griqua is less of the mongrel than the Bastard; his features are better defined; his bearing is more manly; his hair more crisp; and his complexion more dark.'²⁷

At the other extreme were the Kora, the longest-established of the Khoi-type populations of the area. They, in fact, were relatively unconcerned about disputing territory

²³ See Melvill, October 29, 1829 [LMS 11/4/A]; Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 62.

²⁴ See Melvill, entries May 13, October 31 [LMS 11/4/A]; February 4, 1830 [LMS 12/1/A]; December 31, 1828 [Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 62fn]; Smith, diary, I, 194.

²⁵ Smith, *Diary*, I, 152-3. See also Smith to D'Urban, September 17, 1834 [Kirby, *Smith*, 144-151] where Smith continues, 'If the vagrant laws be passed I am convinced many Hottentots and Bastards now residing in the Colony will leave it and attach themselves to Kok and others.'

²⁶ Smith, *Diary*, I, 80-81. See also *ibid.*, I, 122, 176.

²⁷ Arbousset, *Narrative*, 19. See also *ibid.*, 9-11, 18; Pelissier, January 27, 1832 [JDM, VII, 238]; Casalis, October 4, 1833 [JDM, IX, 136]; Casalis, *Mes Souvenirs*, 157; Backhouse, *Narrative*, 348. Also Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, 118-9 who relates that Griqua of the first generation considered themselves superior to those of the second generation.

with the white farmers. To them the white farmers were little more than trading partners. 'William,' wrote Smith of the successor to the Kora leader Abraham Kruger, 'is a man that agrees well with the farmers and dislikes the country Govt. and the missionary.'²⁸ For the Bastards the Colonial government, by supporting the territorial claims and authority of the Griqua state, could ensure their security and property. For the Kora, the Colonial government was simply an agency restricting their trade in firearms, and making ineffective threats against their cattle-raiding activities.²⁹

The Griqua themselves — those who had been associated with the Griquatown state — were ranged between these positions. Adam Kok II himself probably inclined more towards the Bastards, but for much of the period of his rule was under the influence of his son-in-law, the highly capable Bergenaar leader Hendrick Hendricks. Indeed the role of Hendricks as chief counselor to Kok provoked the first of a series of factional conflicts at Philippolis soon after Kok had become established there. In this instance the 'Old Inhabitants' of the station, incensed by the take-over by Kok and Hendricks, talked the missionary James Clark into supporting them against the Koks. The argument used by the 'Old Inhabitant' leader, Andries Pretorius, was that the station had been intended for the San, that the Koks had promised to 'protect' the San, but were in fact driving them away. Furthermore, Kok laid claims to the San territory to his north-east.³⁰

Undoubtedly the Griqua had little use for the San, and in the ensuing years they would kill many San on commandos, believing that they had stolen cattle; but in fact the San had left the Philippolis mission even before the arrival of the Koks. The Old Inhabitants and Clark marshaled away from the station, and conflict was averted only by the arrival of John Melvill, from Griquatown, and Stockenstrom, from Graaff-Reinet, to mediate. It was eventually agreed that Clark should find a new site for the San mission, and this he eventually established further to the north-east at the place later to be called Bethulie. Though in the midst of the conflict the 'Old Inhabitants' had elected Clark their chief, they do not appear to have accompanied him, and instead were pacified by being granted representation on Adam Kok's council. Melvill assumed Clark's post as missionary.³¹

²⁸ Smith, *Diary* I, 195-6. Also *ibid.*, I, 182.

²⁹ See Smith, *Diary*, I, 148-9, 151, 154. Also Smith to D'Urban, September 17, 1834 [Kirby, *Smith*, 144-151].

³⁰ See Clarke to Stockenstrom, February 6, 1827 [Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 249-250].

³¹ For this incident see Van der Merwe, *op. cit.*, 249-251; Melvill, entries March-April 1827 [LMS Journals 4/92]; Melvill, April 2, 1827 [LMS 10/2/B]; Wright to Clark, May 10, 1827 [LMS 10/1/C]; Melvill, June 8, 1827 [LMS 10/2/C]; Clark and Melvill, December 25, 1827 [LMS 10/3/C]; Miles, June 7, 1828 [LMS 11/1/C]; Philip to Wright [n.d.] in Wright to Archbell, December 1, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/B]; Stockenstrom, May 14, 1827; May 19, 1827; Clark, May 19, 1827; May 21, 1827; Melvill, June 8, 1827 [Theal, *RecCC*, XXXIV, 435-443].

It was possibly this increased Old Inhabitants/Bastard representation on his council that induced Adam Kok to take a firmer stand against the Kora raiders within his territory. In February 1829, at any rate, he wrote to Van Ryneveld, Civil Commissioner at Graaff-Reinet, complaining that Abraham Kruger had been raiding San kraals; and it may well have been prior to this period that he had conducted a war 'for about nine months' against Kruger in an attempt to get him to submit to his authority.³² The conflict escalated when there were rumors that Abraham Kruger was intriguing with Moletsane's Taung and the Links Kora. These two groups had just suffered a severe defeat at the hands of Mzilikazi, and had retired from the Vaal to the Modder River where their remnants no doubt hoped to settle.³³ Whether or not aggressive action was contemplated by Kruger, Moletsane, and the Links is impossible to determine, but a Griqua commando was dispatched to the scene, attacked the Taung, and seized the remainder of their cattle. Moletsane later reported to Stockenstrom that he 'had 300 men killed and about 3000 cattle and a large flock of goats, and sheep, taken, being all they had (except a few since carried off by the Griqua Chief Barend) which reduced them to starvation and obliged them to live upon the dead, and kill and eat the dying of their tribe.'³⁴ In about August, Van Ryneveld visited Philippolis and secured an end to the Kruger-Kok conflict by arranging the appointment of Kruger as a Field-Cornet. Kruger, however, was not to be overawed: 'When they [Kruger's Kora] repaired to Philippolis to conclude the peace, they galloped into the town about 200 in number each with a gun, for which conduct they were reprimanded.'³⁵

The contradictory attitudes of the 'Kora' and 'Bastard' elements of Adam Kok's state soon became enmeshed in a series of other controversial issues: in particular the attitudes to be taken towards white farmers and towards the San. The droughts which lasted from 1825 to 1829 had forced the reluctant Stockenstrom to give permission to an increasing number of farmers to pasture their cattle across the Orange, and before long some of these were unsuccessfully petitioning the Colonial government for permanent farms on the Riet and Modder Rivers. Until 1829, according to Van der Merwe, this presented little problem: 'the field-cornets' letters, in which there is mention of the Griqua, suggest that during this time [1827-8] there was a good relationship between the two parties,'³⁶ In January 1829, however, Kok and his council addressed a Memorial to the Colony govern-

³² Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 50; Smith, *Diary*, I, 183. For other attacks on the Kora probably at this time see Tryn Isaac in Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 174; Smith, *Diary*, I, 194; Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 44.

³³ See below for their defeat by Mzilikazi.

³⁴ Stockenstrom, *Autobiography*, I, 386. For the opinions of Stockenstrom, Melvill and the Griqua on the motives for this battle see also *ibid.*, I, 378; Melvill, October 29, 1829 [LMS 11/4/A].

³⁵ Smith, *Diary*, I, 183. See also Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 50-1.

³⁶ Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 262. For such petitions, see *ibid.*, 234; Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 64.

ment protesting at the behaviour of some of the white farmers. They realized, they said, that the drought had put some farmers in 'distress' but if they were permitted to cross the Orange, the Colonial government should require them to go to those parts of the country designated by the Griqua, and subject them to those parts of the country designated by the Griqua, and subject them to regulations which would ensure the 'peace and security of the natives.'³⁷

It is important to note that this Memorial did not ask for a ban on white settlement across the Orange. Indeed, though Adam Kok would later invoke a judicial precedent of May 5, 1828, confirmed by an 1830 law, against the sale of lands in the Philippolis state to aliens, at least one piece of ground eight hours north of the capital had been *leased* by late in 1828.³⁸ The question was rather one of securing the cooperation of the Colony to ensure that the farmers conformed to the regulations of the state: in other words, securing Colonial cooperation in upholding the autonomous authority of the Griqua state. The major Griqua concerns in fact were ill treatment of subjects by white farmers and trading in firearms between farmers and the Kora. One Hendrik Badenhorst, for example, 'was stated to have regularly settled beyond the Orange River, and to be in the habit of repairing the firearms of the plundering Corannas.'³⁹ In 1832, when the Colony had taken no action on Badenhorst, who was by then living with (Abraham?) Kruger's widow, the Griqua arrested him and dispatched him across the Orange themselves.⁴⁰ Clearly it was impossible for Adam Kok to maintain order in his state if white farmers not only broke the law, but encouraged the Kora in the subversion of his authority.

Such a policy, however, depended on the total support by the Colony government of Griqua authority north of the Orange. As Kok's council would later state to Andrew Smith,

...they acknowledge that their security and existence as an independent people depended entirely on their connection with Government, and that it was necessary that they should take care to cultivate its favour in order to have its support and countenance. Not one seemed to believe that they could exist as a community without the succour of the Colonial [Govt,] and all appeared ready and willing to perform any duty which might be required of them, and which was within their power, in order to be regarded as friends of the Government.⁴¹

³⁷ Memorial of Adam Kok and Council to Sir Lowry Cole, January 23, 1829 [LMS 11/3/A].

³⁸ See the precedent as quoted in Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 61, Kok to Philip, May 31, 1842 [LMS 18/1/D]. Also Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 252-3.

³⁹ Stockenstrom, March 24, 1830 [Stockenstrom, *Autobiography*, I, 375]. See generally *ibid.*, I, 373-5; Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 267.

⁴⁰ Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 314. Also Smith, *Diary*, I, 192-3.

⁴¹ Smith, *Diary*, I, 73.

Stockenstrom's support was far short of that required. Until 1825 he had been, as earlier chapters have demonstrated, more friendly to Kok and Berends than to Waterboer. He had secured Adam Kok's sanction from government as chief, and he had mediated between Kok and James Clark in 1827. But, particularly after his appointment as Commissioner General in January 1828 (and his replacement at Graaff-Reinet by W.C. Van Ryneveld with the title of Civil Commissioner), his attitude changed. Indeed he did, in 1829 and in response to Kok's Memorial, suggest to the government that field-cornets should be instructed to order white farmers who misbehaved in Griqua country back to the Colony, and that if such a person refused to go, he should be dealt with by Griqua law.⁴² But his major preoccupation was with the treatment of the San.

Almost certainly the Griqua in Transorangia were treating the San more brutally than the white farmer at this time. The white farmers, after all, could compare the experience of the late eighteenth century, when San resistance had forced them to abandon whole districts, with the advance of settlement during the period that the San had been better treated. Yet this preoccupation with the San made Stockenstrom's vision of the power realities of Transorangia steadily more myopic.⁴³ By 1830, the struggle for power in the Philippolis area was, between the Philippolis state, and the refusal of the white farmers to submit to its authority. There was little that could be done to preserve territory for the San: they would have to remove, or become incorporated as dependents.

When Stockenstrom traveled to Philippolis in March 1830 to investigate a series of Griqua complaints against white farmers, he gave far less attention to these than to the reports (which he heard mainly from the farmers and their Kora friends) of Griqua cruelty to the San, raids on the Kora, and the attack on Moletsane. The question as to what extent such military action was necessary for Kok to enforce his authority does not appear to have been raised by him. Stockenstrom 'gave [Adam Kok] some threatening and abusive language and then set off with his party,' reported an LMS missionary. 'What an awful example of profanity does such conduct lay before the eyes of the heathen.'⁴⁴ Back in the Colony, Stockenstrom did indeed recall all white farmers across the Orange, though this was merely a temporary return. But he dismissed all the Griqua charges, and in a series of documents disparaged any progress in Adam Kok's state towards permanent settlement and the practice of agriculture. The country, he argued, was 'Bushman' country, and the Griqua had no right to it:

⁴² See Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 265-6 especially Stockenstrom to CO, February 26, 1829 [LG 279].

⁴³ For Stockenstrom's policy on the San in this period see *ibid.*, 241-270.

⁴⁴ Baillie, September 30, 1830 [LMS 12/1/C]. Baillie incorrectly dates the visit in July.

If the Griquas be allowed to possess themselves of the Bushmen country on the north side of the Orange River, as the Colonists have done on the other, and we check further encroachments on the part of the latter, without producing any other result than removing all restraint from the bloodthirsty barbarity which the former exercise against the people they dispossess, and their neighbours, I would then say it would be better to people the country in question by those on whom our laws, religion and feelings have some more influence, and that a civilized Government cannot tolerate at its very elbow scenes so disgraceful to human nature, which it can so easily repress.⁴⁵

Over the same period, from 1827 to 1830, Berend Berends' relations with the colony authorities had deteriorated equally, though his distance from the Colony made this less important. From about 1826, Berend Berends attempted to gather under his protection a heterogeneous collection of people in a state that was more loosely structured than those at Griquatown or Philippolis, but for that reason perhaps more acceptable to its members as a whole. The central axis of this state was the Harts River, a river which, as an LMS missionary commented, 'is nothing more than an extensive valley, of some 70 miles long, having a line of pools generally some miles distant from each other and occasionally filled by the rains that fall each autumn.'⁴⁶ Between the Harts and Daniels Kuil, however there was an abundance of grass, and at Daniels Kuil itself there were fountains which remained the agricultural basis of the state.⁴⁷

The Harts River, and the territory between it and the Vaal, had seen numerous different occupants. Originally within the territory of the Sotho-Tswana, it was occupied by Kora towards the beginning of the nineteenth century. Jan Bloem, Sr., with his base at Lekatlong (near the Harts-Vaal junction) may have been in the vanguard of this Kora movement.⁴⁸ When Berend Berends moved from Daniels Kuil to Boetsap, therefore, he moved into Kora territory, and specifically by this time, as noted in the previous chapter, the domain of Jan Taaibosch and Mosweu Taaibosch. But it was not long before Berends secured his hegemony.⁴⁹ 'In my time,' related Jan Pienaar at Bloemhof in 1871,

Gert Stoffel van Wyk was the field-cornet embracing the country from this side of Harts River to the junction with the Vaal River; his field-cornetcy commenced from Platberg. Piet Jood was the field-cornet on the other side of the Harts River and resided at Little Boetschap; his field-cornetcy was from Platberg to where the line passes Roelofsfontein,

⁴⁵ Stockenstrom to CO, March 24, 1830 [Stockenstrom, *Autobiography*, I, 379-380]. For Stockenstrom's change of attitude to the Griqua see also Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 262-278.

⁴⁶ Hughes, October 13, 1836 [LMS 15/1/E].

⁴⁷ See, for example, Archbell, August 29, 1832 [MMS: V-1832/29]; Archbell to WMS, [n.d.] [Quoted in Archbell, 'The Question of Daniels Kuil,' MMS: XI-Document].

⁴⁸ See Chapter 3.

⁴⁹ See Andries in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 300 for an initial dispute over territory between Taaibosch and Berends. Also Mosweu Taaibosch in Lindley, *Adamantia*, 12.

and down the Harts River...Klaas Barends was field- cornet on the west side of Great Boetschap, north west and west. These...received their orders from Berend Berends.⁵⁰

Lekatlong, according to Pienaar, marked the border between Berends' and Waterboer's territory.⁵¹

Berends' closest associates in his state-building were men like Jan Karse, Peter David, Jan Hendrick, Joseph Arend and the Jood family.⁵² These people had remained largely aloof from the dispute between Waterboer and the Bergenaars. They had cultivated their gardens during the *Difaqane*, and they were quickest to resume the pre-*Difaqane* Griqua mode of life: hunting and trading further into the interior while their dependents herded the cattle. Such men, in fact, were the principal means of protection for the Kuruman mission when it was again subject to Bergenaar attack in 1827-8.⁵³

Around Berend Berends who, as the Wesleyans reported, was 'of the greatest consequence of any in the immediate neighbourhood,' there gathered other peoples.⁵⁴ Thus, apart from the Kora of Taaibosch and Mosweu, it was near Boetsap that Mothibi settled when he left the Kuruman during 1825-6. The Rolong-Seleka, establishing themselves at Platberg in mid-1826, were some six hours on horseback from Boetsap.⁵⁵ And finally, the Bergenaars came for the most part to Berends' state as they grew disillusioned with their precarious life in the Langeberg in 1827-8.⁵⁶ The absorption of such people into his state worsened the relations between Berends and government. Besides such leaders as Jacob Cloete and the Goeyman brothers, Berends gave refuge to a party who had murdered a white farmer in the Colony in mid-1828. Berends did in fact first take the culprits into

⁵⁰ Jan Pienaar in *ibid.*, 17. Also Jan Pienaar in *ibid.*, 18-9, 348. Jan Pienaar appears to have been born in the Khamiesberg in c.1805-6, moved to Kheis, and from there to the Riet River just after 1820 (with the Bergenaars?). In 1824, however, his father joined Waterboer's commando against Sefunelo, and thereafter Pienaar claims that they moved to Platberg and Boetsap as subjects of Berends, with the (incorrect) implication that Waterboer's commando secured this territory for the Griqua. At one point in his evidence he claims moving to Philippolis in 1827 and remaining there until 1862 when he moved to Griqualand East. Elsewhere he speaks of participating in the Berends commando against Mzilikazi in 1831, and a Bloem commando in 1837 (?), and of living on the Vaal as late as 1838. He married a daughter of Jan Bloem's. Backhouse, *Narrative*, 394, met a Jan Pienaar, 'a pious old man,' probably this Pienaar's father, at Mirametsu in the Caledon valley in 1839.

⁵¹ Jan Pienaar in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 348.

⁵² Jan Karse died before 1832: see Philip, in Wright to Archbell, December 1, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/B]. Arend lived at Kuruman during much of this period, and moved to the Caledon valley for a few years in the 1830's.

⁵³ For this military support see Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 184-5, 280-1, 283-4. For their resumption of other activities see *ibid.*, 216, 221, 249, 265, 271; Bain, *Journal*, 9fn; letter of Melvill [c.1826] quoted in J. Moffat, *Lives*, 135-6.

⁵⁴ [Hodgson and Archbell?], October 22, 1827 [MMS: IV-1827/39].

⁵⁵ See Chapter 7. Also Klaas Hendrik's Moroka, Mahura, Jantje in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 22, 137, 293.

⁵⁶ See Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 278; Wright, September 10, 1828 [LMS 11/2/B].

custody, but then released them and went hunting in the interior when Civil Commissioner Van Ryneveld paid a journey to Griquatown to investigate the matter.⁵⁷ Early in 1829, there was another important addition to the state: Jan Bloem, who had joined a third revolt against Waterboer in 1827-8 and then conducted a commando against Mzilikazi, came finally to settle between the Harts and Vaal. Berend reproved Bloem and his allies for having raided Jan Taaibosch's cattle, but allowed him to remain.⁵⁸

After Berend Berends had removed from this area to establish himself further east, a remaining resident told Andrew Smith that 'when Berend was here there was neither regulation nor laws; you might complain but nothing ever resulted therefrom. It is a country where you may kill a man and there it stands.'⁵⁹ But this was a partial view, though a view held as well by Melvill and by John Philip. The attitude of the Wesleyans is a welcome corrective. Berend Berends and his followers, said Hodgson and Archbell, with their 100 guns and 'proportionate number of horses,' provided a 'necessary protection from marauding parties from the interior, against which Platberg is not able to defend itself. To Platberg this station [Boetsap] is as necessary as the Colony is to our stations in Caffraria.'⁶⁰ Berends, they said, was 'cordially disposed' to help them in any way, and, as for the Bergenaars, Hodgson and Archbell were on as friendly terms with them as with the Griqua and believed that they probably had a case against Waterboer.

The presence of the Wesleyan mission at Platberg had a two-fold influence on the development of Berends' state. On the one hand, as the church grew in numbers at Platberg, and as the missionaries extended their preaching to other areas of the state, it began to have a unifying influence with a potential equal to what it had achieved at Griquatown earlier in the century. On the other hand, as the Wesleyans extended their activities in a field which had hitherto been monopolized by the LMS, they posed both an evangelical and a political challenge to the latter society.

By mid-1828 Thomas Hodgson had established himself at Boetsap, leaving Archbell at Platberg. He reported that since arriving at Boetsap many people had joined the settle-

⁵⁷ Wright, September 10, 1828; October 10, 1828 [LMS 11/2/B]. See also Van Ryneveld, September 18, 1828 [Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 130 – 1; Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 59]. It is possible that the culprits returned from the Colony to participate in the August 1828 commando against the Kuruman, and left here with Archbell for Berend Berends' state. Certainly Archbell, who was on a visit to the Kuruman, took back to Platberg with him three Bergenaars from the Kuruman: Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 288.

⁵⁸ See Moffat and Hamilton, March 6, 1829 [LMS 11/3/B]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 150-1, 163, 380; Jan Bloem in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 294, which describes the 'ground' which Bloem and Berends held 'in company.' Also Nicholas Kruger in *ibid.*, 350, 375; Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 44, 59-60.

⁵⁹ Smith, *Diary*, I, 231.

⁶⁰ Hodgson, August 18, 1829 [MMS: IV]. See also Hodgson, January 7, 1828 [MMS: IV]; June 7, 1830 [MMS: V-1830/22].

ment, and in fact by 1831 there were 60 church members there.⁶¹ As new Wesleyan missionaries arrived, further expansion was undertaken. Thomas Jenkins replaced Hodgson at Boetsap when the latter returned to the Colony in 1830, and two years later John Edwards, arriving with James Allison, began to itinerate to the Kora at Taungs. These, who probably included Taaibosch's and Mosweu's, were dominating a settlement of 5000 people that was two-thirds composed of Sotho-Tswana refugees.⁶² Not far away was another Kora chief named 'Douz Koop' by Edwards, who is probably the same 'De Goup' who was active as a raider in the 1830's and in 1839 claimed hegemony over the territory east of the Vaal between the Modder and the Vet Rivers.⁶³ Meanwhile at Platberg, irrigation had commenced and a store had been established. Moroka, eldest son and successor to the deceased Sefunelo, was showing signs of impending conversion to Christianity. And the Rolong-Seleka numbers were being further augmented by the arrival of refugees.⁶⁴

The Wesleyan expansion from Platberg to Boetsap had been carried with the consent of the LMS.⁶⁵ The further expansion of the Wesleyans no doubt provoked concern among the LMS missionaries on the spot: the Wesleyans talked among themselves, and wrote to London, of intentions of setting up missions with Moletsane's Taung, with the Ndebele of Mzilikazi, with Mahura at Old Dithakong, and among the Rolong of Tawana. They were thwarted by delay from their home committees, local warfare, and the activities of other missions.⁶⁶ Particularly after the departure of Hodgson, first to Boetsap and then back to England, James Archbell began to entertain grandiose plans for the expansion of Wesleyan activity.⁶⁷ But it is significant that the only serious conflict between the Wes-

⁶¹ Hodgson, June 20, 1828 [MMS: IV]; September 18, 1828 [MMS: IV]; Rolland, July 5, 1831 [JDM, VII, 9 – 10]; Baillie, September 30, 1830 [LMS 12/1/C]. Also Wesleyan Committee to Hodgson, February 4, 1829; April 16-7, 1829; Wesleyan Committee to W. Shaw, December 11, 1831 [MMS: Outgoing letters]; Mrs. Hodgson, *Memorials*, 198-215.

⁶² Archbell, August 28, 1831 [WMN, VII, 52-3]; Jenkins, February 22, 1832 [MMS: V-1832/3]; Archbell, July 19, 1832 [MMS: V-1832/23]; August 29, 1832 [WMN, VII, 326]; J. Edwards, November 5, [WMN, VII, 337-8]; March 27, 1833 [MMS: V – 1833/9]; Mrs. Hodgson, *Memorial*, 214-5; Hodgson, *Memoir*, 100-1, Edwards, *Reminiscences*, 60ff. Also R. Edwards, September 24, 1841 [LMS 18/2/A].

⁶³ For this 'De Goup' see also Smith, *Diary*, I, 150, 155, 157-8, 194-5; Treaty between D. S. Fourie and...De Goep, May 18, 1839 [*Bloembhof Bluebook*, 266-7].

⁶⁴ Archbell, December 31, 1829 [MMS: IV-1821]; August 28, 1831 [WMN, VII, 52-3]; December 30, 1831 [MMS: V-1831/35].

⁶⁵ See Archbell to Wesleyan Missionary Society, [n.d.] [Quoted in Archbell, 'Question,' MMS: XI-D]; Mrs. Hodgson, *Memorial*, 298; Hodgson, *Memoir*, 90.

⁶⁶ See particularly Hodgson, January 7, 1828 [MMS: IV]; Archbell, December 30, 1828 [MMS: IV]; June 30, 1830 [MMS: V-1830/26]; July 19, 1832 [MMS: V-1832/23].

⁶⁷ Besides the above, see Archbell, December 31, 1829 [MMS: III-1829/37]; September 9, 1830 [MMS: V-1830/35]; August 10, 1832 [MMS: V-1832/27]; February 5, 1833 [MMS: V-1833/3]; December 23, 1834 [MMS: VII] Archbell was obsessed with 'securing a line of stations,' though after the Paris Evangelicals began work with the Hurutshe, he turned his attention away from the north towards establishing a link with Fort Natal.

leyans and the LMS at this time should have broken out over the farm at Daniels Kuil, where the issue was essentially a political dispute between Berend Berends and Andries Waterboer.

Soon after Berends moved from Daniels Kuil to Boetsap, leaving some of his followers at the former place along with followers of Waterboer, a rumour arose that Waterboer intended to take full possession of the Kuil and Kramer's fountain nearby 'as a sowing farm to Griqua Town, the waters of which place had failed.'⁶⁸ Waterboer, it was alleged, argued that Berends had forfeited his rights at that place by leaving the Griquatown church for the Wesleyans, and by a mutual agreement with Waterboer. This Berends denied. The matter was temporarily resolved by Thomas Hodgson, who brought the matter to the attention of Robert Moffat. Moffat took the matter up with Waterboer, and obtained from the latter 'a document disclaiming all claims whatever to Daniels Kuil':

Andries at first laughed...but afterwards seemed to feel indignant at such a base project or intention being laid to his charge — He declared that...such a proposal (namely laying claim to Daniels Kuil) savored of insanity, inasmuch as it would be an act of the greatest injustice to attempt taking it from Captain Barend, its lawful owner.⁶⁹

There, for the moment, the matter rested. It erupted into intense controversy again in 1832, when James Archbell denied the rights of the LMS to itinerate to the Kuil.⁷⁰

Andries Waterboer at Griquatown, 1826 – 1832

With the establishment of two new Griqua states in 1825-6, to which dissidents from Griquatown could disperse, it appeared that Griquatown itself might return to stability. For a while, in fact, Andries Waterboer made gains in winning the Bergenaars back to his authority: those, for example, who disliked the rule of Cornelius Kok III at Philippolis.⁷¹ In February 1827, Waterboer met the Bergenaar leaders of the Langeberg, and they promised him that they too would return to Griquatown during the year. If Waterboer was ignoring the 1825 Philip agreements, he seemed to be doing so successfully. But once again his severity was to prove his undoing. Two months later eleven of the Bergenaars, against the wishes of the remainder, attacked a Kora kraal south of the Orange at Houw Water in the Winterveld. Six of those involved were captured by Waterboer on April 19,

⁶⁸ Archbell to WMS, [n.d] [Quoted in Archbell, 'Question,' MMS: XI-D]. See also Wright to Philip, November 9, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/B]; Archbell, August 29, 1832 [MMS: V-1832/29]; Edwards, *Reminiscences*, 62. Also Schapera in *Apprenticeship*, 38fn; Chapter IV.

⁶⁹ Moffat to Hodgson, June 25, 1830 [Quoted in Archbell, August 29, 1832, MMS: V-1832/29].

⁷⁰ See Chapter 10.

⁷¹ See above.

brought to Griquatown, and tried by Waterboer and Cornelius Kok III. Despite missionary intercession, and though the party had killed only one woman and taken no cattle, all six were executed at 4:00 P.M. on May 16, 1827. They included William Engelbrecht, youngest brother of the native teacher Gert Engelbrecht, and Piet Hendricks, brother of Hendrick Hendricks.

Waterboer claimed that some Bergenaars had testified at the trial, and the remainder had agreed to the trial and volunteered to capture the remaining culprits. Nevertheless he would appear at the minimum to have violated the agreement made with the Bergenaars earlier in the year — even if he was not, as Adam Kok II later argued to Smith, in some way implicated in this revival of raiding.⁷² For immediately after the execution, all the Bergenaars who had already returned, as well as Jan Bloem who had been settled peacefully at Kheis during 1826-7, and Kora and San who had been living ‘in peace’ with Waterboer for the past eight years, left the area in disgust and assembled in the Langeberg.⁷³

This exodus amounted to a third revolt against the Griquatown state, with the rebels better armed and more numerous than before. They must have numbered at least a thousand, with Kora recently in possession of arms and ammunition in the overwhelming majority. Soon commandos were resumed against the southern Sotho-Tswana: two commandos were sent to the Molopo, one led by Paul of the Karosshebbers, a Kora group whose traditional home was further down the Orange. Cattle were seized from the Rolong, though by this time the Sotho-Tswana could engage commandos on more equal terms. The first Bergenaar group was joined by some Tlharo who, during the return, managed to surprise the rebels, recapture the cattle and some muskets, and kill several members of the commando including two leaders, Hans Berend and Klaas Kornet. The second commando was attacked by the Tlhaping even before it reached the Molopo, and by the Tlharo on its return: it did not bring back as many cattle as it had wished.⁷⁴

Waterboer may have been on the point of setting out to subdue the instigators of this raiding when the remainder of the rebel force numbering between five and eight hundred persons, 400 with firearms, and led by Jan Bloem, Gert Goeyman, and Jan David (the brother of Peter David), fell on Griquatown itself. By 8:00 A.M. on July 7 the rebels had

⁷² Adam Kok argued that at this time Waterboer did not unite with him (Kok) against the Bergenaars, despite a request, and that Waterboer ‘was once seen among them exchanging articles. He then gave several passes to go to the Colony’: this may refer to the occasion of the negotiations in February. See Smith, *Diary*, I, 214.

⁷³ Waterboer, ‘A short account...’ [LMS 10/3/D]; Sass, February 17, 1827 [LMS 10/2/B]; Wright, July 17, 1827 [LMS 10/2/c]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 271, 281; Nicholas Kruger in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 8.

⁷⁴ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 260, 268, 275-6; Wright, July 17, 1827 [LMS 10/2/C]; Moffat and Hamilton, August 20, 1827 [LMS 10/3/A]; December 6, 1827 [LMS 10/3/B]. See also Smith, *Diary*, I, 371 for a counter-attack by Mahura on this occasion or in 1828.

surrounded the village, where there were only 18 men, and captured a part of it. Only by occupying a defensive position on higher ground were Waterboer's slim forces able to hold the rebels off through that day and the next, until at 2:00 A.M. on July 9 the Bergenaars suddenly stopped firing. By then six people had been killed, and twelve houses including Waterboer's burnt out, as well as 1200 cattle seized. Despite a recent supply of ammunition from Graaff-Reinet, and the melting down of pewter plates, teapots and copper ornaments for bullets, Waterboer's men had at this time only twenty rounds left. But the Bergenaars were equally pressed for powder, and, though the negotiations between them and the Griquatown missionaries were inconclusive, the siege was lifted at mid-day on July 10.⁷⁵

For the next six months the missionaries at Griquatown and the Kuruman were in a state of suspense, fearing, as in late 1824 and early 1825, that Waterboer's state would collapse. In August, an outpost of Griquatown, down the Orange, was attacked, reducing the eight families inhabiting it to nakedness so that they stumbled along the river to Griquatown in a state of starvation. And since the Bergenaars had been unable to replenish their ammunition supply in the Colony, it was feared that they would renew their attack on Griquatown or on the Kuruman mission with this aim in mind. Richard Miles, temporary replacement for Philip as LMS Superintendent in South Africa, in mid-November hastened north to distribute beads and supplies to the worn out Griqua loyalists at Griquatown and Campbell and continued to the Kuruman to visit the harassed Moffats. The suggestion was made by the Griquatown missionaries that Waterboer's Griqua move to the Kuruman to consolidate forces, but this was rejected by Moffat.⁷⁶

On December 7, five days after Miles had returned southward, Griquatown was attacked again, though this time Waterboer's forces were better prepared:

...about an hour after sunrise the enemy made an appearance and attempted to get possession of the fountain, but were completely repulsed by our people after a skirmish of about an hour. About midday our people succeeded in confining the whole body of the enemy within the hills at the top of the valley, and kept them in that position without either water or victuals till sunrise this morning. About [7:00 A.M.] the body of the enemy began to move in a direction from the village...⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Waterboer, 'A short account...' [LMS 10/3/D]; Wright, July 17, 1827 [LMS 10/2/C]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 281; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 123-5; Wright, *Journal* April-July 1827 [538 of 1836, 614].

⁷⁶ Wright, *Journal*, August, November 1827 [538 of 1836, 615]; August 25, 1827 [LMS 0/3/A]; December 18, 1827 [LMS 10/3/C]; Hamilton and Moffat, December 6, 1827 [LMS 10/3/B]; Miles February 8, 1828 [LMS 11/1/D]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 268, 270-1, 282; *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XXVII.

⁷⁷ Wright, entry December 7, 1827 [538 of 1836, 615]; December 28, 1827 [LMS 11/1/A].

The retiring party was followed by a force from Griquatown, which recovered some cattle and horses.

This was the last attack on Griquatown itself, though the Bergenaars and their allies made further forays on the Kuruman. In January 1828, Jan Bloem, who had secured ammunition from the Colony independently from the other Bergenaars, raided the Tlharo and, when attacked by a mounted party from the Kuruman, threatened to return and destroy the mission. He returned three months later, to find that all in the neighbourhood had gathered their cattle near the mission, and that Jan Kora, a relative of Bloem by marriage, had come to negotiate or defend the station. After some verbal and actual skirmishing, Bloem's party was in fact driven off by Karse, Joseph Arend, and 'a number of men who can use firearms',⁷⁸

Six weeks later came the last attempt on the Kuruman. A large commando led by Paul of the Karosshebbes and the brothers Lucas and Jantje Goeyman descended on the mission, and this time it was Moffat himself, who knew Paul from earlier times, who persuaded them to leave. Continuing to the Molopo, his commando fared no better. Like another Kora party which, shortly before, had lost thirty men in attempting to take cattle near Old Dithakong, they too, on their return, were ambushed and their raided cattle seized.⁷⁹

By this time the revolt was petering out. Kora groups, and individual Bergenaars who joined or led them, continued cattle-raiding through the 1830s, both from the Orange west of Kheis, and from the central part of Transorangia along the Modder River. But a revolt from Griquatown in 1827 based in the Langeberg could not be sustained for even as long as one based on the Harts in 1815 or on the Modder in 1822. The Langeberg was too desolate to support a large population of rebels and moreover, the victims of the cattle-raiding necessary to sustain the rebellion were acquiring the firearms which could allow them to fight back. In December 1827, a number of Bergenaars, including Kurasie Cloete and Klaas Dreyer, were killed in a commando sent westward across the Kalahari.⁸⁰ Waterboer sent peace terms to the rebels in February 1828; these were rejected. But it hardly mattered. When Peter David, associate of Berend Berends, went to reclaim his brother Jan from the Bergenaars, and conducted two rebel parties to Boetsap, 'he found those people actually in a state of starvation, dying daily from sheer hunger...48 of the party have died of hunger since they have left the banks of the river, and they continue

⁷⁸ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 284. Also *ibid.*, 278-28, 283-4; Moffat, April 7, 1828 [LMS 11/1/B]; Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 59-60.

⁷⁹ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 285-292; Wright, September 10, 1828 [LMS 11/2/B]; March 3, 1829 [LMS 11/3/C]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 281, 379-380.

⁸⁰ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 277-8; Smith, *Diary*, I, 373.

to die two and three daily.⁸¹ The people of Griquatown itself were not prosperous, but the Bergenaars were in far worse condition: they quarreled among themselves, their herds were stolen by San, and they were ravaged by disease.⁸²

Between 1828 and 1832, the Griqua state underwent a slow recovery from the trauma of the previous decade. In part this was a result of the replacement of the ineffectual Christopher Sass who (with Henry Helm) and managed the mission since 1821, by a new missionary, Peter Wright. Wright had come to the Colony in 1822, intended for the Hurutshe mission as an artisan, but had been appointed to Theopolis. It was Wright's success here which induced John Philip, after his trip in 1825, to transfer Wright to Griquatown, to try to revive the mission.⁸³ This task was soon under way.

In 1828, Wright reported that the fountains around Griquatown, which had silted up through disuse in the previous few years, were being reopened and that plants had begun again for building a water-course for irrigation from the Orange River (in which the Fortuin family, William and Jan, were playing an important part).⁸⁴ The Griqua, and the Sotho-Tswana refugees now equal in number to the Griqua, began cultivating the ground once more. 'I suppose that there never was so much land under cultivation before at this place as there is this year,' wrote Wright in August 1829.⁸⁵ Returns submitted to Government and the LMS in 1830 show that wheat, barley, rye, maize, potatoes, pumpkins, melons, tobacco were being grown, though the returns to government show figures apparently highly inflated over those to the LMS.⁸⁶

The vision held by Wright was not unfamiliar, namely that each Griqua should have 'a decent house made of brick or stone erected opposite its own piece of corn and garden lands.'⁸⁷ By 1830 Waterboer and his most ardent followers had even begun to build a new town.⁸⁸ Church activity increased once more Wright and his associate Isaac Hughes began

⁸¹ Wright, entry June 27, 1828 [538 of 1836, 616].

⁸² For the condition of the Bergenaars after June see Wright, September 10, 1828 [LMS 11/2/B]; Wright and Hughes, November 6, 1828 [LMS 11/2/C]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 284-5, 288-9.

⁸³ See Philip, *Researches*, II, 105-6. Also Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 108fn, 173; Melvill, July 6, 1826 [LMS 10/1/D].

⁸⁴ Wright, October 10, 1828 [LMS 11/2/B]; August 6, 1829 [LMS 11/3/D]; Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 66. Also Melvill, October 17, 1825 [LMS 9/4/A].

⁸⁵ Wright, August 6, 1829 [LMS 11/3/D]. Also May 28, 1830 [LMS 12/1/B]. For the numbers of Sotho-Tswana see Melvill, October 17, 1825 [LMS 9/4/A]; Wright, November 30, 1826 [LMS 10/1/E]; July 10, [LMS 13/1/B]; December 8, 1834 [LMS 14/2/D].

⁸⁶ 'Reply to Colonial Office Circular,' Griquatown, December 17, 1830 [LMS 12/4/C]; 'Schedule of Returns to LMS' Griquatown, December 6, 1830 [LMS 12/4/E]. The figures, where different, are 1800 bushels wheat (92 bushels), 180 bushels barley (5 bushels), 100 bushels rye (4 bushels), 1840 bushels maize (44 bushels), 180 bushels potatoes (6 bushels).

⁸⁷ Wright, August 6, 1829 [LMS 11/3/D].

⁸⁸ Wright, May 28, 1830 [LMS 12/1/B]; Miles, October 27, 1830 [LMS 12/3/B]; Lemue, March 23, 1831 [JDM, VI, 315].

to itinerate to the Griqua settlements. Though the expansion of the church was slow in comparison with what would be achieved in the 1830's, the strength of 25 members in 1826 had been doubled to 50 in 1832.⁸⁹ In two respects, however, matter in the Griquatown state did not improve. In the first place the alliance between Andries Waterboer and Cornelius Kok II, which had flourished since the latter had been elected chief at Campbell in 1824, deteriorated. The first contemporary hint of this is in Wright's journal of 1827-8:

July 15 [1827]... Their friends at Campbell, in whom they have confided, have not yet come to their assistance in any way whatever; at this we are all surprised...

December 7 [1827]... At five o'clock a party, consisting of 20 men, arrived from Campbell, having come in defiance of the captain and missionary there to assist our people...⁹⁰

From this time on, Cornelius Kok would act in complete autonomy from Andries Waterboer, and the area around Campbell would constitute a vaguely-defined and precarious fourth center of Griqua power. What the cause of this rupture was is unclear, though it may be presumed that Cornelius Kok was equally as dissatisfied with Waterboer's severity as were the Bergenaars or his own brother Adam Kok II.⁹¹ Cornelius was sustained in his autonomy, however, by the young catechist John Bartlett, who had been at Pella in Little Namaqualand until 1825, and had then joined Philip on his tour to investigate the possibilities of removing his people to Campbell. Though the people did not in fact follow him, he moved to Campbell soon after this.⁹²

In the second place, the unique relationship with government which Waterboer had had until 1826 ended with the resignation of Melvill and the formation of two other Griqua states. In March 1827, Waterboer wrote to Stockenstrom complaining that the only rewards for his steadfast support of the Colony government had been threats to his life and other abuse. Stockenstrom's response is unrecorded, but in August he refused to send ammunition to Waterboer after the Bergenaar attack on Griquatown, despite the urgency of the request, and wrote to government that Waterboer's 'rash' conduct had precipitated the rebellion.⁹³ W. C. Van Ryneveld, assuming Stockenstrom's post the following Janu-

⁸⁹ See Wright, March 3, 1829 [LMS 11/3/C]; August 6, 1829 [LMS 11/3/D]; 'Reply to Colonial Office...' [LMS 12/4/C]; 'Schedule of Returns...' [LMS 12/4/E]; Lemue, March 23, 1831 [JDM, VI, 312]; Wright, February 24, 1839 [LMS 16/3/B]; Philip [LMS Journals 4/112].

⁹⁰ [538 of 1836, 614-5].

⁹¹ See Wright, September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B], who writes of Cornelius having 'formed bad connections, allowed himself to be misled by designing men...gave countenance to the Bergenaars, to the marauding system, winked at the murders of the Colonists on the border...'

⁹² See Philip, February 22, 1839 [LMS 16/3/B]. Also Thompson, *Travels*, 280-284.

⁹³ See Waterboer to Stockenstrom, March 29, 1827 [Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 123]; Waterboer, August 21, 1827 [LMS 10/3/D]; Stockenstrom to CO, August 18, 1827 [Orpen, *op. cit.*, 124-5]. See also Stock-

ary, reconfirmed this position of neutrality among the various Griqua elements, but did agree, after the intercession of Richard Miles, to send ammunition to the missionaries at Griquatown and the Kuruman.⁹⁴ This was acceptable neither to Wright nor Waterboer. Indeed after paying a visit to Griquatown in late August of 1828, Van Ryneveld did revise his views:

...he reported in the highest terms on Waterboer. He said that all, including the Bushmen, spoke highly of him, that his people had the most gratifying regard for him and were perfectly obedient and it was only his want of ammunition, compared with the plenty which the marauders were able to obtain for their plunder, which prevented his protecting the native tribes against them.⁹⁵

But between 1828 and 1832, Van Ryneveld's praise does not appear to have led to any restoration of Waterboer's favored relations. If the Colony authorities, particularly Stockenström, were losing their confidence in Adam Kok II and Berends, this did not signify a return to sole support of Waterboer. Late in 1832, Van Ryneveld returned to the Orange with a commando in pursuit of the raider Stuurman, and requested the assistance of Waterboer, which was granted. Waterboer told Van Ryneveld

...that the murders which had been perpetrated on the colonists, and the great expense of the commando, were circumstances which might have been prevented, had the government supported me, as it had pledge itself to do, while I was active in its service...I had received many letters from the civil authorities of the colony, expressing their confidence in me, and their approbation of my services to the colony... But alas! To this day I had received nothing but promises, and...the government had rendered me neither countenance nor support when I stood in need of its assistance... Down to the period the government abandoned me [in July 1827]...there were no disorders in the colony that I could not instantly suppress with the smallest handful of my men [sic!] but it was no sooner known that the government would no more assist me...than [all the bad men on the Great River] came together, making themselves sure of my destruction. Since that period the government has made no apology to me for deserting me on that occasion; and without such an apology or explanation of the event referred to in 1827, I have found it necessary to confine myself to my own affairs and those of my people.⁹⁶

enström to Waterboer, August 7, 1827 [Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 59] asking Waterboer to apprehend Karel Kruger who had crossed the border with a false pass.

⁹⁴ Van Ryneveld to Government, February 8, 1828 [Orpen, *op. cit.*, 129]; Van Ryneveld to Miles, July 1, 1828 [LMS 11/1/C]; Wright, September 10, 1828 [LMS 11/2/B]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 285.

⁹⁵ Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 131, discussing Van Ryneveld to CO, September 18, 1828.

⁹⁶ Quoted in [538 of 1836, 617]. See also Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Chs XIII, XXVII.

The Influence of Mzilikazi on the Transorangia Power Balance, 1829 – 1832

The Ndebele of Mzilikazi established themselves on the Apies River in about 1825. The following year an Ndebele *impi* attacked the Hurutshe and the Rolong; in 1827–8 they had entered Transorangia to do battle with the Ngwane and drive them south-east across the Orange; late in 1828, the Ngwaketse suffered their first defeat by the Ndebele.⁹⁷ By this time the Hurutshe at Mosega were tributary to Mzilikazi, forced to send to the Ndebele capital a large part of their harvest each year.⁹⁸ But despite there forays by his military forces to the west and south of his kraal at eHlahlandela, it was not until 1829 that Mzilikazi had any decisive influence on the power balance in Transorangia. In that year he reduced to subjection one of the major Sotho-Tswana groups that had sustained and indeed strengthened itself during the *Difaqane*: the Taung of Moletsane.

Moletsane's Taung were joined late in 1828 by Jan Bloem and the Links Kora for an attack on Mzilikazi's cattle-posts.⁹⁹ Though there is no contemporary record of the others, this was almost certainly not the first such raid by either Bloem or Moletsane.¹⁰⁰ For Mzilikazi, however, it was the last straw. His regiments had recovered the stolen cattle by counter-attacking Bloem's commando as he retreated, but this was not enough. Determined to eliminate Moletsane's influence in northern Transorangia, Mzilikazi, in conjunction with the Rolong-Rapulana who were tributary to him, attacked Moletsane a few months later.

Hot in pursuit of the robber chief, they passed the Vaal, drove him headlong, along with the fighting force of the Links [Kora] across the northern plains of the Free State, until they hurled Moletsane and the Links over the Modder River. A great battle took place just beyond at Spitzkop near the modern Bloemfontein.¹⁰¹

After this, Moletsane suffered further attacks from the Philippolis Griqua, Berend Berends, and possibly Piet Witvoet. Reported at the beginning of the year to number 10,000, the Taung were reduced by these engagements to 'about the inhabitants of twenty houses, who were in subjection to Mitselekatse'.¹⁰² It is no wonder that, after Moletsane's own

⁹⁷ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 212, 215-6, 289; Omer-Cooper, *Zulu Aftermath*, 90-2; Schapera, 'Ngwaketse...', 8. Schapera, drawing his evidence largely from the *Bloemhof Bluebook*, is incorrect in saying that the first attack on the Ngwaketse was in 1830, with subsequent attacks in 1832 and 1834.

⁹⁸ See Lemue, November 27, 1830 [JDM, VI, 305]; Rolland, July 5, 1831 [JDM, VII, 241; Moilwa, 'Hogaal' in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 315, 326.

⁹⁹ See Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 292; Moffat and Hamilton, March 6, 1829 [LMS 11/3/B].

¹⁰⁰ See Smith, *Diary*, II, 261-2 which implies eight commandos, at least three including Jan Bloem, before 1831: the internal chronology is confused however.

¹⁰¹ Maingard, 'Studies in Korana History...', 123-4. Maingard bases his account on *Bloemhof Bluebook* evidence: see also Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 60; Smith, *Diary*, I, 158, 263, 266, 278-9, 292, 407. The commando occurred while Schoon and McLuckie were visiting Mzilikazi, and possibly only Jan Bloem lost his cattle again to the Ndebele.

¹⁰² Archbell, December 31, 1829 [MMS: IV-1829/37]. Also Archbell, June 30, 1830 [MMS: V-1830/26].

raiding, and these battles as well, Archbell should have found the country between Platberg and the Apies River desolated when he traveled across it later in the year.¹⁰³ Moletsane himself appears to have taken refuge for a while at Philippolis, while the remainder of the Links Kora settled with Mosweu Taaibosch.¹⁰⁴ 'I was once a great man,' said Moletsane to Stockenstrom early in 1830, 'but I have only about thirty men who, like myself, live on what the Coranna chief Harb will give us. My people are scattered all over the country. The mothers eat their own children.'¹⁰⁵

It was, no doubt, this catastrophic reverse for Moletsane which awakened Berend Berends to the potential threat posed by the Ndebele to Griqua hegemony in Transorangia. Joined in 1828-9 by many former Bergenaars, as well as by Jan Bloem, Berends was in the best position of any Griqua leader to turn the raiding energies of the Bergenaars and Kora to more constructive political ends. Within a short time he was mustering a much larger and more formidable commando than the Bloem-Moletsane venture, and himself preparing to attack Mzilikazi. This commando is conventionally interpreted as yet another Bergenaar-type cattle raid. But it had in fact carefully considered political motivations. The first aim was to re-open to Griqua hunting and trading the High Veld north of the Vaal, such activities having been curtailed by Mzilikazi's subjection of the Sotho-Tswana communities settled there,

The Bastards and Corannas and Grikwas had long before been in the habit of visiting that chief [Pilane of the Kgatla-Kgafela] [wrote Andrew Smith] hunting and exchanging, but after Masalacatzie arrived he would not permit Pelanie to trade in that way any more, and he therefore requested assistance of Barend to get away Masalacatzie from his territory.¹⁰⁶

'Long before' might be an exaggeration, but certainly Berends' followers had been traveling to the Western Transvaal for several years previously.

The second aim was to contest Mzilikazi's ability to influence the Transorangia power balance by his raiding and subjugation of Sotho-Tswana communities, and thus to assert a measure of hegemony by southern frontiersmen. Mzilikazi's attentions were, in this period, increasingly directed towards the west and south. Attacked by Dingane in 1830, Mzilikazi, who had assumed Dingane would be less hostile to him than Shaka, began to

¹⁰³ Archbell, December 31, 1829 [MMS: IV-1829/37]; September 6, 1830 [MMS: V-1830/35].

¹⁰⁴ Maingard, 'Studies in Korana History...', 124; Engelbrecht, Korana, 44-5; Omer-Cooper, *Zulu Aftermath*, 98, 137-8. Omer-Cooper maintains the Rolong joined the 1829 commando against Mzilikazi: I can find no evidence for this.

¹⁰⁵ Stockenstrom, *Autobiography*, I, 386. See also Jan Pienaar in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 347-8.

¹⁰⁶ Smith, *Diary*, I, 382. Also *ibid*, I, 384-7; Wright, November 3, 1831 [LMS 12/4/D]. Berends obtained the invitation from Pilane when he accompanied Archbell to the Ndebele state in 1829; in 1830 there were apparently encounters between hostile Ndebele and Berends' followers hunting who were hunting.

prepare the way for a westwards move by attacking the Sotho-Tswana in that direction.¹⁰⁷ Hi *impis*, in about the middle of 1830, did battle with the Ngwaketse for the second time, forcing them to flee into the Kalahari to Lotlhakeng (or Dutlwe?).¹⁰⁸ Mzilikazi's intention to move westwards was, of course, also influenced by the fact that he had already been paid visits from this direction by Schoon and McLuckie, Moffat and Archbell. From men such as these he hoped to gain access to firearms by which he could defend himself against raids by southern frontiersmen.

In consequence of this, the Sotho-Tswana and others were already beginning to discuss the situation. Lemue, visiting Old Dithakong in November 1830, reported that

Mahura, the Korannas and the Griquas, alarmed at the hostile disposition of Mzilikazi, and fearing to suffer in the same way as their neighbours, were holding counsel and speaking seriously of marching against him at the end of the summer.¹⁰⁹

In the next six months Berends sent out invitations to all interested in participating, and received requests from several communities, including the Hurutshe and Ngwaketse, to recover cattle which had been seized.¹¹⁰ The other Griqua leaders were invited too:

...a letter was then sent to Old Dam [Adam Kok II] who at first refused, but his councilors said, 'This is the first time that Barend has asked assistance though he has so often assisted you: why cannot you help him?' and on this Dam sent a commando. [which] joined Barend above on the Vaal River.¹¹¹

Adam Kok II was later to repudiate his support — perhaps because the commando failed — and Waterboer was totally opposed. But it may be that at the time Berends 'had the understanding that Waterboer and Adam Kok anxiously desired the humiliation of Matsilikatsi.'¹¹² It appears, furthermore, that Berends notified government of his intentions, believing probably that such a venture would be considered as safeguarding the northern frontier.¹¹³

¹⁰⁷ See for Dingane, Archbell, September 9, 1830 [MMS: V-1830/26]; Bryant, *Olden Times*, 429-430; Ellenberger, *Basuto*, 207. Also Omer-Cooper, *Zulu Aftermath*, 138.

¹⁰⁸ Lemue, November 27, 1830 [JDM, VI, 305]; Baillie September 30, 1830 [LMS 12/1/C]; Schapera, 'Ngwaketse...', 8. It was probably at this time that the Ngwaketse fought an inconclusive engagement with the Rolong-Mariba in the Kalahari: Smith, *Diary*, I, 280, 408.

¹⁰⁹ Lemue, November 27, 1830 [JDM, VI, 305].

¹¹⁰ See, for example, Archbell, entry June 2 [WMN, VII, 52-3]; Kolbe, entry September 9, [LMS journals 4/102]; Wright, November 3, 183 [LMS 12/4/D]; Jan Pienaar in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 19; Bergovers in Methuen, *Wilderness*, 79.

¹¹¹ Smith, *Diary*, I, 382-3. Also Kolbe, entries September 9 – 26 [LMS Journals 4/102]; Philip to Wade, October 10, 1833 [245 of 1837].

¹¹² W. Shaw to Philip, [n.d.] [LMS: PPapers 3/1/C]. Also Philip to Shaw, October 5, 1833 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/C]

¹¹³ Smith, *Diary*, I, 382.

By June, when the party left, its intentions disguised (more for the benefit of the missionaries than Mzilikazi no doubt) as hunting in the interior, it numbered some 300-600 Griqua and Kora armed horsemen, accompanied by perhaps 1000 Sotho-Tswana. Neither Mahura nor Sebego of the Ngwaketse proceeded with the commando. Jan Taaibosch, Moletsane, Tawana of the Rolong-Tshidi, and Matlaba of the Rolong-Rapulana, who had for a while been at Thabeng subject to Mzilikazi, were a part of it however; so possibly was Jan Bloem.¹¹⁴ There were also some white traders who set off with the expedition, but left it when its intentions were discovered.¹¹⁵ There was a contingent from Cornelius Kok at Campbell, and 75 men from Philippolis, as well as Berends' own Griquas and ex-Bergenaars. A base camp was established on the Vaal River above Maquassie, and from here a commando led by Gert Goeyman and Goliath Jagers went forward, while Berends remained behind. There was at this stage a division of opinions. While some of the former Bergenaar and Kora elements wanted simply to seize cattle, Berends' intentions were 'to drive Masalacatzie out of the land which he had without right taken possession of, and if cattle were taken they were to be given to the Buchuanas who had...lost them.'¹¹⁶ A council was held at which Berends' wishes prevailed. But the divisions could not have been beneficial to the expedition's morale. Less serious dissension occurred when Berends read, as a preparation for the combat, a chapter of the Bible, followed by an address and a call to prayer. Hendrick Hendricks, it is reported, left the meeting unwilling to hear 'the old hypocrite exhort the people to go and murder an innocent [sic!] people in the name of God and religion.'¹¹⁷

Like Jan Bloem's earlier commando, the expedition was successful in seizing cattle from the Ndebele posts, especially as most of Mzilikazi's fighting men were away on other expeditions: estimates of the numbers seized range from 4000 to 20,000. But 'in spite of the lessons of the earlier disaster, the instructions of Barend-Barends, and the advice of some captured women...the Griquas made the same elementary mistake that had caused the downfall of Jan Bloem's party.'¹¹⁸ As the commando retreated with its booty, it failed to set guards at night. The *impi* at the Ndebele capital, which specialized in night attacks, fell upon the Griqua force just before daybreak as they were encamped in a valley below

¹¹⁴ Smith, *Diary*, I, 381 for Matlaba. But see also Archbell, September 9, 1830 [MMS: V-1830/26; Jantje and Matlaba in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 103, 262, 265; Albany District Committee Meeting, February 5, 1833 [MMS: Synod Minutes], which suggest that Matlaba was still subject to Mzilikazi in 1832-3.

¹¹⁵ See Rolland, July 5, 1831 [JDM, VII, 11]; Mary Moffat, September 15, 1831 [J. Moffat, *Lives*, 172-3].

¹¹⁶ Smith, *Diary*, I, 383.

¹¹⁷ Philip to Shaw October 5, 1833 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/C].

¹¹⁸ Omer-Cooper, *Zulu Aftermath*, 140.

the hill to become known as Moordkop.¹¹⁹ The Ndebele force was not seen until it was 200 yards away, and by the time the Griqua had begun to jump to their clothes and guns, the Ndebele were upon them. The *impi* caused confusion by driving the captured cattle down upon the camp and by setting upon the Sotho-Tswana participants who fled to the midst of the Griqua. Those trampled to the death by the terrified cattle, and shot in error by the Griqua themselves, probably outnumbered the deaths caused by the Ndebele. Escape was barely possible since the horses were still tied, and it is estimated at least 80 Griqua and 100 Kora, besides a large number of Sotho-Tswana were killed.¹²⁰ At least two hundred horses and two hundred guns were lost, and the survivors who returned to tell the grim tale were few since the remainder of the Ndebele force had encircled the camp at a distance. Among those who perished were the notorious Bergenaar leaders Gert, Journals and Hans Goeyman, the brother and son of Peter David, Gert Kok, councilor at Philippolis, Jan Pienaar and Abraham Kruger.¹²¹

In their exultation after the fight, [the Ndebele] piled guns, gunpowder, horns, saddles and other articles together in one large heap; and, having set fire to it, commenced a savage dance around the blazing mass... More than 100 lbs of gunpowder, besides several loaded guns, exploding at once, killed many of them — more, indeed, than had fallen in the combat.¹²²

Four years later a member of Andrew Smith's expedition visited the site of the battle and related that

...skulls of men and horses and bones of different parts of the bodies of both lay so thick that they could be distinctly seen from a distance. In one place a great number of bones of horses were almost in a line which probably was one of the places where they made them fast. Upon looking around they found broken stocks of guns, flaps of saddles, stirrup-irons, old clothes, hats, powder horns in abundance... So certain were the Griquas that night that no danger awaited them that they actually stript to go to sleep.¹²³

The melancholy picture of the battle-scene symbolized the failure of southern frontiersmen to deal with an African state that had learned its methods of warfare from Shaka. The

¹¹⁹ See Smith, *Diary*, II, 115.

¹²⁰ See Kolbe, entry September 12 [LMS Journals 4/102], Steedman, *Adventures*, II, 29-31; also Kolbe, October 7, 1831 [LMS 12/4/E] who estimated 40 persons killed of the 75 who had gone from Philippolis; Jan Pienaar in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 19, who said 600 of 900 participants died.

¹²¹ Smith, *Diary*, I, 190, 281, 307; Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 50-1.

¹²² Methuen, *Wilderness*, 80.

¹²³ Smith, *Diary*, II, 116. This account of the expedition has been drawn largely from Smith, *Diary*, I, 191, 289-90, 381-6, II, 115-7; Archbell, August 28, 1831 [WMN, VII, 52-3]; Wright, November 3, 1831; Kuruman Missionaries, December 26, 1831 [LMS 12/4/D]; Rolland, JDM, VII, 33-4, 202-3; Kolbe, September 1831 [LMS Journals 4/102]; Methuen, *Wilderness*, 79-80; Steedman, *Adventures*, II, 25, 29-31; Grimbeck in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 194. Jan Pienaar, Baikhaki, Molema, in *ibid.*, 19, 143; Joint letter, August 18, 1836 [Kotze, *American Missionaries*, 135].

crucial military failure was the inability of the Griqua to evolve a means of defense against attack from an *impi*. While they were on the offensive, their horses gave them mobility and their firearms, inaccurate though they sometimes were, were a fearsome weapon to keep stabbing spears at a distance. But without the device of the *laager*, which would not be introduced into the area until white farmers encountered Mzilikazi in 1836 and 1837, their offensive superiority was useless. It was not even that the Griqua had been outnumbered: the evidence suggests that the Ndebele *impi* which counter-attacked them numbered only 400 men, to the more than a thousand on the Griqua side.

Since 1825, the Griqua states had been, along with Moshweshwe and Sekonyela, attempting to restore a new stability, maintained by a new balance of power, in the area dislocated by the *Difaqane* and the Bergenaar revolts. Even in southern Transorangia their control was not complete: the Philippolis state was rent by schism, Waterboer was still recovering from revolt against him, and Berends did not seek more than a loose hegemony. The Sotho-Tswana of Transorangia were in transition: the old order had been destroyed, and yet they were not sufficiently integrated into the frontier zone to exert much autonomous power. By his victory in 1831, Mzilikazi had demonstrated that the Sotho-Tswana could not expect military protection from the Griqua: the Sotho-Tswana waited, expecting the worst.

But Mzilikazi moved carefully. He had no wish to antagonize his one ally in the South, Robert Moffat, who was now assisting the missionaries of the Paris Evangelical Society to establish a station among the Hurutshe, tributaries to the Ndebele. Mzilikazi had to balance his fears of renewed attacks by Dingane, and renewed attacks from the south, against his desire to conciliate the missionaries by means of a policy of peace. Whites within his dominions could teach him the use of firearms; yet he was not sure how far whites had been implicated in the Berends commando. The settlement of the French among the Hurutshe complicated his problems. To permit them to settle among his tributaries rather than at his capital was dangerous, yet too strong an insistence on settlement at the capital might drive them away altogether. The missionaries themselves were equally torn: they wished to mediate between Mzilikazi and the Sotho-Tswana and yet, stimulated by Mahura and the Rolong, they were afraid of his aggression.¹²⁴

These doubts in Mzilikazi's mind remained until the French missionaries, their fear triumphing over their desire to mediate, left the Hurutshe and returned south-west in

¹²⁴ For the dealings of the missionaries with Mzilikazi, the Hurutshe, etc., in this period, see Rolland, July 5, 1831 [JDM, VII, 9-25]; November 20, 1831 [JDM, VII, 202-212]; May 7, 1832 [JDM, VII, 375-380]; Lemue, March 30 1832 [JDM, VII, 358-371]; June 20, 1832 [JDM, VIII, 19-25]; Pelissier, May 12, 1832 [JDM, VIII, 5-18]; Moffat, February 22, 1832; Ballies, August 16, 1832 [LMS 13/2/D]; Moffat to Philip, August 16, 1832 [Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 34].

June 1832. By this time Mzilikazi had suffered one, or perhaps two, fresh attacks by Dingane, and had been humiliated by the murder of his embassy to the Kuruman by the Rolong-Tshidi, participants in the 1831 commando.¹²⁵ Indeed Moffat had already managed to persuade Berend Berends not to mount a further attack against Mzilikazi that year, an attack for which Berends appears already to have been gathering forces.¹²⁶ But Mzilikazi decided that, at the least, he must punish those who had come against him, and secure himself room in the west in which to move. *Impis* were dispatched against Pilane's Kgatla-Kgafela, against the Rolong at Khunwana, and against the Ngwaketse. Pilane fled northwards for refuge and his town was destroyed, many killed, and the young men incorporated into the Ndebele army. The Ngwaketse put up some resistance but were driven further into the desert. And while Gonntse and the Rolong-Ratlou appear to have taken flight from Setlagole, the Rolong-Tshidi remained at Khunwana to fight a furious battle and suffer a painful defeat. Limping away south-wards, the Rolong survivors were successively raided of their cattle by the Kora of Jan Taaibosch and Mahura's Tlhaping. Before the end of the year, both Tawana of the Tshidi and Gonntse of the Ratlou sought shelter with the Rolong-Seleka at Platberg. The Hurutshe also fled southwards from Mosega towards the Vaal, and Mzilikazi moved his main settlements into Hurutshe country.¹²⁷

By September 1832, therefore, it appeared as if Mzilikazi was launched on a campaign of expansion into Transorangia. Were this the case, the situation was indeed ominous for Transorangia and even the Colony. All that stood between Mzilikazi and the Orange was Mahura, who had not yet suffered attack, the missions, and the three (or four) Griqua states. But these were not Mzilikazi's intentions. Mzilikazi still wished to retain or open a route to the south via the Kuruman, and this is why he had not attacked Mahura. Far from wishing to expand southwards, 'it would seem as if he was sweeping the country to the North and North-West to prepare for a retreat should he not be able to withstand the force by Dingaan,' as Moffat wrote at the time.¹²⁸ Nevertheless it was in the aftermath of this dramatic Ndebele offensive that John Philip crossed the Orange on his first trip northwards since 1825, anxious to evaluate the situation on the northern frontier, ready to make recommendation to government on the policies that should be adopted.

¹²⁵ Moffat, February 22, 1832 [LMS 13/2/D]; Rolland, November 20, 1831 [JDM, VII, 207]; September 25, 1832 [JDM, VIII, 99]; Mary Moffat, September 15, 1831 [Moffat, *Lives*, 172-3]; Baillie, January 3, 1833 [LMS 13/4/E]; Molema, *Montshiwa*, 19-20.

¹²⁶ See Lemue, June 20, 1832 [JDM, VIII, 24]; Smith, *Diary*, II, 64-5.

¹²⁷ See Rolland, September 25, 1832 [JDM, VIII, 100]; Lemue, January 1, 1833 [JDM, VIII, 195]; January 26, 1, 1833 [LMS 13/3/A]; Baillie, January 3, 1833 [LMS 13/4/E]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 401-2, II, 175, 187, 189; Schapera, 'Kgatla-Kgafela...'; Breutz, *Rustenburg*, 257; Schapera, 'Ngwaketse...', 8; Molema, *Montshiwa*, 20-4.

¹²⁸ Moffat, January 10, 1835 [LMS 13/4/E].

9 John Philip, Robert Moffat, and the Griqua, 1819 – 1832

In the 1830's and 1840's three missionaries had a significant effect on the mode of development of the Griqua frontier states: John Philip, LMS Superintendent in Africa; his protégé Peter Wright, missionary at Griquatown; and Robert Moffat, missionary at Kuruman. Since on almost every issue John Philip and Robert Moffat were diametrically opposed, it is necessary to review the evolution of the attitudes of each towards the Griqua frontier states and towards each other.

The appointment of John Philip as LMS Superintendent at the Cape was the direct result of two crises in the affairs of the LMS in the Colony. These were the poor, and even hostile, relationships between the LMS and the administration of Lord Charles Somerset, and the evidence of adulterous activities by LMS missionaries: the two subjects prompted George Thom to call a missionary meeting in Cape Town in August 1817.¹ When the news of this meeting reached London, it was decided by the LMS Directors amid unprecedented Special Meetings prefaced by prayer and Bible readings, to appoint a Superintendent or 'Resident at the Cape'. He would be a Director of the Society and not, as had previously been the case, himself a missionary. A circular was sent around to call for suitable nominees, and on November 10, 1817 the Directors were read a letter from John Philip, Congregational pastor of a church in Aberdeen. After some delay caused by the reluctance of Philip's congregation to part with him, John Philip left for South Africa with John Campbell, arriving at Cape Town on February 26, 1819.²

From the start, relationships between Philip and Campbell, on the one hand, and Robert Moffat on the other, were suspicious. Robert Moffat had arrived at the Cape early in 1817, had warmly endorsed the August meeting called by George Thom, and then, after two years in Namaqualand with Afrikaner, had been invited (even if he had not accepted) by the government to work as a missionary under their auspices.³ Thus, even though Philip had initially endorsed the views of the missionary 'colonial faction', the newly appointed Superintendent must have had some reservations about Moffat's commitment to the London Missionary Society itself. The LMS Directors after all, though approving some of the decisions of Thom's 1817 meeting, and though anxious for good relations with government to be restored, had not approved the meeting itself which they

¹ See Chapter 6.

² LMS Board Minutes: October 10-November 10, 1817; G. Burder, Circular, October 27, 1817 [LMS 7/3/B]; Macmillan, *Cape Colour Question*, 101-3. For a brief Account of Philip's early life see *ibid.*, 95-104.

³ See Chapter 6.

saw as an infringement of their authority. More serious was the opposition of Moffat and others to the appointment of a Superintendent. Shortly after Moffat's arrival in Cape Town George Thom had written to the LMS Directors recommending an alteration in the system of direction of the LMS South African mission. There should, he said, either be a committee elected in South Africa, or the appointment of two persons with the specific function of making representations to government, or a governing body consisting of two missionaries and two sympathetic colonists. But 'to appoint one man, however able, is out of the question.'⁴ It was this unacceptable latter course which the LMS had chosen to follow. Moffat soon made his 'stout Nonconformist objection' to this appointment plain. It was, he said, 'putting the Pope into new clothes,' and 'to submit to any *Ruling Resident Director* or *Superintendent* in the world is what I will never do (I mean such a superintendency as has hitherto been exercised in Africa)...so long as they [Campbell and Philip] retain their present sentiments, we cannot mingle our ideas together respecting the future government of the Missions.'⁵

These differences of opinion did not, however, prevent Moffat from accompanying Philip and Campbell on a tour of the mission stations on the eastern frontier, the main object of which was the task of securing James Read's suspension from the Bethelsdorp church, different in view of Read's popularity with his Khoi followers.⁶ Halted at Theopolis by the outbreak of the Xhosa resistance war led by Maqana, the three missionaries returned to Cape Town. From here Moffat and Campbell traveled north, leaving Philip in Cape Town, with Moffat designated to replace James Read at the Tlhaping mission with an interim period at Griquatown until he could secure government approval to take up his post among the Tlhaping. During this journey Moffat's attitude to Campbell, whom he had described in Cape Town as 'so good a man' hardened into something like contempt. Moffat strongly disapproved of Campbell's attempts at Griquatown to 'examine into the political affairs of this people.' His puritan tastes were shocked by Campbell's excessive consumption of brandy. And, equally important, Moffat was disgusted at the steady weakening of Campbell's resolution to bring the disgraced James Read back to the Colony: it was eventually Moffat who had to remind Campbell that the transfer of James Read to Bethelsdorp as a lay artisan was precisely the reason that had brought Campbell north. A few years later Moffat would write of Campbell that 'it was often a matter of

⁴ Thom, January 25, 1817 [LMS: PPapers 1/1/D]. Until the news of the August meeting, the LMS intended to implement Thom's third proposal: LMS Board Minutes, April 21, 1817.

⁵ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 4; J. Moffat, *Lives*, 64. Also Moffat, *Lives*, 69.

⁶ See Campbell, March 30, 1820 [LMS 18/2/A]; 'Statement on Mr. Read's case' [LMS 8/3A]; Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 2-4; Philip, 'A brief view...' [LMS: PPapers 1/1/D].

surprise to us how he came to be exalted to the important offices he has filled. He is unquestionably a weak man.⁷⁷

If Campbell's sympathy with James Read alienated Robert Moffat from him, the rapprochement which shortly took place between Read and John Philip undoubtedly worsened the relations between Moffat and the latter. To Moffat, James Read was beneath contempt, and incompetent as well as an adulterer: Read had 'a heart and a head like...the Vicar of Bray; for the one recommended things which the other could scarcely credit.'⁷⁸ Moffat came to believe that many of the problems of the LMS missions north of the Orange resulted from the transfer of the 'Bethelsdorp system' to the north through Campbell's insistence on the transfer of Read from Bethelsdorp to Dithakong after 1813. Unable to work with the Griqua and Khoi native agents whose appointment was due to Campbell and Read, Moffat laid a great part of the blame on such converts:

A very great degree of wisdom and decision should be exercised in receiving from among Hottentots, Namaquas, Corannas, and Griquas... Among [these] something honourable is attached to the name Christian. By being baptised, their external conditions are bettered... they acquire a name which is generally of some use in temporal pursuits. Persecution, confiscation, imprisonment, and death, which were the harbingers of the ancient believers, are known here. Here is nothing to deter, but on the contrary everything to stimulate [them] to become Christians. When members under such circumstances are received under a mere profession, manifested by a redundancy of tears and an unconnected inexplicable confession of their faith in the Gospel, it is contrary to reason and experience for a missionary to appeal to such converts as letters known and read of all men, adorning the doctrine they profess with a holy life and unblamable conversation. But their deficiency in these glorious characteristics of the ransomed of the Lord is easily accounted for by some in the following manner: 'Their minds are incapable of being exercised to any degree consonant with that of civilized countries; they have been accustomed to laziness and dirt from their infancy, etc. etc.' That their minds are very incapable of exercise is indisputable, and that they are inured to idleness and dirt is equally true. But the scripture warrants us to expect new creatures from the effectual working of the Holy Spirit, whether in Greek or Barbarian, and in Africa there have been and still are a few examples in corroboration of the fact.⁷⁹

Moffat's sociological explanation of the attractiveness of Christianity to the Griqua and Khoi was acute. Yet his attitudes were squarely opposed to those of Van der Kemp, inherited by Read, who believed in baptism on profession, and on the greatest possible use of indigenous peoples in the spreading of the Gospel. Moffat's disenchantment with John Philip grew, therefore, to the extent that Philip moved away from the 'colonial faction'

⁷⁷ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 4-10, 61. In *ibid.*, 11-15 there is a letter from Moffat to Melvill dated January 1821 whose first, and missing, section would 'give him [Philip] an opportunity of judging how far I am right in complaining both of him and M. Campbell.'

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 282.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 40-1.

and embraced the views of Read and Van der Kemp. It was within months after his return to Bethelsdorp in late 1820 that Read began once again to take up the issue of oppression of the Khoi which he had championed there so vigorously from 1803 to 1812. Read's first complaints, transmitted to Philip and then, informally, to Governor Donkin, were pronounced unfounded by the Governor after a formal investigation. Philip, at this stage still confident of the good faith of the government, was inclined to agree: 'Mr. Read has taken the part of some Hottentots,' heard Moffat from Philip,

...in whose favour he [Read] has always been too much prejudiced...he had charged the Landdrost with unjust treatment and dealing with the Hottentots. When the Governor was in that part of the Colony, he investigated the subject. Read...perhaps too violently stood his ground. His witnesses, however, failed, and, as one informs me, Read actually denied some of his charges. All matters turned out against him and the result was that the Governor, as well as the Landdrost, was dreadfully enraged, and had prudential measures not been used the whole might have terminated in the ruin of the Mission. The Governor stated to Dr. Philip that...he should cut him [Read] off from all connection with the Society.¹⁰

But Philip did not 'cut off' Read. Late in 1821, Philip himself visited Bethelsdorp, and discovered papers, which are printed in an appendix to his *Researches*, which he believed vindicated Read's charges. Returning to Cape Town, Philip wrote six months later to the LMS 'pronouncing for the liberation of the Hottentots,' and by mid-1823 had formulated the principles that 'every part of the system must fall together.'¹¹

In 1819, Philip wrote to government that the 'great source' in which the errors committed by the LMS had originated was

...the mistaken confidence which the Directors of the Society appear to have placed in the late Dr. Van der Kemp's judgement...he seems to have been too much of a theorist and a visionary, and not to have had an understanding sufficiently practical for the situation he filled as a Missionary or even for the common purpose of life. When we say that Van der Kemp appears to have possessed sincerity, to have been a disinterested man, to have had much commendable zeal, and to have meant well, I am of the opinion that we give him all the praise to which he was entitled.¹²

James Read was described by Campbell and Philip as Van der Kemp's 'feeble successor': he 'studied nothing but what is called effect; and it must be acknowledged that he had some

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 58. See also Philip, January 9, 1822 [LMS 8/1/A]; Hamilton, February 28, 1822 [LMS 8/4/B].

¹¹ For this series of events see Macmillan, *Cape Colour Question*, 134-7, 183-7; *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 15-16; *Cambridge History*, VIII, 292-3; Schutte, 'Dr. John Philip's Observation...', 105-6, 180-5, Harry A. Gailey, Jr., 'John Philip's Role in Hottentot Emancipation.' *JAH*, III (1962), 3. Also Du Plessis, *Christian Missions*, 429-430.

¹² Quoted in Somerset to Bathurst, June 30, 1819 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 245-6].

skill in the use of this dangerous weapon.¹³ By 1828 in his *Researches*, however, Philip's attitudes had been transformed:

Dr. Vanderkemp was certainly one of the most remarkable characters of his age: his natural talents were of a high order, and in him they were united with intellectual and moral qualities, which fitted him for great exertions...it will be admitted by everyone whose mind had been elevated by an enlarged benevolence, that such a sacrifice of personal comfort, such a consecration of talents, of literature, and of science, as is exhibited in the example before us, in an attempt to evangelise, to civilize, and to elevate one of the most oppressed and degraded classes of human beings, furnishes one of the most sublime spectacles upon earth... In a country where slavery obtains, the mind cannot long remain in a state of neutrality. By a residence in such a country, a stranger from Europe will either have his aversion to the slave system increased, or that aversion will gradually subside, and his sympathies for the slave will at last be exchanged, perhaps imperceptibly to himself, for the views and feelings of the master... Dr. Van der Kemp had faults; his mind was not cast in the common mould, but the 'front of his offending' in the eyes of the colonists was, his hatred of oppression, and his uncompromising zeal for the cause of the oppressed. But for this, everything else would have been easily forgiven...¹⁴

To James Read, Philip's revised attitude was similar. Much to Moffat's disgust, Philip proposed sending Read back to Dithakong, or else to Afrikaner in Namaqualand, and when this was rejected, intended that Read should proceed to Moffat's mission to investigate his expenditure on new buildings.¹⁵ Eventually in 1829, with the formation of the Kat River settlement for Bastards and Khoi, Read was 'called' by the people to be their missionary, which was approved by Philip on his return from England: 'the hatred of the colonists against him,' wrote Philip in confirming the appointment of Read, was not from the moral obliquity into which he had been led [his adultery] but for his uncompromising stand against oppression.¹⁶ In 1836, Philip took James Read with him to England, where the latter testified to Buxton's important Committee of investigation, and throughout the 1830's and 1840's Philip was to rely on Read as a trusted adviser.

Philip's growing confidence in Read, the several minor brushes between Philip and Moffat over Griqua policy (see below), and Philip's increasing political involvement on behalf of the Khoi, led Robert Moffat and his wife Mary into more outspoken criticism of the LMS Superintendent. 'Dr. Philip...has lately been involved in political controversy,' wrote Moffat to his wife's parents in mid-1825, 'which according to the testimony of friends and foes has done, and will do, injury to our Society's missions. A man in his

¹³ Quoted by Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 149-150.

¹⁴ Philip, *Researches*, I, 133-141 passim.

¹⁵ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 59, 69, 191-2.

¹⁶ Quoted in Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 93fn. See also Macmillan, *Cape Colour Question*, 239-242; Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, Chapter VII.

situation requires to be prudent.¹⁷ This letter was followed by others pouring scorn on Philip's honorary American doctorate, and painting a brutally cynical, though probably not greatly exaggerated, picture of Philip's visits to Dithakong and Griquatown in 1825. When Philip left for England to plead for the Khoi and to write his *Researches*, the Moffats were delighted, and heaped praise upon his less-aggressive successor Richard Miles when the latter visited Transorangia in 1827. 'Since the Dr.'s departure [for Britain] our desire had been that he might never return, and from what we see of his successor we have no reason to suppress that desire.' 'Ever since we were last at the Cape,' wrote Mary Moffat late in 1828, 'we have viewed [Philip] as intoxicated with ambition... We hear that he has published, but feel no desire to see his work, as we are aware we shall see much to disgust us.' When it appeared that the *Researches* had greatly antagonized colonial opinion, Mary Moffat added that 'though we do not rejoice he has met with such a humiliation, we hope it will do him good.'¹⁸

Though many of the Moffats' criticisms of Philip were valid, the hostility between them did little good for the formulation of an effective LMS policy in South Africa and particularly Transorangia. For if Philip was an ambitious propagandist, the Moffats were acerbic personalities, forthright and dogmatic in their criticism, and self-confident to the point of arrogance. In their mid-twenties when they went to take charge of the Tlhaping mission, their temperaments did indeed moderate in later years. But even at the Kuruman mission itself they found it hard to cooperate with their colleagues. Isaac Hughes, who arrived in 1824, left the Kuruman for Griquatown three years later, followed by Moffat's criticism.¹⁹ John Baillie, sent as an assistant in 1830, was soon denounced by Moffat and cast around for another station.²⁰ Peter Wright, the missionary at Griquatown, was acceptable at first only because he had been feuding with Philip, and became an antagonist when relations with Philip were repaired.²¹ Roger Edwards, who arrived in about 1833, endured longer at the Kuruman only because a feud which developed with Griquatown strengthened Kuruman unity; he moved north to Mabotsa in 1842, while Moffat was absent in Britain. Only the mild and patient Robert Hamilton, who had preceded Moffat among the Tlhaping, continued at the Kuruman with the Moffats until his death in 1851. And even in his case there is little doubt that the Moffats played a large part in the estrangement of Hamilton from his wife in 1821-3, which led to her permanent separ-

¹⁷ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 197.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 290-1.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 114-5, 280; Hughes, December 1, 1827 [LMS 10/3/B]; Hamilton and Moffat, December 6, 1827 [LMS 10/3/B].

²⁰ See particularly Moffat, February 1832 [LMS 13/2/D]; Baillie, August 16, 1832 [LMS 13/2/D]; Philip to Baillie, October 5, 1833 [LMS 13/4/A].

²¹ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 291; Kuruman missionaries, September 19, 1838 [LMS 16/2/L].

ture. It is probable that the Moffats wished to get rid of Mrs. Hamilton because of her support of James Read.²²

Moffat, indeed, was a hardly repressed authoritarian. It is no accident that Moffat found it impossible to win the friendship of the apparently 'weak' Tlhaping chiefs, who were forced to govern with democratic attentions to their councils and their people, and that his warmest African relationships were with chiefs who exerted authoritarian leadership: Jager Afrikaner, Makaba and Sebego of the Ngwaketse and, the most famous instance of all, Mzilikazi.²³ Moffat professed to despise 'despotism' — he wrote on one occasion of the 'galling yoke of a despotic government' — yet there is more than a touch of respect and admiration in his description of Makaba's power:

...we see only one great man, revered and apparently beloved by all. His orders are peremptory, and obeyed with the greatest promptitude... Though Makkabbe's subjects be numerous, they appear unanimous, and I think Makkabbe may ascribe his renowned valour more to the unity of his people than their natural boldness. Makkabbe is accustomed to conquer, so that he holds the nations around him in awe. His government seems to savour much of despotism.²⁴

It is little wonder that latent hostility should have existed between the aggressive publicist Philip, and the cynical, dogmatic, and authoritarian Moffat. Such hostility was to have significant effects on the development of LMS policy in Transorangia.

The Evolution of LMS Policy Towards the Griqua, 1819 – 1832

When Philip arrived in South Africa, the administration of Lord Charles Somerset was totally mistrustful of missionary activity beyond the northern frontiers of the Colony.²⁵ Faced with the proposals of the government to bring the missionaries and Griqua back into the Colony by force if necessary, Philip was required to defend the activities of the missionaries. His essential argument was not new: that the missionaries were a 'civilizing' influence on the Griqua, and were therefore contributing to the security of the Colony. In a Memorial to the Secretary of State for the Colonies at the height of the government-LMS discord, the Directors of the LMS had argued the same thing:

²² See Moffat, July 12, 1821, [LMS 8/3/B]; January 24, 1823 [LMS 8/3/C]; [January 30, 1828?] [LMS 11/1/A]; Mary Moffat, September 12, 1821 [LMS 8/3/C]; Philip, July 1, 1822 [LMS 8/5/A]; December 28, 1822 [LMS 8/5/D]; Hamilton, February 17, 1823 [LMS 9/1/B]; June 12, 1824 [LMS 9/2/C]; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 23, 30, 34.

²³ For the relations between Moffat and Mzilikazi see especially Northcott, *Moffat*.

²⁴ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 159-160. Also *ibid.*, 140.

²⁵ See Chapter 6.

Your Memorialists conceive that the peace of the Colony would be promoted by the residence of the Missionaries and the civilization of the Natives in the countries bordering on the Colony, in which the Society now has several stations.²⁶

Thus Philip elaborated:

Every house they [the Griqua] build, every garden which they inclose, and every acre of corn-land which they cultivate, are so many securities for their peaceable conduct towards the colony. They are aware that their place of abode is known; they now have a large stake to lose...by increasing their artificial wants, you increase the dependence of the Griquas on the colony, and you make for the preservation of peace.

Furthermore, argued Philip, just as the withdrawal of the missionaries would not prevent desertion from the Colony, so attacking the Griqua would not in fact succeed in returning them to the colony. They would, he said,

...join themselves to such a man as Conrad Buys, disperse themselves in hostile bands among the neighboring tribes, attach themselves to the wandering savages beyond the limits, and bring war upon the colony, from the mouth of the Keskamma to the mouth of the Orange River... In a very short time, your Excellency would see all the present traces of civilization among these tribes obliterated; every way into the interior obstructed; and the thinly-scattered population on the extended frontier of the colony kept in constant terror and alarm.²⁷

Very soon, however, Philip began to project a more positive policy, seemingly as a result of the defeat of the 'Mantatees' by the joint Griqua commando in 1823. A subsequent editorial in the *LMS Missionary Transactions* reflected Philip's somewhat inaccurate appraisal:

...a missionary was the person who ascertained the approach of the invading tribes in time to procure help from Griquatown; and it was at his call that the Griquas gave their assistance. Had it been merely a message from a Bechuana chief, it is doubtful whether the Griquas would have moved until the enemy had approached their own borders. Again, had not the Griquas been previously brought into a comparatively civilized state by the influence of the missionaries who have resided among them, they would not have been in a condition to have resisted the enemy.²⁸

The missionaries, in other words, were not only performing a *passive* function in safeguarding the Colony by restraining the Griqua from engaging in hostile acts. They were

²⁶ Memorial of LMS to Bathurst, November 3, 1818 [Theal, RecCC, XII, 55-7]. See also Bathurst to Somerset, December 22, 1818, September 28, 1819; Somerset to Bathurst, June 30, 1819 [Theal, RecCC, XII, 107-8, 242-8].

²⁷ See Memorial to Sir Rufane Donkin [May 1820]; Philip, *Researches*, II, 72-5]. Also Philip, 'A brief view...' [LMS: PPapers 1/1/D]; Philip to Donkin, May 12, 1820 [Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 57].

²⁸ Quoted in Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XXI. For the inaccuracy, see above, Chapter VII.

also performing an *active* function, through their ‘civilizing’ mission, in encouraging the Griqua to engage in acts on behalf of the Colony. In arguing this, Philip pointed not only to the 1823 battle against the ‘Mantatees’, but to the participation of the Khoi of Theopolis in the 1819 war against Maqana’s Xhosa: twice in four years, he argued, the Colony had been saved from ‘devastation’ by the missionary stations and their inhabitants.²⁹ The transformation in Philip’s propaganda is made evident by a reply he wrote in 1825 to ‘Evitas’, who had argued, like Philip himself in 1819-20, that any attempt to subdue the unruly Griqua in the north — and this was the period of the Bergenaar revolt — would result in them fleeing further into the interior. On the contrary, argued Philip, whereas the northern border of the colony from the mouth of the Orange to the New Hantam had been, before the arrival of the missionaries ‘in a state of constant hostility,’ this was no longer the case. Far from wishing to flee further from the Colony, claimed Philip, the Griqua had saved the Colony from stationing a military force of 1000 men on the northern border to maintain order, and this transformation had been achieved by the missionaries.³⁰

The consistent presentation of this new role that Philip had conceived for the Griqua occasionally required distortion, and even falsification of the facts. It was necessary, for example, to exaggerate the conditions of the Griqua before the missionaries arrived, in order to contrast it with the existing situation. ‘In speaking of the conduct of the Griquas,’ wrote Philip to the LMS as he enclosed Moffat’s journal of the battle against the ‘Mantatees’, ‘and the manner in which the Colony has been defended by them, be sure to tell the Enemies of Missions that the Griquas were a few years ago wandering naked savages.’³¹ Two years later he obtained from William Anderson a lengthy and often-quoted statement to support this assertion, a statement which is undoubtedly distorted. As J. S. Marais has pointed out, and as earlier chapters of the present study have argued, the ‘Bastards’, as they then were, could by no means be regarded, even in the terminology of the time, as ‘wandering naked savages.’ Anderson’s remarks on this point refer probably to the Kora who were dependents of the Bastard families.³²

Furthermore, Philip did not intend to have aspersions cast on the success of the missionaries in transforming the Griqua:

²⁹ Philip, ‘a brief view...’ [LMS: PPapers 1/1/D]; August 23, 1823 [LMS 9/1/C]. See also *Researches*, II, 226-243; 290-3, 321-2; 331-2. Another similar instance was Moffat’s conversion of Afrikaner, though this fell more under the category of passive rather than active measures.

³⁰ Philip, in *S. A. Commercial Advertiser*, November 26, 1825 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/A].

³¹ Philip, August 23, 1823 [LMS 9/1/C].

³² For Anderson’s statement, December 23, 1825, see Philip, *Researches*, II, 57-60; [538 of 1836, 608-9]; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XIII. Also Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 33-5.

There is a passage in Moffat's Journal [wrote Philip of the same occasion] which may be misunderstood and should either be omitted or qualified — 'alas they are Heathens still' — Common readers will infer from this that they [the Griqua] are not baptized, that they have not received the Gospel in the common acceptation of the word, that they are still infidels, and that they are uncivilized, whereas he means no such thing — The population of Griqualand is numerous — there are perhaps as many *real Christians* among them in proportion to their numbers as will be found among the same number of people, in an English Town; and in this passage he speaks of the people in general, as he would of the farmers of this Colony, or as he would speak of an English army, or even an English Town — 'Alas they are Heathen still' — that is to say notwithstanding their civilisation, and their knowledge, the greater part of them are yet strange to the transforming and saving power of the Gospel.³³

On this occasion Moffat, whether he meant the phrase in this sense or not, was content to allow Philip's censorship.³⁴ But the following year, Philip did the same on an issue on which Moffat was not so flexible. Moffat had found conclusive evidence that it had been the Taung of Moletsane and not Sefunelo who attacked the Wesleyan Maquassie mission, and that the sentencing of Sefunelo by Waterboer was therefore unjust.³⁵ He wrote so in no uncertain terms to the LMS, sending the letter via Cape Town so that it could be seen by John Melvill, who had participated in the 'sentence':

Poor man [Sefunelo], his people as well as his cattle are greatly reduced... Sebinnel's affair is of a very painful nature — *condemned, robbed, and driven from his country!!* It has given the cause of Christ a deep wound from the impression it *has* [made] *and* will *yet* make on the minds of the neighbouring tribes. It has broken down what missionaries will require twenty years to build up... I cannot refer to Sebinnel without a sigh... I am in possession of facts which will demonstrate in the strongest language the innocence of Sebinnel. I shall by the first opportunity use my endeavours to convince the heads of the commando of their error and quilt, and if possible get back some or all of the cattle for Sebinnel.³⁶

Such an implicit attack on the Griqua, and particularly Waterboer, could not be accepted by Philip. His reply to Moffat is not available in full, but Moffat described it as 'in [such a] style as I should not have expected from a director on such a subject' and 'very scurrilous.' Philip accused Moffat of 'unjustifiable assumption of authority in having proceeded in the collecting of the cattle of Sebinnel in the absence of Waterboer and Melvill,' who were

³³ Philip, August 23, 1823 [LMS 9/1/C]. See Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 96 and footnote.

³⁴ See Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 201-2. For other instances of censorship see, possibly, Helm, entry June 4 [LMS Journals 3/79] where a section concerning the Griqua and starting 'The Cape Government' has been obliterated, apparently in another land. Also Philip, July 1, 1832 [LMS 13/1/B]; Baillie, January 3, 1833 [LMS 13/4/E].

³⁵ See Chapter 6.

³⁶ Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 150-1, 154.

both in Cape Town.³⁷ Further, argued Philip, ‘Mr. M[elville] and Andreus have a right to complain that they have been condemned and acted against as criminals without being heard in their own defence.’ Moffat replied to Philip in the withering tones of injured innocence, and indeed Philip, Melville, and Waterboer were soon forced to recognize that Sefunelo was not guilty.³⁸ But the affair illustrated the speed with which Philip would move to the support of his favorites even in the absence of adequate information.

Until 1825, John Philip had not visited the Griqua of whom he had written with such confidence. On many issues he remained uncertain. Confronted with the suggestion of a Government Agency, for example, he had advocated that a Landdrost should be appointed instead. But this was hardly in accordance with his statement to Moffat at the same time that

The present situation of our station within the Colony gives us little to hope from the extension of the Colony...look at Bethelsdorp, Theopolis and Zuurbraak. While the greater part of the able-bodied men are serving the Government, and receiving nothing but rations, the women and children are perishing at home for want of the necessaries of life and the missionaries are teased to death about every trifle the local authorities think proper to impose upon them.³⁹

At the end of 1824, in fact, when Melville visited Cape Town, Philip became reconciled to the Agency, especially as it was apparent that Melville was prepared to advocate the Griqua, and Waterboer in particular, as ‘defenders of the northern frontier.’ But on his visit to Transorangia in 1825 Philip, for the first time, realized that matters were more complex. The government, he saw, was not able to exert its authority effectively in the frontier zone, and hence the ‘civilizing’ work of the missionaries was impeded by the access which ‘disorderly’ elements had to illegal trade with frontier farmers.⁴⁰ Nor, Philip knew, was Waterboer’s government in quite so favorable a situation to fulfill the role he had projected for the Griqua as Melville believed: ‘the people [of Griquatown] having come to that state that they required a civil government, they could no longer be governed, as a body, by the laws of the Christian church: and our missionaries could go no

³⁷ This is unclear: presumably Moffat collected the 600 cattle from Sefunelo for Waterboer. Sefunelo never received them all back from Waterboer, despite the endeavours of the Wesleyan missionaries on his behalf see Archbell, January 20, 1827 [MMS: IV-1827/2]; January 28, 1826 [LMS: IV-1826/5]; Hodgson and Archbell, March 31, 1826 [LMS: IV-1826/11]; Hodgson, entries June 1826 [MMS: IV-1827/2]; September 30, 1827 [MMS: IV-1827/32]; Hodgson, and Archbell, September 30, 1826 [MMS: IV-1827/34]. Also Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 50.

³⁸ For quotations from the Moffat-Philip correspondence in this case see Moffat to James and Mary Smith, September 6, 1825 [Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 199-202]. Also *ibid.*, 197-8, 203-4, 206-7.

³⁹ Philip to Moffat, January 31, 1822 [Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 58].

⁴⁰ For the lack of government authority see quotations from Philip in Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 58, 64-5.

further.⁴¹ Undercutting Melvill's policy, therefore, by ratifying the separation of the 'old' chiefs from Waterboer, Philip returned to the Colony, where he arranged for the transfer of his protégé Peter Wright from Theopolis to Griquatown, and departed 'in a matter of days' for Britain to take up the issue of Khoi oppression in the colony and to write his *Researches*.⁴² The *Researches*, in fact, contain, so far as the Griqua are concerned, merely an extended discussion of policy thus far articulated, and did not contribute to the development of a policy towards the northern frontier.⁴³

By 1830, when Philip was back in the colony renewing his recommendations to government on Griqua policy, there were two significant developments. The first was the passage of the 50th Ordinance of 1828, which, so far as Philip was concerned, had secured sufficient rights for the Khoi in the Colony to make it possible to propose the extension of the Colony to non-white frontiersmen beyond it. When Philip wrote of 'the grievances of the natives under the British government, and of those still beyond the limits of the colony' his argument had been that 'justice being done to the one, will prove the most effectual mutual security we can hold out for the preservation of the other.'⁴⁴ Or, at more length:

...the only method by which we can elevate all classes of people in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope is, by elevating the coloured population to a full and fair participation of those privileges from which they have hitherto been excluded. Unless these privileges are granted to the natives in the *remote and northern districts of our colony*, the evil we have dwelt upon at so much length will neutralize the effects of every other remedy. We repeat it — there is but one method by which the system of rapine and murder, which has been as prejudicial to the colonists as it has been to the natives, can be effectually checked: — make the coloured population within your colony free — refuse to legalise to the colonists their usurped claims over the service of the men, women, and children they may have caught in their marauding expeditions — permit the natives to choose their own masters — secure to them, inviolate from the grasp of colonial violence, the right which God and nature have given them to their offspring — allow them to bring their labour to a fair market, and the farmers will no longer have occasion to complain of the want of servants: and, as there will no longer remain any temptation for commandoes, and as the colonists will thereby be compelled to win by kindness what they now seize by force, all classes will shortly be seen mingling together in one common fraternity, without bloodshed and without fear.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Philip, *Researches*, II, 105.

⁴² Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 28.

⁴³ For another extended version of this policy, clearly influenced if not written by Philip, see Hankey to Bathurst, January 22, 1827 [Theal, *RecCC*, XXX, 119-177]. It is possible that the recommendation of the Commissioners of Enquiry to the Cape that the gunpowder monopoly should be abolished, and that the Griqua should be given free access to trade in the colony, was inspired also by Philip: see *ibid.*, XVII, 437.

⁴⁴ Philip, *Researches*, II, 354.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 328-9, (My emphasis).

The second development was the settlement of white farmers across the Orange. Philip had long deplored the expansion of white settlement *south* of the Orange — it had deprived the San of territory, it was responsible for illegal trade in firearms and slaves, and it encouraged raiding of indigenous peoples. White expansion was, moreover, detrimental to the Colonial economy, for ‘all are producers and there are no consumers.’⁴⁶ Returning from a tour to the eastern frontier, therefore, towards the end of 1830, he composed a report to government based on what he had heard of the situation in the north. The Griqua, he claimed, arguing the point of view of the ‘Bastard’ faction, were ‘waiting for the Colonial government to put a stop to the cause of their grievances... The Griquas are to a man attached to the English government, and are willing to make sacrifices to remain in connection with it.’ He recommended that the Griqua should be placed under the protection of the Colony, and a magistrate appointed to them, to prevent the abuse of Griqua rights by white colonists. Pointing out that ‘such had been the beneficial influence of missionary institutions among’ the Griqua, in contrast to the eastern frontier ‘it has not been necessary to have *one* soldier on the more extended Frontier of the Griquas, to defend that part of the Colony,’ he suggested that the Griqua themselves be formed ‘as a kind of Frontier Militia to prevent aggressions committed by the farmers, and the reaction that might arise from those aggressions.’⁴⁷

What Philip called the ‘imbecile administration’ of Sir Lowry Cole, did not follow up on these proposals. The report had, indeed, involved some distortion of facts, particularly on the comparative treatment of San by Griqua and white farmers, for which Stockenström had justly taken Philip to task. And the concept of the Griqua as ‘defenders of the northern frontier’ had undergone considerable change: they were in this case to be seen as defending Transorangia against potential depredations by white farmers, rather than by Kora or Bantu-speaking raiders as envisaged in the 1820’s. Two years later, in 1832, Philip traveled north to investigate the Griqua situation at close hand. Visiting Philipolis, Griquatown, the Kuruman, and Old Dithakong at least, and consulting particularly with Andries Waterboer and the missionary Peter Wright, he was able on this occasion to devise a much more comprehensive proposal for the role of the Griqua.⁴⁸

The earliest version of this new ideological formulation of the relationship between the Griqua and the Colony appears to be embodied in a letter from Philip to the Act-

⁴⁶ Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 67.

⁴⁷ J. Philip, ‘Return of Missions belonging to the LMS,’ 1830 [CO: 1778: Donkin’s Collection of Missionary Complaints] [Extracts quoted in Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 65; Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 275]. See also Macmillan, *op. cit.*, 67; Van der Merwe, *op. cit.*, 251, 275-8.

⁴⁸ Philip’s journal of this tour was burned with the remainder of the Philip papers in the Gubbins collection fire; but see Kolbe [LMS Journals 4/108]; Pelissier, November 5, 1832 [JDM, VIII, 105]; Lemue, January 1, 1833 [JDM, VIII, 195-6]; Baillie, January 3, 1833 [LMS 13/4/E].

ing Governor, Colonel Wade, of October 10, 1833; the letter was the product of earlier conversations among Philip, Wright and Wade.⁴⁹ Two proposals were made. Either the Griqua — ‘the people belonging to Griqua Town, Campbell, and Philipolis’ — should be incorporated into the Colony on the same terms as the inhabitants of the Kat River settlement, where James Read had been stationed for three years; or, if the government was not amenable to the annexation of further territory,

...it might be well to consider whether it might not be advisable to make Waterboer commandant over the whole district, such a measure would give unity and strength to the operations of the government on that frontier, and by making a man like Waterboer the responsible individual of the district, it would exceedingly simplify the business of government with the district. Waterboer would by this means be brought into immediate contact with the colonial government, and he being an intelligent and active as well as a benevolent and just man, the fullest reliance might be placed on his superintendence and on his communications.

The Griqua, maintained Philip, were the most suitable people for a Colonial military force in the north since they knew the country well and were adapted to warfare in it even better than were the white farmers. If supported by the government with arms and powder, the Griqua could defend the Colony against the continued raiding activities by nonwhite frontier groups. They could prevent the desertion of the Colonial slaves, who, about to be freed, were likely to move to the north and take up marauding. And, if it was well-known that the Griqua were supported by the Colony, they could assist in ‘confining the boors within their present limits’ as well as assist in preventing direct contact between white colonists and ‘banditti’. Furthermore, there was a new demon to add to Phillip’s list of those against whom the Griqua would defend the Colony: Philip journeyed north of the Orange in the aftermath of Mzilikazi’s exceptional series of punitive raids resulting from the Berends’ commando. Philip argued, and may well have believed, that these demonstrated Mzilikazi’s threat to the Colony:

It is well-known that Matselikatsie has nothing more between him and the colony but the Griquas; and should the strength of that people be weakened, we know that he will immediately seat himself in the country upon the very borders of the colony. From what is known of the man, and of his mode of conducting war, I cannot conceive of a greater calamity to the colony than such an event would be. From the Griqua country he could send forth his bands over the colony in such numbers that he would make desolate every part of it beyond the Snewbergh, and the boors would fall before him like sheep under the knife of a butcher.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Philip to Wade, October 10, 1833 [425 of 1837, 143-151].

⁵⁰ For Philip’s views on Mzilikazi at this time see also Philip, March 7, 1833 [LMS 13/3/B]; Philip to J.B. Purney, May 1833 [Kotze, *American Missionaries*, 31-3]; Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 34-5. MacMillan here attempts an unsatisfactory synthesis between the opposed views of Philip and Moffat,

As usual, Philip's analysis was exaggerated and distorted. Far from 'hitherto serv[ing] the colony in returning runaway slaves,' the Griqua for the most part had sheltered and absorbed them. To suppose that all the Griqua were willing to 'confine the boors within their present limits' and restrict illegal trade was to neglect the Kora and Kora-aligned Griqua who benefited from the presence of white farmers among them. More important, indeed, than a restriction on settlement was the strengthening of Griqua authority, so that those farmers who did move into Transorangia accepted Griqua rule over them. As for the Ndebele of Mzilikazi, the contemporary evidence shows that, far from being hostile to the Colony or intending to move southwards, they were desperately trying to maintain good relations with Moffat at the Kuruman, and would move, if at all, *northwards* to evade Dingane.⁵¹ Those in frequent communication with Mzilikazi, Moffat wrote later, knew 'nothing of such intentions' described by Philip, and 'as to the name of Andries Waterboer, it so happened that Moselekatse did not know that such a being even existed, or even the name of Griqua, until many years afterward, when he was first informed by the writer.'⁵² Moffat exaggerated; it was in 1835 that Mzilikazi heard of Waterboer and, through Andrew Smith, sent him an ox in token of friendship, and had Mzilikazi not heard of the 'Griqua' he had certainly heard of Jan Bloem and Berend Berends. But the point still holds.⁵³

In some respects Philip's proposals at this time were in accordance with the views of Moffat. It was indeed Moffat who, on a journey to the Colony in 1830, first proposed a Treaty of alliance between Andries Waterboer and the Colony.⁵⁴ But in most respects Philip's proposals went not only further than those of Moffat, but in a direction entirely antithetical. In the first place, Moffat had far less faith in the ability of the Griqua themselves, as opposed to the mission stations, in 'defending' the northern frontier by acting as a civilizing force; much less did Moffat favor the idea of a Griqua 'frontier militia.'⁵⁵ Secondly, the implications of Philip's recommendation of Waterboer as the 'commandant' of the *whole* district' were, so far as Moffat was concerned, a political interference in the Transorangia power balance.

but on *ibid*, 59 accepts without question Philip's assessment.

⁵¹ See Chapters 8, 10.

⁵² Moffat, January 8, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A], who cites his *Missionary Labours*, 587 in support. Or, as Moffat wrote elsewhere, 'had Philip said in Exeter Hall that when he visited Lattakoo in 1832 he found Mahura the only one of the Bechuana chiefs the *Griquas and Corannas* had not subdued it would have been more correct than to say Moselekatse did so.'; Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]. See also Hamilton and Edwards, December 18, 1838 [LMS 16/5/B].

⁵³ See Smith, *Diary*, II, 257 for example.

⁵⁴ See Moffat, February 20, 1839 [LMS 16/5/B]; *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XIII.

⁵⁵ For Moffat's emphasis on the missions, rather than the Griqua, as a civilizing force see, for example, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XIII.

For, in order that Waterboer should achieve hegemony throughout Transorangia, it was necessary that the other Griqua chiefs should submit to his overall authority or be replaced. Since the 1820's had demonstrated that Waterboer could not on his own, by force or other means, prevent the development of new centers of Griqua power, other means had to be developed. Thus John Philip, initially in connection with a dispute with Berend Berends and the Wesleyan missionary James Archbell, concocted a distorted history to rationalize the hegemony of Waterboer.

Mr. A[rchbell] reasons as if the Chiefs at our Missionary Stations had been independent Princes when the Missionaries of our Society came to settle in the country [wrote Philip], and that the land on which they now exercise their delegated authority had been theirs originally by right of conquest. [This is incorrect, he continued.] The Chiefs of Griqua Town, Campbell and Philippolis arose out of our Missions, a part of the mass of barbarism which the missionaries Anderson, Jansz and Helm found wandering about in a savage state between the old limits of the Colony and the Orange River... They [the chiefs] did not find a country for the Missionaries, but the Missionaries found an unoccupied country for them — This new country they did not take possession of in their own name, or in the name of any men among them, but in the name of the London Missionary Society, and the Colonial Government sanctioned the deed... [In the course of time] the people were persuaded by the Missionaries to choose magistrates which they denominated chiefs...

These chiefs, continued Philip, had their authority sanctioned by the Colonial government so that communication with the Colony might be preserved:

The chiefs at our Missionary stations in the Griqua country can have no such claims upon any of our Missionary Stations as Mr. Archbell asserts... The authority has never been more than a delegated authority to be exercised for the benefit of the missions and the people at our Missionary stations, and for the proper exercise of this authority they are responsible to the people whom they were chosen to serve, and to the Colonial Government from whom they had their chieftainship during pleasure.⁵⁶

Previous chapters of the present study have demonstrated the degree to which this new thesis of Philip's was blatant distortion. If both missionaries and the Colonial government had played a role in shaping the form and development of the Griqua frontier states, the basic initiative had come from, and remained with, the Griqua themselves.⁵⁷ Both the Griquatown area, and the Philippolis district, had been 'colonised' initially by the Griqua, and contemporary missionaries recognized this fact full well.⁵⁸ By explicitly denying the

⁵⁶ Philip to Wright [November 1832?], [Quoted in Wright to Archbell, December 1, 1832, LMS: PPapers 3/1/B; and in Archbell, 'The Question of Daniels' Kuil Farm, 1830-1838' [MMS: XI-Documents D]. See also Wright to Philip, November 9, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/B]; Philip to Wade, October 10, 1833 [425 of 1837, 149-150]; Philip, [538 of 1836, 622-5].

⁵⁷ See Chapters 3, 4, 6, 8.

⁵⁸ See, particularly, Chapter 3, footnote 55; Chapter 8, footnote 10.

claims of the Griqua to authority and territory, independently of the measures taken by missionaries or government, Philip was undermining, rather than strengthening the position of the Griqua.

There is no doubt that this ideological formulation by Philip was a charter to give the London Missionary Society, and Philip in particular, power to recommend or depose Griqua chiefs at will. Since the Colonial government was not directly involved in Transorangia, Philip sought to transfer the authority of the Griqua chiefs to the London Missionary Society, which would use the Colonial government to implement its proposals. Indeed, this was explicitly asserted by Philip:

...it has been said...that the Griqua chiefs have as good a right to their chieftainship as any other independent chiefs have to their territory, and the authority which they exercise over their people [and that therefore] the colonial government has no right to interfere in their concerns. Were this the fact, that those chiefs had all the rights which belong to the Bechuanna chiefs, the principles advanced on this fact [are] contrary to all the principles of international law among civilized nations, which allows one country to interfere with the affairs of another, so far as its own safety is concerned; but the assertion that the rights of the Griqua chiefs stand upon the same footing with those of the chiefs of the independent tribes of the interior beyond them, is an assumption that could not have had any place in the minds of persons at all acquainted with the history of this people.⁵⁹

Only in the special conditions of a frontier zone could Philip's theses have been formulated at all. Only under these conditions could Philip, Wright, and Waterboer have attempted to put them into practice by undermining the legitimacy of Cornelius Kok II, Berend Berends, and Adam Kok II.⁶⁰ Only in the frontier zone could Philip have claimed territorial rights for the London Missionary Society, not in terms of territory held under the ultimate authority of some state, but as an *autonomous political community*. It is little wonder that James Archbell should have written,

What right had the Dr. to go into that country at the first and to claim possessions there? What right had he to take the Griquas there? Who were the original properties of the soil as claimed? Did Dr. Philip or his agents purchase it? Where are documents?⁶¹

In the same way Andries Stockenstrom, testifying to the 1836 Buxton Aborigine's Committee, stated that in the case of Philippolis, 'I disputed the right of D. Philip to dispose of that land at all.'⁶² In 1819 Lord Charles Somerset wrote that

⁵⁹ Philip to Wade, October 10, 1833 [425 of 1837, 149].

⁶⁰ See Chapter 11.

⁶¹ Archbell to Secretaries, Wesleyan Missionary Society, [n.d] [Archbell, 'Question,' MMS: XI-Documents D].

⁶² See Stockenstrom in [538 of 1836, 216-8].

The establishment of a Theocracy entirely independent of the Civil Government was Dr. Van der Kemp's favorite and avowed plan, and to the attempt to reduce that plan to practice is to be attributed the misrule which has given so much annoyance to the local Magistracy there. In the prosecution of this scheme both Dr. Van der Kemp and his successor [Read] have not scrupled to resort to means highly unbecoming to the character with which the Society in England had invested them.⁶³

The same accusations could have been leveled by government at Philip's plans for Transorangia; that they were not is due less to the nature of Philip's plans than his ability as propagandist.

The plan to establish an LMS theocracy in Transorangia under the rule of Griqua chiefs had several important consequences both for LMS policy and for the peoples of Transorangia themselves. Firstly, in the 1830's, under Philip's guidance, the missionary societies operating in South Africa turned away from the expansionist dreams nurtured by John Campbell on his two visits. 'It is not Latakoo [the Tlhaping capital] considered by itself that I attach so much importance to,' Campbell had written in 1816, 'as its being the key to the nations beyond.'⁶⁴ In the early 1820's the talk among missionaries was of establishing a chain of stations towards Delagoa Bay.⁶⁵ In 1826 Melvill wrote that

Mr. Wright considers this Mission [Griquatown] of most importance as it relates to that among the Bechuanas — which is the view I have always taken... Lattakoo is the most interesting and important [mission] in Africa. The present convulsed state of the Interior, the wars and rumors of wars ought not to discourage or tend to slacken exertion — for it may be the very means of preparing the way for the more rapid spread of the Gospel of peace.⁶⁶

Philip inverted this chain of reasoning: Griquatown was to be the most important mission, and the others were important insofar as they 'related' to it.

It was, at one time, a favourite plan in South Africa to erect missionary stations as far apart from each as possible [wrote Philip in his *Researches*] under the idea that the light emanating from each of those stations would spread around, and enlighten all the intermediate tracts between them. It is a pity to find fault with an idea so pleasing to the benevolent feelings of the mind; but we have been taught by experience that more is expected from a few efficient missions in a country, conducted on a liberal and enlightened system, than from a multitude of missionaries labouring apart over a widely-extended surface.⁶⁷

⁶³ Somerset to Bathurst, June 30, 1819 [Theal, *RecCC*, XII, 248].

⁶⁴ Campbell, November 12, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C]. See also Campbell, July 26, 1813 [LMS 5/2/D]; April 8, 1820 [LMS 8/2/A]; Anderson to Campbell, November 1816 [LMS 6/4/C].

⁶⁵ See, for example, [Anon.]. [1820?] [LMS 8/2/D]; A. Faure in Hamilton, February 10, 1821 [LMS 8/3/A]; Campbell, 'Statement of visits...' [LMS 8/3A]; B. Shaw, July 13, 1823 [WMN, IV, 167].

⁶⁶ Melvill, July 6, 1826 [LMS 10/1/D]. See also Melvill, December 17, 1824 [LMS 9/2/F]; Sass, January 12, 1825 [LMS 9/3/A]; Miles, October 27, 1830 [LMS 12/3/B].

⁶⁷ Philip, *Researches*, II, 211. Compare Campbell in Clinton, *Melting Pot*, 92.

In his deployment of missionaries, therefore, Philip concentrated on Transorangia itself. In 1832, for example, Philip suggested to the French missionaries who had retired from the Hurutshe mission in the Ndebele state that they establish themselves at Old Dithakong with Mahura, at Bethulie high on the Orange, and with Moshweshwe's Southern Sotho, who had sent to Philippolis to 'buy' a missionary.⁶⁸ Three years later he sent the first missionaries of the Berlin Society who, like the Paris Evangelicals, fell under his superintendence, that they should establish themselves among the Kora on the upper Riet River, on the fringes of Adam Kok II's Philippolis state.⁶⁹ To the Ndebele, for whom Moffat had been urging a missionary since 1830, were dispatched in 1835, rather reluctantly, the first missionaries of the American Board for Foreign Missions.⁷⁰ Despite requests for missionaries from the Ngwaketse, the Kwena, and the Ngwato, all anxious for a white presence to counter Mzilikazi, and all situated on the 'road to the north' along which others had envisaged missionary expansion, Philip did not station any missionaries north of the Molopo River.⁷¹

Secondly, Philip envisaged that the non-Griqua populations of Transorangia would fall under the hegemony of Waterboer as 'commandant of the whole district'; the Griqua would then act as a 'civilizing agency' on such peoples. Such a role had been implicitly anticipated by Stockenstrom as early as 1820 when he argued that the removal of the Griqua to the Colony 'would generate the entire dissolution of the shadow of restraint which, little as it is, keeps the Corannas...from those depredations which the colony formerly had to complain,' and it had been theoretically and practically implemented by Melvill and Waterboer during the *Difaqane*.⁷² Once more Philip elaborated the concept:

The Griqua country has as good a right to be considered a Christian country as the colony of the Cape of Good Hope; we see here by the labours of our missionaries a new country brought within the pale of Christianity...we see perhaps 30,000 Bechuanas looking up to the Christian chief of Griquatown, who cannot perhaps muster more than 200 horsemen, as their sole dependence and their only safeguard against the overwhelming and ferocious band of Mosalekatsi...such is the condition to which this handful of people [the Griqua] have been raised by the elevating influence of Christian doctrine and Christian education,

⁶⁸ Philip, June 20, 1833 [LMS 13/3/B]; Lemue January 1, 1833 [JDM, VIII, 195-7]; Casalis, April 29, 1833 [JDM, VIII, 269-270]; JDM, IX, 26; Pelissier, November 19, 1833 [JDM, IX, 130-4]; Lemue, May 27, 1833 [JDM, VIII, 300-301]; Arbousset, *Narrative*, 312-3; Casalis, *Basuto*, 10; Kotze, *American Missionaries*, 30.

⁶⁹ See JDM, X, 164.

⁷⁰ Kotze, *American Missionaries*, 8-13, 54-5, 173fn. Of course the Paris Evangelicals had gone initially to the Ndebele state, but when they left, Philip, unlike Moffat, did not urge them to continue trying.

⁷¹ For the desire of such groups for missionaries see, for example, Rolland, May 7, 1832 [JDM, VII, 380]. My assessment is contradictory to that of Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 56, that "Griquatown was early recognized...Dr. Philip as the 'gate' to the far interior."

⁷² Stockenstrom, September 13, 1820 [50 of 1835, 130]. See also Chapter 6.

that, while the people under their protection are perhaps five times their own number, their strength and courage and discipline is an occasion of jealousy with the colonists, while they are at the same time its defence along a frontier 300 miles in extent...⁷³

Furthermore, argued Philip, it was education which had 'raised' the Griqua to this condition, and, it was implied, it was education through a Griqua native agency which would gradually produce the same effects for all the peoples of Transorangia. The concept of the native agency derived ultimately from Van der Kemp, Read, and Campbell, but in his formulation of its 'civilizing' role, Philip laid far more emphasis than had been done before on education, as opposed to agriculture or 'industry'.

The work of God in the conversion of the world has never been carried on to any extent without a native agency; and that work has always prospered in proportion as that agency has been numerous and effective...in savage and barbarous countries we can only look for a native agency by the general education of the people. I say general education, for we have found by experience that we must raise the community itself to a certain level, before such an agency can be found as will prove of any efficiency in the general spread of the gospel... If the children of parents in [savage or barbarous] society are not put under instructions till they are seven, eight, or nine years of age, after all the education which can be given them they will differ very little from their parents... To illustrate the importance of a native agency, it is necessary only to say that the work of God among the people and in the schools [at the Kat River] is carried on chiefly by the people who were from Bethelsdorp and Theopolis. They are the leaven which is leavening the whole lump...many of them preach, perhaps with much effect to their own countrymen than persons of superior education would do, and who, from the nature of their very education and their ignorance of the customs and modes of thinking among the people, might not have the same access to their understandings and their hearts...one thing is clear, that to carry on and extend the missionary work we must have native agency; and that to procure that agency the work of education among the heathen cannot be begun too soon, nor carried on too extensively... The gospel can never have a permanent footing in a barbarous country unless education and civilization go hand in hand with our religious instructions.⁷⁴

Though John Philip's blueprint for a Christian Griqua republic in Transorangia assigned an illegitimately ambitious place to Waterboer, the LMS, and Philip, it was not lacking in noble motivations.

The great bane of Africa [wrote Philip in 1842] is the minute fractions into which its tribes have been broken...we have material here for a noble building but nothing can be done toward it till the fragments are joined together. The Gospel is the only instrument by which this can be accomplished...in the Griqua Mission...providence has furnished...with a site

⁷³ Philip to J. B. Purney, May 1833 [Kotze, *American Missionaries*, 35-6].

⁷⁴ Philip to Purney, May 1833 [Kotze, *op. cit.*, 39, 43-45]. See also Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 100: 'This [the native agency] was one of many themes left over for fuller study which the loss of the Philip Papers now makes impossible.'

on which we may erect a Temple to God from which may issue forth the Law of the Lord in the power and spirit of Elias turning the hearts of the Fathers to the Children and the hearts of the Children to the Fathers.⁷⁵

Such an aspiration for ‘enlargement of political scale’ was shared by many African leaders in South Africa themselves, both in the aftermath of the *Difaqane* and when they attempted to resist the imposition of white rule. Indeed it is commonly accepted by contemporary African nationalists that the failure to ward off white supremacy resulted ultimately from the failure to achieve a sufficient enlargement of political scale.

Philip was indeed favorable to ‘accommodators’ rather than ‘resisters’ to white rule.

Ever since I have formed fixed opinions on the subject [he wrote] I have always considered it of the last importance to have belts of civilized natives between the colonists and their less civilized neighbours. The people in [the] immediate neighbourhood [of the Colony] who have worked themselves up to a knowledge of our character and power, and who have acquired any portion of the civilization of Europeans without losing their sympathy with their uncivilized brethren, would unite the colonists and the uncivilized tribes by internal bonds, and operate in preventing collisions taking place between them.⁷⁶

But in the 1830’s it was not unrealistic for a person with faith in the ultimate goodness of Britain to favor ‘accommodation’ to Colony rule. Philip believed in the equal abilities of ‘civilized’ people:

...it appears to me that the natural capacity of the African is nothing inferior to that of the European...in point of abilities and good feelings, I consider the Caffers on the borders of the Colony as most decidedly superior to that portion of the refuse of English society that find their way to this country.⁷⁷

Thus, with the 50th Ordinance of 1828 securing, as he believed, equal rights for the Khoi peoples of the Colony, it was not unrealistic to suppose that the Griqua and ‘the peoples under their protection,’ when sufficiently Christianized and civilized, could be incorporated within the Colony political community on an equal footing.

Philip’s short-sightedness, then, was not in urging the formation of larger political units Transorangia, or necessarily in urging accommodation towards the Colony. It was in undermining the power of the frontier states instead of strengthening them. His plans for Transorangia weakened not only the authority of the Griqua chiefs, but also of such Sotho-Tswana peoples (and this excluded Moshweshwe’s people) who were encouraged to place themselves under Griqua authority. If he planned for the incorporation on equal

⁷⁵ Philip [LMS Journals 4/112]. See also Philip to CO, June 15, 1845 [Quoted in Philip, April 17, 1846, LMS 22/1/D].

⁷⁶ Philip in [538 of 1836, 605].

⁷⁷ Philip to Purney, May 1833 [Kotze, *American Missionaries*, 28].

terms of the peoples of Transorangia into the Cape Colony, he should have insisted more strongly on the retention of Sotho-Tswana political power under Griqua hegemony (perhaps through their incorporation within political councils) and on the independent authority of the Griqua chiefs. His failure to suggest such measures stemmed from the limitations of his viewpoint, which were characteristic of the missionary viewpoint of the time. 'Civilization,' it was argued, must precede political power in a 'civilized' community. Hence the Sotho-Tswana must, for the time being, submit to the superior 'civilization' of the Griqua, and the Griqua must be subject to the ultimate authority of missionary mentors. The danger was that, on the one hand, the Griqua would be only in degree less hostile than their fellow white frontiersmen to sharing eventual power with the Sotho-Tswana. On the other hand, the danger was that the Griqua themselves, unable to secure incorporation within the Colony on equal terms, would, their authority undermined, lose their land and their power to whites. Both in fact occurred. It is this, despite the mixture of motivations among the missionaries, despite the exaggeration to which the concept has been subjected, that allows one to speak of the 'role of the missionaries in conquest.'⁷⁸

In the meantime, Philip's political proposals for Transorangia found their consummation, with Divine rewards and punishments built in, in his testimony to the Aborigine's Committee of 1836. Rising to a rhetorical conclusion, he stated that he had 'formed an opinion that...the aborigines of Africa would ultimately be exterminated.' This view, based on the fate of the Khoi and San, and the retreat of the Xhosa until the 1830's, had been changed by the Xhosa resistance war of 1835:

The elements of power and destruction are, at this moment, widely scattered over the whole of the country between the Orange River and Delagoa Bay, and no more is necessary but to continue and put them in motion, to blot out the name of the Cape of Good Hope from the list of British colonies. One individual only is wanting to wield those elements, and should we continue the iniquitous course we have hither to pursued, who can say how soon an offended God may raise him up...to be the minister of retributive justice...to repay us in full measure all the injuries we have inflicted... We have nothing to dread from the Caffres compared to what we have to apprehend from the state of the northern frontier...those that have guns are, with very few exceptions, in possession of horses, and if the colonial government is foolish enough, at this moment, to lose the affections of the Grikwas and by that means to disperse them among that people [the white farmers] woe be to the Colony... When I take a review of the numerous and rapidly improving tribes of the interior, it appears to me clear that we are to be the instruments of subduing them to Christ, or they are to be the instruments of Divine vengeance upon us for our neglect of so

⁷⁸ See N. Majeke, *The Role of the Missionaries in Conquest*. It is not meant to imply that Majeke's analysis can at all points be sustained; for a scholarly analysis of the similar role of the missionaries in Yorubaland see for example E. A. Ayendele, *The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria*, 29-69.

plain and obvious a duty... An able governor of the Cape might, in twelve years, influence the continent of Africa as far as the tropic; influence it for good, make every tribe to know its limits, to be content with its own, to respect its neighbours, and to drink with eagerness from the fountains of our religion, civil policy, and science. The missionaries have already done enough to prove that all this is not only possible, but easy; much easier for a wise man to accomplish than it is for a fool to render the whole part of the continent not only more barbarous than it is at present, but hostile to us and never ready to combine for our destruction.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Philip in [538 of 1836, 629-631].

10 Griqua Expansionism, I: Andries Waterboer in Transorangia, 1832 – 1836

John Philip's formulation of the role of the Griqua in Transorangia provided, at last, the ideological framework, for harmonious cooperation between the Griqua frontier states and the government, which had been lacking during the regimes of Anderson and Melvill. More specifically, the implementation of Philip's policy was laid to the charge of Andries Waterboer and his Griquatown state, and to the LMS missionary in that state, Peter Wright. It is almost impossible to judge the role played by each of the three in the elaboration of the proposals made by Philip for Transorangia. Nevertheless, all three men were totally in agreement with the manner in which they were presented to the government. Independently of Philip, both Wright and Waterboer had sought to project an image of Waterboer's state as competent to undertake the defense of the northern frontier on behalf of the Colony. There could, indeed, have been no more suitable missionary to the Griquatown state than Peter Wright. In contrast to most other missionaries, Wright had early on formed a high opinion of Griqua capabilities. While even the generous Campbell regarded the Griqua as having the 'minds of children,' Wright had written to another missionary soon after arriving at Griquatown that 'you must not think of treating them [the Griqua] like children under age, which is generally the case with Hottentots, but you must treat them as men determined to think and act for themselves.'¹ Such an approach ensured that Wright did not develop the paternalist attitude to his 'flock' so characteristic of other missionaries.² Although there can be no doubt that he and Waterboer collaborated on political affairs, Wright's public attitude was to strengthen the chief's autonomous power by claiming that 'it was not my province to interfere in the least political matter.'³ It was for this same reason, that he did not wish to usurp Waterboer's public authority, that Wright was unwilling to assume the responsibility for ammunition sent to the Griqua state in 1827.⁴

Andries Waterboer, a politician at least as capable as Philip, was well able to employ this public self-effacement by Wright to his own advantage. Independently of Philip's propaganda on his behalf, Waterboer was able to present to government a favorable image

¹ Wright to Clark, May 10, 1827 [LMS 10/1/C]; Campbell, August 20, 1820 [LMS 8/2/D]. See also Anderson, in Campbell, *Travels*, 243.

² Compare Backhouse, *Narrative*, 546.

³ Wright, July 17, 1827 [LMS 10/2/C]. Also Wright, August 25, 1827 [LMS 10/3/A].

⁴ See Chapter 8.

of his abilities. By 1833, Civil Commissioner Van Ryneveld, who had been relatively hostile to Waterboer six years before, could write to government that 'Waterboer is a man of the highest possible integrity: a man of correct information and sound judgment. There is not a British officer in the Colony in whom Government can place greater confidence in any thing that relates to its interest and defence.'⁵ In that year Van Ryneveld sent to Waterboer a staff mounted in silver as an expression of gratitude for Waterboer's services to the 1832 commando against Stuurman, as well as an ivory seal mounted in silver 'in token of my personal esteem of you.'⁶ In 1836, even Stockenstrom, who was hardly an ardent friend of Waterboer's, was forced by the weight of government opinion to concede that Waterboer was 'a very intelligent man, [who] by his ability [has] worked himself up to the head of the Griquas... He has always expressed himself [very much attached to the colonial Government] and I believe he is sincere.'⁷

Such assessments of Waterboer would become increasingly widespread in the Colony. Three years after the Griqua chief's death, Edward Solomon wrote:

The grasp of his mind was large, and his intellect acute. He could quickly understand any subject to which his attention was called, and could soon comprehend the bearings of passing events upon society. His imagination was powerful, and his sensibility great; so that in his addresses he was, at times, happy, and even eloquent. He was several times in Cape Town, and highly respected by all those who knew him. Some of his addresses are still remembered as having alike astonished and delighted many who did not expect such exhibitions of intellect, imagination, and feeling, from one whom they regarded as just emerging out of barbarism. Waterboer's manners were pleasing and courteous, his address exceedingly good; he was in every respect a *gentleman*...⁸

Waterboer's talents can hardly be denied. But that he should have been viewed, contemporaneously and subsequently, as having 'a name both as a chief and as a man such as no other South African Chief ever attained'⁹ is less a measure of his capabilities in comparison to other non-white leaders, than of the successful propaganda engaged in by himself and by others on his behalf. Waterboer, in other words, was more highly regarded than the other Griqua chiefs because he was, or was thought to be, an 'accommodator': because he acted in the interests of the colony. In reality, the ideology developed by Philip allowed Waterboer to advance his own interests while presenting his actions (sometimes truly, sometimes falsely) as advancing the interests of the colony. In reality, moreover, it is an ar-

⁵ Van Ryneveld to CO, January 3, 1833 [Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 132].

⁶ An Ryneveld to Waterboer, February 5, 1834 [Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 16-17]. Also *ibid.*, 241-2.

⁷ Stockenstrom in [538 of 1836, 215].

⁸ Solomon, *Two Lectures*, 28.

⁹ Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 34.

guable proposition that Waterboer was more capable (except as an image-maker), or more concerned with the welfare of the people in Transorangia, than the other Griqua chiefs. Indeed he did, from 1824 onwards, take under his protection refugee Sotho-Tswana, and in later years chiefs such as Moshweshwe would lavish praise on him for the sanctuary he had given refugees who returned to Lesotho. But both Adam Kok II and Berend Berends also gave sanctuary to such refugees, and if their role is not so well-known, this must again be credited to the pro-Waterboer propaganda by the missionaries and Waterboer himself. Furthermore, as a state-builder Waterboer was not more successful than the other Griqua chiefs until he was able to win preferential missionary and government support. He was troubled by dissidence in his state as much if not more than the other Griqua chiefs, and he had been as violent as them, and even as violent as the Bergenaars, in measures directed against his enemies. Stockenstrom, 'old' chiefs, and the Griqua who had deserted him, all accused him at various times of undue severity, of impetuous judgments, of inability to compromise and of rash decisions.¹⁰ Yet always Waterboer and the missionaries managed to present his actions in a form which made him appear in the right. His qualities had precipitated two revolts against him in the 1820's, and had led to the *contretemps* with Sefunelo in 1824; but he was able to justify these policies as he became better versed in the dichotomous rhetoric of the missionaries, which separated people uncompromisingly into 'good' and 'bad', and which applied strict moral judgments on 'good actions' and 'bad' actions.

At Griquatown in 1832, Waterboer had the strong support of a Griqua nucleus. He was longer threatened by the 'old' chiefs, and neither rebels nor Kora raiders were of great concern anymore. Why then, should he have supported Philip's proposals for Griqua hegemony so ardently when his state could have survived without such expansion? Why, particularly, should he have given specific endorsement to that part of Philip's formulation which undermined his own authority? For, in a letter to Philip in December 1832, he endorsed Philip's claims that it was the missionaries who made the Griqua a 'people', found them a country, and originated the chieftainship.

I...consider the whole of the power of the Griqua captains as a delegated power, to be assumed for the benefit of the people, and the spread of the Gospel in the country, and among the heathen beyond the Griqua country. For the proper exercise of this power, I consider the chiefs of the Grikwas responsible to the people and the London Missionary Society in everything that has a relation to the well-being of the missions, and the promotion of religion and morals among the people...I consider the circumstances of the chiefs taking office from the colonial government as a acknowledgement of their dependence upon the government for their office as captains; and I consider the government which sanctioned

¹⁰ See Chapters 6-8.

my appointment as having a right, 'reason being shown for such a step' to withdraw that sanction, and to withhold from me any immunities the office of captain may entitle me to, as far as my political relation to the colony is concerned.¹¹

In part, Waterboer's endorsement of the Philip proposals was for reasons of defense. A warm relationship with the Colonial government, which Waterboer believed that Philip could ensure for him, would lessen the possibility of recurring revolt or raiding damaging the state; and the Colony was the only force which could prevent the loss of his lands or authority to the white farmers who were already a problem at Philippolis. But Waterboer's endorsement of these proposals indicated also his ambitions for territorial expansion. Having enough trust in Wright's and Philip's assessment of him to know that the LMS would not undermine his power, he intended to use the Philip proposals, their diminution of the autonomous authority of Griqua chiefs, to undermine those chiefs who would not collaborate with him.

The territorial expansion of Griqua hegemony was partly motivated by Waterboer's ambition. But there were other, economic, reasons which impelled such expansion. Andries Waterboer, no less than Peter Wright, realized that Griqua survival depended on a strong economic base for the state, which meant in turn settled agriculture. Particularly if the people of Griquatown were not to diffuse their energies by basing their economy on hunting and trading, such agriculture was essential. In the years immediately following the third revolt, there were good, if not marvellous harvests. But this was unusual, for the springs at Griquatown were drying up. From 1831 to 1834 there was drought at Griquatown, which 'burnt up' the Griqua country, and not only prevented cultivation for the most part, but forced the Griqua to disperse to the banks of the Orange to preserve their cattle.¹²

Wright and Waterboer saw three answers to this problem. The first was irrigation by means of a water-course from the Orange River, but this was a long term project, which encountered many practical problems, of water-levels for example, even as it began.¹³ The second solution was articulated to the LMS by Wright:

Our people's circumstances would not be so distressing as they are, nor would their improvement be retarded as it now is, were they in possession of the fountains and lands of the different out-stations which formerly belonged to Griqua Town...which formerly were of vast advantage to these people both as regards their private interests and their general

¹¹ Waterboer to Wright, December 11, 1832 [425 Of 1837, 150-1].

¹² Wright, December 1, 1831 [LMS 12/4/D]; July 10, 1832 [LMS 13/1/B]; January 25, 1834 [LMS 14/1/A]; December 8, 1834 [LMS 14/2/D].

¹³ The initial project, at Hardcastle, was abandoned because of difficulties, and a new plan was made to lead the water – course from Read's drift. Between 1835 and 1840, however, the prime years of Griqua expansionism, little or no work was done on the project: see Wright, June 9, 1836 [LMS 15/1/C].

improvement, and also to the promotion of Missions... The out-stations to which I more particularly allude and which possess the greatest capabilities are those of Daniels Kuil and Campbell; but the capabilities of these places have been totally lost for the last several years.¹⁴

But even such encroachment on the domains of Cornelius Kok II and Berend Berends, which was attempted at the time, was not regarded as sufficient to support the Griqua.¹⁵ Increasingly Wright and Waterboer realized that, until irrigation from the Orange River could be carried out, it was the Sotho-Tswana of the state who were more adapted to agriculture in Transorangia than the Griqua:

The Griquas follow the European method of cultivating the ground which is the most efficient and the most certain, when the means necessary to this mode can be commanded. The Bechuana on the contrary in the cultivation of their corn (a kind of millet) and watermelons, etc. (things best adapted to the climate) do not irrigate but depend upon the rains. In good seasons they obtain unlimited and abundant crops, but when drought prevails...their labour is in vain. This uncertainty does not apply to the Bechuanas connected with us, as they have some advantages. The Chief Waterboer, some years since, granted for their use all the different small valleys in the neighbourhood, which are sufficiently damp to produce vegetation; from there they obtain certain and moderately good crops. These valleys were not used by the Griquas, so long as they could command water for irrigation, and since this has failed, the Chief and the Griquas do not disturb the Bechuanas in the possession of what was granted to them in better times.¹⁶

To secure an economic base for the Griquatown state, in other words, it was desirable to expand the numbers of Sotho-Tswana under 'protection' of the state, either by encouraging them to move within its orbit, or, if necessary, by expanding the territory of the state itself.

Waterboer and the Southern Sotho-Tswana, 1832 – 1835

It was during Phillip's tour of 1832 that attempts were made to add other such Sotho-Tswana groups to those already within the state, and to solidify relations with the Sotho-Tswana already within the territorial bounds.¹⁷ When Prosper Lemue and the other French missionaries withdrew from the Hurutshe mission at Mosega in June 1832, Lemue came to Griquatown where he was persuaded by Phillip and Waterboer "to bring them [the Hurutshe] under the protection of Waterboer, where an asylum was provided

¹⁴ Wright, June 19, 1834 [LMS 14/1/C]. Also Wright, September 25 1835 [LMS 14/4/E].

¹⁵ For the attempted encroachment by Waterboer see below.

¹⁶ Wright, September 25, 1835 [LMS 14/4/E]. Also Wright, January 25, 1834[LMS 14/1/A]; June 19, 1834 [LMS 14/1/C].

¹⁷ For the Sotho-Tswana already under Waterboer's protection see Chapters 6, 7, 8.

for them.” It was agreed, significantly, that the Hurutshe were to settle at Daniels Kuil, the ownership of which place was then a matter of serious controversy between Waterboer and Berend Berends. Lemue departed promptly to fetch the Hurutshe and found them on the Harts River where they had fled after Mzilikazi’s offensive of 1832. The plan fell through, however. After discussions with Kora members of the Berend’s state, Mokgatla, the Hurutshe regent, managed to persuade the pro-missionary heir to the throne, Moilwa, that it would be preferable to remain under the protection of Berends, who was planning a commando against Mzilikazi for 1833. Lemue took a handful of Hurutshe to Motito, while the remainder established themselves at Taungs.¹⁸

If the Griquatown state was unable to persuade additional Sotho-Tswana to come under its protection, it could at least strengthen its ties with those already in the state. It was, apparently, at this time that Waterboer stationed some Griqua families at a fountain north of Tsantsabane (Blinkklip) and Daniels Kuil, a fountain purportedly ‘granted’ him by Mothibi at the time of Waterboer’s assistance to the Tlhaping against the ‘Mantatees’ in 1823.¹⁹ And it was during this visit that Philip transferred John Baillie from the Kuruman to Tsantsabane, to work under the authority of the Griquatown missionaries among the refugee Tlharo and others, and to assist the few Griqua families stationed there in the integration of these Sotho-Tswana in the Griquatown state.

Baillie proved unsatisfactory at Tsantsabane, and left the station to resign from the LMS in 1836. The nominal reasons for Philip’s dissatisfaction with him were his disorganized financial affairs and his deficiencies as a missionary. There can be little doubt, however, that the main reason for his departure was his unwillingness to subject himself to the plans of Wright and Philip. Significantly, Philip wrote to Baillie that he should not concern himself with teaching the Sotho-Tswana trades.

The Griquas of Waterboer have all fountains and farms of their own. The Bechuanas live upon the milk of their cows that may graze over a whole country, until the Gospel changes their hearts they will not change their manners to build houses and to acquire trades.²⁰

¹⁸ See, for these events, Lemue January 1, 1833 [JDM, VIII, 195-206]; January 26, 1833 [LMS 13/3/A]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 303-4; Moilwa, Petrus Rooy in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 299, 315-7.

¹⁹ Nicholas Kruger in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 5.

²⁰ Philip to Baillie, October 5, 1833 [LMS 13/4/A]. For Baillie at Tsantsabane see also Philip, July 3, 1832 [LMS 13/1/B]; November 5, 1833 [LMS 13/4/A]; Baillie, August 16, 1832 [LMS 13/2/D]; May 30, 1833 [LMS 13/3/B]; January 3, 1833 [LMS 13/4/E]; October 23, 1833 [LMS 14/2/B]; March 7, 1835 [LMS 14/3/C]; August 13, 1835 [LMS 14/4/D]; Wright, June 9, 1836 [LMS 15/1/C]. The Tlharo chief was ‘Siamechue’ and Jan Visser and Jan Klaas appear to have been the leading Griqua. Baillie had wanted to move from the Kuruman to Mahura at Old Dithakong, but Moffat had resisted this because he wanted, unavailingly, to persuade Mahura back to the Kuruman.

This statement of Philip's, so contrary to the usual emphasis on 'civilization and the Gospel' going hand-in-hand together, is further illuminated in the correspondence of Peter Wright. Wright, of course, was forced to justify to the LMS the fact that the Sotho-Tswana practice of agriculture was so far superior to that of the 'semi-civilized' Griqua, that the Sotho-Tswana were more advanced in 'habits of industry and frugality.' It was, he argued, precisely because of the greater civilization of the Griqua, because of their greater 'artificial wants' that their agricultural achievement in times of drought was inferior to that of the Sotho-Tswana. In order to defend the district, for example, the Griqua needed horses and firearms, the procurement and care of which occupied time and energy which would otherwise have been devoted to agriculture. Thus, Wright continued, it was perfectly justifiable for the Griqua to depend on the Sotho-Tswana for their crops, since the Griqua were able to spare the 'timid' and 'defenseless' Sotho-Tswana from the expense, labour, and risk, 'public duty in the general defence.'²¹

Except for the fact that Philip and Wright were inclined to attribute the 'civilization' of the Griqua totally to missionary influence, rather than to the fact that the Griqua had, since the eighteenth century, been frontiersmen, this was a more realistic appraisal of the Griqua economy than any missionary had presented before. Like the white frontier farmers, the Griqua were traders, hunters, herders, raiders rather than agriculturalists. But this appraisal also provided the final element for the justification of Griqua hegemony in Transorangia. The energies of the Griqua would be diverted, at Griquatown, from hunting and trading and would be used instead to secure Griqua hegemony in Transorangia for the defense of the Colony northern frontier. Meanwhile, at least until such hegemony was secured, the Sotho-Tswana were required to raise crops for the Griqua and be grateful for their protection. As they became converted to Christianity, indeed, the position of the Sotho-Tswana might change: in the meantime their position was to be little better than 'hewers of wood and drawers of water.'

Failing to persuade most of the Sotho-Tswana communities south of the Molopo to seek protection within the confines of the Griqua state, it was necessary for Waterboer to extend the territorial boundaries of his hegemony in order to implement the Philip proposals. The main thrust of these attempts came in the aftermath of his Treaty with the Colonial government, which was signed on December 11, 1834. Though Philip had as yet made no headway in his attempts to secure the annexation of the Griqua territory, he had persuaded the Colony government to enter into a more formal relationship with his protégé Waterboer. Conducted by Peter Wright, who had already made one journey to Cape Town to conduct preliminary negotiations, Waterboer traveled to the city in 1834

²¹ Wright, September 25, 1835 [LMS 14/4/E]. Also Wright, June 19, 1834 [LMS 14/1/C].

to find a well-prepared and lavish reception laid on for him. Besides two banquets at Government House, for which, as Wright notes, Waterboer was fetched and taken home in the Governor's carriage, he made speeches and attended banquets with most of Cape Town's notables, including the Bishop-elect of Madras, the Chief Justice, that 'great Philosopher' Sir John Herschel, and others of similar stature.²² His assertion of his principles of government evoked, no doubt, surprise and respect:

I feel that I am bound to govern my people by Christian principles...the government which is not founded on the principles of the Bible must come to nothing. When government lose sight of the[se] principles...partiality, injustice, oppression and cruelty prevail, then suspicion, want of confidence, jealousy, hatred, revolt and destruction succeed... I hope by the principles of the Gospel the morals of my people will continue to improve, and that it shall be my endeavour in humble dependence on the divine blessing, that those principles shall lose none of their force by my example. Sound education I know will civilize them, make them wise, useful, powerful and secure among their neighbours; and the better they are educated the more clearly will they see that the principles of the Bible are the best principles for the government of individuals, of families, of tribes and nations.²³

However, some remained skeptical, not of Waterboer himself, but of the influence which this privileged treatment would have on him: 'that man is ruined,' Andrew Smith, then at the Kuruman, is reported to have said.²⁴ Armed with his treaty, Waterboer returned to Griquatown on March 22, 1835. He was now a 'friend and ally' of the Colony, ordered to protect the colonial frontier from 'Kheis to Ramah', by sending back fugitives, warning of possible attacks, and assisting Colony forces. He would receive a salary of £100, and arms and ammunition. £50 a year would be given to the mission school at Griquatown for Griqua education, especially in English.²⁵ The two most important elements of the Treaty, however, were its omissions. Waterboer's territory, in the first place, was not clearly defined. In an accompanying letter D'Urban speaks of it as 'on the northern frontier of the colony, extending over a surface, on both banks of the Orange River, nearly from the 28th to the 30th degree of south latitude, and from 22-1/2 to 25° east longitude beyond which also he had considerable influence': in particular the Treaty stated 'the limits to the north undefined.'²⁶ And, by a separate and confidential arrangement, Peter Wright was asked to become Government Agent at Griquatown.

²² Wright, May 25, 1835 [LMS 14/3/D]. Also Wright, January 25, 1834 [LMS 14/4/A]; 'Report for Griquatown,' December 8, 1834 [LMS 14/2/D].

²³ For this speech, given to the Cape Society of Missionaries on January 28, 1835, see Philip in [538 of 1836, 626-7]; JDM, XI, 119-123; *S. A. Commercial Advertiser*, February 11, 1835; Backhouse, *Narrative*, 447-8.

²⁴ Quoted in Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]. See also Smith, *Diary*, II, 274.

²⁵ For the treaty, see [252 of 1835, 115-6]. See also Kotze, *American Missionaries*, 65fn.

²⁶ Sir B. D'Urban to Spring Rice, December 26, 1834 [252 of 1835, 114-5].

Hither to I have not been in the habit of interfering with the general affairs of the country [wrote Wright in accepting]. I beg leave to add, that I think it advisable that the missionary should not be in an official capacity with the Government, and should I find the engagement even in this way to interfere with my usefulness as a missionary, I shall acquaint your Excellency, so that another person, if necessary, may be appointed in time.²⁷

As Philip later pointed out, Wright's position was different from that of Anderson, or for that matter, Melvill. 'Anderson's appointment was disagreeable to the chiefs and the people, they were then jealous of the colonial government and they supposed that he was made an agent of the Government to oppress them.'²⁸ Nevertheless, particularly because the appointment was kept secret from the Kuruman missionaries, Wright had placed himself in a role which was *a priori* anathema to Robert Moffat.²⁹

Waterboer's visit to the Cape, wrote Peter Wright from Griquatown in July 1835, 'appears very much to have increased his influence and importance in this country.' By that time Waterboer had been visited by many of the nearby Sotho-Tswana chiefs, including Mothibi, Seretse of the Tlharo (living west of the Kuruman), and Mokgatla of the Hurutshe, as well as the two chiefs from the Caledon valley who had taken refuge in the district in 1824. 'All the above-mentioned chiefs look up to Waterboer as a wise and just man and a powerful Chieftainship,' continued Wright. 'They place great confidence in him and will have recourse to him in all difficulties.'³⁰ During the second part of 1835, Waterboer returned these visits, and extended his journey to the Kuruman and Motito. Waterboer's 'influence in the country and his power, is vastly increasing by forming alliances with these chiefs,' wrote the faithful Wright.³¹ Lemue, who saw Waterboer at Motito, reported that he had been 'very satisfied and very edified by his conversation,' and soon afterwards sent a letter to Waterboer asking him to reprimand Mahura for cattle-raiding from the Rolong at Motito. 'In these circumstances if we had not a friend in you on whom we can depend Mahura and his people would distress us very much.'³²

It seemed as if Waterboer would indeed be able to unite the Sotho-Tswana of western Transorangia under his hegemony. There is little wonder, then, that Wright should have

²⁷ P. Wright, November 18, 1834 [252 of 1835, 116]. Also D'Urban to Spring Rice, December 26, 1834 [*ibid.*, 116]; 'Instructions' to Wright, December 15, 1834 [*ibid.*, 116-7].

²⁸ See Philip, February 22, 1839 [LMS 16/3/B].

²⁹ For this secrecy, see Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E].

³⁰ Wright, July 15, [LMS 14/4/C].

³¹ Wright, August 17, 1835 [LMS 14/4/D].

³² Lemue to Waterboer, October 19, 1835 [Quoted in Wright to Lemue, September 25, 1840]; Lemue, November 5 1835 [JDM, XI, 189-190]. See also Lemue, July 15, 1835 [JDM, XI, 8]; October 7, 1835 [JDM, XI, 125]; Lemue to Wright, June 15, 1836 [Quoted in Wright to Lemue, September 25, 1840]. The Rolong concerned were the Mariba under Molala and Motshware.

written so boastfully to Phillip in October 1835, comparing Griquatown with the Kuruman: though Kuruman, he said,

...has the appearance of a little paradise in the desert...there is no foundation laid for the framework of civil society, there is no Chief, no Government, the different petty chiefs round about the Station are jealous of each other, parties are forming, bad feelings are generating and maturing, and the consequences must one day be — —.

Griquatown, continued Wright, despite its 'gloomy' outward aspect due to continued drought, was different. Wright spoke of

...the extent of our labours, which through our blessing result in the good principles, disposition, and conduct of our people, for which our people are distinguished, and by which the country and the defenceless tribes around are saved from confusion and blood.

The congregations were 'equal to anything...in this country in cleanliness, attention and intelligence,' there was 'nothing equal...in these parts for efficiency and progress' to the day-school. In sum, 'there is no Mission on this side the River that can present more than a fraction of a similar state of things, nor are there any people equal to our people, in intelligence, principle, and conduct.'³³

In this letter, however, there is more than a hint of arrogance and complacency, characteristics which the Griqua, as well as Wright, were beginning to show. Nor were these hidden from the Sotho-Tswana who, almost immediately after Waterboer's return to Griquatown, began to react against the increased powers given him by his treaty. In some cases, perhaps, this was predominantly a 'traditionalist' reaction against the Christian Griqua: at Tsantsabane, for example, the Tlharo chief and a man named 'Kotlane...who is esteemed as a Prophet among them' began to intimidate those of their subjects who attended Baillie's services.³⁴ But the major reaction was entirely political. When Mokgatla of the Hurutshe advised Mahura of his intention to remove from Taungs to join Mahura at Old Dithakong, the latter sent a message back that instead he was intending to come to Taungs. 'This occurred soon after the news was heard concerning Waterboer's power and which was reported to be so great as to warrant him in interfering with Latakoo [Dithakong] and its inhabitants.'³⁵ It was later to be claimed that Waterboer and his son-in-law Nicholas Kruger, when visiting the Tlharo near Kuruman in 1835, 'convened the chiefs, and insisted on them and their people becoming his subjects and threatened

³³ Wright to Philip, October 5, 1835 [LMS 14/4/E]. The letter was in fact an attack on Andrew Smith, who had been reported in the S.A. Commercial advertiser (always read by Waterboer) as criticizing the 'impertinence' of some of Waterboer's men, and praising the Kuruman. At the time Smith wrote, he had not yet visited Griquatown.

³⁴ Baillie, March 7, 1835 [LMS 14/3/C].

³⁵ Smith, *Diary*, I, 387. Also *ibid.*, II, 274.

them with the deprivation of everything like guns and ammunition or visits of traders.' Further, Waterboer wanted Griqua field-cornets appointed to the district, and 'respecting this part of the country he did not hesitate to say to whose who were in his confidence that it was his by right of conquest,' the 'conquest' being his commando against the 'Mantatees' in 1823. The Tlharo replied that 'we like your friendship but not your sway' and pointed out that they had their own chiefs, as well as their own mission, at the Kuruman. The missionaries, replied Waterboer, 'wish to be great men among you' and would be removed from the country if they stood in the way of Griqua hegemony.³⁶ Soon after this complaints began to be voiced by the Sotho-Tswana that the Griqua were attempting to restrict their access to firearms and ammunition from traders, and in some cases seizing traders' wagons. This was, of course, because Waterboer's Griqua intended to maintain a monopoly on the control of these commodities, and issue them only to their friends.³⁷ For, as Hendrick Hendricks pointed out to Andrew Smith, if Bantu-speakers obtained firearms, 'they would soon master all the civilized people, they are so numerous.'³⁸

By the end of 1835, therefore, there were already signs that Griqua hegemony was acquiring a momentum unsuspected, perhaps (but only perhaps) by Wright and Philip. There were even signs that this hegemony was of a kind different only in degree from that which white frontiersmen sought to impose on Bantu-speakers. And there were signs that Griqua expansionism had its eyes on the Kuruman, its flowing fountains, and its mission. After all, as Moffat wrote later, the Kuruman

...with its fine chrystal river...[was] the loveliest spot on the face of the whole country to make a Griqua metropolis, where the...Coranna Decemviri might hold their forum under the cooling shade of the tall spreading willows opposite a range of substantial buildings and awe the nations until Waterboer had become a second Washington.³⁹

³⁶ Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]; Lemue to Wright, July 2, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A]. As Wright pointed out in his letter of reply to Lemue, the latter had made a different assessment of Waterboer until 1836 (see footnote 32); however, according to Wright, Waterboer did say to the Tlharo in 1835 that 'ere long he hoped he should have the pleasure of seeing them, and all the other tribes united with him and the British Government in *one* treaty of peace, friendship and confidence' (my emphasis); Wright to Lemue, September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B].

³⁷ Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/4/E]; Hamilton and Edwards, December 18, 1838 [LMS 16/5/B]; W. Boyce, March 6, 1839 [MMS: VII]; Lemue to Wright, July 2, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A]; Lemue, October 15, 1840 [PEMS: Lemue file]. See also Wright, September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B] who claimed that in fact the people outside Waterboer's orbit has been better able to arm themselves than those such as Mothibi who were within it. Also Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 242-3.

³⁸ Smith, *Diary*, I, 213.

³⁹ Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/4/E].

Waterboer, Cornelius Kok II and Berend Berends, 1832 – 1836: Regrouping along the Harts and Vaal

At the same time that the Griquatown state was attempting to extend its hegemony over the Sotho-Tswana, Waterboer, with the support of Philip, sought to assert his precedence over the other three Griqua chiefs. Since all three were in possession of staffs of office issued by the Colonial government, and the chieftainships of Adam Kok II and Cornelius Kok II at least had been sanctioned by the government, it was necessary for a two-pronged offensive: Waterboer and Wright on the spot, and Philip to the government in Cape Town. The strategy employed was, as in the 1820's, to implicate these chiefs in 'marauding' activities, with the addition of the new Philip formulation of Griqua chieftainship: that it existed at the pleasure of the LMS and Colonial government.

In 1832, the conflict between Waterboer and Cornelius Kok II at Campbell was worse than ever. In July, Waterboer visited Campbell, on his way to Philippolis, 'for the purpose of conversing with [Cornelius] upon general subjects connected with the welfare of the country.'

On entering his house [wrote Waterboer] he grossly insulted me, ordered me out, took off his clothes to fight with me, and threw my hat out of his house...finding that I could not get a hearing, I went out of his door and picked up my hat; and I am since informed on good authority, that at the moment I was leaving his house he took up his gun...and had it not been for the interference of his wife he would have shot me... But his bad conduct did not end there; for the following day he forwarded a private letter to the chief of Philippolis, charging him to be aware of me; that his (A. Kok's) life was not safe in my presence.⁴⁰

Later in the year, Philip and Waterboer together built a case to present to government. Cornelius Kok, said Waterboer, quite incorrectly, had been 'recommended' to government as Waterboer's deputy at Campbell by Waterboer himself: in fact, Kok had been elected by the people of Campbell.⁴¹ He was longer fulfilling his task adequately however, and had given countenance to raiders, including Stuurman (a former subject of Cornelius') who had murdered members of two colonial families during 1832.⁴² Furthermore, added Philip to this indictment, Cornelius Kok 'has literally driven all the people all the people away [from Campbell]...the whole of the fountains...are running to waste...the people who formerly used them are wandering about the country in a state of banishment.' Therefore, recommended Philip, Cornelius Kok should have his sanction withdrawn by government, especially since he might call on 'the disorderly people of the country' to as-

⁴⁰ Waterboer to Philip, December 4, 1832 [538 of 1836, 619].

⁴¹ See Chapter 6.

⁴² Waterboer to Wright, December 11, 1832 [425 of 1837, 151].

sist him against Waterboer.⁴³ The accusations were unjust: Stuurman's connections with Cornelius Kok appear to have been tenuous in the extreme, and if there were no people at Campbell, this was quite probably because a smallpox epidemic had claimed 52 lives at the station only a year before, and because a severe drought was forcing the dispersal of the Griqua. Government did not in fact act on the accusations, even when Philip renewed his recommendation in 1834, suggesting this time that Cornelius Kok be given £30 a year by government to forfeit his position.⁴⁴ 'Nothing can be done at present,' wrote Wright in 1835 with regard to Campbell, 'but to wait patiently till Providence removes the difficulty.'⁴⁵ But Providence did not intervene, and though Kok's missionary Bartlett, suspended from the LMS for a period in the late 1820's, was dismissed unconditionally in the mid-1830's, both he and Cornelius Kok himself remained at Campbell with their following, establishing closer relationships with the growing number of those discontented with the Waterboer-Wright-Philip axis.

The challenge to Berend Berends was posed in a different way. In 1830, as has been seen, Waterboer had told Moffat that 'it would be an act of the greatest injustice to attempt taking it [Daniels Kuil] from Captain Berend, its lawful owner.'⁴⁶ Soon after this the LMS missionaries began again the itineration which had lapsed during the 1820's, and included within their sphere Daniels Kuil, where some of Waterboer's followers were living.⁴⁷ James Archbell at Platberg, perturbed by this, grew more alarmed when he discovered that the Jood family and the Fortuin family, upset by the 1831 Berends commando, had moved from Boetsap to Daniels Kuil and transferred their allegiance to Waterboer. Believing that the itineration of the LMS had encouraged this, and hearing renewed rumors of Waterboer's plans for ousting Berends from the Daniels Kuil fountain, he wrote to Griquatown asking the missionaries 'aware of the connection of Daniels Kuil with our Buchuaap station only' to desist from their itineration.⁴⁸

Archbell based his argument around the principles of an agreement concluded between the Wesleyans and the LMS in London, that Berend Berends 'Political right to Daniels

⁴³ Philip to Wade, October 10, 1833 [425 of 1837, 145].

⁴⁴ Philip to D'Urban, July 16, 1834 [538 of 1836, 620-1]. See also Philip in *ibid.*, 618. Roger Edwards later alleged that Philip had sent the trader Ward to buy off Cornelius Kok from the chieftainship: Edward's notes in Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E].

⁴⁵ Wright, September 25, 1835 [LMS 14/4/E]. See also Bartlett, December 26, 1831 [LMS 12/4/D]; Rolland, July 27, 1830 [JDM, VI, 44]; Philip, April 4, 1838 [LMS 16/1/B].

⁴⁶ See Chapter 8.

⁴⁷ For the itineration, see Wright, March 3, 1829 [LMS 11/3/C]; 'Reply to colonial Office Circular,' Griquatown, December 17, 1830 [LMS 12/4/C]; 'Schedule of Returns,' Griquatown, December 6, 1830 [LMS 12/4/E].

⁴⁸ Archbell to Wright, August 17, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/A].

Kuil establishes our Ecclesiastical claim to it.⁴⁹ This issue the Griquatown missionaries sought at first to avoid. Daniels Kuil, they insisted, had 'for many years' been within the itineration field of Griquatown, and 'prudence should direct you [Archbell] as it had hitherto directed us' to leave the 'political' issues alone. Almost all of the Boetsap Griqua, including Berends himself, had originally been members of the Griquatown church, and if Archbell was to establish claims wherever they went, he would soon be denying LMS rights at Griquatown and the Kuruman.⁵⁰

But this was not, as Wright and Hughes sought at first to present, and as John Galbraith has recently argued, a 'violent controversy over an insignificant fountain' arising from the rival mission imperialism of the Wesleyans and the LMS.⁵¹ It was primarily a conflict between Waterboer and Berends for political control over one of the best fountains in Griqua territory. After consultation with Philip during his journey to Griquatown, therefore, Wright and Hughes reformulated their approach in line with his concepts of Griqua chieftainship. Berend Berends, they argued to Archbell, was not a chief since he

...was never recognized as a chief by the Colonial Government, he was not ever chosen by the people at Daniels Kuil, and never a higher office at that station than the deputy of the Chief at Griquatown who had the power to supersede him at pleasure.

While they did not dispute Berends' ownership, in a private capacity, of a fountain at Daniels Kuil, they denied that this gave the Wesleyans the right to itinerate there.⁵² Archbell, however, challenged the LMS position by commencing itineration at the Kuil himself in November 1832, and the matter was referred to John Philip and William Shaw, the latter head of the Wesleyan district which included Transorangia. Philip argued that Berend Berends had made use of Archbell, and that at the time Archbell began the correspondence, Berends was in Namaqualand raising 'banditti' for another commando against Mzilikazi, whose first object 'Berends himself declared publicly...would be to destroy Waterboer and take possession of Daniels Kuil.'⁵³

But it was impossible for Philip to sustain the argument that Berends was the aggressor, when it was Philip who was denying Berends any rights to chieftainship at all. Berends

⁴⁹ Archbell to Wright, October 31, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/B]

⁵⁰ Wright and Hughes to Archbell, September 5, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/A]; Wright to Archbell, December 1, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/B]. See also Wright to Philip, November 9, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/B].

⁵¹ Galbraith, *Reluctant Empire*, 90-1.

⁵² Wright to Archbell, December 1, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/B] which included Philip to Wright, [n.d.]. It was on this occasion, in fact, that Philip first formulated the views on Griqua chieftainship discussed in Chapter 9.

⁵³ Philip to [LMS?], October 5, 1833 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/C]. See also Shaw to Philip [January 1833?]; Philip to LMS, [n.d.] [LMS: PPapers 3/1/C].

was indeed raising a commando against Mzilikazi, but it is highly unlikely that he would have employed it in Griqualand except in the defense of Daniels Kuil. In 1825, Philip had himself described Berends as 'a very shrewd and respectable-looking old man...one of the Griqua chiefs,' and he was now again forced to concede, to the Wesleyans at least, that Berends was 'the acknowledged chief of Boetsap.'⁵⁴ Shaw, Philip and Archbell, in fact, signed a mutual declaration that recognized the rights of both societies to itinerate to Daniels Kuil, and stated that 'any dispute respecting the right to lands in question shall not be settled by the Missionaries, but by the Griqua chiefs themselves.'⁵⁵ Soon after this, Berend Berends himself and many of his followers removed from the Harts-Vaal area to the Caledon valley, easing the strains between himself and Waterboer. But it would appear that some of Berends' followers, including David Bergover, a field-cornet, remained at the Kuil.⁵⁶ And since Andries Waterboer borrowed money from Wright to buy the particular farm owned by Berends at the Kuil, the question of the political, as opposed to personal, rights of Berends over Daniels Kuil were left unresolved. With the removal of the Wesleyans from the area, though, the LMS was left in undisputed possession of iteration rights.⁵⁷

There is only one aspect of this affair that is puzzling. In 1832 Moffat placed a different interpretation on his conversation with Waterboer two years earlier, arguing that the 1830 agreement contained 'nothing like resigning political rights etc. etc. but merely an assurance that [Waterboer] would not...make war on Barend for sowing corn or planting a garden...at Daniels Kuil.'⁵⁸ Though Moffat would later admit that he had been wrong in supporting Waterboer, it is hard to explain the discrepancy. Archbell believed that it was Waterboer who placed a different interpretation on the agreement in 1832 from 1830. It is equally plausible to suppose that the cantankerous Moffat had personal hostility to the equally cantankerous Archbell. Archbell did indeed have as many disagreements with his Wesleyan colleagues as Moffat with those of the LMS: as the Wesleyan

⁵⁴ Philip, *Researches*, II, 109; Philip to [LMS?], October 5, 1833 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/C].

⁵⁵ J. Philip, J. Archbell, and W. Shaw, January 23, 1833 [Quoted in Archbell, 'The Question of Daniels Kuil, MMS: XI-Document D].

⁵⁶ See, for example, Smith, *Diary*, I, 387, II, 276; Lambert Jansz in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 10-11.

⁵⁷ See W. Shaw, 'A Defence of the Wesleyan society' [Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 238-9]; Freeman to Waterboer, December 6, 1849 [LMS 24/1/B]; Waterboer to Freeman, January 18, 1850 [LMS 25/1/A]; 'Daniels Kuil' in Freeman's notebook [LMS: Africa, Odds, Box IV]. Both parties, however, continued to maintain that they had won the case. See, for example, Wright, September 25, 1835 [LMS 14/4/E]; Archbell, 'Question' [MMS: XI-D]; Nicholas Kruger in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 3, 6; Warren, *On the Veldt*, 339-340.

⁵⁸ Moffat to Wright, December 6, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/C]. See also Moffat to Archbell, November 15, 1832 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/B].

Boyce commented it 1839, this was to be expected if one put a genius in a remote field for twenty years at a stretch.⁵⁹

The first two attempts by Philip, Wright, and Waterboer to displace or undermine Griqua chiefs had therefore failed. But Waterboer's position in western Transorangia was strengthened by the removal, in 1833-4, of a large part of the population of Berend Berends' loosely structured Griqua state across Transorangia to the Caledon Valley. The motives for this move were mixed, but it appears that the least of them was the attempted intimidation of Berends by Waterboer and Wright. In the first place, the Rolong-Seleka had been joined at Platberg by the Rolong-Ratlou and the Rolong-Tshidi, which was placing an impossible strain on the resources of the area. Secondly, the state had been subject in 1832 to a series of raids by Kora groups, probably those based on the Modder or Riet Rivers, and possibly those of Witvoet.⁶⁰ Thirdly, the Rolong claimed later that they moved across Transorangia to the south-east so that they could more easily procure firearms.⁶¹ In mid-1833, the chiefs and the missionaries went scouting for suitable sites for settlement, and found one at the mountain of Thaba Nchu, then occupied by a chief named Mosema, who was kin of or tributary to Moshweshwe. By the beginning of 1834, the move across Transorangia was complete, with the Rolong settled at Thaba Nchu, the Kora of Jan Taaibosch and 'Xgai' at Umpukani, and Berends' followers at New Boetsap.⁶² In this new area along the Caledon valley, with the elements of the state rather more dispersed than before, and each of them in an uncertain relationship with Moshweshwe across the Caledon River, the state of Berends would never quite regain its strength. Berends himself, in fact, appears to have spent as much time in Namaqualand (with Afrikaner?) as at New Boetsap (or Lishuani, to where the Griqua shortly transferred): his position as Griqua chief was more-or-less assumed by his follower Peter David.

The move left hegemony over the Harts-Vaal area uncertain. All elements of the Berends state left remnants of their people behind them, and claimed later that they had not forfeited their land or their authority in the area. Of those who remained, however, the dominant figure was Jan Bloem. 'During the absence of Jan Taaibosch [in the Caledon

⁵⁹ W. Boyce, March 6, 1839 [MMS: VII]; Archbell, 'Question' [MMS: XI-D].

⁶⁰ See Archbell, June 25, 1832 [MMS: V-1832/16]; July 19, 1832 [MMS: V-1832/23]; Steedman, *Adventures*, II, 34ff.

⁶¹ Korea, 'Bhaikkaki,' Molema in Bloemhof Bluebook, 136-8, 142-3, 144. See also Matlaba in *ibid.*, 263-4; D.F. Kruger and J.L. Pretorius in *ibid.*, 197-9, 218-9.

⁶² For the scouting and the move, see Archbell, February 5, 1833 [MMS: V-1833/3]; May 27, 1833 [MMS: V-1833/17]; September 2, 1833 [MMS: V-1833/28]; January 17, 1834 [MMS: VII- 'A summary of the Wesleyan Bichuana Mission...'] [MMS: V-1833/32]; December 2, 1833 [MMS: V-1833/38]; Edwards, *Reminiscences*, 78-92; Jenkins, December 24, 1833 [MMS: V-1833/43]. Also Beecham to Chairman Albany District, September 8, 1834 [MMS: Outgoing letters]; Albany District Committee, February 4, 1834 [MMS: Synod Minutes].

valley]’ it was said later, ‘Jan Bloem ruled in the country.’⁶³ To the American missionaries, Bloem acknowledge that he governed the area subject to the authority of Berend Berends.⁶⁴ Bloem, ‘a tall, robots, fine-looking man — his complexion nearly white, and his features European...a clever man and a first-rate shot,’ may have had immediately under him some 2000 Kora, who were clearly best-equipped, with their firearms, to protect the populations along the Harts and the Vaal.⁶⁵ Also in the area still were the Kora of Mosweu Taaibosch, possibly as far up the Harts as the present Schweizer-Rienecke.⁶⁶ And, seeking refuge from Mzilikazi, some 2000 Hurutshe had settled at Taungs at the end of 1832. Here, then, was the nucleus of another loosely-structured state, or confederation, to replace the vacuum left by the departure of Berends and the Wesleyans.

It was not long before this incipient state was under attack by Mzilikazi, whose spies had been sent to discover the whereabouts of the Hurutshe, not yet punished for daring to flee from subjection to the Ndebele. Mokgatla asked Mosweu’s Kora to dispose of the Ndebele scouting party but, after a lengthy battle, it was the Kora themselves, despite superior arms and numbers, who were defeated.⁶⁷ It would seem to have been this event which stimulated Jan Bloem to organize another commando against Mzilikazi. This force took the field in June 1834, and included the Hurutshe. Once more the familiar pattern was repeated: the commando succeeded in capturing some cattle, but as it retreated it was ambushed and severely defeated.⁶⁸ Mzilikazi ‘has been attacked three times now with horsemen and guns,’ wrote Moffat, ‘and in every instance they have been driven... One thing is certain, if Moselekatse...becomes exasperated to make an irruption into this country he will make terrible havoc and likely drive all the inhabitants beyond the Orange River.’⁶⁹

Mzilikazi, however, did not become exasperated. Still pursuing his attempts at building a relationship with the southern frontier through Moffat, and believing that Jan Blo-

⁶³)Petrus Rooy in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 292. See also Gasibonwe, Petrus Rooy, Jantje Mothibi, Andries, Moilwa in *ibid.*, 292, 299, 300, 315-7. Also Smith, *Diary*, I, 190-1, 231; Bain, *Journals*, 137-8; citations in footnote 60.

⁶⁴ Joint letter, August 18, 1836 [Kotze, *American Missionaries*, 136].

⁶⁵ Solomon, *Two Lectures*, 16. For various reports on where Jan Bloem was living during this period (Springbokfontein, Modder River, Phokwane?) see Jan Bloem, Jr., in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 294; Petrus Rooy in *ibid.*, 300; Engelbrecht, Korana, 60; Kotze, *American Missionaries*, 136; Helmore to Waterboer, November 27, 1840 [LMS 18/2/B].

⁶⁶ See Lemue, April 8, 1836 [JDM, XI, 332]. Also Moffat, November 23, 1836 [LMS 15/2/D].

⁶⁷ Lemue, February 28, 1834 [JDM, X, 15-16]. See also Moilwa in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 315-6.

⁶⁸ See Lemue, June 1, 1834 [JDM, X, 14-5]; Kuruman Missionaries, September 3, 1834 [LMS 14/2/F]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 326-7, 336, 353, II, 53, 66, 98, 243-4, 262-3; R. Moffat, July 28, 1834; Mary Moffat, August 20, 1834 [Moffat, *Lives*, 181-2]; Jan Pienaar in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 19; Moilwa, Mogaal in *ibid.*, 316-7, 326-7; Kolbe [LMS Journals 4/106].

⁶⁹ Kuruman Missionaries, September 3, 1834 [LMS 14/2/F]. See also Smith, *Diary*, I, 128-9, 144.

em had a missionary with his people, Mzilikazi did not counterattack the peoples of the Harts-Vaal area. Visited for the second time by Moffat in 1835, and negotiating in that year with Andrew Smith for a treaty relationship with the Colony, Mzilikazi was very careful not give any cause of offense to his white friends.⁷⁰ Under these conditions, the Harts-Vaal area offered the best possibilities for Sotho-Tswana communities to attempt to establish themselves in independence form either Mzilikazi or Waterboer. It was, no doubt, for these reasons that Mahura, the only remaining southern Sotho-Tswana chief of any stature, moved from Old Dithakong to the Harts-Vaal area towards the end of 1834. At Old Dithakong, Mahura had played a cautious diplomatic game with Mzilikazi. Relying on the protection of Moffat at the Kuruman, Mahura had made occasional cattle-raids on the Ndebele outposts, and at times attempted to stop Ndebele envoys or white traders from passing his settlement.⁷¹ But he had not participated in either of the major commandos against Mzilikazi (in 1831 or 1834) which might have provoked the Ndebele to counter-attack. Meanwhile he had conserved the strength of his Tlhaping followers, and sought to increase his power by the acquisition of firearms.⁷² But Old Dithakong was uncomfortably close to Motito, over which Waterboer appeared by 1834-5 to be asserting hegemony, and in addition, the pasture was better near the Harts. Thus Mahura moved, to establish himself at Taungs where, under the shelter of Jan Bloem's guns, he could secure hegemony over a growing population.⁷³

By 1836 Mahura was exerting authority over a heterogeneous collection of Sotho-Tswana peoples in the Harts-Vaal area. Besides the 1500 Tlhaping he had brought from Old Dithakong, there were the 2000 Hurutshe who considered themselves as 'under [Tlhaping] shelter,' as well as Mosweu's Kora. Living with Mosweu Taaibosch (whose daughter was a wife of Mahura) there were some 500 Sotho-Tswana refugees of mixed origin. In addition there were the Maidei, numbering 1200-1500, who had followed Mahura from old Dithakong and 'pay some deference to Mahura, though they have not owned him as their head.'⁷⁴

⁷⁰ For Mzilikazi's assessment of affairs in the south, and the diplomacy of this period, see, for example, Smith, *Diary*, I, 352, II, 244; Joint letter, August 18, 1836 [Kotze, *American Missionaries*, 135-7]; Edwards, May 1, 1835 [LMS 14/5/D]; Moffat, *Matabele Journals*, I, 133-8; Kirby, *Smith*, 178-191, 203-211. Mzilikazi appears to have taken his revenge on a hunting party of Berends' followers: see Wright, July 15, 1835 [LMS 14/4/C]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 109, 117-8, 123, 127, 144.

⁷¹ See Rolland, July 12, 1834 [JDM, X, 96]; Lemue, January 2, 1835 [JDM, X, 264-5]; March 30, 1835 [JDM, X, 328-38]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 244-7, 330-336, 339-340, 399, II, 37, 65; Lemue, July 15, 1835 [JDM, XI, 7-16]; November 11, 1835 [JDM, XI, 188]; Bain, *Journals*, 140; Kotze, *American Missionaries*, 137.

⁷² See, for example, Smith, *Diary*, I, 216, 244.

⁷³ See Gert Molehabangwe in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 9; Smith, *Diary*, 387.

⁷⁴ Hughes, October 13, 1836 [LMS 15/1/C]. Also Moffat, November 23, 1836 [LMS 15/2/D].

Mahura [wrote Andrew Smith] has a very difficult task in governing the peoples of his district; they are composed of the remnants of so many different tribes all having separate interests and all being eaten up with fear. If he reproves one of the people of another tribe they instantly state that he intends making a commando against them, the report get rapid circulation, all are in consternation and nothing but death and destruction are expected for a time.⁷⁵

Two factors increased the problems of state-building for Mahura. Firstly, though both Archbell and Rolland had at one time intended to settle with him, he had in fact been unable to secure a missionary presence. Not only did this make more difficult his dealings with whites, but it prevented the growth of a church which could have acted as a unifying influence on the different elements of the population. Secondly, Mahura was not a 'legitimate' Tlhaping chief. As the brother of the 'real' chief Mothibi, who had sought the protection of Waterboer, Mahura's claims to rule an even larger section of the Tlhaping than his brother were strictly pragmatic: that his rule was more effective in the circumstances.⁷⁶ Neither a legitimate 'traditional' ruler, therefore, nor a missionary-supported chief like Waterboer or Moroka of the Rolong-Seleka, Mahura had to tread the difficult path of secular modernization. The description given by Harris of the dress of Mahura and one of his counselors aptly symbolizes Mahura's policies:

Foremost in the motley group was Mahura...a portly personage of exceedingly forbidding manners and unprepossessing exterior. He was habited in a threadbare jacket and leathern trowsers, with a broad-brimmed white hat which obscured a large portion of his sinister physiognomy. His A.D.C. — another prominent figure — had inducted his shriveled frame into a green surtout and military chaco, being withal the least martial character I ever beheld.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, Mahura and his loosely-organized following at Taungs played, as his strength in firearms grew, an increasingly important part in the power balance of Transorangia. As Lemue wrote in 1838, 'when I visited Taungs in 1832 to look for the Hurutshe, only a handful of miserable huts could be seen, and now, from the center of Mahura's town, I could distinguish fifteen villages, spread on the two banks of the Harts. Several of these villages did not have less than 500 – 600 huts.'⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Smith, *Diary*, I, 322.

⁷⁶ It is not clear whether Gasibonwe, Mothibi's heir, was initially with Mahura or not; towards the end of the decade he was certainly with Mothibi. See Gert Molehabangwe in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 90.

⁷⁷ Harris, *Wild Sports*, 44.

⁷⁸ Lemue, December 28, 1838 [JDM, XIV, 331-2].

Waterboer and the Philippolis State, 1830 – 1837

At Philippolis in the early 1830's, the conflict between the 'Kora' and 'Bastard' elements of the state continued, and was manipulated by Philip and Waterboer in an attempt to extend the hegemony of the Griquatown state in that direction. Stockenström's visit of March 1830 had served to exacerbate the tensions. On the one hand, by ordering the white farmers across the Orange to return to the Colony, he alienated the 'Kora-aligned' faction of the state. On the other hand, by his condemnation of the Griqua for their treatment of the San he gave the Bastard element little to hope for in the way of Colonial support for the strengthening of the authority of the state. Soon after Stockenström's departure, Hendrick Hendricks, choosing to ally himself with the Kora elements, went to the Colony to encourage farmers to return. But when a party of colonists did present themselves at the Orange River ford, Adam Kok II had been persuaded by the Bastards to resist them by force: if the Colony did not intend to regulate the white farmers as Kok wanted, then he intended (as he had not before) to stop their entry to the state himself.⁷⁹

Upon this the farmers informed the Colonial government that they intended only to pass through Kok's state to the 'native tribes' beyond who welcomed their presence; thus, they secured Colonial sanction, and were permitted to pass. These 'native tribes' were undoubtedly the Kora on the fringes of the Philippolis state who, once more able to engage in illegal trade, continued to raid the Ghoya and others who were unable to protect themselves.⁸⁰ Hendrick Hendricks himself appears to have participated in such activities at this time: he is reported to have led a commando against Moshweshwe in about 1830, and he was also one of the leaders of the Griqua and Kora party which joined the Berends commando against Mzilikazi in 1831.⁸¹

Meanwhile Adam Kok II, the Bastards, and Peter Kolbe, who replaced Melvill as LMS missionary in 1831, attempted to stem the tide of white farmer emigration. The white colonists, of course, had a case. They did not understand why Bastards and Khoi were permitted to emigrate when they were not, they knew that land was available, and they argued that it was unfair that the Griqua should be permitted to sell their cattle, grown fat in the Transorangia pastures, in the Colony and compete with the farmers whose pastures were overcropped and dry. They wanted, they claimed to be 'no better...but also no

⁷⁹ See Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 239-240, 307-9

⁸⁰ See, for example, Arbousset, *Narrative*, 26, 95, 210-211, 226, 228-9, 295; Smith, *Dairy*, I, 96, 148, 154, 179, 195, 212-3, 223, 232; Rolland, July 27, 1830 [JDM, VI, 43-4]; Pelissier, November 19, 1833 [JDM, IX, 131-4]; Casalis, October 4, 1833 [JDM, IX, 138-141]; Rolland, April 20, 1835 [JDM, X, 302]; Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 51.

⁸¹ See, for example, Orpen, *History of the Basutos*, 7. Also Smith, *Diary*, I, 113, 116.

worse' than the Griqua, 'no higher, but also no lower.'⁸² But at the same time there were those among them who could describe Adam Kok II as a 'gemeen schepsel,' who were prepared to submit to Colonial law in Transorangia, and wished to invoke Colonial authority to ensure their ability to cross into Transorangia rather than to negotiate with the Griqua themselves. Under such conditions there was little that Adam Kok could do but attempt to strengthen his authority and plead continually with the Colonial government.⁸³

Philip's recommendations to government after his visit to Philippolis in 1832 did not help improve matters. By the time Philip arrived at Philippolis in October of that year, Hendrick Hendricks and Kolbe (the latter giving his whole support to the pro-missionary Bastards) were at daggers drawn. When Kolbe denounced Hendricks' participation in the 1831 Berends commando, Hendricks wrote to him 'that if I did not alter my manner of preaching in making allusion to the affair of Matzelikatsi I could fear the consequences.'⁸⁴ Almost certainly instigated by Hendricks, a Kora party

...entered Adam Kok's district [a few days before Philip's arrival] robbed one of his field-cornets of all his cattle, and...threatened to return and take all the cattle of the Bechuanas...who were then under the protection of Adam Kok. They had been followed by Joseph de Bruin, and a few of the respectable part of Kok's people, and a part of the property had been recovered, but the Berghannas [i.e., the Hendricks supporters] would not join in the pursuit, and the chief himself took no interest in the affair.⁸⁵

Indeed Philip held one of his famous 'meetings of reconciliation' at which 'agreement' was reached to give obedience and support to the 'Chief and the council,' but while Philip traveled further into the interior, the Hendricks faction rebelled and succeeded in removing those councilors who had supported the agreement.⁸⁶ Philip passed rapidly through Philippolis on his return, remarking on the 'ingratitude' of the Griqua, and returned to Cape Town to recommend the deposition of Adam II and his replacement by Joseph de Bruin as deputy to Waterboer. 'More than three fourths' of the people of Philippolis, he said, would support such a measure. This, of course, was a gross exaggeration, for three-fourths of the population would have been able to depose Adam Kok II on their own. Philip was more realistic when he stated that, in order to effect the deposition, it would be necessary to station 25-30 of the Cape Corps at Philippolis who could count on the sup-

⁸² P. van der Walt and 36 farmers to Cole, Stockenstrom and Van Ryneveld, July 1, 1830 [LG 217 Sundry Memorials] [Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 311].

⁸³ See, generally, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 307-321; Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 62ff.

⁸⁴ Kolbe, January 9, 1837 [LMS 15/3/A].

⁸⁵ Philip to Wade, October 10, 1833 [425 of 1837, 144]. See also Kolbe [LMS Journals 4/108]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 76-7; Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 51.

⁸⁶ Kolbe [LMS Journals 4/108]; October 9, 1833 [LMS 13/4/A].

port of only 200 out of the whole population.⁸⁷ But, as at Campbell, the Colonial government did not accept the recommendations of Philip, and confined itself to sending one Captain Armstrong on a journey to the Kora raiders to warn them of the consequences if they persisted.⁸⁸

The consequences of Philip's visit and proposals were twofold for the Philippolis state. Firstly, from 1832 onwards, Philip encouraged the settlement of the missionaries under his jurisdiction in the territory on the fringes of the Philippolis state. In terms of Philip's plans for Transorangia, these would no doubt have strengthened the Griqua position in the long-run, by fostering the common ideology of Christianity and the common structure of the church. But, in the short-run, their influence was divisive, for each chief, as one missionary was later to note, 'expected that *their* Missionary without regard to justice was bound to espouse their cause and aid in the prosecution of their unrighteous desires.'⁸⁹ Or, as Adam Kok told Smith about the Berlin station at Bethany, it was either too near Philippolis or too distant from it; 'they seemed to fear that their residence among [the Kora] would be followed by division in the country; than an independent party would rise up with them and endeavour to establish an independent chief.'⁹⁰ Such stations were established at Bethulie in 1833 — when the French missionary Pelissier was given permission by Philip to take over the deserted San station established by Clark in 1827 — at Bethany, and at Beersheba. To Bethulie went Lepui and his followers who till then had been members of the Philippolis state; at Bethany on the Riet River the Berlin Mission gathered some Kora; and at Beersheba Samuel Rolland of the Paris Evangelicals collected more Sotho-Tswana refugees, some from Philippolis, and a sprinkling of Bastards.⁹¹

The second, and unintended, consequences of Philip's visit was a *rapprochement* between Adam Kok and Hendrick Hendricks. Hendricks, as Andrew Smith noted was 'a man endowed with much natural talent and to that is added a very tolerable proportion of acquired knowledge. He is the most intelligent Hottentot I have ever met; an original thinker.' He was, continued Smith, 'too sharp' for the white farmers, 'too much of a lawyer not to be able to expose their acts of injustice': he was also 'vain and conceited.'⁹² Hendrick Hendricks hated Waterboer with a consuming passion, for Waterboer had executed his brother, and there can be little doubt that the switch in Hendricks' allegiance at

⁸⁷ Philip to Wade, October 10, 1833 [425 of 1837, 144-7, 153].

⁸⁸ See Pelissier, November 19, 1833 [JDM, IX, 133-4]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 148, 151, 154.

⁸⁹ Schreiner, December 24, 1841 [LMS 18/2/C].

⁹⁰ Smith, *Diary*, I, 183.

⁹¹ Pelissier, November 19, 1833 [JDM, IX, 130-4]; Kolbe [LMS Journals 4/108]; JDM, X, 24; Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 51-2; Rolland, April 20, 1835 [JDM, X, 297-302]; January 18, 1836 [JDM, XI, 162-8]. Piet Witvoet was at the Bethany station for a short while.

⁹² Smith, *Diary*, I, 72-3, 200-201; Smith to D'Urban, September 17, 1834 [Kirby, *Smith*, 144-151].

this time was intended to bolster the weak Adam Kok against Philip's attempts to depose him.⁹³

The support which Hendricks gave to Kok — he became Kok's Secretary at this time — did not lead to any diminution of Kora raiding, or to any strengthening of the authority of Kok in the outer reaches of the Philippolis state.⁹⁴ The new solidarity, however, did induce Philip to reverse his attitude to Adam Kok, and persuaded Andrew Smith, who visited Philippolis in 1835, that the Colonial government should strengthen its relationship with the Griqua state. With Adam II willing to resign his authority to Adam III, 'a good-natured, amiable-looking young man and notorious for his honesty and decision,'⁹⁵ both Andrew Smith and Philip recommended that the Philippolis state should be brought into Treaty relationship with the Colony as had the Griquatown state. Noting that Kok wanted 100 pounds of gunpowder a year and 25 muskets to protect the frontier 'from Griquatown to the Caledon River Institution [Bethulie],' Smith wrote, 'the more these articles are introduced among the tribes immediately beyond the Colony the more is peace and quiet maintained.'⁹⁶ This was a recommendation completely antithetical to the policy that Stockenstrom had advocated, but he realized, as Stockenstrom did not, that it was in the Colonial interest to strengthen the Griqua state. And Philip wrote to D'Urban in 1834 that

I am now happy to state to your Excellency, that the necessity of placing Waterboer over the chief of Philippolis is no longer necessary. The aged chief is now willing to resign his office to his second son who, from what I know of him, and have heard of him, appears a very fit person to succeed his father in his office. This old man has declared his eldest son as unfit for the office... I am confident that [Hendricks] will join in giving his consent and support to the second son of the chief. So far as the Grikwas are concerned, there is not now the slightest difficult in the way to prevent your Excellency from coming to an immediate settlement of the affairs of Philippolis.⁹⁷

⁹³ Adam Kok had indeed attempted to resign again: see Smith, *Diary*, I, 78.

⁹⁴ In 1836 a Xhosa party under 'Yaloosa' (a fragmented group from the eastern frontier zone) emigrated to Transorangia, joined Witvoet's party and commenced raiding. Many departed after Moshweshwe had attacked them, but in 1839 some were still around: see Rolland, June 28, 1836 [JDM, XII, 17-22]; March 28, 1837 [JDM, XII, 301-7]; December 12, 1837 [JDM, XIII, 232ff]; Daumas, December 5, 1836 [JDM, XII, 134-6]; Pelissier, January 28, 1837 [JDM, XII, 227]; February 15, 1839 [JDM, XIV, 369ff]; Report on Beersheba [JDM, XII, 197ff]; Report on Bethulie [JDM, XIII, 287]; Casalis, *Basuto*, 69-71.

⁹⁵ Smith to D'Urban, September 17, 1834 [Kirby, *Smith*, 144-151].

⁹⁶ See Kirby, *Smith*, 144-151. Smith suggested the provision of arms for other friendly chiefs in the area, and his recommendations were in line with those he had made in 1828 for the Namaqualand frontier zone: see *ibid.*, 67-76, 141-166.

⁹⁷ Philip to D'Urban, July 16, 1834 [538 of 1836, 620]. Hendricks had initially been in favor of Abraham (whom Philip mistakenly calls 'Girb', unless the document is misprinted) 'an illegitimate son of the chief's ...[who] cannot write,' but had become reconciled to Adam III believing, no doubt, that he

And so Philip suggested that Hendrick Hendricks, whom he had earlier described as ‘the worst and most dangerous man among that party [the Bergenaars]...a thorough scoundrel’ should be invited, along with Peter Kolbe and Adam Kok III, to negotiate the new relationship between the Colony and Philippolis.

In fact, no Treaty could be signed. Adam Kok II traveled to Cape Town, was unable to meet the Governor who had left for the eastern frontier, and died on the return journey to Philippolis on September 12, 1835.⁹⁸ Nor did Adam III succeed. Almost certainly through the machinations of Hendrick Hendricks, it was Abraham Kok, Adam II’s eldest son, who secured the vote of the General Meeting. Wishing to complete his triumph, Hendricks now intrigued for the expulsion of Peter Kolbe, who, with the Bastards, was opposed to the Treaty relationship and opposed to the accession of Abraham. Hendricks, wrote Kolbe,

...excited the chief to expel me with force from the country as appeared afterward on the ground of my having taught the people too much to know their own rights and privileges, and they had become too knowing as the chief expressed it to be governed by him while I remained among them — I was summoned before the council, a party of unlawful counselors selected on purpose — I replied to about 8 false accusations this Hendrick Hendricks brought against me and he joined finally with the Chief and council in declaring me in all things innocent.⁹⁹

Once again the Philip forces took a hand. In August 1836, Atkinson, a protégé of Philip’s, arrived at the station, and was soon convinced of the truth of a rumor spread by Hendricks that Kolbe had been engaged in an adulterous relationship with a Bastard woman. When a French missionary investigation pronounced Kolbe innocent, Wright was called to Philippolis and, amid a series of threats and counter threats with regard to Kolbe forming a new station, Kolbe was forced to leave for the Colony in February 1837.¹⁰⁰ The Philip forces had clearly decided to accept the *de facto* situation and secure the alliance of

could exert his influence on him too: see also Smith, *Diary*, I, 77-8; Smith to D’Urban, September 17, 1834 [Kirby, *Smith*, 144-151].

⁹⁸ See Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 319-320; Kolbe, October 20, 1835 [LMS 14/4/E].

⁹⁹ Kolbe, January 9, 1837 [LMS 15/3/A]. See also J. J. Meintjies to Van Ryneveld, January 18, 1836 [van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 320]; Atkinson, January 24, 1837 [LMS 15/3/A]; Wright, February 1, 1837 [LMS 15/3/A]. Why the Bastards should have been opposed to the Treaty is unclear, except that they disliked Hendricks’ influence on any of the Koks, and also, unlike the Kok family, they may have wished annexation: see Van der Merwe, *op. cit.*, 319-320; Smith, *Diary*, I, 73; Kirby, *Smith*, 142.

¹⁰⁰ For this series of events see Kolbe, January 9, 1837 [LMS 15/3/A]; Atkinson, January 24, 1837; January 27, 1837 [LMS 15/3/A]; June 30, 1837 [LMS 15/3/B]; Wright, February 1, 1837 [LMS 15/3/A]; July 19, 1837 [LMS 15/3/B]; March 5, 1838 [LMS 16/1/A]. Throughout the controversy Wright and Atkinson claimed that Kolbe was supported by the Bergenaars, i.e., the Kora-aligned and ‘disruptive’ elements but in fact his support came from Bastards and church-members as they admitted later: see Atkinson, June 18, 1838 [LMS 16/1/C].

Abraham with the Colony. In January 1837 Abraham Kok and his council, Wright and Atkinson, met with Stockenström near Colesberg,

...and there, in the presence of all, His Honour recognized the sacred right of the Griquas to the country they occupied, and stated the determination of the British Government not to interfere with their rights. He made it known also that all who came into their territory must be subject to their laws, and if they offended must be punished accordingly, and that if they considered any individuals injurious to their interests they must take them into custody and set them over the river.¹⁰¹

Thus Stockenström had been brought around to endorse the policy he had rejected in 1830. But he insisted, and Wright and Philip concurred, that a treaty between Abraham Kok and Waterboer must precede that between Abraham and the Colony. At the end of January, therefore, after Abraham had spent some time 'preparing the public mind' for this, such a Treaty was fully endorsed at a General Meeting, and was signed by the two chiefs at Griquatown on February 23, 1837. It provided that the two chiefs should jointly govern 'the Griqua country', under 'two separate governments', each 'governed by its own separate laws.' There were provisions for a biennial joint meeting, and for joint action in warfare, capital punishment, and certain other instances. The division between the two territories was set at Ramah, on the Orange, though since in both cases 'the northern boundary of the district is not yet fixed,' this hardly delimited a line between the two territories. However a significant feature of the Treaty was its legal exclusion of any claims to territory by Cornelius Kok II at Campbell. And, further, Article VII stated that 'the two governments shall act together in quelling all rebellion against one or both of the Governments.'¹⁰²

Conclusion

Four years of the implementation of John Philip's plans for Transorangia had not produced many achievements. No Griqua chief had submitted to the authority of Waterboer. Cornelius Kok II was still at Campbell. Berends had indeed removed his state from the Harts-Vaal area, but Jan Bloem and Mahura had occupied the vacuum thus created. At least eight hundred farmer families and several thousand Bastards were established within and beyond the boundaries of the Philippolis state, few if any of the whites and some of the Bastards unwilling to submit to its authority.¹⁰³ In central Transorangia, as well as

¹⁰¹ Atkinson, January 24, 1837 [LMS 15/3/A]. See also Wright, February 1, 1837 [LMS 15/3/A]. For Stockenström's policy from 1830 to 1837 see Van der Merwe, *op. cit.*, 312-21.

¹⁰² For the treaty, see Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 191-3.

¹⁰³ For white farmer numbers see Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 290-1.

on the Orange west of Griquatown, there were still Kora 'frontiersmen' engaged in raiding. Nor had much been gained in terms of asserting hegemony over the Sotho-Tswana, which was a pre-requisite for the Christian Griqua republic which Philip envisaged as part of or autonomous from the Colony. With the exceptions of Moshweshwe and Sekonyela and those who fell, like it or not, within their sphere of influence, Mahura was a rallying-point for Sotho-Tswana independents.¹⁰⁴ Other more fragmented refugee communities, mixed in origin, were leading a precarious existence north of the Vet River, and between Kuruman and the Molopo.¹⁰⁵ And the mission-stations, LMS or not, whether established among organized communities or, like Kuruman and Motito, composed of a mixture of refugees, were unwilling to acknowledge the supremacy of Waterboer or the Griqua.¹⁰⁶

The Griquatown state had, however, succeeded in some measure. In particular, from the end of 1834, as the next chapter will show, Mothibi's Tlhaping had begun to be converted, and more strongly incorporated within the Griqua state by means of the Griquatown church. And, as has been seen above, a Treaty had been signed between Abraham Kok and Waterboer which provided the potential for a strengthened, though dual, Griqua hegemony. As Wright noted at the time, however, the 'success of the whole arrangement of things [under the Treaty] does not depend on the management of things at Griquatown, but the management of things here at Philippolis.'¹⁰⁷ This 'management' led to renewed dissension, and to civil war, within months of the signing of the Treaty. Not long afterwards, there were the first overt signs of Sotho-Tswana reaction against the imposition of Griqua hegemony. The next chapter will take up these events: the apex of Griqua hegemony and the beginnings of its downfall.

¹⁰⁴ Besides the communities with Wesleyan missionaries, such groups on the fringes of Moshweshwe's influence at this time included Danzer, the Xhosa leader, and Knecht Windvogel, possibly an early settler from Bethelsdorp, who had formed a raiding group: see Smith, *Diary*, I, 107, 115; Kirby, *Smith*, 153; Kolbe [LMS Journals 4/106]; Kolbe, October 9, 1833 [LMS 13/4/A]; Rolland, April 20, 1835 [JDM, X, 302]; September 15, 1838 [JDM, XIV, 50ff].

¹⁰⁵ See, for example, Arbousset, *Narrative*, 84-132, 196-229 *passim*; and, for the area north of the Kuruman, Lemue, October 15, 1831 [JDM, VII, 196-201]; Kuruman missionaries, December 26, 1831 [LMS 12/4/D]; Hamilton, January 31, 1834 [LMS 14/2/F]; Moffat, September 16, 1835 [LMS 14/5/D]; Smith, *Diary*, I, 282-322 *passim*, II, 41; Lemue, February 28, 1834 [JDM, X, 18-26 and map opp. 32]; Joint letter, August 18, 1836 [Kotze, *American Missionaries*, 138].

¹⁰⁶ For the distinction between the two types of mission, see Lemue, September 1, 1843 [PEMS: Lemue File]. For the habitation of the stations of Kuruman and Motito see, for example, Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1833 [Lemue, November 27, 1830 [JDM, VI, 293]; Lemue, March 30, 1835 [JDM, X, 328].

¹⁰⁷ Wright, February 1, 1837 [LMS 15/3/A]. A further hopeful sign was that Jan Bloem had indicated that he might join the treaty arrangement. Kolbe had applied to Bloem as a missionary but been refused: see also Atkinson, January 27, 1837 [LMS 15/3/A].

11 Griqua Expansionism, II: Church and State at Griquatown and Philippolis, 1836 – 1842

In Philip's terms, the development of a Christian Griqua republic in Transorangia demanded not only the extension of the power of Andries Waterboer, but the spread of education, Christianity, and hence 'civilization' by means of 'native agents.' In theoretical terms, Philip was reviving the ideas of Van der Kemp, Read and Campbell, though with a new political dimension. In practical terms, Peter Wright and the Griquatown church were required to revive a native agency which had flourished in Transorangia from 1813 until 1820, but had been undercut by Moffat and Melvill and by the revolts of the 1820's.¹

In order to meet the wants of the country [wrote Peter Wright] and operate effectually upon the mass we must pursue a system of labour by means of native Agency, instead of as formerly confining our efforts to a spot (a station) where compared to the mass of people only a few can reside and the rest left in heathenism, uninstructed, to fill the surrounding country with terror and of blood.²

The first of these were Griquatown church members, all of whom, apparently, had belonged to the church for twenty-five years. In 1831, Jan Fortuin, the 27-year old son of the late and loyal William Fortuin, began work at Hardcastle, and in the same year a woman established a day-school at the controversial site of Daniels Kuil. During 1836 Jan Fortuin was transferred to Griquatown itself, so that Wright and Hughes would have more time to devote to itineration and to the proposed irrigation project on the banks of the Orange, and in the following year Fortuin began to receive from the LMS a salary of 500 rix dollars a year.³ By that time (1836) there were some ten native agents, and three years later the numbers had grown to 22, of whom 16, however, were described as occasional; and in most parts of the district day-schools and Sunday schools had been established. In 1842 John Philip found 17 native agents in full-time association with the Griquatown church, including Jan and William Fortuin and Dirk Kok and two Griqua women, as well as eight Sotho-Tswana converts.⁴

¹ See Chapters 4, 5, 9.

² Wright, September 10, 1836 [LMS 15/1/C]. Also Hughes, October 13, 1836 [LMS 1/1/E]; Wright, October 15, 1841 [LMS 18/2/C].

³ Wright, September 25, 1835 [LMS 14/4/E]; June 10, 1836; September 10, 1836 [LMS 15/1/C]; July 19, 1837 [LMS 15/3/B]; September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B].

⁴ Wright, September 25, 1835 [LMS 14/4/E]; June 9, 1836 [LMS 15/1/C]; November 13, 1836 [LMS 15/1/E]; September 11, 1838 [LMS 16/2/A]; Wright and Hughes, October 1845 [LMS 15/4/A]; No-

Over the same period, from 1832 to 1842, there was a phenomenal growth in the Griquatown church. During the decade, the church grew at a rate of about 70 members a year, from 50 to 749 members.⁵ Branch churches were established at several places, and a Temperance Society and an Auxiliary Mission Society came into existence, the latter gathering contributions for the world-wide mission cause. The figures of congregations in 1836 give some idea of the new receptivity to Christianity: 400 at Griquatown, with 100 at school, 300 at Hardcastle, with 120 at school, 400 at Blinkklip, with 100 at school, 80-100 at Daniels Kuil, with 40 at school, 200 at Witwater, with 50 at school. Emphasis was laid on the instruction of the young, and in this regard the grant for education which was included in the terms of Waterboer's Treaty was of inestimable value.⁶ Wright and Hughes could hardly keep up:

...to keep things going with vigour at all our stations, it is absolutely necessary that one or the other of us be constantly traveling... By manifesting respect for the persons, the judgement, and the labours of the native teachers although yet very defective, we are enabled to call forth and effect that amount of labour through a blessing which would require five or six of those Missionaries who are determined to confine their labours to a single locality.⁷

This 'revival' began at Griquatown itself, and many of the converts were Griqua, Kora, or San. But undoubtedly the major breakthrough, in political as well religious terms, was the spread of this enthusiasm for conversion to the Tlhaping on the Vaal in 1834-5.

Christianity and the Southern Sotho-Tswana: The Church in Griqua Expansionism, 1834 – 1838

Until the 1830's missionaries made little impact on the Sotho-Tswana in terms of conversion. Among the Tlhaping there were no converts prior to 1828, by which time the Tlhaping chiefs and the bulk of the community had deserted the Kuruman, leaving the mission populated by a dislocated refugee collection. At Kuruman and Motito in the 1830's a church did indeed begin, but both Moffat and Lemue imposed stringent requirement on members, and all of the converts were almost completely detached from their traditional society. Only the Wesleyans were working under the auspices of a Sotho-Tswana chief, and even there the church was not large.⁸ This was to be expected. While Sotho-Tswana

ember 5, 1839 [LMS 16/4/D]; Philip, May 20, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A].

⁵ Wright, September 25, 1835 [LMS 14/4/E]; February 24, 1839 [LMS 16/3/B]; Wright and Hughes, September 20, 1840 [LMS 17/3/C]; Philip, May 20, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A]. By 1842 the total attendance at congregations was reported to be 3600, and school attendance at least 1100.

⁶ Wright and Hughes, 'Schedule of Returns,' October 1836 [LMS 15/2/B].

⁷ Wright, March 3, 1840 [LMS 17/1/B].

⁸ In 1835 there were reported to be 14 Sotho-Tswana church members at Thaba Nchu: see 'Report on

political and social structures remained in existence, 'conversion' as it was regarded by the missionaries, involving a denial of such basic Sotho-Tswana institutions as initiation and polygamy, was a step which was hard to take. And such structures were in existence: even the Tlhaping, though weakened by the events of the preceding thirty years, were not in a state of disintegration. Mothibi and Mahura were the recognized chiefs of two different sections, and if Mahura was a 'secular modernizer', he still felt compelled to defer to the ritual authority of Mothibi.⁹

But things were changing: incorporation in a frontier zone was having its effects on the southern Sotho-Tswana. In the first place, economic patterns were changing, 'artificial wants' were being engendered. This extended further than a desire for guns and horses. Thus in 1835, Andrew Smith was told by the trader Schoon that whereas when he had begun trading a few years before 'nothing was desired by the natives but beads,' this was no longer the case. Now they would barter beads only for milk or firewood, and their main desire was for 'European' clothes, which they bought with tobacco, or, sometimes, money — money procured through the sale of commodities such as ivory, or even by service to the Griqua or in the Colony. In two months of 1835 Schoon and Hume obtained 400 rix dollars in exchange for clothing.¹⁰ Ten years later a merchant in the Tlhaping area sold within a year £1000 of haberdashery, hardware and tools.¹¹ In 1840 it was reported that the majority of the inhabitants of the Tlhaping settlements where churches were in existence were wearing 'European' clothes, 'and goodly number of them ornamented with the cotton and woollen manufactures of Manchester and Leeds.'¹² Several were in possession of wagons.

Such a transformation of economic patterns went along with a receptivity to new cultural patterns, and hence to conversion. This was not, however, universally or uniformly the case. The desire of many southern Sotho-Tswana chiefs for missionary presence in the late 1820's and early 1830's was almost entirely for 'temporal' reasons. It was the missionaries, they believed, who had secured for the Griqua their advantageous political and economic relationship with the Colony which was increasing Griqua power. It was the

Thaba Nchu,' Albany District Committee Meeting, February 9, 1836 [MMS: Synod Minutes].

⁹ See, for example, Hamilton and Edwards, December 18, 2838 [LMS 16/5/B] who relate that, at a meeting of Tlharo chiefs at Kuruman in October 1838, Mahura said 'he could not assume any authority in his brother's country.'

¹⁰ Smith, *Diary*, I, 250-1. Also Kirby, *Smith*, 213. The extent to which the Sotho-Tswana could obtain money is seen from Hume, who told Methuen that he often bought from the Sotho-Tswana and Griqua 200 pounds of ostrich feathers (at £5 per pound), 2000 pounds of ivory (at 3/6 per pound) and 200 karosses in a year: Methuen, *Wilderness*, 91.

¹¹ Kuruman missionaries, December 1845 [LMS 21/1/B].

¹² Hughes, October 15, 1840 [LMS 17/2/C]. See also Wright and Hughes, September 20, 1840 [LMS 17/3/C]; Compare Smith, *Diary*, I, 225-6.

missionaries, many of them believed, who could ensure protection of their communities from the raiding characteristic of the 1820's, and from Mzilikazi. But as the missionaries became established in different communities, the dislocation of authority and values characteristic of the frontier zone began to have its effects. The young, in particular were receptive, and they were receptive especially to education. They had grown up within the frontier zone, and many of them were as fascinated by the opportunities which it provided as by the patterns of traditional society. It was not simply missionary presence among the Griqua, believed the young Sotho-Tswana, which accounted for the economic and political dominance of that people; but instruction and conversion, as well as trade. Was not Andries Waterboer, of San extraction, ruling a Griqua state now defined as an 'ally' of the Colony? Generally, then, in the period after 1835, young people in particular heard the preaching and instruction of the missionaries and, at Bethulie and Motito for example, a conflict began to develop between pro-Christian and 'traditional' factions.¹³ Furthermore, by cutting across traditional political communities, this increasing acceptance by the young of the cultural of the Colony- influenced frontier zone did provide the potential for a wider and stronger political community.

The most dramatic instance of this receptivity occurred when the 'revival' among the Sotho-Tswana at Griquatown spread to the Tlhaping on the Vaal. These were established in two main settlements, one, of about 1000 people, under Mothibi himself, and the other, slightly smaller, consisting of the 'Bamoruni' Tlhaping under the chief Simenu.¹⁴ Native agents from Griquatown visited these towns towards the end of 1834, and some of the Tlhaping, surprised at people of the 'same nation and colour as themselves' preaching the Gospel without interpreters, began to visit Campbell and Griquatown to 'enquire further of the Word.' Amongst them was one Makane, a Maidi, who had been the bell-ringer at Read's school at Dithakong. He related a familiar, though hardly explanatory, story of the 'guilt' which he had begun to feel some two years earlier at his relapse into 'heathenism', and of his conversations with Griqua converts which had added to his torment. Baptized at Griquatown, he was sent back to Simenu's town to act as native agent. By the end of 1835, he was joined in his work by Thabe, son of the Tlhaping royal Thaiso long the friend of missions.¹⁵ Thabe worked at Mothibi's settlement. From June of 1835, Wright

¹³ Compare Pelissier, May 1, 1835 [JDM, IX, 290-1]; November 20, 1835 [JDM, X, 138-9]; Rolland, January 18, 1836 [JDM, XI, 162] with Pelissier, January 28, 1837 [JDM, XII, 233-4]; Lemue, January 2, 1837 [JDM, XII, 257-9]; March 30, 1837 [JDM, XIII, 84]; M. Lemue, May 19, 1837 [JDM, XIII, 85-8]; Lemue, October 24, 1837 [JDM, XIII, 163]; April 21, 1838 [JDM, XII, 362]; Rolland, September 15, 1838 [JDM, XIV, 51-2]. Also Lemue, January 25, 1842 [JDM, XIII, 245ff].

¹⁴ Wright, May 25, 1835 [LMS 14/3/D].

¹⁵ Wright, January 1, 1836 [LMS 15/1/A]; June 9, 1836; September 10, 1836 [LMS 15/1/C]; Hughes, February 13, 1836 [LMS 15/1/B]. For a partial biography of Makane see Hughes, November 19, 1846

and Hughes began itineration every three months or so to these two Tlhaping settlements on the Vaal to administer the sacraments to church members and to baptize more people. Their visits were supplemented by similar itineration by Griqua 'native agents' as well, of course, as by the Tlhaping converts themselves. By September 1838 94 Tlhaping out of 165 new converts were members of the Griquatown church; and these included Jantje, son of Mothibi by a Kora wife, Mahutu, Mothibi's own wife, and other Tlhaping royals.¹⁶ Four years later the Tlhaping converts numbered 416.¹⁷

These 'conversions' were virtually by profession: Wright and Hughes, unlike the stringent Kuruman missionaries, were concerned with building the strength of the church through numbers. Under such circumstances, and where much of the day-to-day church activity was left in the hands of indigenous converts, and where a traditional political structure was still in existence, it would be expected that certain syncretic features would have crept into the Tlhaping formulation of Christianity. The evidence on this is lamentably slim, but it would appear that such did occur. The native agents taught, reported some of the missionaries, that weeping at a death was wrong, and that ill people were justly suffering for their sins. On the death of an individual the converts would sit down after the burial to determine whether the soul of the dead man had gone to Heaven or Hell. The adaptation of traditional Sotho-Tswana beliefs to a Christian form is apparent in these practices; but in the most controversial of them the significance is elusive. It was taught, apparently, that it was sinful to eat meat killed with a gun or spear.¹⁸ Wright and Hughes argued for tolerance of this belief, which they interpreted as 'scruples about eating of blood, or things strangled, etc.' because 'they as Bechuana Christians can appreciate the danger, or impropriety, of many customs among their nation much more than we Foreigners.'¹⁹ Elsewhere they wrote that, while they were indifferent to the methods of slaughtering used, they could not be indifferent to 'participation in meats, offerings, presents, etc. professedly connected with and instituted for the support of Bechuana heathenism.'²⁰ It would appear, then, that the ban on the use of guns or spears for killing

[LMS 22/1/B]; also criticism of Makane in Hamilton, September 7, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E].

¹⁶ Wright, September 10, 1836 [LMS 15/1/C]; Kuruman missionaries, July 2, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]; Wright, July 19, 1837 [LMS 15/3/B]; September 11, 1838 [LMS 16/2/A]. Wright and Hughes speak of Jantje as Mothibi's 'eldest son', though if he was, it was not by the chief wife. Mahura also sent his eldest son, Bogosing, aged about 17, to Griquatown for instruction: see Hughes, November 1, 1837 [LMS 15/3/D].

¹⁷ Philip, May 20, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A].

¹⁸ See particularly Hamilton, June 19, 1838 [LMS 16/5/B]; Edwards and Hamilton to Wright and Hughes, April 1, 1840 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/C]; Lemue, July 7, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A].

¹⁹ Wright and Hughes to Edwards, Hamilton, July 31, 1840 in reply to Edwards and Hamilton, June 10, 1840 [Both enclosed in Wright and Hughes, October 7, 1840 LMS 17/3/D].

²⁰ Wright and Hughes to Hamilton and Edwards, May 14, 1840 [LMS 17/1/C].

meat was an anti-traditional practice, though in this case it is curious that the gun should have become incorporated by traditionalists into Tlhaping ritual practice.²¹

It was such features of the 'revival' among the Tlhaping, amongst others, which led the Kuruman missionaries severely to criticize the Griquatown missionaries and their policy. Robert Moffat and his colleagues had, no doubt, a measure of jealousy that Griquatown was having so much success among the Tlhaping, the 'Kuruman people' who had fled from the Kuruman mission. In 1835-6 Moffat paid two visits to Mothibi, and on the second occasion at least he tried to persuade the Tlhaping chief to return with his people to the Kuruman area. But Mothibi, forced to reconcile this demand with that of the Griquatown missionaries, decided to remain where he was. The Kuruman missionaries, overtly at least, resigned themselves to the loss: they would not, they said, include the towns on the Vaal among their out-stations. 'They are but distant fields in which we sow the everlasting seed of the Gospel with the fullest assurance that it will in due time spring up.'²² Indeed the requirements placed on church membership at the Kuruman, which refused mere 'profession' as a condition of entry, and required a knowledge of reading and some familiarity with the Gospel, precluded Moffat and his colleagues for entering into competition with Griquatown.²³ Thus, although a few Tlhaping and others who expressed a special desire to be baptized at the Kuruman were admitted, under these conditions, as church members, in most instances Griquatown was able to win the potential converts to their church. It would seem, for example, that Moffat was making preparations for Mahutu to fulfill his requirements for baptism when she was seized upon and baptized by the missionaries at the Kuruman.²⁴

Such jealousy, however, gives but a partial explanation of the friction which gradually developed between the missionaries at Griquatown and the Kuruman. While there is no evidence at all that the Kuruman missionaries were fostering a spirit of competition, it is clear that such was being done by the native agents of the Griquatown church, and even by the Griquatown missionaries themselves. Dismissed as unfounded rumor by Wright

²¹ In traditional ritual, presumably, meat was killed with a spear or a needle.

²² Kuruman missionaries, June 15, 1837 [LMS 15/4/D]. Also Hughes, February 13, 1836 [LMS 15/1/B]; Moffat, November 23, 1836 [LMS 15/2/D]; R. Moffat to Mary Moffat, December 2, 1835 [Moffat, *Lives*, 200 – 204]. In March 1835 Mothibi is reported to have sent a message to the Kuruman saying his people wished to return immediately if wagons could be provided to move their property; Mothibi said 'they have acted like fools in leaving Kuruman, and...it has been the destruction of their temporal and spiritual welfare': see also Mary Moffat to R. Moffat, June 25, 1835 [Moffat, *Lives*, 196].

²³ See, for example, Baillie, August 16, 1832 [LMS 13/2/D]; Kuruman missionaries, June 15, 1837 [LMS 15/4/D]; Northcott, *Moffat*, 185 etc.

²⁴ Kuruman missionaries, June 15, 1837 [LMS 15/4/D]; July 2, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]. Those admitted at the Kuruman included a daughter of 'Salakootoo' from Taungs, and a son of the former Hurutshe chief, Sebegodi, also from Taungs.

and Hughes, this evidence cannot on that account alone be neglected. Lukas Kok was reported as ‘railing at and abusing’ Moffat for ‘poaching’ after Moffat’s two visits to Mothibi in 1835-6. The same Lukas and Abraham Kok told the Tlhaping that the Kuruman missionaries were ‘bad’ because they had allowed the Tlhaping to leave them: what the Tlhaping now were was due solely to Griquatown. Morisanyana, a subject of Mahura’s baptized at the Kuruman, was almost prevented from returning to the Kuruman for more education, and was then summoned by Mothibi to return to the Vaal. Thabe, the native agent at Mothibi’s town, was accused of preaching that Kuruman had the ‘doctrine of Hell’ because Moffat and his colleagues ‘separate from the church those who publicly sin’ rather than urging and accepting their repentance. Makane, the agent at Simenu’s town, told his congregations that the books which came from Griquatown were better than those from the Kuruman — though in fact they were both printed on the same (Kuruman) press. Isaac Hughes was reported to have asked two men to repent for having joined the Kuruman church, and Peter Wright acted in a threatening manner to a Tlhaping who had gone to the Kuruman to be baptized. It is little wonder that the Tlhaping began to ask ‘*A Merimo mberi*’ (‘are there two Gods?’), one for Griquatown and one for the Kuruman.²⁵

It was not long before the Kuruman missionaries began overtly to criticize the native agency. Urged by the LMS Directors to adopt the same system, they replied in June 1837 that ‘we do think you are mistaken from want of correct information as it regards the real efficiency of Natives in their capabilities for instructing others’ and argued that paying such persons reduced their ‘zeal.’²⁶ A year later they began to hint what they considered to be the motives which underlay the deficiencies of the native agency:

We have no such high opinion of Griqua native assistants either in the spirit they manifest or the abilities they may profess to have... We are not so hard to please as some might think, but we would really tremble to be linked in the way you recommend to a people who are nurtured in the school of religious politics and Jesuitical intrigue. ‘My Kingdom is not of this world’ is our motto.²⁷

Soon afterwards, Roger Edwards was more explicit: Wright and Hughes, he wrote, ‘told the world they wished to bring souls to Christ but withheld the other part of the truth, viz. they wished to proselyte as many as possible to the Church at Griquatown, and add numbers to the few men who acknowledge Waterboer as their chief.’ Criticizing the

²⁵ See Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]; Lemue, July 2, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A]. Also Edwards, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]. For denials by Griquatown see Wright, September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B]; Wright and Hughes, October 7, 1840 [LMS 17/3/D]; Lemue, October 15, 1840 [PENS: Lemue file].

²⁶ Kuruman missionaries, June 15, 1837 [LMS 15/4/D].

²⁷ Kuruman missionaries, July 2, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E].

Griquatown conversions as ‘superficial’ he continued that these attempts ‘to enlarge the dominion of Waterboer in connection with the advancement of Christ’s kingdom’ were already sowing ‘seeds of discord...yielding envy and hatred, jealousies and evil speaking.’²⁸

The main drive towards Griqua hegemony, however, began in 1838. By this time Mzilikazi and the Ndebele, losing a series of battles to white farmers and their Rolong allies, to the Griqua, and to Dingane, had begun the northward trek across the Limpopo towards the new home they would occupy for the remainder of the century. Indeed the white farmers who had played a major part in the removal of Mzilikazi were the Trekkers, a more cohesive and less conciliatory group than the white farmer families who had long been established in southern Transorangia. But the Trekkers had moved from Thaba Nchu to Winburg, in the northern part of Transorangia, and from there the majority had gone to Natal while a few others had been conducted by the Rolong across the Vaal to the former Rolong territory near Potchefstroom. If the Griqua were to establish an unquestioned hegemony over Transorangia, this was a propitious time for concerted effort, before the vacuum left by the departure of Mzilikazi had been filled by a hostile community of white farmers. Early in 1838 Abraham Kok was replaced at Philippolis by Adam Kok III, more amenable to the plans of Waterboer, Wright and Philip: on a joint basis the Griqua of Waterboer and Adam Kok II asserted their claims.²⁹

During the first part of 1838 there were reports of repeated threats by Waterboer and other Griqua against the Kuruman missionaries and the Sotho-Tswana chiefs. Unless the London Missionary Society removed all white missionaries from Transorangia besides those at Griquatown, this would be done by the Griqua, the wife of Roger Edwards was informed in March by Nicholas Kruger.³⁰ Waterboer, reported a Tlharo convert named Sebubi, had told Sebubi that he was determined to sweep the missionaries from the Kuruman. Now that the Griqua themselves had the *bongaka*, the power of healing souls, said Waterboer, white missionaries were not necessary with the exception of Isaac Hughes and Peter Wright, and the latter would transfer to Philippolis. At the annual Missionary Society meeting at Griquatown, it was claimed, Waterboer repeated this threat. ‘This year (they say) all old things must be done away and all things must begin anew at the commencement of the year.’³¹ At a joint meeting between Waterboer and Adam Kok III at

²⁸ Edwards, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E].

²⁹ For Adam Kok III’s accession, see below.

³⁰ R. Edwards, Notes of events at Daniels Kuil, March 10, 1838 [Enclosed in Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838, LMS 16/2/E].

³¹ See Edwards, September 10, 1838; Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]; Edwards, February 7, 1839 [LMS 16/5/B]; Lemue, July 2, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A]. Wright denied these charges, and claimed Lemue’s source of information was already dead at the time.

Philippolis in June 1838, Waterboer affirmed that the only chiefs over the Sotho-Tswana in Transorangia would be himself, Adam Kok III, and Peter David of Lishuani.³²

During the first part of 1838 Waterboer had in fact sent messages to Cornelius Kok II and his missionary Bartlett that he intended to remove them both from Campbell by force, the justification being Cornelius' support for Abraham Kok in his attempt to regain the chieftainship at Philippolis.³³ Against the Kuruman, though, and in particular against Robert Moffat, more subtle measures were used. In August 1838, Nicholas Kruger and Gert van Rooyen, a 'Church officer' rode to the Kuruman with a party of twenty people, some of them armed. They accused Moffat of adultery with a woman on the station, Sara, who had had a 'white' child in about January 1837. There is no doubt that rumors, with some degree of circumstantial support, had been already in circulation that the child was Moffat's, though that Moffat should have committed such an act would appear to be totally inconsistent with his character.³⁴ The accusation was regarded at Kuruman, almost certainly with truth, as the prelude to an attempt to force the LMS to withdraw Moffat and the other missionaries from the Kuruman. It is very probably, moreover, that the Griqua had in mind the accusations of adultery against James Read in 1817-1820, and against Peter Kolbe in 1836-7, which in both cases had forced the withdrawal of those missionaries, as well as that against Andries Waterboer himself in 1816, which had resulted in his dismissal from the church.³⁵ The Griqua party continued to Motito, where they camped outside the town and are reported to have sent threatening messages to Lemue that they intended to secure his removal, and later continued to the Kora of Mosweu Taaibosch, the northern outpost of the Harts-Vaal settlement area.

Mosheu [Mosweu] knows nothing of Griquas, but what he may hear from others, hence he was perfectly astonished when informed by them that Waterboer was his chief, from whom he would get a supply of native teachers for his people; and as if to convince him of their

³² Helmore, August 30, 1841 [LMS 18/2/A].

³³ See Edwards, September 10, 1838; Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]; Hamilton and Edwards, December 18, 1838 [LMS 16/5/B]; Philip, March 30, 1840 [LMS 17/1/C]; December 21, 1840 [LMS 17/1/C]; December 21, 1840 [LMS 17/2/D]. In May 1836 there had been a court case arising out of the flogging to death of a San at Campbell. Cornelius Kok, supported by Bartlett, the Kuruman missionaries, and Lemue, believed that he had been treated unfairly in the investigation, but Philip, Waterboer and the Griquatown missionaries saw this as a reason for the dismissal of Bartlett and the escalation of their threats on Campbell: see particularly Philip, April 4, 1838 [LMS 16/1/B]; July 29, 1838 [LMS 16/1/C].

³⁴ See Hamilton, September 7, 1838; Edwards, September 10, 1838; Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E] for the accusations. For the most damaging of the circumstantial evidence see Wright to Philip, June 20, 1840 [LMS: Africa, Odds, Box 1]; Wright, September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B].

³⁵ See Chapters 4, 6, 10.

sincerity they authorized a runaway subject from Griquatown to take the government from Mosheu and rule for Waterboer among Mosheu's people.³⁶

A few months later Lukas Kok and Jan Fortuin were boasting among their charges at Blinkklip (Tsantsabane) and at Mothibi's settlement on the Vaal that Moffat, did he not remove, would be taken prisoner and put over the Orange — 'the chain is ready' — and were extolling the virtues of having a single chief over the whole country, and a single merchant's store at Griquatown to serve the whole country.³⁷ Lukas Kok, it was claimed in addition, was himself administering Communion at Tsantsabane, a duty which should have been reserved for the ordained missionaries too. In mid-1839 Waterboer made the first move towards pushing his hegemony further north. A Griqua party which included the brother of Nicholas Kruger and Lambert Jansz went to investigate the former Hurutshe territory of Mosega 'previous to the general removal.' It was later to be argued that the Griqua had gone only at the invitation of Moilwa, chief of the Hurutshe, though Moilwa claimed he had come to Griquatown only to ask for a missionary.³⁸

Adam Kok III at Philippolis and Griqua Expansionism, 1837 – 1840

Within a few months of the signing of a Treaty between Andries Waterboer and Abraham Kok, dissension had broken out again at Philippolis. In May 1837 Abraham met with Cornelius Kok, Berend Berends, and Jan Bloem on the Vaal to plan an attack against their long-standing enemy, Mzilikazi, who had just suffered defeat at the hands of the white Griqua and Rolong commando headed by Hendrick Potgieter and Gerrit Maritz. Undoubtedly the Griqua chiefs, as always, were able to call on the services of such non-white frontiersmen as had a taste for cattle-raiding, but equally without doubt they — Berends and Bloem in particular — intended to secure their revenge for the defeats Mzilikazi had inflicted on them earlier in the decade.³⁹ Nevertheless Abraham found himself rebuked

³⁶ Hamilton and Edwards, December 18, 1838 [LMS 16/5/B]. Also Lemue, July 2, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A]. Wright denied this in a reply to Lemue, but stated that if Waterboer did now have any thoughts of extending his authority, it was the fault of Lemue and others: Wright, September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B].

³⁷ Hamilton and Edwards, December 12, 1838 [LMS 16/5/B]; Lemue, July 2, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A]. See also Hughes, October 1838 [LMS Journals 4/111]; Wright, September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/D].

³⁸ Hamilton and Edwards, September 6, 1839 [LMS 16/5/B]; Edwards in Owen, *Diary*, 147-8; Moilwa in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 346; Nicholas Kruger, Lambert Jansz in *ibid.*, 349-350, 351. See also Breutz, *Marico*, 104. The discussion on this matter at Bloemhof was in response to the introduction of a sealed document which was not opened and was not printed in the proceedings. It is possible that Waterboer was thinking of abandoning Griquatown, by now so infertile, entirely, for there was another contemporary rumor of a removal to the Caledon valley: Pelissier, March 26, 1840 [JDM, XV, 330].

³⁹ For this commando see Jan Pienaar in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 19, 348; Mathibe and Gasietisiwe in *ibid.*,

at Philippolis by Atkinson, the missionary, by Stockenstrom, and by a part of his people. Although he had given written authorizations to those of his people who had gone on the commando, he now dissociated himself from them but, finding himself consequently rejected by both pro-commando and anti-commando forces, retired in disgust to the Modder River. Towards the end of 1837 (or perhaps the beginning of 1838) those who had not participated in the commando — the ‘Bastard’ faction — elected as chief Adam Kok III in place of Abraham.

Since this election presumably took place during the absence of those participating in the Bloem commando, it is arguable that the installation of Adam Kok III constituted a rebellion against which Waterboer, by Article VII of the Treaty, should have assisted Abraham. In fact the question was academic: Adam III was immediately accorded support by Atkinson, and March 1838, Peter Wright wrote that Adam III, ‘a man of good principle and talent disgusted with and ashamed of the conduct of his brother’ would be supported by Waterboer and allied with him.⁴⁰ Abraham did indeed, with the support of Cornelius Kok and Jan Bloem, muster forces for a series of raids on the Philippolis outposts, but in June both Abraham and Cornelius II were captured by the Philippolis forces and put on trial Wright claims that it was only Waterboer’s plea to a joint council which prevented the execution of both dissident Griqua chiefs. In fact the only result appears to have been that the joint council formally withdrew the ‘chieftainship’ of Cornelius Kok, an office which Waterboer had anyway not recognized since 1832, and that Cornelius was then allowed to return to Campbell and Abraham, with hardly any followers, to the Modder River.⁴¹

In November of 1838 a new Treaty was signed by Waterboer and Adam Kok III. Its provisions, with two significant exceptions, were the same as those of the 1837 Treaty. Instead of ‘two separate governments’ each ‘governed by its own separate laws,’ it was stated that ‘the chiefs and inhabitants of Griqua Town and Philippolis will be considered as one people, and also stand in connection with each other, having one interest.’ There was, too, a more explicit definition of boundary lines, though these still excluded the northern limits:

186-7, 1879.

⁴⁰ Wright, March 5, 1838 [LMS 16/1/A].

⁴¹ For these events see Atkinson, June 18, 1838 [LMS 16/1/C]; Wright, September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B]; Jan Pienaar in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 17-8; Hendrik Hendricks in Lindley, *Adamantia*, 39; J. Van Wyk and Abraham Kok in Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 154-5, 196. (This Abraham Kok was a disaffected brother of Cornelius II, and not the erstwhile chief of Philippolis.) See also Lemue, December 28, 1838 [JDM, XIV, 333-4]; September 21, 1839 [JDM, XV, 42-3]; Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]. While Wright and the Griqua accused Moffat or Kolbe of instigating Abraham in his attacks on Philippolis, the Kuruman missionaries believed that a letter (of which they had a copy) from Wright to Hendrick Hendricks early in 1837 had led to the downfall of Abraham.

The boundaries of the eastern portion, governed by Adam Kok, of Philippolis, shall extend from Ramah in the west along the boundaries of the Colony, easterly by Cornet's Spruit beyond the Caledon River, and northerly to Modder River. The boundaries of the western portion, ruled by Andries Waterboer, of Griquatown, shall extend from Ramah on the east along the boundaries of the Colony westerly to Kheis, and northerly to Platberg.⁴²

While once again the definition of Waterboer's territory ignored the claims of Cornelius Kok II, as well as Jan Bloem, that claimed by Adam Kok III asserted his hegemony over the French mission stations of Bethulie, Beersheba, and 'almost to Morija'.⁴³

Shortly before his death, Adam Kok II, apparently anticipating such a move, had drawn up a document with Pelissier at Bethulie defining the boundary between their territories.⁴⁴ Adam Kok III refused to recognize this, and in September 1838 wrote to Pelissier describing the new boundaries of the Philippolis state. Lepui, the Tlhaping chief at the station, was at first determined to resist the Griqua, but the machinations of Griqua native agents and a station convert named Korassi turned the resentment of Lepui, most of his family, and the majority of the station population against Pelissier. The missionary left the station, allowing the complaints of the Tlhaping to be judged by his colleagues, but when they were dismissed and he returned he found that the school and the church were boycotted, and that Lepui was preventing attendance by stationing armed guards at the doors. Not until the end of 1839 was the situation alleviated: with the intervention of Philip, Adam Kok was persuaded to abandon the attack he had been making on Pelissier.⁴⁵

Adam Kok III did not yet abandon his claims for Griqua hegemony over the Bethulie lands, however. During 1841, his Griqua followers began to lease to white farmers the lands of Bethulie, as they had been doing with the territory of the Philippolis state itself since the mid-1830's.⁴⁶ When Pelissier called on the Colonial authorities to mediate, Kok

⁴² See *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 30-1.

⁴³ Pelissier, March 26, 1840 [JDM, XV, 330]. See also Boyce, March 6, 1839 [MMS: VII]; Lemue, August 18, 1840 [Pens: Lemue file].

⁴⁴ 'Report on Bethulie, 'November 10, 1838 [JDM, XV, 171]; Editorial in JDM, XV, 322; Pelissier, December 23, 1841 [JDM, XVII, 285]; Boyce, March 6, 1839 [MMS: VII].

⁴⁵ For these events see Pelissier, February 15, 1839 [JDM, XIV, 369ff] (Most of this letter is omitted in the *Journal des Missions* and it was not traced in the Pelissier file in the PEMS archives) ; March 26, 1840 [JDM, XV, 321-332]; Gosselin, January 3, 1840 [JDM, XV, 364, 375]; Pelissier, September 29, 1840 [JDM, XVI, 322-4]; Philip, March 30, 1840 [LMS 17/1/C]; Lemue, July 2, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A]; Philip, December 21, 1840 [LMS 17/2/D].

⁴⁶ See Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 316-320. There was, asserts Van der Merwe, no friction between white farmers and Griquas between 1835 and 1842. This was partly, perhaps, because the farmers were careful in their actions, and partly because the Griqua were preoccupied in other directions. Also, of course, as Van der Merwe argues, there was plenty of land in the district for both people: on this see also Schreiner, December 24, 1841 [LMS 18/2/C].

told Civil Commissioner Rawstorne that there had never been any boundary between him and Lepui, and they were accustomed to use the land communally. Lepui had by this time grown disenchanted with the Griqua — perhaps especially because he believed that his second son was using the situation to attempt usurping the chieftainship — and consequently he gave strong backing to Pelissier and Colonial mediation. To this the Griqua replied, ‘who is Lepui? He is the slave of Adam Kok.’⁴⁷ Despite a land commission investigation, whose decisions in fact benefited the white farmers rather than Griqua or Lepui, the matter was still unresolved when Jan Mocke returned to the area in 1843 to attempt the extension of the hegemony of the white Republic of Natal.⁴⁸

If there is included the less adequately documented attempt by Adam Kok to oust Samuel Rolland from Beersheba, and the contemporaneous attempt by the Griqua under Peter Davids in the Caledon valley to assert hegemony over a part of Moshweshwe’s territory,⁴⁹ then it is apparent that from 1838 Andries Waterboer and Adam Kok III were striving to bring into existence almost overnight the Christian Griqua republic in Transorangia which had been the aim of John Philip since the early 1830’s. Indeed, this aggressive, over-confident Griqua mood was ultimately the consequence of the transformation of the ‘Bastards’ to the ‘Griqua’ as symbolized by the change of name suggested by Campbell in 1833. When Nicholas Kruger and a Griqua party encountered Roger Edwards, the Kuruman missionary, and his wife at Daniels Kuil in March 1838 and threatened them that ‘all who make divisions, and unfaithful missionaries who teach only to read and write and mind their farming must leave and be gone,’ Nicholas Kruger continued, significantly:

Look at the American nation, what a powerful (or able) people they are and if our first teachers had done their duty, we should have been as advanced in civilization and knowledge as they, for our nation began to receive the Gospel at the very same time the colonization of America commenced...but now we have able teachers who teach u and we also are now able to teach the inhabitants of the whole country including the Bechuana tribes.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Pelissier, December 23, 1841 [JDM, XVII, 292].

⁴⁸ See Pelissier, December 23, 1841 [JDM, XVII, 281-293]; November 8, 1842 [JDM, XVII, 250-4]; March 27, 1843 [JDM, XVIII, 254-9]; Schreiner, December 24, 1841 [LMS 18/2/C]; ‘Report on Bethulie, ‘May 20, 1842 [JDM, XVIII, 47-9].

⁴⁹ See Philip, March 30, 1840 [LMS 17/1/C]; Lemue, July 2, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A]; Lemue, October 15, 1840 [PEMS: Lemue file]. At Philippolis Atkinson was also disillusioned with Adam Kok III and Griqua native agents over the expansionist aims: see Hamilton and Edwards, December 18, 1838 [LMS 16/5/B]; Boyce, March 9, 1839 [MMS: VII]. From Atkinson himself there is only one brief letter between June 1838 and February 1840, by which time there was a factional dispute involving him and the new missionary Gottlieb Schreiner.

⁵⁰ Edwards, Notes of events at Daniels Kuil, March 10, 1838 [Enclosed in Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838, LMS16/2/E]. For an earlier assertion of Griqua nationhood see Melvill, October 29, 1829 [LMS 11/4/A]: a Griqua councilor said to Melvill at Philippolis ‘that he was certain that God would

Such an assertion of the 'nationhood' of the Griqua — even if only in the Dutch sense of the *nasie* as the community, the *volk* — was itself significant. But Kruger's addition is of even more significance. Replying to the assertion by Mrs. Edwards that this was not the Griqua country, Kruger proclaimed 'it is my country. My mother was a Mochuana. I shall go and put them to rights. They are all in ignorance. They must hear or obey me.'⁵¹

Philip's plans for Griqua hegemony in Transorangia were producing unexpected results. While Philip undoubtedly saw the future of the Griqua within the Cape Colony, the Griqua nationalists saw themselves as an independent force. They were claiming the right to rule over the Kora and Sotho-Tswana of Transorangia not specifically to defend the northern frontiers of the colony, not chiefly because they intended to protect them from outside invasions, but because Transorangia was 'their' country, the country of a self-conscious community which traced its descent with pride to the previous Kora and Sotho-Tswana inhabitants of the area who formed a part of their ancestry.

Philip and Wright had given a charter and a form to the expression of Griqua nationalism. As the missionaries at Kuruman argued, Philip's letter to Wade in October 1833, the first expression of his ideology of Griqua chieftainship and landholding 'can we think account for the grasping ambitious spirit of Waterboer and his few Griqua.'⁵² Further, by arguing that the authority of the Griqua chiefs derived, in part, from the London Missionary Society, Philip, whether he knew it or not, encouraged what Roger Edwards described as the enlargement of the kingdom of Waterboer 'in connection with the advancement of Christ's kingdom.' There is evidence, moreover, that the inhabitants of the Kat River settlement, where James Read was stationed, were in this period actively encouraging the Griqua to remove white missionaries and install a complete native agency: and Read's influence on the development of the theory of the native agency has already been noted.⁵³ The fusion of secular and spiritual concerns was further encouraged among the Griqua by the missionary Peter Wright's role as confidential Agent of the Colonial government:

The native teachers ought to have been put on their guard that they may not interfere with politics [wrote Lemue to Wright] but then they were led to think that there was not harm in it, knowing that you were yourself a political agent... I admit...that good people and sincere in their convictions can be most useful in exhorting, reading, and praying with their countrymen, but their power ought not to go farther... If you say that you are not engaged

destroy the Grikwas as a Nation for the abuse of their privileges.'

⁵¹ Edwards, Notes of events at Daniels Kuil, March 10, 1838.

⁵² Hamilton and Edwards, December 18, 1838 [LMS 16/5/B].

⁵³ Boyce, March 9, 1839 [MMS: VII]. It is also significant that Read took with him as interpreter (when he toured north of the Orange in 1842 with Philip) the man Korassi who had been responsible for the attack on Pelissier at Bethulie: Hamilton and Edwards, August 12, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A].

to promote Waterboer's views for the extension of his kingdom I shall then ask how it is that you are countenanced as a minister of the Gospel and a servant of the government, for you know that Waterboer would not suffer Mr. Melville to preach on account of his concern with government, but preached himself instead of Mr Melville... Have you learnt to serve two masters?... Waterboer has judgement and penetration enough to manage his own government.⁵⁴

This fusion of church and state, encouraged rather than tolerated by Peter Wright, and expressed in the form of Griqua expansionism partially promoted (at Griquatown at least) by the extension of the Griquatown church through the native agency, was the basic characteristic of Griqua nationalism. It was as if the latent energy of the Griqua had been turned in a new direction. The missionaries had told the Griqua repeatedly, and with considerable distortion of the facts, that the Griqua had been nurtured into being as a separate people by the missionaries. The missionaries had tried to turn the energies of the Griqua to the building of houses and the planting of crops, and the Griqua had responded by revolt. Now that their nationhood was established, believed the Griqua, the need for missionaries (apart from Wright and Hughes) was past. The energy of revolt could be rechanneled: on the one hand towards the removal of the remaining white missionaries, and on the other, towards the fulfillment of their 'purpose', the conversion to Christianity of those Sotho-Tswana peoples over whom they could establish hegemony.

Formerly [wrote Lemue at this time of the Griqua] they were friendly, but now they are haughty with most people and arrogant with the missionaries. They now pass us by affecting disdain. They have used low and degrading language against certain missionaries in particular, and not spoken with much respect of anyone. They have threatened to visit the schools of the missionaries in order to convince themselves that the latter performed their duty...it is likely when such a spirit is displayed to a great extent piety is not retrograding.⁵⁵

Or, as the pioneer missionary Robert Hamilton querulously complained, 'surely it is not the intention of the Directors to give up this Mission to Griqua Native teachers who are very unfit as yet for that great work. If Pride maketh them fit they have got it in abundance.'⁵⁶ From the missionary point of view the native agency had its defects, and from the Sotho-Tswana point of view Griqua expansionism was a threat. But at least the Griqua had developed a proud self-consciousness.

⁵⁴ Lemue, July 2, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A].

⁵⁵ Lemue, July 2, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A]. To this Wright replied that the 'disdain' shown by the Griqua for Kuruman and Motito was the 'natural result of the improper and unfriendly conduct of Mr. Lemue and others manifested towards our people,' and 'our people having talked of visiting the schools of the missionaries under a momentary excitement of feeling can scarcely be considered a ground of complaint': Wright, September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B].

⁵⁶ Hamilton, September 7, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E].

Tlhaping Reaction to Griqua Expansionism, 1838 – 1842

The abandonment by the Griquatown state of attempts at hegemony over the Sotho-Tswana was, in large part, a result of the reversal of Philip's policies for the LMS in Transorangia. During 1837-8, the Kuruman missionaries complained to the LMS Directors, with little effect, at Wright's government agency and the deficiencies of the Griqua native agents. Early in 1838 they were joined by James Archbell, who visited Grahamstown from the Caledon valley and told the Colonial Governor that Waterboer was 'ruining the country oppressing the people around him.'⁵⁷ But the missionary counter-offensive gathered momentum only after the Griqua accusations of adultery against Moffat. Robert Moffat himself departed soon afterwards for the Colony, determined to get a satisfactory resolution of his complaints, and when Philip was indifferent, Moffat took ship for England. Meanwhile, Hamilton and Edwards launched a lengthy and acrimonious correspondence with Wright and Hughes about the adultery accusation.⁵⁸ Within a year the Kuruman missionaries were joined, in an ever-escalating criticism of Griqua expansionism, by more of the Wesleyans, and some of the French evangelicals including Pelissier and Lemue. Eventually such broadly based dissent had its effects on the LMS Directors, especially with Moffat in London to advise them, and Philip Wright and Waterboer were forced to temper, and then abandon, their plans for Griqua hegemony in Transorangia.⁵⁹

But if the missionaries had their own grievances, as well as articulating the complaints of the Sotho-Tswana, it was the Sotho-Tswana themselves who were most affected by Griqua aims. Uneasy from the start at Waterboer's claims to rule, the Sotho-Tswana were placed in a better position to act on this uneasiness when the threat posed by the Ndebele was removed from the power balance of Transorangia. In some places the Sotho-Tswana reaction took the form of antagonism to Christianity, even in the manner presented by white missionaries.⁶⁰ In others it was expressed by 'voting with the feet,' by moves northwards on the part of those Sotho-Tswana groups who had come under Griqua 'protection'

⁵⁷ See Philip, July 29, 1838 [LMS 16/1/C]. Also Philip, September 1838 [LMS 16/2/A]; February 21, 1839 [LMS 16/3/B]. Philip claimed Archbell was put up to the matter by 'Cornelius Kok, who is the creature of Bartlett, who puts all his trust in Moffat.'

⁵⁸ For the exchange see Hamilton and Edwards to Hughes and Wright, August 11, 1838; September 24, 1838; December 15, 1838 [LMS: Africa, Odds, Box 1]; Wright and Hughes to Edwards and Hamilton, September 4, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]; October 16, 1838 [In Edwards and Hamilton, December 18, 1838 LMS 16/5/B]; January 8, 1839 [Quoted in Wright and Hughes to LMS, January 8, 1839 LMS 16/3/A]. For further discussion of this matter see Edwards, February 7, 1839; Moffat, February 20, 1839; Hamilton and Edwards, December 18, 1838 [LMS 16/5/B]; Philip, March 30, 1840 [LMS 17/1/C]; Lemue, July 2, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A].

⁵⁹ See Chapter 12.

⁶⁰ See, for example, Lemue, September 21, 1839 [JDM, XV, 46].

during the crisis of the 1820's and 1830's. From the Philippolis district, and even from the Colony, in particular, scattered Sotho-Tswana groups began to make their way back to their traditional homes, or to the new Sotho-Tswana states — Moshweshwe's, Sekonyela's — which had come into existence during this period.⁶¹ In some cases both elements of reaction came into play. Thus Peter Wright explained the move towards Taungs of the Tlhaping situated on the Vaal as a response to the effect of the Gospel 'in breaking up their heathenish system and in effecting an entire change in the habits and dispositions of all the people.'⁶²

But the removal of many of the Tlhaping between late 1837 and mid-1840 from Waterboer's defined domains to areas further up the Vaal was a reaction against the Griquatown church rather than against Christianity itself. This removal began in 1837 when Gasibonwe moved from Mothibi's town to locate himself and his following at Borigelong, about twenty miles south of Mahura's confederation at Taungs.⁶³ But if Gasibonwe was a 'heathen', the 'Christians' were, in part, to follow. By March 1838 Mothibi himself had moved to Lekatlong, at the Harts-Vaal junction with his converted son Jantje, who was acting as a native agent. During the remainder of that year the people at Lekatlong, including the church members, debated among themselves and with Mahura as to whether they should not move to Taungs.⁶⁴ The people of Simenu, the other chief on the lower Vaal, had also moved near Lekatlong by this time, and though Simenu returned with some of them to his former site in mid-1839, he himself went northwards again a year later, leaving his younger brother, a Griquatown convert, to act as chief over those who wished to remain in Waterboer's orbit.⁶⁵

The combined effects of the frontier zone, Waterboer's thrust for power, and the removal of Mzilikazi thus left the Tlhaping hopelessly divided. There was cleavage between church members and those who remained 'pagans.' There was cleavage between Kuruman and Griquatown church members, and those who wished to have a church au-

⁶¹ It was about this time, too, that Moletsane left Philippolis or Beersheba to return to the Ghoya or Taung north of the Vet River: see Rolland, September 15, 1838 [JDM, XIV, 51-2]; Backhouse, *Narrative*, 389-391.

⁶² Wright and Hughes, January 8, 1839 [LMS 16/3/A]. See also Wright and Hughes, September 9, 1840 [LMS 17/3/C]; Hughes, November 19, 1846 [LMS 22/1/B].

⁶³ See Hamilton, November 3, 1837 [LMS 15/4/D]; Kuruman missionaries, July 2, 1838; September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]; Lemue, December 28, 1838 [JDM, XIV, 331]. For the not unfavorable attitude of Mahura and Gasibonwe to Christian preaching as such at this time see Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E].

⁶⁴ See Hughes, December 4, 1838 [LMS Journals 4/111]. Hughes claimed Jan Bloem had persuaded the Tlhaping to move so that they would not be drawn into the 'struggle for Griqualand' between Abraham Kok and Adam Kok III.

⁶⁵ See also Hughes, June 19, 1839 [LMS 16/3/D]; October 15, 1840 [LMS 17/2/C].

tonomous from both. There was cleavage in the Tlhaping ruling lineage itself. Strictly speaking Mothibi was still chief of the Tlhaping, and some ritual deference was paid to him by all. But in practice his power was ended. He was, wrote Livingstone in 1841 'a feeble decrepit old man, tottering into the grave... When talking to him of his past life he always commenced crying like a child. This is remarkable for a Bechuana, and particularly for a king.'⁶⁶ In 1841 Mothibi became converted to Christianity and divided his property among his sons, and he died four years later.⁶⁷ But even before Mothibi's conversion, power among the Tlhaping resided in fact with his brother Mahura and his two sons Gasibonwe and Jantje. Of these, strictly speaking, Gasibonwe at Borigelong was the rightful ruler: he was the eldest son of Mothibi by his chief wife Mahutu. But neither Mahura nor Jantje could be expected to relinquish the power they had gained over the previous decade. Mahura's power stemmed from his secular modernization, from his construction of a confederation at Taungs of Sotho-Tswana communities, and his acquisition of firearms and horses. Jantje's power derived from the Christians among the Tlhaping: he was a convert and a native agent, and he intended to build Lekatlong into a Christian community in the manner of Griquatown.

It was not only among the Tlhaping that such contests for chiefly power broke out after the removal of the Ndebele threat. Such succession disputes took overt form not only among the Kwenā and Ngwaketse further to the north, but among the Hurutshe at Taungs, where Moilwa and Motladile, sons of the chief Sebegodi, were determined to wrest power from the regent Mokgatla, Sebegodi's brother.⁶⁸ But in the case of the Tlhaping they were complicated by the context in which they took place. Cornelius Kok and Jan Bloem, as leaders of armed Griqua groups, were potential allies or antagonists as was Waterboer himself. And with church members, and potential church members, scattered at Lekatlong, Borigelong and Taungs, both the Griquatown missionaries and the Kuruman missionaries stepped up their competition for membership and hegemony. At the Kuruman, Hamilton and Edwards not only increased the number of their tours of itineration, but decided that they would have to emulate Griquatown in the establishment of a native agency. Amongst others, one Morisanyana was stationed as Kuruman native agent at Borigelong, and two other Kuruman church members performed similar functions less

⁶⁶ Livingstone, September 29, 1841 [Livingstone, *Family Letters*, I, 39-40].

⁶⁷ Edwards, September 24, 1831 [LMS 18/2/A]; Helmore, October 28, 1842 [LMS 18/5/A]; Helmore, November 17, 1845 [LMS 21/1/B]. For Mothibi's transfer of authority to Jantje (though the latter continued to call himself 'guardian' of Lekatlong) see Helmore, July 17, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A]; Wright and Hughes, September 20, 1840 [LMS 17/3/D]. Also Phiri in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 99-100.

⁶⁸ For the Hurutshe succession dispute see particularly Hamilton, March 9, 1840 [LMS 17/3/D]; Dumas, April 15, 1840 [JDM, XVI, 18-9]; Hamilton, April 8, 1841 [LMS 18/1/B].

officially at settlements to the south of Borigelong.⁶⁹ The Griquatown missionaries began itineration to Borigelong and Taungs, but both they and Waterboer devoted their main efforts to assuring that Lekatlong remained within the Griquatown orbit. In January 1839 Waterboer visited Jantje and Mothibi at Lekatlong, and the fact that Mothibi received a while later a wagon from the ‘Governor of the Colony’ in token of his ‘friendship’ to Waterboer and Christianity can hardly be unrelated to Waterboer’s visit.⁷⁰ Late in 1839, a new missionary, Henry Helmore, arrived at Griquatown and it was decided by Wright and Hughes that he should be stationed at Lekatlong under the authority of Griquatown.

In this situation Mahura, who had been the major force behind the initial Tlhaping reaction to Waterboer’s expansionism, challenged by Gasibonwe, chose temporarily to come to terms with Waterboer. Gasibonwe, on the other hand, allied himself with Cornelius Kok and Jan Bloem. And Jantje at Lekatlong wavered indecisively between acceptance and rejection of the Griquatown state and church. By 1840, however, when the struggle for power among the Tlhaping chiefs broke into the open, the main thrust of Waterboer’s expansionist drive had ended, and the relations between Bloem, Cornelius Kok and the Griquatown chief had improved slightly since 1838. This was undoubtedly because Philip, while openly defending Waterboer’s and Wright’s and Wright’s actions unreservedly, had spoken quiet words with them in private.

As early as September 1838, Philip, commenting on James Archbell’s complaints of Griqua expansionism, wrote that ‘Archbell might not have grounds for all he reported... [but] it is deeply to be regretted...he should have had any grounds for what he said.’⁷¹ In the middle of the following year Wright and Waterboer were summoned to Cape Town for discussions with Philip, and though Philip wrote after the visit extolling Waterboer — he had ‘the mind of a statesman...the simplicity of a child’ and was ‘filled with Christian spirit,’ disinterestedness, missionary zeal, spirituality and humility — and justifying the drift of his policies since 1832, yet he must have advised his protégés to move cautiously.⁷² In Waterboer’s absence, for example, Cornelius Kok II had threatened an attack on Griquatown and he renewed this threat early in 1840, in company with Jan Bloem. Instead of taking action against Cornelius, however, Waterboer and Adam Kok III had a meeting of mediation:

⁶⁹ Edwards, February 7, 1839 [LMS 16/5/B]; Edwards and Hamilton, September 12, 1840 [LMS 17/3D]. A native agent was also appointed to the Tlharo, and Lemue appointed one to the Kora of Mosweu: see also Lemue, February 25, 1840 [JDM, XV, 404].

⁷⁰ Hughes, December 4, 1838 [LMS Journals 4/111]; June 19, 1839 [LMS 16/3/D].

⁷¹ Philip, September 1838 [LMS 16/2/A].

⁷² Philip, March 30, 1840 [LMS 17/1/C]. See also Own, *Diary*, 147. Lat in 1840 he wrote to Wright urging him to cease the acrimonious correspondence with the Kuruman, and to concentrate on writing a narrative which would justify Waterboer’s position: see Philip, December 21, 1840 [LMS 17/2/D].

...in the month of April 1840 [wrote Wright to government] there was a general assembly of the Griquas held at Philippolis to settle Griqua affairs, and on that occasion the difference which had previously existed between Waterboer and C. Kok was settled in such a peaceable way that no violent dispute can again arise between them.⁷³

It was possibly at this time that a boundary line was established between Griquatown and Campbell, a line later described by several witnesses.⁷⁴ Certainly a few months afterwards Cornelius Kok II and Jan Bloem together signed a Treaty with M. A. Obenholzer, leader of the Transorangia white framers, as 'friends and allies.'⁷⁵

Furthermore, in September 1840, Wright, in reply to a letter from Lemue, claimed that the only reason that the 1834 Treaty had left the northern limits of Waterboer's territory 'undefined' was because the Tlhaping chief Mothibi was not at hand to agree on a boundary: it was well-known argued Wright, that the northern border of Griquatown territory was a little north of Daniels Kuil.⁷⁶ A month later Wright and Hughes moved to the banks of the Orange with a large number of Griquas to restart the irrigation project which had been abandoned in 1836, this time at a new spot some eight to ten miles above the confluence of the Vaal and Orange.⁷⁷ It is of the utmost significance that this project should have been begun again some *four* years after the Griquatown fountain itself had ceased to flow, and *two* whole years after the surface water supply had dried up. Only, in other words, with their expansionism restrained, and the Griqua thus prevented from removing their main settlement to a more fertile area, did the Griqua and their missionaries think again of renovating the Griquatown area itself. If Waterboer was inhibited from extending his authority, they argued, then let the fortunate be persuaded to come to Griquatown:

...many important matters are depending upon our success [in the irrigation project, wrote Wright]; not only the existence and advancement of our own Mission and the strengthening of Waterboer's hands, who is the only Christian chief in the country, the rest being all

⁷³ Wright to Craig, August 4, 1840 [Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 237-8]. See also Craig to Wright, July 2, 1840 [*ibid.*, 237]; Wright, September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B]; H. Hendricks in Lindley, *Adamantia*, 37-9 (Lindley incorrectly claims that this was in 1820; Hendricks is wrong in asserting that Andrew Smith was present); D. C. Verwey in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 214 who 'heard' of this meeting 'and such is recorded in the missionaries' books; and I had documents in my possession, being extracts out of the book of Missionary Bartlett, and which I handed to the Free State authorities.'

⁷⁴ H. Hendricks in Lindley, *Adamantia*, 38; D. C. Verwey, J. C. Coetzee, A. W. Greef, W. Davis, P. J. Goeyman in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 214, 226, 238, 241, 244, Lindley, *Adamantia*, 70-1, 157.

⁷⁵ For the Treaty, dated August 8, 1840, see Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 254-5; H. A. Greef in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 232. The treaty was reportedly similar to one signed by 'the Griquas of Philippolis' (probably a faction there) on June 16, 1840.

⁷⁶ Wright, September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B].

⁷⁷ Wright, October 16, 1840; Hughes, October 15, 1840 [LMS 17/2/C]. Also Wright, January 8, 1841 [LMS 18/1/A]; Philip, April 6, 1841 [LMS 18/1/C].

heathen and Marauders, but the wants and difficulties of many parties around us are causing them to look to the success of our present attempts with intense anxiety.⁷⁸

This was the situation at Griquatown when, in November 1840, Gasibonwe moved to assert his supremacy as Tlhaping chief by raiding Mahura's cattle-posts at Taungs, robbing a Rolong trading party who were passing through his territory, and attacking cattle-posts in the Old Dithakong area, presumably to assert his authority there. At the same time he warned the peoples of the Kuruman area and at Lekatlong that they might be attacked also and then retired to Phokwane to join Jan Bloem.⁷⁹ Mahura immediately wrote, via Jantje at Lekatlong, whom he still regarded as under the authority of Waterboer, and asked for the assistance of the Griquatown chief. The magnitude and the significance of this attack were vastly inflated as the news of it passed from Mahura to Jantje to Helmore to Waterboer to Wright to Philip...and finally to the LMS Directors.⁸⁰ But the new policy adopted by Waterboer and Wright was clear. Waterboer would not send assistance.

The Kuruman missionaries and Lemue [wrote Waterboer to Wright] have by their unjust and violent proceedings of late ruined their own people and put it out of my power to help them. They have now let loose all the Tigers and Wolves of the land, and we are compelled to remain within our own doors, and now there is nothing but ruin to the weak and defenceless who have protected by us and kept in safety under our wing for the last twenty years.⁸¹

But, continued Waterboer significantly, Lekatlong and Moruane 'I shall not suffer to be molested as their religious connection with us demands this from me.' Wright, in forwarding the correspondence to Philip, underlined the point. When the Orange River irrigation scheme was completed, he said, the peoples from Lekatlong, Moruane, Daniels Kuil, and Tsantsabane would move to reap the benefits of it, and those at Kuruman and Motito would be left exposed to the 'Banditti'. 'Waterboer knows well the extent of the ruin caused by the dismembering of the country, and compelling him to withdraw his saving influence from the chiefs and people around him, by those who have aimed at his and our ruin.'⁸²

At the same time, however, both Lekatlong's 'religious connection' with Griquatown and Waterboer's 'saving influence' were in serious question by the people of Lekatlong

⁷⁸ Wright to Philip, December 5, 1840 [In Philip, January 20, 1841 [LMS 18/1/A].

⁷⁹ Helmore, on behalf of Jantje, etc. to Waterboer, November 27, 1840 [LMS 18/2/B]. for Gasibonwe's earlier association with Bloem (in 1834) see Wright to Philip, December 5, 1840 [LMS 18/1/A]; Wright, September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B]; March 5, 1838 [LMS 16/1/A].

⁸⁰ For the exaggeration see Moffat to Directors of PEMS, August 28, 1841 [PEMS: Moffat file].

⁸¹ Waterboer to Wright, December 5, 1840 [In Philip, January 20, 1841, LMS 18/1/A; also in Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 185-6]. See also Waterboer to Jantje, etc., December 4, 1840 [LMS 18/2/B].

⁸² Wright to Philip, December 5, 1840 [In Philip, January 20, 1841]. Also Wright, January 18, 1841; Philip, January 20, 1841 [LMS 18/1/A]; Philip, April 16, 1841 [LMS 18/1/C].

under Jantje. Helmore, stationed at Lekatlong in mid-1840, had arrived in Transorangia full of admiration for the work of Wright and Hughes: the advance of 'civilization' at Griquatown, he wrote, 'far surpasses everything I have witnessed before in Africa.'⁸³ Yet very shortly he too was exposed to Griquatown expansionism. Wright and Hughes were insistent that Helmore should be stationed at Lekatlong within the framework of a Griquatown church 'union'; Helmore was equally insistent that he intended to form a separate church and not an outstation of Griquatown. He wished to be 'the sole Missionary and Pastor and the Church consequently under my superintendence,' though he was not averse to a 'union' if this included the other LMS stations as well. Eventually an agreement was drawn up, recognizing Helmore as 'sole' missionary and pastor, and continuing that 'the affairs of the Mission shall be transacted by myself and the Church unitedly' and 'that in case of any difficulties arising, myself and the people conjointly should seek advice from *Griquatown*.' Helmore interpreted this as asserting his independence, while Wright and Hughes took the final clause to mean that the connection of Lekatlong with Griquatown 'was preserved unbroken,'⁸⁴

Matters went smoothly at Lekatlong until the LMS Directors wrote to Helmore suggesting that he restore his connection with Griquatown. The people of Lekatlong, he replied, would not stand for this; they

...have been so oppressed by the Griquas that they possess no confidence in them: and they stand in peculiar fear of Griqua Town in consequence of language lately used by the Chief Waterboer: and were I to enter into a union with that place which should be different from that entered into with other Stations, I should be received with suspicion by all the towns of Korannas and Bechuanas, which I may visit.⁸⁵

This, he argued, was a missionary matter as well as a 'political' matter, because it was believed that Waterboer's conduct was countenanced by Wright. Within months after Helmore had written this letter, however, he found his own position threatened. Growing exasperated with the poor quality of the church members and deacons, and what he described as the 'nominal' authority of the Christian chief Jantje over the Lekatlong population, Helmore suspended Jantje from the church for stealing some oxen from a trader. Even when Jantje restored the oxen and apologized to the trader, Helmore and the remaining deacons refused to readmit Jantje, wishing to be more severe than usual on the chief. This stringent action, totally alien to the method of operation of the Griquatown church, induced Jantje to proceed to Griquatown in the company of the native agent

⁸³ Helmore, December 14, 1839 [LMS 16/4/B]. Also Wright, November 5, 1839 [LMS 16/4/B].

⁸⁴ Helmore, July 7, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A]; Hughes, October 15, 1840 [LMS 17/2/C]; Wright and Hughes, September 20, 1840 [LMS 17/3/C]; Helmore, July 12, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A].

⁸⁵ Helmore, August 30, 1841 [LMS 18/2/A].

Thabe and his father Thaiso, to demand that the connection of Lekatlong with Griquatown be re-established.⁸⁶

John Philip in Transorangia in 1842

Thus, despite the setback to Philip's plans for a Christian Griqua republic in Transorangia, and despite Waterboer's retreat within his own borders, by the end of 1841 two of the three Tlhaping chiefs, Mahura and Jantje, were making renewed overtures towards the Griquatown chief. It was in this situation that John Philip decided to pay his first visit to Transorangia in ten years, and to make what would be his final contribution to the politics of the region.

John Philip, accompanied by the now-elderly James Read, because of the 'affectionate remembrance in which he has always been held by Mateebe and his people,' and his 'long intimacy with the principal people at Philippolis,' traveled first to pay a visit to Moshweshwe, and then returned to Philippolis itself before heading for western Transorangia.⁸⁷ The decisions which he made in the east were an ill omen for his diplomacy between Waterboer and the Tlhaping. Intriguing for the removal of the Philippolis missionary Schreiner, recommending to the Colony government the signature of treaties with Moshweshwe and Adam Kok III, the LMS Superintendent, as always, rode roughshod over lesser parties who stood in his way.⁸⁸ His philosophy was simple:

Were treaties with the Government to become a common thing, they would lose all their value and cease to answer any good purpose...should the Government enter into treaties with other chiefs beyond [Adam Kok III and Moshweshwe]...they will find nothing but rivals in those whom in other circumstances they may find allies.⁸⁹

Philip, however, produced at least as many 'rivals' as 'allies'. He antagonized Lepui at Bethulie, who was fearful of Adam Kok III's expansionism, by insisting that occupying LMS territory on sufferance, he needed no Treaty with government. He commenced another altercation with the Wesleyans, who were arguing the rather more dubious claims of Moroka, and their Griqua, Kora and Bastard charges, to independence from Moshweshwe. These,

⁸⁶ Also Helmore, November 16, 1841 [LMS 18/2/D].

⁸⁷ Philip, June 11, 1842 [LMS 18/3/C].

⁸⁸ See Read and Philip, May 26, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A]; Schreiner, July 25, 1842 [LMS 18/4/D]; Wright, October 25, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A] for the removal of Schreiner. Stockenström had been willing to ratify a treaty with Abraham Kok in 1837, and then with Adam Kok III in 1838, and Atkinson had in fact proceeded with Adam to Colesberg in 1839 for the signing of a Treaty but been told to return by Philip: see Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 220-1; Atkinson, February 29, 1840 [LMS 16/1/B]; January 24, 1837 [LMS 15/3/A].

⁸⁹ Quoted in Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 235.

claimed the Wesleyans, had 2000 muskets and 1500 horses, and 'from the superior knowledge of the Griquas and Newlanders (who are exactly the same kind of people as those under Waterboer and Kok) they are more powerful for good or evil than the Basuto Nation.'⁹⁰

From Philippolis John Philip proceeded to Griquatown, where he wrote in glowing terms of the achievements of Wright and Waterboer. The native agency was, he said, the 'most remarkable feature' and

...the fitness of the men for the work in which they are engaged far exceeds anything I could have imagined...men of genuine piety, possessing good natural talents, and a knowledge of the Scriptures that has surprised us...their gifts and graces are of no common order...[though] the freshness and interest connected with the work of God in this place in 1836, 37 and 38 have ceased...the work itself still continues to make progress, and if the native agency is not now peculiar to Griquatown that which belongs to it has not lost its efficiency...with the increase of members to the church a corresponding improvement might be expected in the tempers, habits, and manners of the people; and comparing what they now are with what they were when I saw them on my former journeys, the change is striking and highly gratifying.⁹¹

From Griquatown Philip journeyed northwards to Kuruman and Motito, and returned to Waterboer's capital by way of Taungs, Borigelong and Lekatlong. In almost every place he succeeded in sowing, or aggravating, seeds of discord, rather than healing them. At Kuruman he detected dissension between Roger Edwards, then absent in the Colony, and the newly arrived missionaries Ross and David Livingstone, which he exploited to the full in order to discredit Edwards to the LMS.⁹² At Borigelong Philip cross-questioned the Kuruman native agent Morisanyana, who had some minor dissatisfactions. 'Do the missionaries treat you well? And have you no cause for complaint? Morisanyana was asked, at which a colleague warned him '*Ba batla go ee bapala mo Baruti* (They wish to ensnare us with our teachers).'⁹³ At Lekatlong Philip assisted in the displacement of Helmore, who was transferred to Borigelong, thus temporarily restoring Lekatlong to the Griquatown circuit.

Philip and Read argued that Helmore had attached himself at Lekatlong to 'those who were opposed to the Griquatown people,' and had thereby lost the confidence of the majority. 'It was the spirit he had manifested against Waterboer and the reports he had circulated against that chief that had done him the greatest injury,' they wrote.⁹⁴ Helmore, they claimed, had made a written confession of his errors. Helmore's version was reveal-

⁹⁰ W. Shaw to Government, December 15, 1843 [LMS 19/4/B]. For these treaties, and Philip's role, see Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 220-238; Galbraith, *Reluctant Empire*, 198-209.

⁹¹ Philip, May 20, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A]. Also Philip [LMS Journals 4/112].

⁹² See Moffat, January 8, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A].

⁹³ Hamilton and Edwards, August 12, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A].

⁹⁴ Philip and Read, May 6, 1842 [LMS 18/3/C]. See also Read, June 3, 1843 [LMS 19/2/A]; Hughes, September 14, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A].

ingly different. Peter Wright, he said, had arrived at Lekatlong five days before Philip and Read, and when they arrived had convened a meeting of several leading men without Helmore's knowledge. Some complaints were raised and settled, and then

...the grand complaint was brought forward that I was not on friendly terms with Waterboer and Mr. Wright. With regards to the former I had formed my own private opinions but had no hostile feelings towards him nor had acted or spoken differently to what I have done since I first entered the country. I had believed the report which I stated in my letter to you⁹⁵ for Mothibi himself told me that he left in consequence of the strong language used by Waterboer. There seems however to be some misunderstanding with regards to that matter, and as Waterboer denies that he used such language I have taken his word as a Christian.⁹⁶

Philip and Read argued that the overwhelming majority of the Lekatlong population was opposed to Helmore. The missionary claimed, on the other hand, that the dissidents numbered only two or three. That Helmore was correct was demonstrated soon after his departure. Even Jantje, who had led the discontent, came to commiserate for Helmore and himself. Only another visit from Waterboer intimidated Jantje and his people from leaving Lekatlong, and Helmore moved to Borigelong in June 1842 'amid the tears of men, women and children.' By October 1843, he had returned to Lekatlong and re-established it as an independent church.⁹⁷

During his tour, Philip conducted, with Read, an 'enquiry' into the complaints against Waterboer and pronounced him completely 'exculpated'. All the Sotho-Tswana chiefs of the area, said Philip, including Mahura, Gasebonwe and Mothibi,

...both in public and in private have declared that Waterboer has never shown the slightest inclination to oppress them, to take from them their subjects, or to bring them under his authority. On the contrary they one and all of them assert that to Waterboer they are indebted for their existence as chiefs and as a people, that so far from taking advantage of their divisions he has always done everything to unite, and to strengthen their authority over their people when it has at any time been weakened...it was actually proposed among them to expel from the country every [missionary] who might attempt to sow dissension among them by speaking against Waterboer.⁹⁸

Such apparent unanimity might be regarded as conclusive were it not that Helmore, who was present at the 'enquiry' wrote soon after to the LMS that 'the charges were merely

⁹⁵ See footnote 85.

⁹⁶ Helmore, May 16, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A]. See also Helmore, July 12, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A].

⁹⁷ Helmore, October 28, 1842 [LMS 18/5/A]; Hughes, August 10, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A]; Helmore, December 12, 1842 [LMS 20/1/B].

⁹⁸ 'Result of an enquiry...' [Enclosed in Philip, July 2, 1842, LMS 18/3/C]. Philip also claimed that Ross, Livingstone, Hamilton, Pelissier and Lemue were either 'at one' with the Griquatown missionaries or had withdrawn their charges against Waterboer: see Philip, July 2, 1842 [LMS 18/3/C].

put and denied without any proof for or against: and I expressly forbade my name being connected with the matter.⁹⁹ One chief, however, for his own purposes, was ready to resurrect his friendship with Waterboer. This was Mahura who, on April 22 1842 signed, at his main settlement of Taungs and in the presence of Philip, a Treaty with Waterboer. This Treaty was framed in rather looser terms than that between Waterboer and Adam Kok III. The chiefs would meet 'when circumstances make it necessary,' they would 'govern within their own boundaries' rather than being considered 'one people,' they would call in 'impartial men' to arbitrate between them in case of dispute rather than the Colony government, and they could take defensive, but not aggressive, action independently. The boundaries between the two were subject to later falsification, but the most reliable version that survives states that they ran

...from the northerly point of the Langeberg and extending a little south of Nokaneng, and further half-way between Maremane and Klipfontein...between Koning and Daniels Kuil, and thence in a straight line to the north of Boetsap, including Roelofsfontein.¹⁰⁰

Mahura no doubt saw this agreement as little more than a definition of boundaries, which on the one hand secured him against further Griqua expansionism, and on the other hand recognized him as the legitimate Tlhaping ruler instead of Gasibonwe or Jantje. Philip, Wright, and Waterboer, on the other hand, must have seen it as the ratification of a necessary evil. For although Mahura was not hostile to missionaries, he could by no means be described as a 'Christian chief' like Waterboer or Adam Kok III, and indeed there had developed at Taungs in 1841-2 a distinct reaction against Christianity.¹⁰¹ Yet this Treaty, while no doubt seen by Philip and from Griquatown as contributing to stability in Transorangia, again promoted instability by ignoring the complexities of the situation. If the Treaty of 1838 with Adam Kok II had ignored the claims of Cornelius Kok II, this Treaty of 1842 ignored not only Jan Bloem, but also Gasibonwe, the legitimate Tlhaping ruler. And it left Jantje, who also had pretensions to chieftainship, and *was* a 'Christian' leader firmly and unwillingly within the territory of Waterboer. If this new carving up of eastern Transorangia remained more theoretical than practical, it was because of the reassertion of the Tlhaping themselves, and not because of the policies advocated by John Philip.

⁹⁹ Helmore, October 28, 1842 [LMS 18/5/A].

¹⁰⁰ For versions of the Treaty, see *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 27 – 8, 115 – 6. Also Nicholas Kruger in *ibid.*, 3, 7; Lambert Jansz in *ibid.*, 10 – 11, 351; J. J. O'Reilly in *ibid.*, 193; Ross, July 5, [LMS 18/3/A]; March 8, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A].

¹⁰¹ For the reaction against Christianity at Taungs see Hamilton, January 20, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A]; April 8, 1841 [LMS 18/1/B]; Edwards, September 1, 1840 [LMS 17/3/ D]; Lemue, July 29, 1840 [JDM, XVI, 82].

12 The Decline of Griqua Hegemony

‘The truth must be told,’ wrote the Kuruman missionary Roger Edwards in 1838, ‘the Bechuana are a rising and numerous people and will eclipse the Griqua who are despised by them as a mere company of Bastards.’¹ This was true. John Philip’s tour of 1842 was a last unavailing attempt to repair the tattered fabric of his vision for Transorangia. Already Griqua hegemony was challenged from three directions: by Sotho-Tswana groups themselves, by a broad coalition of missionaries, and by the farmers of the Great Trek, who had passed through the Philippolis territory to Winburg and Natal, and who returned in the early 1840’s to begin consolidating a white-ruled state in Transorangia. Adam Kok III ruled at Philippolis until 1861, and the Waterboers, Andries and his son Nicholas, at Griquatown until the annexation of 1871, but with steadily diminishing influence. As individuals, the Griqua continued — or returned to — trading and hunting, especially along the ‘northern road’ through the present Botswana. But their consciousness of themselves as a people, and with it their dignity and their pride, eroded: many, classically, drowned their troubles in drink. Apart from David Arnot’s resurrection on paper of John Philip’s proposals for Transorangia, the main resistance to the establishment of white supremacy over Transorangia came from the Sotho-Tswana: from Moshoeshoe in the east and Mahura in the west. The main resistance to the alienation of land to white farmers came from these leaders and from the missionaries.

John Philip and Robert Moffat, 1837 – 1843

That by the 1860’s and 1870’s missionaries were established with Sotho-Tswana communities along the western fringes of white settlement, able to protest the expansion of this settlement, and willing to call on the ‘Imperial factor’ to assist them, was in part due to Robert Moffat’s triumph over John Philip in their last battle. This battle was a long-drawn out affair, which began when Moffat discovered, with the publication of the relevant documents, that Peter Wright had been acting as confidential Government agent to Waterboer since 1834. It ended only towards the end of Moffat’s visit to London, when he convinced the LMS Directors that considerable modifications of their policy in South Africa were required.

¹ Edwards, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]. Moffat, in a postscript to Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1836 argued that in 1836 Wright himself had recognized this fact.

It was while Philip was still in Britain, his attention distracted from the development of his Transorangia schemes by his concern over Governor D'Urban's handling of the 1835 – 6 Xhosa war of resistance, that Moffat and his Kuruman colleagues began to express their grievances. To the LMS Directors Robert Hamilton wrote of the 'evil' of allowing missionaries to become government agents:

...this was the cause of Br. Anderson leaving Griquatown. Counraad Buys sent a message to Matebee that we were Government Agents which made him drive us away on our first visit to Old Latakoo. We have told this people from the beginning that we have no connection with government, nor another Missionary. Some are now asking how is it that Mr. Wright is Government Agent.²

To the concern over the Government Agency, Robert Moffat added the issue of John Bartlett at Campbell, who Moffat felt has been unjustly dismissed by the LMS. But, despite the hints by the Kuruman missionaries that there were other matters of which to complain ("a 'chapter of accidents' in this country, the fruit of which is called a Union of Church and State") neither Philip nor the LMS Directors paid much attention. Philip, indeed, stung also by the similar criticisms from the Wesleyan Archbell, wrote a passionate defense of Waterboer to the Directors, and included a vicious personal attack on Moffat.³

Several months later, alarmed by the accusations of adultery made by the Griqua against Moffat, and convinced that these were a prelude to more forcible Griqua action against the white missionaries they disliked, the Kuruman missionaries went into greater detail. In two lengthy letters they set out all the evidence of Griqua expansionism that they could muster, and concluded that 'while Andries was in the Cape [in 1834-5] laudably engaged in accepting a treaty with our Government, some one (for we leave you to guess) put it into his head to convert handful of subjects into an empire.' Peter Wright, they said, was 'a fellow-labourer in the grand design.'⁴ Early in November 1838 Moffat set out for the Colony, while Mahura and the chief Motshware at Motito implored him not to leave for fear he would never return. Moffat's meetings with Wright and Waterboer at Griquatown, and with Philip himself in Cape Town, led to no resolution of the differ-

² Hamilton, February 9, 1837 [LMS 15/4/D].

³ See Kuruman missionaries, June 15, 1837 [LMS 15/4/D]. Also Philip, April 4, 1838 [LMS 16/1/B]; June 18, July 29, 1838 [LMS 16/1/C]; September 1838 [LMS 16/2/A]; February 21, 1839 [LMS 16/3/B].

⁴ Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]. See also Edwards, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]; Hamilton, September 7, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]. As in the case of Hamilton's letter of February 1837, it is possible that the motivator of the letter of February 1837, it is possible that the motivator of the letter was Moffat, who believed Hamilton would be regarded as a more credible source: see Wright, January 18, 1841 [LMS 18/1A].

ences between them. Moffat therefore, though he claims he traveled to Cape Town largely to secure the printing of his SeTswana translation of the New Testament, and with no intention of leaving the Colony, decided to go to England. Registering with the governor his complaints on the Government Agency, and the Bartlett affair, as well as the grievances of some Tlhaping who has accompanied him, Moffat took ship.⁵ As he left, John Philip wrote hastily to the LMS. The LMS, wrote Philip, should do nothing until they heard from Wright and Waterboer who were due in Cape Town shortly, and if mediation was necessary he, Philip, would undertake the task. It might in fact be best were Moffat not to return to Africa, for if the Governor told Wright or Waterboer of Moffat's complaints, it would be 'war to the knife.'⁶

Publicly at least, Philip would maintain this staunch defense of his Griquatown protégés in the face of a rising tide of missionary criticism. In March 1839, as Wright and Waterboer set out for Cape Town, William Boyce wrote to the Wesleyan Missionary Society in similar vein to the missionaries at the Kuruman. The Griqua and Bastards, he claimed, were 'interlopers', attempting to 'usurp' territory from the Sotho-Tswana in order to lease it to white farmers. 'All this originates in Dr. Philips' favorite but impracticable scheme of placing all the tribes North of the Orange...under Waterboer as King,' Peter Wright, said Boyce, was believed to be aiming at the expulsion of all white missionaries in Transorangia 'to aggrandize himself' as the head of a chain of native agents.⁷ Had the criticism been confined to Moffat and the Wesleyans (who were already in conflict with Philip over policies on the eastern frontier) one might be justified in placing less weight on it. But to the correspondence from the Kuruman and from Boyce there were now added the complaints, elaborated and documented in an exchange of letters with Wright, of Prosper Lemue at Motito,⁸ as well as Pelissier at Bethulie, others of the Paris Evangelicals, and even Atkinson at Philippolis.⁹

⁵ See Moffat, February 20, 1839 [LMS 16/5/B]; Wright, February 24, 1839 [LMS 16/3/B]; Hamilton and Edwards, December 16, 1838 [LMS 16/5/B]. All Moffat's biographers are quite silent on the dispute of this period, except for references to Moffat's opposition to the Superintendency of Philip. But see Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 226-230 for a brief, confused, and unfair assessment of the differences.

⁶ Philip, February 21, 1839 [LMS 16/3/B].

⁷ W. Boyce, March 9, 1839 [MMS: VII].

⁸ The text of this letter could not be located in the PEMS archives. It is however quoted, commented upon, and amplified in the subsequent exchange: see Philip, March 30, 1840 [LMS 17/1/C]; Wright to Lemue, June 7, 1840 [PEMS: Lemue file]; Lemue to Wright, July 2, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A]; Lemue August 18, 1840 [PEMS: Lemue file]; Wright, September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B].

⁹ See Chapter 11 for the attitudes of Pelissier, Atkinson, Rolland, etc.

In private, to Wright and Waterboer, Philip appears to have had some reservations about the development of the situation in Transorangia.¹⁰ But to the Directors he was concerned most of all to discredit those who criticized him. Of Moffat he wrote,

Moffat is not to be convinced by argument. The defect he labours under is not in his head but in his heart, and that can never be remedied but by divine powers. Like one of old I shall not name he is offended that God has approved of the *sacrifice* of his brother. He had driven away Matebee and Mahuri and denounced them as forsaken and reprobated by God, and he will never forgive Wright for what has been done by his instrumentality among that people until God shall be pleased to reconvert him. What he calls the agency of Mr. Wright is nothing but a pretext, and the Board ought without delay to settle that point by its authority... Moffat's temper...drove away Matebee and Mahuri and their people...he is [pleasant?] to strangers and they have all praised him not excepting Dr. Smith, this circumstances has made a temper naturally bad worse, to those under him he is the most [impetuous?] and overbearing man I ever knew, to strangers he is the most smooth man in the world, the praise he has got (for he has some good parts as a missionary) has filled him with pride and...without knowing what spirit he is of he would rather lay desolate the whole country rather than that it should bear a plant not of his own planting and watering... The passions of Moffat have such a complete ascendancy over him that they shut his heart against all gratitude for the past and his eyes against all foresight with regard to the future.¹¹

It was the same, initially, with Pelissier. Receiving a statement from Adam Kok III that the Griqua had never intended to press claims to Bethulie, Philip castigated the French missionary for antagonizing the Griqua and interfering with 'an union between Lepui and Adam Kok.' Within months, however, he was forced to recognize that Pelissier's criticism had in this case been justified.¹²

To the LMS, also, Philip continued to distort Waterboer's role as 'defender of the northern frontier' and Wright's role as his agent.

Waterboer has always made him [Wright] his adviser and Wright has saved Waterboer and the Griqua Nation from total ruin...that treaty that has saved even Latakoo would not have taken place had not Wright consented to act as he has done... Wright is not a government agent in the sense in which that term is understood — he never meddles with the affairs of the Colonial Government — he is merely the medium of communication between Government and Waterboer, the translator of the government letters and of Waterboer's letters to government, or, if you will, the Secretary to Waterboer.¹³

In the 1830's, in Philip's eyes, 'the name of Waterboer' had saved Transorangia and the missions from 'promiscuous ruin' by Mzilikazi. With Mzilikazi departed for the north,

¹⁰ See Chapter 11.

¹¹ Philip, July 29, 1838 [LMS 16/1/C].

¹² Philip, March 30, 1840 [LMS 17/1/C]; December 21, 1840 [LMS 17/2/D].

¹³ Philip, July 29, 1838 [LMS 16/1/C].

it was necessary to invoke another demon. Once again it was the white farmers, for were Waterboer 'out of the way without anyone of similar qualifications to succeed him, the Boers would still locate themselves in that country, and leave the Missionaries without a country and without people.'

Our missionaries [argued Philip] resemble a number of people in a besieged town where everyone is looking at his own domicile without paying the slightest regard either to the outworks or the Citadel...so blink[er]ed with passion and prejudice as to be actually leading themselves to support the banditti against the power which is the only shield by the side of which they can enjoy protection and prosecute their labours in peace.¹⁴

But Philip was equally 'blinkerred with prejudice.' If Mzilikazi intended, as is doubtful, to involve Transorangia in 'promiscuous ruin,' it was the diplomacy of Moffat himself, and not Waterboer, which had prevented this. Equally Waterboer had not prevented, and could not prevent, the expansion of white settlement in eastern Transorangia; and that the white farmers did not move towards the Griquatown state was more because of its infertility than any fear of Waterboer, or his relationship with the Colony.

For some time after Moffat's arrival in Britain, however, Philip's views had the greater weight among the LMS Directors. In 1839 the LMS wrote to both Griquatown and the Kuruman that they should attempt a friendly adjustment of the differences between them; a letter which only sparked off an exchange of correspondence between the two Transorangia missions as bitter in tone as the previous exchange on Moffat's adultery.¹⁵ Not until 1841 does there appear to have been some change. Writing to the Directors of the Paris Evangelical Society (who were sympathetic to him) in August that year, Moffat spoke of the correspondence which had reached Britain about Gasebonwe's raiding late in 1840. The Directors, he said,

...are now beginning to have their eyes opened to the character of Mr. Wright. His own letters seem to convince them of this, they are so bitter against Mr. Lemue and myself... Some months ago the Directors received letters from Waterboer and Wright stating that the Missions at Kuruman Motito etc were in the greatest danger... It was...said that Gasebonwe would...attack the Kuruman and the people from there and other places were soliciting help from A. Waterboer. I happened to be at hand and was called into a Committee meeting met for the purpose and apparently much alarmed. I was able to set their minds at rest...having received a letter about the same time from the Kuruman. The simple fact was

¹⁴ Philip, March 30, 1840 [LMS 17/1/C].

¹⁵ See Edwards and Hamilton to Wright and Hughes, April 1, 1840 [LMS: PPapers 3/1/C]; June 10, 1840 [Enclosed in Wright, etc., October 7, 1840, LMS 17/3/D]; Hughes and Wright to Hamilton and Edwards, May 14, 1840 [LMS 17/1/C]; July 31, 1840 [Enclosed in Wright, etc., October 7, 1840, LMS 17/3/D]. See also Hamilton to Wright, December 21, 1840; Wright to Hamilton, January 20, 1841 [Enclosed in Wright, January 18, 1841, LMS 18/1/A]; Philip, April 16, 1841 [LMS 18/1/C].

this, Gasibonwe offended by a handful of...Basutus living at Old Lattakoo...he took their cattle and in the scuffle a man was killed.¹⁶

In the same letter Moffat reported that the subject of his adultery had again been brought before the Directors 'and I believe all now regret the way the subject has been treated.' Before the end of the year, in fact, the Directors had written again to the Kuruman and Griquatown missions, this time in tones which were satisfactory to the Kuruman. If the proposed suggestions were pursued, wrote Edwards and Hamilton, 'if jangling slander-ing spirit is checked...by telling the Griquas plainly their duty and warning them against imagining they can trifle with character...peace may be restored.'¹⁷

The change in the LMS attitude is demonstrated, if subtly, in Moffat's *Missionary Labours and Scenes in South Africa*, published in 1842. Like Philip's *Researches*, and the first major publication by an LMS missionary since that time, this was a 'semi-official' work, reflecting in some sense the policies of the LMS. Throughout this work, where appropriate, there is criticism of a 'union of church and state,' and hints at the resentment of the Tlhaping and other Sotho-Tswana groups at Griqua hegemony. Of Anderson's tenure at Griquatown Moffat wrote that 'the events now recorded prove a demonstration that it is not the duty of the missionary to take an active part in political affairs'; after his own tenure there in 1820-21, he said, 'the mission-house, instead of being turned into a kind of council-chamber, were visited only by such as had cases of conscience to propose.' 'Many judicious persons,' furthermore, had deprecated the appointment of Wright as Government Agent: it was well known that both John Brownlee among the Xhosa and William Thompson at the Kat River had found the dual function had to fulfill.

More than twenty years experience among the aborigines beyond the boundary of the colony has convinced the writer that the two offices ought not to be held by the same person. Among the Bechuanas our lives have been placed in imminent danger from the suspicious exerted in their mines by Conrad Buys and others, that we were the agents of government.

And, describing Peter Wright's proposal in 1827 for the combination of the Griqua and Kuruman missions, Moffat made a plea of Tlhaping autonomy:

...the Bechuanas, though unable to defend their country against enemies who possessed both firearms and horses, were nevertheless extremely jealous of every encroachment on the domains of their ancestors, and however the subdued condition might for a time prostrate their patriotism, we were well aware that should we connive at the Griquas settling down

¹⁶ Moffat to directors, PEMS, August 28, 1841 [PEMS: Moffat file]. See also on this affair Chapter 11.

¹⁷ Hamilton and Edwards, August 12, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A]. This refers to letters from the LMS Directors to them dated February 8, 1842, and from the LMS to Wright and Hughes dated February 8, 1842. See also, for criticism of these LMS letters, Philip, July 2, 1842 [LMS 18/3/C].

in their country, it would eventually bring upon us a load of obloquy, when they found themselves viewed as subordinate, in what was once their own territory.¹⁸

On other matters, however, Moffat was forced to recognize the policies of Philip, though with varied emphases of his own. He had not, he stressed in his book, been opposed to Waterboer's Treaty with Colony, and had indeed been the first to recommend it: before the treaty 'Waterboer did not receive either the sanction or support from the colonial government which he deserved.'¹⁹ Nor was he opposed to a suitably defined relationship between missionary and chief (the role, in fact, which Philip defensively claimed Wright had filled):

...no missionary, however, can with any show of Scripture or reason, refuse his pacific counsel and advice, when those among whom he labours require it, nor decline to become interpreter or translator to any foreign power, or to be the medium of hushing the din of war arising from either family interests or national claims; nor is it inconsistent with his character to become a mediator or intercessor where life is at stake, whether arising from ignorance despotism, or revenge... A missionary may do all this, and more than this...but his entering into diplomatic engagements places himself, as well as the great object of his life in jeopardy.

Quoting the evidence of Andries Stockenstrom to the 1836 Aborigine's Committee, and the role of the Griqua in the 1823 commando against the 'Mantatees', Moffat also drew attention to the 'frontier defense' question. But here he emphasized the role of the missionaries rather than of such people as the Griqua: 'that missionaries do obtain an influence among the tribes beyond, without any official interference, has been demonstrated along the whole line of the colonial boundary from the Atlantic to the Fish River on the East.'²⁰

Perhaps the most significant alteration of Moffat's views, however, was on the question of the native agency. Having written earlier of the Griqua native agents that 'a picture could be drawn which would not disgrace the pen of Hogarth', he now claimed that the missionaries at Kuruman had already begun such a practice through the use of Joseph Arend and Tshweng convert named Paul at the station itself since 1834.²¹ Furthermore, he said, a Tlharo convert named Sebubi had been appointed to preach to his people

¹⁸ See Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Chs. XIII, XXVII.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Ch. XXVI.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Chs. XIII, XXVI. See also Philip, February 21, 1839 [LMS 16/3/B].

²¹ Paul was the husband of Sara, the woman with whom Moffat was accused of an adulterous relationship. Arend had been baptized at the Kuruman in May 1829, moved to the Philippolis district in 1836, and returned to the Kuruman in 1840 (see also Chapter VIII). See Kuruman, Schedule, August 29, 1836 [LMS 15/2/D]; Rolland, June 28, 1836 [JDM, XII, 21]; March 28, 1837 [JDM, XII, 301-7]; Report on Beersheba, November 18, 1840 [JDM, XVI, 324]; Livingstone, *Missionary Correspondence*, 148.

in 1837. Indeed, despite considerable earlier reluctance, the Kuruman missionaries did begin to appoint native agents in the late 1830's, though it would appear as if Sebubi's appointment was not until at least 1839.²² But even on this matter, on which his change of attitude was no doubt a realization of the worsening financial situation of the missionary societies, making it more difficult of them to appoint white missionaries, Moffat's views differed significantly from those of John Philip. No doubt to prevent the fusion of politics and religion, Moffat argued that the native agents should be sent to communities different from their own.

This was a question intimately related with the northwards expansion of the missionary endeavour. During the 1830's, as has been seen, Philip had deployed new missionaries entirely in Transorangia, with the exception of the Americans. But as Mzilikazi withdrew to the north, and as the peoples who had fled southwards from him began to think of resuming their former territories, the missionaries at Kuruman and Motito in particular began to look again towards expansion in that direction.²³ In particular, there was a desire to reopen the abandoned Hurutshe mission at Mosega, in the hope that the Hurutshe would return there. Under the encouragement of Edwards and Lemue, Francis Owen of the Church Missionary Society did in fact occupy this station from late 1839 until September 1840, when he was recalled by his society who had decided to abandon their mission in South Africa.²⁴ At the same time the French Evangelicals established a mission with the following of Mosweu Taaibosch, who had moved from Taungs up the Harts to Friedou.²⁵ For a time Edwards and Hamilton contemplated a mission among the Kwena (north of the Ngwaketse), and in October 1841 Edwards set off on a delayed investigation of the prospects in the north with the newly — arrived David Livingstone. Both Edwards and Livingstone argued for expansion to the north, to the Hurutshe, the

²² See Kuruman missionaries, September 10, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XXXII. For the Kuruman reluctance to appoint native agents see Kuruman missionaries, June 15, 1837 [LMS 15/4/D]; July 2, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]; Hamilton and Edwards, September 6, 1839 [LMS 16/5/B]. Also Livingstone, *Missionary Correspondence*, 12: 'After Mr. Moffat went to England he seems to have changed his views on this subject [native agency], for he wrote back advising the brethren here [Kuruman] to make a trial of two.'

²³ Edwards, February 7, 1839; Hamilton, June 19, 1839 [LMS 16/5/B]; Lemue, September 21, 1839 [JDM, XV, 48]; February 25, 1840 [JDM, XV, 403-4]. Also Owen, *Diary*, 143-4, 148, 150. Edwards, I particular, seems to have been concerned at the possibility of the Griqua establishing claims to territory at Mosega.

²⁴ Owen, *Diary*, 151-4. Also Edwards, September 1, 1840 [LMS 17/3/D]; September 24, 1841 [LMS 18/2/A]; Hamilton and Edwards, March 15, 1841 [LMS 18/1/B].

²⁵ Daumas, April 15, 1840 [JDM, XVI, 24]; Pfimmer, June 1841 [JDM, XVII, 121 – 156]; November 29, 1841 [JDM, XVII, 161-178]; Lemue, [n.d.] [JDM, XVII, 179-182]. For the removal of Mosweu from Taungs to Mamusa and then Friedou see also Kuruman missionaries, July 2, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E]; Hamilton, June 19, 1839 [LMS 16/5/B]; March 9, 1840 [LMS 17/3/D]; Lemue, July 29, 1840 [JDM, XVI, 82-5].

Mmanaana-Kgatla north-west of Mosega, and among the Ngwaketse. Both of them, furthermore, argued that native agents could be suitably deployed in that direction.²⁶ Livingstone, indeed, appears to have interpreted Griqua expansionism purely in terms of the extension of the Gospel:

I see nothing else in the operations of the G. Town Mission to account for its success but these very imperfect instruments [native agents]. The missionaries now can do little else that itinerate and superintend them, and they occupy not only what may be called their own field but great part of ours. Am I sorry to see them stretching out on all sides and passing us as they are now doing W by N? No, I rejoice at it, and don't care though they hug us by and by in their arms and squeeze us out towards the north. It is all the same whoever brings in sinners to Christ. It is common cause, and I am really glad to see the work going on. But unfortunately a little rivalry other than provoking to love and good works has got in amongst us, and those who have been longer in the work have local associations which prevent them seeing some things in the same light as we do. They look at the subject from a different point of view, and consequently it appears in another form to them.²⁷

Perhaps Livingstone was led to alter his opinions on this matter during Philip's northern tour of 1842. Already in 1839 Waterboer, despite his own interest in the Hurutshe country, had tried to discourage Owen from taking up a mission there: 'the missionaries have already been driven from that country and how now will you go?'²⁸ At the Kuru-man Philip did not see either Livingstone, who was already traveling to the north again with two native agents or Edwards, who was in the Colony. To Edwards, however, Philip wrote arguing strongly against the establishment of mission stations further in the north: Mzilikazi, he said,

...like an Eagle hovering over his prey is only waiting an opportunity to pounce upon the Boers and to quiet his thirst of revenge in the blood of every white man that comes in his way. A war of extermination between Mosalikatse and the Boers is unavoidable.²⁹

Edwards, with some justification, was considerably annoyed by this new illusory apocalyptic vision. Writing to the LMS to complain that his views on northward expansion had been made 'subjects of laughter' by Philip and his party, he maintained that Philip's views had been 'picked up between Kat River and this station.'³⁰ Edwards was certainly correct, and had it not been for the persistence of he and Livingstone, warmly supported by Mof-

²⁶ See Hamilton, April 8, 1841 [LMS 18/1/B]; Edwards, September 5, 1841 [LMS 18/2/A]; December 8, 1841 [LMS 18/2/B]; Livingstone, *Missionary Correspondence*, 3-7.

²⁷ Livingstone, *op. cit.*, 11-12.

²⁸ Owen, Diary, 147. See also Philip, April 16, 1841 [LMS 18/1/C]. Also Livingstone, *Missionary Correspondence*, 315.

²⁹ Philip to Edwards, May 1842 [Enclosed in Philip, June 11, 1842, LMS 18/3/C].

³⁰ Edwards, July 12, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A]. See also Moffat, January 8, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A].

fat on his return to the Kuruman, the establishment of stations at Mabota (1834) among the Mmanaana-Kgatla, at Chonwane and Kolobeng (1845 onwards) among Sechele's Kwena, and among the Hurutshe (1846) would certainly have been delayed. In this case the peoples of present-day Botswana might possibly have fallen under Transvaal authority before they had been able to reconsolidate their societies in the aftermath of the Ndebele impact.

Despite the good intentions of Edwards and Livingstone, however, the employment of a native agency in the northwards expansion was not entirely successful. Not only were the efforts made by the LMS at this period to train native agents rather half-hearted — there was an unwillingness to establish an institution for the purpose — but the indigenous converts, on the whole, preferred to remain preaching among their own people rather than among a strange political community further north. Possibly the Tlharo Se-bubi, who worked on his own for a considerable period with the Ngwaketse, was the only native agent who lasted long on the 'northern road'.³¹

In return for his policy concessions, Moffat secured from the LMS Directors one major reform. It was decided that the powers of the Superintendent would be reduced by handing much of the governance of the missions to a series of District Committees. These, composed of the missionaries working in the area concerned, were similar in structure to the system by which the Paris Evangelicals and Wesleyans ran their affairs, and appealed to Moffat's anti-Episcopalian tendencies. After one last tussle with the pro-Philip Southern Committee over the revived accusations against him which arose out of Philip's tour of 1842, Robert Moffat and his wife returned to South Africa at the end of January 1843. Passing through Grahamstown, Moffat organized a District Committee in that area (which was resisted only by Read at the Kat River) and then traveled northwards to organize a similar Committee in the north.³²

The Committee regulations for the 'Griqua and Bechuana' District Committee constituted the committee from ordained missionaries in the area, as well as such unordained missionaries appointed by the directors. They were to be considered as 'acting on behalf of the Directors and as having the credit and interests of the Society confined to their charge.' Matters of expenditure, the foundation or cessation of a station, or an unauthorized move by a missionary, required decision by a three-quarters majority at two meetings, but other matters were to be decided by majority vote. To avoid missionaries acting as Government Agents, the fifth section of the regulations provided that:

³¹ See, for example, Ross, January 20, 1842; July 5, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A]; March 8, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A]; July 7, 1845 [LMS 21/1/A]; Moffat, August 14, 1845 [LMS 21/1/B]; Livingstone, *Missionary Correspondence*, 54-5, 67, 80, 100-1, 108-110, 122, 130, 143, 219, 225-6, 232, 237.

³² Moffat, January 8, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A]; June 3, 1849 [LMS: Africa, Odds, 3/4/A].

The delicacy and occasional difficulty of correspondence between the Missionaries and persons holding official stations in the Colony, the degree and extent to which the correspondence of one individual may involve the whole Mission, render the utmost care indispensable on the part of the Missionaries, and the Directors are persuaded they will see the propriety and benefit of strict adherence to the following Regulations:

1. That communications with His Excellency the Governor or any of the Local authorities be made by the Committee through the medium of the Society's Superintendent at Cape Town.
2. That in cases where it may be necessary for *individuals* to correspond with His Excellency or other Local authorities no communication be sent without being first approved by the Committee or a sub-Committee to whom the correspondence be confided.

The committee was given powers to deal with 'misconduct' by missionaries, though with clear provisions built in for the protection of accused persons.³³

'Should he [Moffat] so far succeed in misleading the Directors as to gain his point of ruling in this quarter by means of a Committee,' wrote Wright to Philip in 1841, 'you and the Board may fully depend upon it as the affairs of the country and the missions now stand the missions will become effectually and decidedly ruined. The missionaries will have to retire, and the committees will have no business to transact.'³⁴ This was another unfounded prediction by Phillip's faction. Indeed there was probably no missionary other than Moffat who remained much more than lukewarm about the 'Griqua and Bechuana' Committee. Edward Solomon, who replaced Peter Wright at Griquatown when the latter transferred to Philippolis (and soon afterwards died) expressed at first considerable reluctance at joining the Committee.³⁵ But the Committee in Transorangia, like that in the Grahamstown area, continued to meet through the 1840's. It fulfilled an important function in containing, though by no means halting, conflicts among the missionaries. Although the provisions on communication with government proved unworkable and had to be revised, the Committee also appears to have functioned as the agency through which the LMS missionaries protested at the abandonment of the Orange River Sovereignty by Britain in 1854.³⁶ The chief defect of the Committee system was the immense distances between mission station, which made it difficult to hold meetings as frequently

³³ 'Regulations for the Griqua and Bechuana District Committee of the London Missionary Society,' [signed] Arthur Tidman, January 29, 1843 [LMS: Africa, Odds Box 1].

³⁴ Wright to Philip, January 18, 1841 [LMS 18/1/A].

³⁵ See Edwards, July 12, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A]; Inglis, January 9, 1844 [LMS 20/1/A]; 'Minutes of...District Committee, January 20, 1844, [signed W. Ross] [LMS 20/1/A]; Moffat 3, 1845 [LMS 21/1/B]; Livingstone, *Missionary Correspondence*, 31.

³⁶ For the revision of section 5 of the regulations see 'Minutes of...District Committee, March 23, 1846 [signed] W. Ashton [LMS 22/1/A].

or with as good attendance as was desirable.³⁷ And in the 1850's, with the substantial reforms in the whole administrative structure of the LMS in South Africa, the system appears to have been abandoned.

The most salient criticism of the Committee system, however, was that made by John Philip. In none of the Committees was there any provision made for the representation of church members or even native agents: indeed at the first meeting of the Grahamstown committee, at which Moffat was present, it was resolved

...that while this Meeting would cherish the utmost confidence in the Native Teachers connected with our several Missionary Stations — it is opinion of this meeting that their circumstances do not render it desirable that they should have a seat and a vote in this Association.³⁸

In June 1843, writing on this matter, and also in reply to a censure he had received for his treatment of Helmore at Lekatlong in 1842, Philip stated the principle which he believed was involved, and 'which has at this moment the strongest claims on your attention':

...are our native churches to have anything to say in the management of their own affairs, and is any young man [i.e. Helmore] coming out from the society to have it in his power to break down the order of any one of these churches, to trample upon its principles, and by this means to scatter a church he has never gathered, and that too before he is capable of speaking to them in their own language so as to minister to their edification?³⁹

The Lekatlong church, Philip pointed out, was Congregational, and its work should continue on this principle: the opinions of its church members deserved respect. Read wrote in support, arguing that it was the right of a church member to admit or exclude other members, to elect elders and deacons, and to 'assist in the choice of a pastor': if this latter right had not so far been exercised it was because the non-white congregations could not afford to pay a pastor.⁴⁰ Though in the particular case of Lekatlong it was arguable to what extent Helmore had ignored the church, and to what extent Read and Philip had in fact manipulated the deacons and church members, the general principle still stood.⁴¹ It was argued again by Philip with reference to the Committee system. This system, maintained Philip, would extinguish the popular element in decision-making. Churches such as Griquatown and Kat River would be less able to influence policy than under a Presbyterian

³⁷ See particularly Moffat, June 3, 1849 [LMS: Africa, Odds 3/4/A]; Freeman to Tidman, May 21, 1850 [LMS Africa, Odds 4/5/B].

³⁸ Minutes of missionary meeting, June 21-2, 1843 [LMS 19/2/B].

³⁹ Philip, June 26, 1843 [LMS 19/2/B]. See also Chapter 11.

⁴⁰ Read, June 3, 1843 [LMS 19/2/A].

⁴¹ It is interesting to recall that in 1819 Philip, Campbell, and Moffat had been compelled to manipulate the Bethelsdorp church in order to secure the exclusion of Read: see Chapter 6.

system: 'stripped of every semblance of power [they] are to be delivered over bound hand and foot into the hands of irresponsible ecclesiastics.'

Jesus Christ [continued Philip] has not in the new Testament laid down one form of church Government for the poor and another for the rich; one for churches of an older date, and another for those of more recent formation; one for black men, another for white men; one for one class of society, another for another class of society; one for the barbarian and Scythian and another...for the Greek; one for England and Scotland; and another for the West Indies and Africa. This simple fact, with us [an] acknowledged principle, sets aside all hypothetical reasoning on this subject...any evil to be dreaded in this country is on the side of ecclesiastical despotism (to which the churches possess the only efficient check) and not from the power of the people.⁴²

Philip's sentiments were noble, egalitarian, and in the context of Colony society extremely radical. So strongly did he feel about them, so much did he regret the death of Wright, his own censure by the Directors, the financial straits of the LMS which made it impossible for them to continue the native agency training program he had instituted in Cape Town, that in this same letter Philip submitted his resignation. He withdrew this later only when the LMS strongly urged him to continue, but he continued with failing powers. 'You and I are growing old now,' he wrote to Waterboer in 1845, 'and our time on earth must be short. Let us live for eternity.'⁴³ Philip died six years later, having exerted little influence on policy since the mid 1840's.

In his letter of resignation Philip laid his finger on the chief weakness of the missionary endeavour of the evangelical revival. Motivated by the conversion and 'civilization' of the 'heathen', the missionaries had little idea of what to do about a church of already converted non-whites. Helmore himself wrote on his arrival at Lekatlong that he was unhappy to be building up an infant church rather than preaching to 'completely unenlightened heathen.'⁴⁴ Through the remainder of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth this problem became more serious, exacerbated by the increasingly racist social climate of Europe (from which the missionaries, with rare exceptions, were not excluded). Missionary paternalism and missionary racialism steadily undermined the power of those non-whites who had chosen to accommodate themselves to the new influences of European culture rather than resist them. This was achieved by inhibiting the participation of non-whites in decision-making within the church, the one institution which remained a potential bridge through which non-whites could exert political power within

⁴² Philip, June 26, 1843 [LMS 19/2/B]. See also, for a similar argument, [Anon], June 6, 1843 [LMS: PPapers 2/6/A] which stressed that Missionary Society authority should be temporary, and withdrawn gradually but gracefully.

⁴³ Philip to Waterboer, June 15, 1845 [LMS 22/1/D].

⁴⁴ Helmore, July 17, 1840 [LMS 17/2/A].

a plural society. Other historians have noted the same phenomenon in Nigerian missionary enterprise.⁴⁵

But the 'church democracy' fostered by Wright at Griquatown and Read at the Kat River under the benevolent eye of Philip, was not without its defects too. The exclusiveness of a church democracy weakened the position of those of the community who were not church members, and to a still greater extent it weakened the position of surrounding communities without churches. Many times Peter Wright argued that Waterboer's 'word as a Christian' could not be disputed; many times he accepted the evidence of one witness rather than another because the one was Christian. This dichotomous approach to human beings — some could do no right and others no wrong — meant that democracy within the church could be used as a justification for despotism over those without it. Democracy within the church, especially where the church was playing a significant political role as the only coherently organized institution, gave great significance to exclusion or suspension from the church. By this means, as often happened at Philippolis, factions could exclude their opposition from church membership, and hence force dissent into disruption and rebellion. And democracy within the church did not exclude oligarchy in secular matters. At Griquatown, for example, where there had been Sotho-Tswana native agents, and where by 1849 Sotho-Tswana comprised four-fifths of the Griquatown church and a substantial part of the population, they had no representation in government:

...[the Sotho-Tswana, wrote Solomon] are increasing rapidly in property and knowledge and yet from the folly of Waterboer and his people are allowed no political influence, not even being permitted to vote in the election of 'Heemraad' — hence they are dissatisfied.⁴⁶

If this applied to the Sotho-Tswana within the Griquatown state, it applied even more to those outside. This was where the views of Philip and his faction were similar in form to, but different in content from the 'democrats' who influenced Nigerian missionary policy at a later time. Philip's vision for a greater Cape Colony, embracing non-white as well as white Christians as fully incorporated members, was limited to the Khoi (or the Coloureds, as they were becoming) and virtually ignored Bantu-speaking peoples. Indeed this vision was formed in the context of the times: it was predominantly the Khoi who were receptive to Christianity, and it was predominantly the Khoi who, non-white peoples, had been embraced within the Colony of the 1840's. In such circumstances it was a radical concept to counterpose the closed society of the white colonists to an open society in which the already part-Christianized and largely 'civilized' (in Philip's terms) Khoi

⁴⁵ See J. Ayaji, *Christian Missions*; E. A. Ayandele, *Missionary Impact*, Chs VI-VIII.

⁴⁶ Solomon to Read, June 20, 1849 [LMS: Africa, Odds, 3/4/A].

and Griqua could acquire full membership: an open society for which the preparation was church democracy. But this vision was wholly inappropriate to the situation which would develop in the succeeding half-country, in which Bantu-speaking societies, more coherent in culture and structure than the Khoi, less readily accommodationist, would be absorbed into the framework of plural societies and lose their political power. Just as Stockenström's myopic concern with the San blinded him to the problems of the Griqua, so the concern of Philip and his faction with the Griqua made them unable to deal with the Bantu-speaking societies.

The Decline of Griquatown and Philippolis

The thwarting of Griqua expansionism led, at Griquatown in the 1840's, to progressive demoralization among the Griqua. This was most manifest in the church, which was the main agency of the expansionism. As early as 1841 Wright commented on 'a considerable abatement of that earnestness with which we have been favoured during the last seven years,' and the same phenomenon was noted by Philip in 1842.⁴⁷ When Edward Solomon replaced Wright at Griquatown in 1843 he was at first optimistic — corn was being sown and 'European' house built — but soon he too was discouraged. Quarrels in 'civil' affairs, resulting no doubt from the Griqua setbacks, spread to the church. Church membership declined and, wrote Solomon, there was an 'unlovely spirit manifested by some of our people and those not the least influential.'⁴⁸ Waterboer's wife, and his eldest daughter and niece were separated from the church. In 1843 Jan Fortuin, the first of the native agents, was in dispute with the LMS over matters of payment and resigned: his wife, too, was separated from the church.⁴⁹ Five years later the number of paid native agents had been reduced to four: Jan Visser and Leonard Balie, and Makhano and Sefunelo working at the two Tlhaping villages at Moruane on the Vaal.⁵⁰ Church members did indeed flee to Moruane from the 'heathen' Tlhaping settlements higher on the Vaal and Harts, and

⁴⁷ Wright, October 15, 1841 [LMS 20/1/B]; Philip, [LMS Journals 4/112].

⁴⁸ Solomon, October 20, 1844 [LM 20/1/B]. See also Solomon, December 7, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A]; November 13, 1848 [LMS 23/4/C]; Hughes and Solomon, October 7, 1843 [LMS 19/3/B].

⁴⁹ Hughes, July 20, 1844 [LMS 20/1/B]; February 11, 1847 [LMS 23/1/A]; July 10, 1847 [LMS 23/1/A]; Solomon, January 29, 1847 [LMS 23/1/A]; July 20, 1847 [LMS 23/1/B].

⁵⁰ See particularly Hughes, November 19, 1846 [LMS 22/1/B]; February 11, 1847 [LMS 23/1/A]; June 4, 1867 [*LMS Chronicle*, December 2, 1867]; Warren, *On the Veldt*, 325-7. Sefunelo took charge of Simenu's village when the latter came and took Bogatsu and many of the people to Taungs in 1845: see Solomon, October 20, 1844 [LMS 20/1/B]; March 14, 1845 [LMS 21/1/A]; Hughes, November 19, 1846 [LMS 22/1/B]. See also Solomon, November 13, 1848 [LMS 23/4/C]: 'I cannot look for native assistance as there is none in the country competent however willing he may be to take entire charge of the School.'

there were temporary 'revivals,' among the Tlharo, for example, but the general trend of church activity was retrogressive.⁵¹

In 1840 Wright and Hughes resumed work on the Vaal River irrigation project, in the hope that this could provide an alternative economic base and focus of energy for the Griqua state. But, though Isaac Hughes lived at Backhouse during the 1840's attempting to persuade the Griqua to work on the project, there was little enthusiasm, and the work proceeded only sporadically.⁵² Freeman, the LMS Director who toured in South Africa in 1849-50, attempted to revive the scheme, but it was finally abandoned when Robert Moffat's son, a trained surveyor, pronounced its impracticability. It would have been possible to carry through the project through the use of pumps, but if Hughes no longer had the energy, neither the LMS nor the Griqua had the financial means to secure the pumps or the skills to put them into operation.⁵³ Though there was fresh arrivals in the Griqua state at this time, many of the older Griqua families, as well as Sotho-Tswana subjects of the state, began to leave. 'One hears nothing but projected removals to other quarters,' wrote Solomon in 1847, and in another letter he described how twelve Griqua families, none of them church members, were going to live further in the interior. 'Waterboer's influence,' he claimed, 'will probably enable them to get a location among the Interior tribes.'⁵⁴

With agriculture virtually impossible, and with their role as a non-productive elite exerting hegemony over other peoples in abeyance, the Griqua turned once again to hunting.

For the last few years [wrote Solomon in 1850] the yearly hunts had lost much of their attraction — but the discovery of the Interior lake [Lake Ngami] last year and the large quantity of Ivory brought by a few of our Gradual who went into that neighborhood, very naturally revived their love for the hunt...this year more than the average number of our people have gone to the Interior to hunt Elephants.⁵⁵

⁵¹ See Solomon, July 20, 1847 [LMS 23/1/B]; October 5, 1847 [LMS: Africa, odds, Box 1]; Solomon and Hughes, November 8, 1847 [LMS 23/1/B]; November 6, 1848 [LMS 23/4/C]; Hughes, July 10, 1847 [LMS 23/1/A]; November 29, 1853 [LMS 28/1/C].

⁵² See Particularly Solomon and Hughes, November 6, 1845 [LMS 20/1/B]; Hughes, November 14, 1846 [LMS 22/1/B]; Solomon, June 20, 1849 [LMS: Africa, Odds, 3/4/A].

⁵³ Freeman to Waterboer, December 6, 1849 [LMS 24/1/B]; Waterboer to Freeman, January 1, 1850 [LMS 25/1/A]; Hughes, March 18, 1850 [LMS 25/1/B]; December 9, 1850 [LMS 25/1/E]; May 10, 1850 [LMS 25/3/C]; Solomon, March 20, 1850; March 26, 1850; May 7, 1850 [LMS 25/1/B]; December 10, 1850 [LMS 25/1/D]; Moffat, March 28, 1850 [LMS 25/1/B]. Also Solomon in Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 266-7.

⁵⁴ Solomon, July 20, 1847 [LMS 23/1/B]; October 5, 1847 [LMS: Africa, Odds, Box 2]. See also Hughes, November 19, 1846 [LMS 22/1/B]; Solomon and Hughes, November 6, 1848 [LMS 23/4/C]; Solomon, January 29, 1847 [LMS 23/1/A]; December 28, 1849 [LMS 24/1/B].

⁵⁵ Solomon, May 30, 1850 [LMS 25/1/C]. See also Hughes, May 10, 1850 [LMS 23/5/C]; Solomon, 'Report on Griquatown,' [1850] [LMS 25/1/E].

From the 1840's, in fact, the Griqua, along with white hunters and traders, returned to the role of extending the frontier society which they had played before 1822. Prevented by the white farmers from the exploitation of the Transvaal hinterland, they moved to the west of this area: to the Kalahari, to Lake Ngami, and to Mzilikazi's new state north of the Limpopo.⁵⁶

Waterboer himself, in his fifties, could no longer exert much leadership. In 1849 Solomon, unable to persuade the chief to rouse himself to protest at the alienation of land to white farmers by Cornelius Kok, wrote:

Indeed I can no longer understand Waterboer; he is evidently sinking rapidly into his dotage, and I have now come to the conclusion that the only chance for the prosperity of the country is for Waterboer to resign the Government into the hands of his son, a very respectable, intelligent young man, now turned 31 years of age.⁵⁷

Three years later, after a short illness, Andries Waterboer died: on December 13, 1852.⁵⁸ The succession did indeed pass dynastically to his son, Nicholas, who ruled until the annexation of the territory by Britain in 1871. It would be a mistake, moreover, to imagine that the structure of the Griqua state itself atrophied with the church.⁵⁹ In 1847, before Waterboer's death, it is reported that a series of political reforms were made, and in a lecture eight years Solomon stated that

They [the Griqua] have some kind of regular organized government, and also a written code of laws, according to which criminal cases are adjudicated. Their government consists of a chief and 12 councillors, all of whom are elective, and that by universal suffrage. The chief has an executive appointed by himself. There is a magistrate by whom minor cases are decided, but the people have the right of appeal from him to the council, before whom all the serious cases are brought...⁶⁰

The field-cornet system appears to have been better organized, and there was a system of taxation.⁶¹ In 1849, it was later claimed, the various laws and regulations relating to land tenure were 'elaborated upon and consolidated': the effect was a system whereby Griqua

⁵⁶ See particularly E. Tabler, 'Non-Europeans as Interior Men,' Also see Lemue, January 3, 1843 [JDM, XIX, 45]; October 25, 1842 [JDM, XVIII, 258]; Hughes, November 29, 1853 [LMS 28/1/C]; Methuen, *Wilderness*, 78, 113, 181-2, 282; Livingstone, *Missionary Correspondence*, 7, 10, 103, 131, 174, 224.

⁵⁷ Solomon, June 21, 1849 [LMS: PPapers 3/2/A]. See also Freeman to Waterboer, December 6, 1849 [LMS 24/1/B]; Waterboer to Freeman, January 18, 1850 [LMS 25/1/A].

⁵⁸ Hughes, January 3, 1853 [LMS 28/1/A].

⁵⁹ See Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 42: 'After 1834 the story [of Griquatown] is one of gradual but uninterrupted decline.'

⁶⁰ Solomon, *Two Lectures*, 20. See also Solomon, July 20, 1847 [LMS 24/1/B]; Solomon and Hughes, November 8, 1847 [LMS 23/1/B].

⁶¹ See, for example, Nicholas Kruger in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 9-10; Lambert Jansz in *ibid.*, 13. See also Warren, *On the Veldt*, 358.

families, or subject groups, had defined rights to particular areas and fountains within the state, and could transfer, sell and buy these among themselves with the consent of the chief. Alienation of land to 'foreigners' was not however, permitted.⁶² In 1845 the population of the Griquatown state was somewhat over 3000.⁶³ Very few of these, however, appear to have been the old Griqua. Some 2500 of them were San and Kora, the latter a group under Cupido Witbooi who joined the state when forced up the Orange by droughts.⁶⁴ The remaining 1500 were largely Tlharo and the people of Khatlane, many of whom would eventually leave: they were reinforced in 1847 by a Xhosa party from the Zak River area.⁶⁵ Thus, although Solomon described the Griquas in all areas in 1855 as numbering 8000-10,000 it is questionable how many of these were the long-established Griqua of the Orange, and it is evident that at Griquatown itself a small Griqua minority still exerted rule over an only partially incorporated majority.⁶⁶

Despite the better-organized structure and the apparent population, therefore, the Griquatown state remained frail. As early as 1849, in applying for a transfer to Philipopolis, Solomon argued that Griquatown had fulfilled its task:

The whole country is now brought under the superintending care of a higher power — that of the British — other chiefs are brought into alliance with the Government and thus Waterboer has been deprived of that distinction *the only ally* of the Government north of the Orange River to which he formerly owed so much of his influence.⁶⁷

When Andries Waterboer died, his Treaty with the British Government was not renewed, although the subsidy to the school was continued. 'This came like a thunderclap upon our people,' wrote Hughes, 'I may safely say that second to the everlasting interests of our people, was and is held their gradual elevation into Alliance and eventual Amalgamation with the Colony, as their nearest neighbour of Civilised and Christian Nations.'⁶⁸ This

⁶² 'Copy of queries and answers recorded at interviews and meetings of the Griqua chief, Captain Nicholas Waterboer, and his ex-Councilors with...the Lieutenant Governor, R. Southey, Esp., May 19, 1871, May 19, May 20, 1874 [Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 335-341]. See also Waterboer to CO, July 29, 1845 [*Bloembhof Bluebook*, 32-3]; and the summary of Andries Stockenström's 1875 Griqualand West Land Court Judgment in Warren, *On the Veldt*, 272, 277, 374.

⁶³ See Waterboer to CO, July 29, 1845 [*Bloembhof Bluebook*, 32-3]; Hughes to Dr. Innes, January 17, 1844 [Enclosed in Hughes, January 25, 1844, LMS 20/1/A]. See also Freeman's Notebook, 'Griquatown,' [LMS: Africa, Odds, Box4]; Freeman, *Tour*, 236.

⁶⁴ See Solomon, October 20, 1844 [LMS 20/1/B]; Hughes, February 11, 1847 [LMS 23/1/A]; Solomon, April 7, 1848 [LMS 23/4/A]; Solomon and Hughes, November 6, 1848 [LMS 23/4/C]. These people are also described as 'Nqubese' Nama. See also Chapter 11.

⁶⁵ For the Xhosa see Solomon, July 20, 1847 [LMS 23/1/B]; November 5, 1847 [LMS: Africa, Odds, Box 2].

⁶⁶ See Solomon, *Two Lectures*, 19.

⁶⁷ Solomon to Read, June 20, 1849 [LMS: Africa, Odds, 3/4/A].

⁶⁸ Hughes, November 29, 1853 [LMS 28/1/C]. See also Ebner to Hughes, Ross, N, Kruger, K. Kruger, W.

hope was now, essentially doomed. In the 1860's Nicholas Waterboer secured the assistance of the Coloured Colesberg lawyer David Arnot to safeguard his territory against encroachment by white farmers or the Orange Free State.⁶⁹ But by the time Arnot had induced the British to annex Griqualand West, diamonds had already been discovered, and the situation was transformed. The non-Griqua population had abandoned a sinking ship, leaving a few miserable Griqua, much of their land taken from them, to eke out an existence, still claiming to rule a non-existent state. Nicholas Waterboer, wrote Warren in the 1870's, suffered from an 'inability to realize that he is no longer paramount chief of the land.'⁷⁰

The situation at Philippolis was different. The factionalism which had plagued the Philippolis state from its inception had never permitted the church, buttressed by a native agency, to stiffen the political structure of the state. Neither Adam Kok III nor his predecessors succeeded in winning the allegiance, or establishing their authority, over the whole population contained within the nominal boundaries of the state. Unable to claim hegemony over all the Griqua, Kora and Bastard elements of the state, yet after 1838 joining Waterboer in an attempted expansion of authority over such Sotho-Tswana as the people of Lepui, Adam Kok III left a power vacuum which the white settlers in his state used to entrench their position. Between 1840 and 1843 this was compounded by renewed missionary strife. Schreiner, arriving in 1840, found Atkinson unpopular with the expansionists, and appears to have attached himself to them. Amid the usual threats and counter-threats of forming a separate mission-station, Atkinson retired from the scene. But by 1842 Schreiner was himself unpopular with Adam Kok III, and Philip and Read intrigued to remove him during their time at Philippolis.⁷¹ Very belatedly, Philip intended Wright to transfer to the district and remedy the situation: 'we want nothing but a man like Wright or Williams at that station to have that people and the neighboring country,' Philip had written earlier.⁷² But it was too late. The issue had already been resolved in 1832, when Philip visualized Griquatown as the focus of Griqua hegemony, in 1826, when Wright had been appointed to Griquatown, in 1820, when Waterboer had become

P. Fortuin, [n.d.] [*Bloembhof Bluebook*, 49]; Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 34ff.

⁶⁹ For Arnot, who had done work for Andries Waterboer as early as 1845, see Campbell, 'South African Frontier, 1865 – 85...', 176ff; Warren, *On the Veldt*, 294ff, 357.

⁷⁰ Warren, *On the Veldt*, 340. For the situation of the Griqua in the 1870's see also *ibid.*, 29, 58, 84, 115, 282, 294, 329-332, 336, 338-9, 343, 347, 357, 359, 372-3; Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 49-50.

⁷¹ See Atkinson, February 29, 1840 [LMS 16/1/B]; Hughes, October 15, 1840 [LMS 17/2/C]; Wright, December 5, 1840 [LMS 18/1/A]; October 25, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A]; Philip, April 16, 1841 [LMS 18/1/C]; Schreiner, September 1, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B]; December 28, 1840 [LMS 17/3/C]; August 8, 1841 [LMS 18/2/C]; July 25, 1842 [LMS 18/4/D]; Read and Philip, May 26, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A].

⁷² Philip, December 21, 1840 [LMS 17/2/D]. Also Philip, January 20, 1841 [LMS 18/1/A].

chief. Griquatown had achieved an illusory importance at the expense of Philippolis and, indeed, by exporting its dissidents and hence many of its problems to Philippolis and elsewhere, had made the achievement of Griqua unity in eastern Transorangia that much more difficult. 'With the exception of Waterboer,' wrote Philip in 1842, 'and his people and the Aboriginal inhabitants within the sphere of his immediate influence...the native tribes are without any common bond of union, and without resources or any means of defence.'⁷³ Doubtless the establishment of 'common bonds of union' in the brief period between the height of the Difaqane and the Trek was a difficult task. But Waterboer and Melvill, Wright and Philip, in seeking this aim, had provoked as much if not more resentment than allegiance. Wright and Philip in particular operated in an atmosphere of secrecy, duplicity and intrigue which fostered suspicion and discord rather than unity.

Wright did indeed transfer to Philippolis in July 1842. But, much to the dismay of the Griqua and Philip himself, he died suddenly of typhus fever on April 18, 1843. 'This is the greatest loss the Griquas have ever felt in their dark and stormy circumstances,' wrote Hendrick Hendricks; it was 'the heaviest stroke in the missionary work that has ever been inflicted in Africa,' said Read. Philip, prone as ever to hyperbole, reported that Wright's death 'continues to be regarded in this country as the greatest loss South Africa has ever sustained.'⁷⁴ Wright's wife and son remained in Transorangia, and a grandson, Samuel Cronwright (Cron Wright) was to marry Olive Schreiner.⁷⁵ But neither the death of Wright, nor the various suggestions that he should be replaced by James Read or even Moffat could have affected the situation by that stage. It must be stressed that the issue was not one of alienation of land to whites. Despite the steady stream of white settlement — and Theal has estimated there were more than 2000 white farmers in the area by 1843 — there was ample room in the state of Philippolis for both white and Griqua. The issue was one of authority and jurisdiction. It is significant that when, as a result of the 1843 Treaty between Kok and the Colony, British troops were brought across the Orange two years later in defense of the Griqua, they came to defend Kok's *jurisdiction* in the area. Even as the British intervened directly, however, they began to undermine this jurisdiction. By the Maitland Treaty of 1846 white farmers within Griqua territory were subjected to the jurisdiction of a British Resident, stationed at Bloemfontein, and removed from

⁷³ Philip to Napier, August 25, 1842 [LMS 18/1/D].

⁷⁴ See Elders and Deacons at Philippolis to Read, April 17, 1843 [LMS 19/1/D]; Hendricks to Read, April 18, 1843 [LMS 19/1/]; Read to Philip, April 24, 1843 [LMS 19/1/D]; Philip, October 17, 1843 [LMS 19/2/A]. Also Moffat, May 8, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A]; Solomon, May 14, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A]; Kok and Council to Read [April 1843]; Kok to Read, April 20, 1843 [LMS 19/1/D]; Hughes, September 14, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A]; Napier to Waterboer, August 18, 1843 [Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 244]. See also Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 40; Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 59.

⁷⁵ See Warren, *On the Veldt*, 29; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, 122-3.

the authority of Kok. Such a measure could only encourage the centrifugal forces already strong within Kok's state. Since this study does not intend to deal with British annexation of, or withdrawal from, eastern Transorangia, it is sufficient to say that by 1861 Adam Kok III and the remaining peoples of Philippolis had had enough: selling their lands to the Orange Free State, they emigrated south-eastward to conserve their autonomy as long as possible in Nomansland (Griqualand East).⁷⁶

In the vacuum created by the end of Waterboer's attempts at hegemony, Cornelius Kok was able to breathe more freely. Although the borders within which his influence were exerted were never satisfactorily defined, he managed to secure Colony recognition as a chief in 1848, over Philip's opposition.⁷⁷ During the decade Cornelius appears to have demanded taxes from the people of Moruani, usually claimed to lie within Waterboer's domains, and possibly from Kora and Griqua settled along the Vaal and to the east of it towards the future Kimberley.⁷⁸ When the Berlin Missionary Wuras settled at Pniel with Jan Bloem's people in 1845 it is claimed that Wuras was told Cornelius Kok was the 'owner' of Pniel.⁷⁹ The Tlhaping chief Jantje also fell within Cornelius' nominal sphere of authority, although he appears continually to have resisted the attempts by Kok to impose authority over him.⁸⁰ From the late 1840's, however, Cornelius Kok, not as concerned as Adam III or Waterboer with preserving an authority which he had maintained anyway only by default, began to alienate territory to white farmers. Despite protests from Waterboer and the Griquatown missionaries when this alienation began to encroach on the area of the Vaal River irrigation scheme, nothing was done, and by the 1850's and 1860's the Orange Free State was able to build a case for territorial expansion on the actions of the independent chief Cornelius Kok.⁸¹

⁷⁶ See for this period, for example, Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 52-62.

⁷⁷ C. Kok to Sir H. Smith, January 25, 1848 [Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 186-7]. See also Kok to Rawstorne, August 22, 1845 [*ibid.*, 256]; R. Southey to C. Kok, May 1, 1848 [*ibid.*, 259-260]; Philip to Freeman, May 21, 1849 [LMS: Africa, Odds, 3/1/D].

⁷⁸ See particularly Hughes, November 19, 1846 [LMS 22/1/B]; Helmore, April 8, 1848 [LMS 23/4/B].

⁷⁹ Engelbrecht, *Korana*, 61; Lindley, *Adamantia*, 181. During a dispute in 1851, however, Jan Bloem appealed to Waterboer: see Bloem to Waterboer, March 27, 1851 [Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 254]. See also Helmore, December 28, 1843 [LMS 20/1/A].

⁸⁰ See Adam Kok III to Cornelius Kok II, April 9, 1851 [Lindley, *Adamantia*, 150-1]; Jantje in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 102-3.

⁸¹ See Moffat, July 16, 1850 [LMS 25/1/D]; Solomon, December 10, 1850 [LMS 25/1/D]; June 3, 1851 [LMS 26/1/A]; Hughes, June 3, 1851; June 12, 1851 [LMS 26/1/A]; February 7, 1852 [LMS 27/1/A]; Waterboer to CO, May 26, 1851 [Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 265-6]. Also *ibid.*, 27-34, 210-214, 258-9, 260-1, 262-4, 266-9, 331-2; Lindley, *Adamantia*, 39, 70-80; J. Mocke to Cornelius Kok, May 9, 1845 [LMS 21/2/C]. It may be significant that this land alienation appears to have begun shortly after the death of the independent missionary John Bartlett, and while Cornelius was looking around for another missionary: Solomon, December 28, 1849 [LMS 24/1/B]; C. Kok, January 21, 1850 [LMS 25/2/A]; Hughes, May 5, 1852 [LMS 27/1/A].

The Rise of Mahura

Waterboer's formal alliance with Mahura, consummated by Philip, did not last long. Almost immediately afterwards Mahura made a raid — forbidden by the Treaty — on Sebe-go, the Ngwaketse chief, who had returned from the Kalahari with herds of cattle which he had been sheltering from Mzilikazi. Mahura's raid, skillfully outwitting all those who had their eyes on Sebe-go's cattle, and launched while the Ngwaketse were in the middle of a church service conducted by the native agent Sebe-go, set off a chain of cattle-raiding activity by the southern Sotho-Tswana.⁸² Once more, as in 1840 when Gasebonwe had raided, these appear to have been part of a competition for power among the Tlhaping chiefs. But by allying with Waterboer Mahura had taken an illegitimate step in this competition, for which he must have been immediately rebuked by the other Tlhaping chiefs. For when Ross arrived at Taungs in June 1842, sent by Philip to establish a new mission with Mahura, he 'found Mahura greatly troubled about the above document [the Treaty], and when...I spoke of Dr. Philip's letter [about the new station] he refused to listen or to speak about it.'⁸³ About this time, furthermore, Mahura went to Griquatown to justify his raiding activities and, especially because Jantje (and Gasibonwe?) arrived in the middle of the meeting, behaved defensively about the treaty. 'He came to make the treaty for the Batlapin nation...as his brother [Mothibi] was rather slow,' he is reported to have said, and further to have 'denied calling himself a captain, but that Waterboer had...said so, because [Waterboer] wanted Mahurah's uncle's children to punish him.'⁸⁴ Jantje was not permitted to speak at this meeting, and therefore took his grievances to Moffat when the latter returned to the Kuruman in December 1843. A meeting of the Tlhaping chiefs was convened at the Kuruman — though it is unclear if this included Mahura himself — and the document was repudiated.⁸⁵ As Moffat wrote later,

The late Captain Waterboer...made with Mahura...a treaty or an agreement whereby he obtained, or supposed that he had obtained, the right to a large slice of the Batlapi territory, extending from the northern point of the Long Mountain to Platberg on the Vaal. With great regret I am constrained to say that this was done by stealth. The thing was managed

⁸² Ross, July 5, 1842; Hamilton and Edwards, August 12, 1842; September 30, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A]; Helmore, October 28, 1842 [LMS 18/5/A]; Ross, March 8, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A]; Lemue, October 25, 1842 [JDM, XVIII, 283 – 6]; Lauga, November 7, 1842 [PEMS: Lauga file]; Livingstone, *Missionary Correspondence*, 32–4; *Family Letters*, I, 64–8.

⁸³ Ross, March 8, [LMS 19/1/A]. See also Ross, July 5, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A]; Lemue, October 25, 1842 [JDM, XVIII, 285 – 6].

⁸⁴ Nicholas Kruger in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 3; Jantje in *ibid.*, 100–101. Also Masa and Phiri in *ibid.*, 23, 99–100.

⁸⁵ Jantje in *ibid.*, 101.

at Latako while Mothibi, the chief paramount, was residing some sixty miles away on the Kolong [Harts River].⁸⁶

In 1844 Waterboer made one last attempt to exert some authority over Mahura, but to no avail. Even Philip wrote that if Mahura 'will not allow you to serve them, the fault is theirs, and they will be the losers by it.'⁸⁷

But if the competition for power was to exclude formal alliances with Griqua chiefs, it could not but take account of the different patterns of modernisation, of incorporation within the frontier society, that the Tlhaping leaders had adopted. All three sought to increase their supplies of firearms. Gasibonwe appears to have remained the least affected: his settlement at Borigelong, so far as can be judged, retained the traditional Tlhaping political structure.⁸⁸ At Lekatlong, on the other hand, Jantje was building a petty 'frontier state' little different from those of the early Griqua period. Shortly after Helmore returned from Borigelong to Lekatlong to break its connection with the Griquatown church there was, indeed, a significant outbreak of anti-Christian sorcery. This was conducted by women, 'baloi?', with the wives of the Griquatown church supporters Thaiso and Thabe among the leaders: the outbreak must undoubtedly be associated with the social tensions which Griqua expansionism and its repudiation had produced.⁸⁹ But this soon settled down, and within a short time an irrigation project was in progress, the men (contrary to traditional custom) were playing a major part in agriculture, and there was even a ferry boat service across the Vaal. Between 1840 and 1848 the population of Lekatlong doubled from 600 to 1200, and according to Helmore they were from ten different tribes and mainly former servants and dependents: they owned more than 20 wagons and two ploughs;

...the prosperous state of Likatlong [wrote Helmore] is to be attributed to a combination of circumstances with which I have little connection...situated at the junction of two riv-

⁸⁶ Moffat, *European Mail*, March 9, 1871 [*ibid.*, 346]. For criticism of this article by Moffat, and a claim that Gasibonwe, as well as 'Bojong' and 'Ehehey' were present at the signing of the Treaty, see Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 6-8. Also Nicholas Kruger, *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 14.

⁸⁷ See Mahura, etc. to Waterboer, February 19, 1845 [*Bloemhof Bluebook*, 126-7]; Hughes, May 2, 1845 [LMS 21/1/A]; Waterboer to CO, April 24, 1845; Maitland, June 15, 1845 [All enclosed in Philip, April 17, 1846, LMS 22/1/D].

⁸⁸ No LMS missionary was stationed at Borigelong, though there were church members there. For an obscure controversy between Mahura and Bloem, the latter possibly instigated by Gasibonwe (or Jantje?) see Hamilton, October 30, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A]; Hughes, July 20, 1844 [LMS 20/1/B]; Ross, May 14, 1845; July 7, 1845 [LMS 21/1/A].

⁸⁹ See Helmore, December 12, 1843; October 18, 1844 [LMS 20/1/B]; Ross, January 7, 1845 [LMS 21/1/A]. Also Helmore, November 17, 1845 [LMS 21/1/B]; 'This [sorcery] arises partly from the feudal system which exists among them and partly from the gospel having abolished their former arbitrary laws while power and energy are wanting to substitute new ones.'

ers, possessing a good grazing country, [it] is an attraction to strangers. The piety of the Chief and his Counsellors ensures order and tranquility... The Batlapi mission is of very great if not of first importance as through the Providence of God they have risen to be the first of the Bechuana Tribes.⁹⁰

But if Jantje was the new favorite of many of the missionaries, the chief who remained 'first of the Bechuana Tribes' south of the Molopo in terms of power was Mahura. Mahura, wrote the missionary Ross who established a station at Taungs in 1843, was

...of greater power and intelligence than any of the under chiefs of the Batlapi tribe...[he] seems to be very much respected as a ruler... His policy seems to be to copy the example of Mosheshe the great Chief of the Basutus who has called Missionaries among his people; he has embraced many of the customs of the Europeans; hears the Gospel himself and allows his relatives and people to improve under the teachings of the servants of God...but is perhaps more hardened than those who have occasionally heard the gospel sound...[he] advises his children and people to attend strictly to the word...he uses every stratagem to increase his people and gain a name...he consults me on any movement of great importance.⁹¹

Mahura had indeed established hegemony over a large population. His following included not only the Tlhaping, Rolong, Maidu and Hurutshe who had been with him at Taungs in the 1830's, but was augmented in the 1840's by the Ngwaketse under Segotshane and Matlaba's Rolong-Rapulana.⁹² His other subjects, Kora, and various client groups attached to the major population elements, were spread between the Harts and Vaal, and even across the Vaal between Platberg and its junction with the Vet, under 'field-cornets' or ward headmen.⁹³ By 1846, when he moved northwards up the Harts to Mamusa his population must have numbered at least twenty thousand. The main settlement was wrote, Ross, 'the largest Bechuana town that is known.'⁹⁴

Mahura was not a state-builder of the order of Moshweshwe, however. His cattle-raiding was often conducted at the expense of potential allies, and even of his subjects: thus his raids against Sebege in 1842 resulted in the temporary alienation of the Maidu,

⁹⁰ Helmore, August 25, 1847 [LMS 23/1/B]; January 2, 1849 [LMS 24/1/A]. See also Helmore, February 8, 1847 [LMS 23/1/A]; November 18, 1847 [LMS: Africa, Odds, Box 2]; July 27, 1848 [LMS 23/4/B]; October 20, 1849 [LMS 24/1/B]; January 1, 1851; April 9, 1851 [LMS 26/1/A]; January 5, 1852 [LMS 27/1/A]; September 4, 1852 [LMS 27/1/B].

⁹¹ Ross, March 11, 1844 [LMS 20/1/A]; July 17, 1844 [LMS 20/1/B]; May 14, 1845 [LMS 21/1/A].

⁹² See footnote 82; J. G. Waldeck, Matlaba, in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 249, 263.

⁹³ See Masip, Rarupulan in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 376, 379. See also Nicholas Kruger in *ibid.*, 375 for Mahura's horses, oxen and wagons.

⁹⁴ Ross, June 2, 1846 [LMS 22/1/A]. For population figures see also Ross, September 12, 1846 [LMS 22/1/A]; October 19, 1846 [LMS 22/1/B]; Inglis, September 18, 1844 [LMS 20/1/B]; Livingstone, *Missionary Correspondence*, 41-4; Lemue, January 3, 1843 [JDM, XIX, 46-8, 55].

who attended themselves to Gasibonwe.⁹⁵ His political community remained a loose confederation, with few institutions to strengthen it into a state. Nevertheless it was Mahura who became in the 1840's, and remained in the 1850's and 1860's, the major leader of eastern Transorangia in the negotiations, cooperation, and conflict of Sotho-Tswana with the white-ruled states. 'Anyone at all acquainted with the country during the last thirty years,' wrote David Arnot and F. Orpen in 1875, 'must well remember that no one, traveller or trader, ever, until very lately, heard of any great chief in these parts, save Waterboer and Mahurah.'⁹⁶ When the Transvaalers attacked Sechele's Kwena in 1852, it was reprisals from Mahura that they feared the most, and it was Mahura who negotiated the peace. In the war of 1858 – 9 with the Free State the dominant figure on the Sotho-Tswana side was Mahura, even though it was Gasibonwe who had gone to war and been killed. Even when Mothibi and Mahura were at the Kuruman, said one of the Tlhaping in 1871, 'Mahurah had the greatest influence, and had more subjects, because he was richer and cared more for his people.'⁹⁷ If Mahura failed to weld the Sotho-Tswana south of the Molopo into a community whose territory, if not authority, would remain intact when white supremacy was firmly established, it was partly due to his failings as a leader. But the major reasons were entirely beyond his control. It was chiefly these reasons which prevented state-formation among the southern Sotho-Tswana in the fashion that not only Moshweshwe, but also the Ngwaketse, the Kwena and the Ngwato were able to achieve. Some of these causes were fortuitous: part of the area over which Mahura claimed hegemony became the Diamond Fields in the 1870's. Much of his territory became increasingly dessicated as the century progressed. But it was also true that the early penetration of the influences of the southern frontier, the early involvement of the Tlhaping in a frontier zone, were to blame. So varied were the influences and the responses, and over so long a period were they exerted without resolution, that the crisis of authority and the crisis of values could not be mastered by a single leader. Other Sotho-Tswana communities had some breathing-space between the impacts of the *Difaqane*, of southern trade, of missionaries, and of white settlement: the Tlhaping had none. In this context Mahura achieved as much as could be expected, and it was his right in 1869, to boast, after some considerable quantity of beer, and shortly before his death:

⁹⁵ See footnote 82; also Hamilton, May 11, 1843 [LMS 19/1/A]; Mathibe in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 187; Gasietsiwe in *ibid.*, 189.

⁹⁶ Arnot and Orpen, Land Question, 8. For different contemporary attitudes to Mahura from Ross and Arnot see Hamilton and Edwards, August 12, 1842 [LMS 18/3/A]; Kuruman missionaries, October 12, 1844 [LMS 20/1/B].

⁹⁷ Rarapulan in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 379.

I was the right hand of [Mothibi]; in all the wars he gave me the lead, and when I was engaged in war I did mischief; thence my name became great. It is just like a bit of pork which people like to eat. My name is fat [Mahura means 'fat'] and therefore people love me. The white people — both Boers and Englishmen — like me very much. They know my wisdom.⁹⁸

⁹⁸ Mahura in *ibid.*, 302-3.

13 Conclusion

A frontier zone, the introduction to this study suggested, is a region where different cultural traditions come in contact and interact under conditions where no political community is able to establish an unchallenged legitimacy of authority. The concept was introduced as a tool in studying how two fundamental processes of nineteenth century South Africa, acculturation and the erosion of non-white political power, took place. Clearly frontier zones, as defined here, did not exist in all areas where these two processes occurred. In some cases non-white political communities were able to absorb new influences without suffering fragmentation of structure: indeed in many cases they were able to strengthen themselves through these new influences. Moshweshwe, for example, employed firearms and horses, as well as a missionary presence, in securing the survival of the state of Lesotho. In other cases, it could be argued, the time-period over which legitimate authority was non-existent was so short-lived that erosion of power and acculturation took place within the framework of a white-ruled society. Transorangia, however, with its near unique mixture of cultural traditions, and with the circumstances which created such a lengthy time-lag between the first challenges to the hegemony of Bantu-speakers and the final imposition of white control, showed in their clearest form the characteristics of the frontier zone. It is the intention of this concluding chapter to draw together, re-emphasize, and elaborate some of these characteristics, and their implications, which have emerged in the course of this study.

Political Leadership in the Frontier Zone

Though the different characteristics of the frontier zone all have their causal interconnections, which makes an analytical separation difficult, the situation is perhaps most readily apparent in the case of political leadership. In the frontier zone, it is argued, political leadership had no 'legitimacy', no norms or traditions which could lend it authority. Leadership existed *de facto*, measured purely by the numbers of one's following, and the resources at one's command. One might indeed attempt to buttress this leadership through various forms of 'legitimation', but these were never generally accepted. Waldemaar Campbell, in his study of the annexation of Griqualand West, has argued that this undefined authority structure was a characteristic of the communities concerned:

Rivalries of the leaders and their partisans, factions based on racial origins, the usual disputes of semi-nomadic peoples, and intrigues of the missionaries deeply divided the Gri-

quas and greatly diminished their ability to resist the westward expansion of the Boers... The Griqua core of the communities was mainly Hottentot, with customs like those of other Hottentot clans. The Hottentot clan was not a cohesive unit, and the veneer of European habits, religion, and political organization did not significantly strengthen the Griqua states... Batlapin groups north of Campbell were even weaker. The small, unstable following of a Batlapin chief depended on movement to find water and grass for the livestock. The chief was much less powerful than other Bantu chiefs in populous, well-watered parts of southeastern Africa. The usual dynastic rivalries...had greatly weakened the tribal fabric... Griqua, Batlapin and other groups were...unaccustomed to boundaries... Allegiance was largely personal...[they were] accustomed only...to vague spheres of interest.¹

Such an analysis, it is argued, obscures the fact that it was precisely the influence of the frontier zone, and not the political traditions of either Khoi or Bantu-speakers, which had by the time with which Campbell it concerned produced such rivalries, disputes, and fragmentation. This will be illustrated in the case of the Tlhaping, Rolong, and Griqua leadership of the early nineteenth century.

Before 1800, so far as can be determined, such political authority as existed among the Bastards or Griqua resided in the families of Kok and Berends. As the Griquatown state developed, the agents of the London Missionary Society sought to strengthen this authority with their own sanction, and by securing that of the Colonial Government. Instead they precipitated rebellion. At Griquatown one segment *elected* a new chief, Andries Waterboer. Meanwhile the 'hereditary' chiefs established their own autonomous settlements: Berend Berends at Daniels Kuil and later Boetsap, and Adam Kok II at Campbell and later Philippolis. At Campbell Cornelius Kok II was elected in place of Adam II in 1824, and until the end of the decade was in alliance with Waterboer. At one time or another all four chiefs had endorsement by the Colonial government; at one time or another they all had endorsement by the London Missionary Society. However, at one time or another, the right of each of these chiefs to rule was contested.

Around each chief, therefore, there could be constructed a history to support or deny his legitimacy, just as different factions had sought to do at all the time: this, it would seem, is the clearest indication of the lack of legitimacy. A fragmented, or multifaceted, structure of authority produced, in other words, a fragmented or multifaceted history. Thus David Arnot, secretary and legal counselor to Nicholas Waterboer, constructed a case around the earlier arguments of John Philip, to claim Waterboer's right to territory

¹ W. Campbell, 'The south African Frontier, 1865 – 1885...' 173-4, 177. Campbell does indeed mention the influences of the *Difaqane*, Bergenaar raids, and Waterboer's Philip-influenced attempt at hegemony, but fails to realize their significance.

east and south of the Vaal River.² Initially framed to prevent the expansion of the Orange Free State, Arnot's case was used by the British to annex the Diamond fields as a part of Griqualand West. Just as Philip had denied the chieftainship of Berends, Cornelius Kok II and, at times, Adam Kok II, so Arnot's claims on behalf of the Diamond fields for Waterboer rested on denying the chieftainship of Cornelius II.

All this time, and long before the abdication of his brother [Adam Kok II] [argued Arnot] the late Cornelius Kok [II] was quietly residing as a private individual at Campbell, unless in so far that in 1824, Waterboer had appointed him a sort of Magistrate (provisie captain) to maintain order at Campbell and the country lying eastward, because Campbell was some forty miles distant from Griquatown... This was the extent of this chieftainship; although in common parlance he came to be styled Chief of Campbell. On Cornelius Kok's arrival from the Colony for the first time, about the year 1816, certain agricultural and pastoral privileges or sufferances were assigned him, as had been done to others, and his appointment as Magistrate or provisional Captain conferred on him no territorial or other rights beyond those; and he never acquired more subsequently.³

Furthermore, continued Arnot, the Treaties concluded by Waterboer with the chiefs of Philippolis, which did not recognize any territory as Kok's, nor include him as a Griqua chief, substantiated the case. Arnot's opponents, fully realizing that on the 'proof' of the chieftainship of Cornelius depended the denial of Arnot's case, produced alternative testimony to demonstrate that Cornelius Kok II was in possession of a Colonial staff of office, and a letter sanctioning his authority from the Colonial government; and that he was, furthermore, recognize as chief both by his subjects and outsiders.⁴

Such a case as Arnot's, using the arguments and sometimes the very words of Philip and Waterboer in the 1830's, could not have been formulated except under the conditions of a frontier zone. In the same way, as has been stressed earlier in this study, Philip, Wright and Waterboer could not themselves have sought to stamp as illegitimate the chieftainships of the Koks and Berends except in the fluid and unstable conditions of the frontier zone. How different a reconstruction could be put on these changes of Gri-

² For the earliest complete statement of Arnot's case, see Arnot to Secretary of Orange Free State government, January 21, 1867 [Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 199-223]. For the most lucid account of Arnot's manoeuvres and the British annexation see, despite its deficiencies on background, Campbell, 'the South African Frontier, 1865 - 1885...', 172-193. See also Agar-Hamilton, *Road to the North*, 38-95, 101-5, 132-141 *passim*.

³ Arnot to Secretary, OFS Government, January 21, 1867 [Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 202]. 'The preceding sketch of the career of C. Kok,' continued Arnot, 'can be substantially established by evidence lying in the archives of Downing-street and other indisputable testimony': *ibid.*, 203. The phraseology of Arnot's case in itself demonstrates his debt to Waterboer and Philip: see particularly above, Chapter 10.

⁴ See, for example, Lindley, *Adamantia*, 99-103, III, 120-35 *passim*, 137-140. See also above, Chapter XII. For attempted refutation of part of the evidence see Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 106-111.

qua leadership is illustrated by the admittedly idiosyncratic interpretation of Hendrick Hendricks, in 1863. Authority over the Griqua, argued Hendricks, resided initially with Cornelius Kok I who, when he arrived from the Khamiesberg in 1816, nominated Adam Kok II 'as Chief of the whole Griqua nation,' and Cornelius Kok II 'was made Chief of the family branch of 'de Koks'.' In 1818, continued Hendricks, Adam Kok II

...left the government of Griquatown to his uncle, Adam Kok, commonly called 'Kort Adam', and went up a little higher on the Orange River to a place now called 'Slijpsteen.' The provisional captain, 'Kort Adam', being prevented, through much work (he was a blacksmith) doing everything as Captain, again nominated a Bushman Hottentot who had followed Adam Kok as 'Acterrijder' (a sort of groom), and then acted as messenger (or constable) at the place — to manage to local affairs of Griquatown. This was Waterboer...

According to Hendricks, it was only much later, when Waterboer was disputing the rights of Cornelius Kok II to Campbell (probably c.1837 – 40),⁵ that Adam Kok II,

...as being chief of the whole Griqua nation, on hearing all this, went with his father, and compelled them to make peace... He fixed a boundary line between Griquatown and Campbell, resigned his government of Griquatown to Waterboer (for the missionaries had already spoilt matters) and Cornelius Kok had the government of Campbell with its ground.⁶

This account, which is here condensed, is clearly inaccurate and shows glaring distortions and telescoping of chronology. But it is in fact no more implausibly distorted than the 'charter' given to Waterboer by Arnot and Philip.

Such uncertainty about the legitimacy of Griqua chiefs, as about the tradition of such legitimacy, might be expected among the Griqua. As specific products of the frontier zone the crisis of values was endemic to them: was their structure to be legitimized in terms of 'Europeans' (Colonial) political traditions, or were they an African 'tribe', i.e. an indigenous and autonomous political community? But during the nineteenth century the legitimation of chieftainship among the Tlhaping and the Rolong became equally uncertain. *De facto*, from the 1840's, there were three Tlhaping chiefs: Mahura (succeeded by Mankurwe in 1870), Jantje, and Gasibonwe (who was succeeded by Botlhasitse in 1858/9). White communities, and 'agents' for the chiefs, sought unavailingly to demonstrate that one was paramount, and therefore had the sole right to dispose of territory or sovereignty. The futile nature of this quest is illustrated in various attempts by Tlhaping to explain, or 'legitimate' the situation:

⁵ Lindley, *Adamantia*, 38 thinks incorrectly that this was in 1820.

⁶ H. Hendricks, in Lindley, *Adamantia*, 35-8. Also Hendricks in *ibid.*, 88, 142. For a confusion of 'Kort Adam' with Kok II see Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 5.

After Mothibi left [Kuruman] Mahurah was recognized as the chief of the Matlaping tribe, and remained as such until he died, and during his like still reigned at Kuruman... Gasibone and his council settled all his [Mahura's] cases.⁷

Gasibone was the eldest son of Mothibi and Jantje was the next in rank; and Malala, the father of Mankuroane, was the next in succession; and then Mahurah...⁸

The Batlapin laws is that if the king has three sons, the eldest succeeds him... It is also the custom when there are more than one son, the reign is given to the one most competent.⁹

We have four fathers. Each captain has his separate homestead, and thus it seems that there is confusion...if all the homesteads were put together today, Botlasitse would be chief...¹⁰

Jantje, furthermore, argued that since Gasibonwe and his eldest son were dead, he, Jantje, as the only surviving son of Mothibi, was paramount: Botlhasitse, claimed Jantje, was not born from the 'true' wife.¹¹ In fact, however, none of the three were, in traditional terms, 'rightful' chiefs:

...it will also be well to notice that the true heir of the chieftainship, so far as birth goes, is a person who had never made any public claim to it, so far as I know, and who had never been considered in connection with it.¹²

This was Pohuetsile, a son of Mothibi's original heir Phetlu (who died in 1825), but a son, born under the levirate, whose biological father was Gasibonwe.¹³ Pohuetsile, furthermore, lived under the jurisdiction of Mankurwane!

In part such a situation was the product of Sotho-Tswana laws of succession. Under traditional conditions, fission might no doubt have occurred, and a junior branch have become more powerful through superior access to, or exploitation of, resources. But conditions of the frontier zone changed this situation qualitatively. In the first place, it was quite unprecedented for persons so far removed from the line of succession — and this

⁷ Rarapulan in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 65. See also *ibid.*, 379.

⁸ 'Babousai' in *ibid.*, 95. Breutz argues incorrectly in some places that Gasibonwe was the son, of Iehe, son of Mothibi in a junior house: *Kuruman*, 160-1, 184. See also Bain, *Journal*, 15.

⁹ Gert Mahura in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 90.

¹⁰ Gert Mahura in *ibid.*, 284. The fourth division was those who remained at the Kuruman, for whom see, for example, Livingstone, *Missionary Correspondence*, 148-9 and footnote; Language, 'Herkoms on Geskiedenis...', 126; Breutz, *Kuruman*, 161, 174; *Vryburg*, 26, 155-160. See also Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 183 footnote.

¹¹ Jantje in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 283-4. For the first mentions of Jantje see Campbell, *Travels*, 194; *Second Journey*, I, 92. for other versions of the succession see *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 99, 106, 193.

¹² Mackenzie, *Austral Africa*, I, 46.

¹³ See Agar-Hamilton, *Road to the North*, 17. In fact however, it would appear that Pohuetsile was killed in war against the Orange Free State in 1858, and it was his son, Phetlu, who was living in 1869-70: see Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, I, 43; Language, 'Herkoms on Geskiedenis...', 127. See also Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 179-180; *Missionary Labours*, Ch. XXV; Breutz, *Kuruman*, 162-4, 160, 174.

was true of Mahura, Jantje, and Mankurwane — to assume chieftainship over sections of the community. Furthermore, it was quite unprecedented for such groups, having undergone fission and separated, to be forced to compete for population and resources in so limited an area. Robert Moffat, for example, pointed to the influence of the extensive trading with the south which caused ‘large and densely crowded towns for self-defence...to dissolve into and separate from motives of interest as well as comfort.’¹⁴ The dislocation of the Tlhaping resulting from their incorporation within this frontier zone has, furthermore, caused great confusion among those who have written histories of the Tlhaping. In the usual fashion of South African historians, they have sought to write the history of a ‘tribe’, without reference to the structural implications of frontier influences. Thus Language describes the split between Mahura and Mothibi as a characteristic fission, and argues that Mahura’s section complete disowned Mothibi and decided that the house of Molala (second son of Molehabangwe) would be heirs. Since Molala was dead (in 1826/7), and his son was still a minor, Mahura became ‘regent’ for Mankurwane. After the death of Mothibi, continues Language, his section split between the followers of Jantje and the followers of Gasibonwe, ‘apparently as the result of a dispute over leadership.’¹⁵ There is no mention of the effects of trade, the Griqua and Bergenaars, Christianity, or Waterboer. The version of Breutz is equally distorted: ‘after the death of Mothibi...the Batlhaping were broken up into several sections. Mothibi’s country was so large that he subdivided it among his sons and brothers. Therefore we now find the following Tlhaping sections.’¹⁶ Breutz lists five ‘sections’: those of Gasebonwe’s descendants, those of Jantje’s, those of Mahura, those of Molala and Mankurwane, and those that remained at the Kuruman.¹⁷

The situation among the Rolong is complicated by their division into five independent sections in the late eighteenth century, upon the disintegration of Tau’s Rolong state.¹⁸ Indirectly this is attributable, at least partly, to southern frontier influences — the retreat of Khoi peoples to the Orange — but this would be stretching the argument too far. However in each of the four sections during the nineteenth century, the chieftainship

¹⁴ ‘Admonitor’ [Robert Moffat] in *British Banner*, [Enclosed in LMS 29/1/B]. Moffat, like Philip with the Griqua, exaggerated the transformation however: in 1817, he claimed, quite incorrectly, that ‘there was little intercourse between the varied sections of the [Sotho-Tswana] nations and that always attended with extreme risks.’

¹⁵ Language, ‘Herkoms en Geskiedenis...’, 126-7, 131-2. For Molala and his death see Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 305; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 258, 305; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 20fn, 234. Mackenzie, *Austral Africa*, I, 43 incorrectly regards Molala (and Mahura) as sons of Mothibi. Molala was born c.1790.

¹⁶ Breutz, *Kuruman*, 160. See also *ibid.*, 173-4, 184; *Vryburg*, 25-6, 152.

¹⁷ For Breutz’s account of these various sections see *Kuruman*, 145-213; *Vryburg*, 150-177. Also Breutz, *The Tribes of the Districts Taungs and Herbert* (forthcoming).

¹⁸ See Chapter 1.

moved away from the traditional line of succession. To unravel the manner in which this occurred, and to sort out the 'legitimate' line of succession in each case, is almost impossible: uncertainty about the reliability of contemporary missionary testimony, the frequency practice of the levirate among the Rolong, and subsequent attempts to 'legitimate' junior lines, have confused the problems. Some examples, however, illustrate the point. At Thaba between Nchu between 1833 and the early 1840's, for example, Moroka of the Rolong-Seleka exerted hegemony over four of the five Rolong sections as their chiefs. And not only were the Rolong-Seleka the most junior of the autonomous Rolong sections, but Moroka was not even the rightful successor to the Rolong-Seleka Chieftainship. Though the office in fact remained in the house of Moroka, when he succeeded in the late 1820's it was as regent for another son of Sefunelo (the previous chief) named Sitalo.¹⁹ Or, it has generally been considered during the latter part of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries that the Rolong-Ratlou (specifically the Seitshiro branch of the Ratlou) were the most senior of the four Rolong sections.²⁰ The effective chiefs of this section in the last stages of their autonomous existence were Gonntse (r.c. 1822-853) and his son Phoi (r.c. 1853-1906).²¹ Gonntse himself had by some mysterious means replaced one of his brothers between 1820 and 1823, and in 1872 the Transvaal Republic located the descendant of one of these more senior brothers and dealt with him as Rolong paramount: the man concerned, Moswete, was working as a dependent of a Transvaal farmer.²² But even he was not the 'real' paramount, in strict ritual terms. For there was in existence a more section of the Ratlou, the Ratlou-Mariba, who had remained relatively isolated from frontier-zone influences in the region of Morokweng, north-west of the Kuruman.²³ In 1857 the French missionary Fredoux visited them, talked to their chiefs, as well as an unidentifiable octogenarian grandson of Ratlou named 'Maseng', who was visiting at the time, and found 'the legitimate chief of all the Rolong would be either a man of Nyessa [near Morokweng], who is called Musi, or a man of Taungs, named Masisi.'²⁴ Even in the Morokweng area, however, let alone at Taungs, these persons were not in governing

¹⁹ See Hodgson, *Memoirs*, 91. Also Smith, *Diary*, I, 147; Molema, *Moroka*, 28-30.

²⁰ See, for example, Brown, *Bantu Nomads*, 218; Matthews, 'Tshidi-Rolong,' 12-13, 16; Molema, *Montshiwa*, 3. But see Molema in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 143-4, 170.

²¹ For the assumption of the Chieftainship by Gonntse see, particularly, Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 171-2, 179-180; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 78, 85-6, 129-130. See also Campbell, *op. cit.*, I, 300-4; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 325; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 375; Campbell, *Travels*, 201; Molema, *Montshiwa*, 47.

²² See Mackenzie, *Austral Africa*, I, 61-2. For Moswete see also Molema, *Montshiwa*, 25; Moroka in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 138-9; Condor, 'President Condition...', 85; Breutz, *Mafeking*, 17, 104-5, 108; Breutz, *Lichtenburg*.

²³ For a partial history of this group, see Martin Legassick, 'Mokalaka, Regent of the Rolong boo Ratlou ba Mariba: a synthesis of oral and written sources,' Unpublished seminar paper, SOAS, March 15, 1967.

²⁴ Fredoux, August 8, 1851 [JDM, XXXIII, 18-9]. See generally *ibid.*, 14-9.

positions: 'Musi' (Mmusi) was of the Rolong-Mariba, while Masisi was of the Ratlou-Seitshiro section, but distinct from Moswete.²⁵

Similar illustrations could be made in the case of the Hurutshe, and doubtless other Sotho-Tswana communities in similar frontier-zone conditions. The same arguments apply with equal, if not more force, to the Khoi communities of Transorangia whose leadership, as pointed out earlier in this study, was completely transformed between the late eighteenth century and the 1830's.²⁶ Andrew Smith, in describing Kora government in the 1830's, provides a clue to the mechanisms at work:

The chief has comparatively no power; all are inclined to think and each desirous of adopting his own views. The principal object on all such occasions [attacks] is to secure the means of flight, and how to fly is what most engages their consideration when any kind of danger threatens them. Any person with a numerous family connection can set the chief at defiance.²⁷

Traditional Khoi leadership, in other words, was not equipped to deal with the new situation of the frontier zone, where small groups with horses and firearms had a vast military and political superiority over loosely-organized groups without them. The leaders of Khoi (or Kora) groups who survived were those who adapted to this situation, and in many cases bore little relationship to the traditional leadership. 'The name of Koranna,' wrote Casalis aptly in 1833, 'designates...less a people than an association of brigands.'²⁸ The 'brigands' were the men of the frontier zone.

Political leadership, then, resided *de facto* in those who could maintain a following and access to resources. Sources of legitimation, from 'tradition', from missionaries, from the Colonial government, etc. were secondary tools to be used and manipulated. In this chapter this has been illustrated from later histories of the groups concerned. In the study as a whole this fact was given contemporary illustration: this point maybe re-emphasized by quoting Peter Wright:

You will be aware that in such a state of society where there is no protection by a Government on the one hand, nor strength of principle to be a martyr to truth and justice on the other, facts against an influential individual and the head of a strong party are not to be elicited or developed by an investigation as they would be under an efficient and good Government. Every individual who is known to possess a fact and is disposed to make a proper use of it is threatened and intimidated by the faction and he knows that faithfulness will cost him his safety.²⁹

²⁵ For Masisi see, for example, Breutz, *Mafeking*, 104. Also Molema, *Montshiwa*, 25. For Mmusi see Mackenzie, *Austral Africa*, I, 56; Breutz, *Vryburg*, 69.

²⁶ See particularly Chapters 5, 8, 10.

²⁷ Smith, *Diary*, I, 128-9.

²⁸ Casalis, October 4, 1833 [JDM, IX, 138-9].

²⁹ Wright, July 19, 1837 [LMS 15/3/B].

Trade, Property Rights, and Land Tenure in the Frontier Zone

The political and economic characteristics and implications of a frontier zone are inextricably intertwined. Trade, as has been pointed out earlier in this study, defined as exchange of commodities and hence as interaction, helps to bring into being the frontier zone by creating a network of ties which lead to further interaction and mutual acculturation.³⁰ But trade, or at least trade in new commodities, is itself a form of acculturation. The missionaries generally argued that it was their own presence in societies which 'stimulated artificial wants' and helped promote the extension of trade. But it was equally true that these 'artificial wants' were induced by political conditions; or that new modes of access to traditional wants produced changes in political structure. For example, the universal demand for firearms and horses, which spread from the white farmers and the Bastards to the Kora and the Sotho-Tswana, was stimulated by the need to extend or preserve the political power of these social groups. But, conversely, as Smith noted,

It is generally believed that most of the Basutu who are living with farmers in the Colony, will, when they have occasion to leave in consequence of their cattle getting too numerous, form separate parties and live apart from their chiefs, at least so long as the system exists of the chief being the only holder of property. Many of the Basutu are thus living at [Bethulie] and will probably continue there, as they can there hold their own property.³¹

In the conditions of the frontier zone, in other words, where traditional societies were not able universally to enforce traditional property rights, traditional forms of property such as cattle could be owned in a different manner. New political communities could therefore emerge, not only on the basis of new goods such as firearms and horses, but also on the basis of traditional property owned in a new way. Generally, however, such forms of property and power coexisted, and were responsible for much of the 'disorder' of the frontier zone. 'There is an inclination to possess clothes,' wrote Smith, 'and till they acquire country where they can breed sufficient to produce cattle to exchange to purchase them [clothes], they will get diminished and again must be replenished.'³² The mode of replenishment was, of course, raiding. Raiding, therefore, was both stimulated by the conditions of the frontier zone, and able to exist unchecked precisely because there was no legitimacy authority to check it. It has been pointed out how this phenomenon led to cooperation between unlikely elements: white farmers and Bastards (in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century) and white farmers and Kora (in the 1820's and 1830's): both were frontiersmen, resistant to the re-establishment of legitimate author-

³⁰ See particularly Chapter 3.

³¹ Smith, *Diary*, I, 129.

³² *Ibid.*, I, 215.

ity.³³ Ranged against them were the Colonial government, the missionaries, and those elements among the frontiersmen who had chosen to form 'accommodationist' frontier states rather than resist the reimposition of established authority.

New trade patterns also had their effects on social structure, in so far as this can be distinguished from the formation of new communities and new types of leadership. It was noted earlier in this study that the Kgalagadi clients of the Tlhaping found themselves able to trade independently with the Griqua. Later in the century this phenomenon would spread further north:

...it is not difficult to account for the well-known reluctance of Bechuana chiefs to allow traders and travelers to pass through their country...it is well known that [the vassals of the Ngwato] do not hesitate to keep back part of their produce from their masters, and barter with it themselves as soon as European wagon makes its appearance... It has been found impossible by the Bamangwato to stop this 'contraband' trade. They began with severity, and put some of their vassals to death for daring to sell what belonged to their masters. But they found that severity did not answer their purpose, and so the masters now are in point of fact competitors with the European hunters and traders for the purchase of ivory and feathers from their own vassals...the 'presents' which they now give their vassals are every year more handsome, and the whole transaction assumes more the appearance of barter than the levying of tribute. In a few instances masters have in trusted their Bakalahari and Bushmen with guns.³⁴

If this was occurring so far to the north by the 1860's, it must be presumed that the Tlhaping and Rolong had been placed in a less favorable position *vis a vis* their clients some time before this. In itself, this is an important cause of the structural weakening of these southern Sotho-Tswana communities, and for the need which they felt to compensate through greater participation in the economy of the frontier and of the Colony itself.

A particular case of the question of exchange and property rights in the frontier zone is that of *land*. Land, even under a capitalist system of production, is not equivalent to other forms of property: the state, as was noted in the introduction to this study, continues to retain certain of the 'bundle of rights' which constitute the ownership of land. Not could agriculture or pastoralism in nineteenth century Transorangia be described as capitalist: although there was production for the market, both white and non-white depended upon their own production for their subsistence, and marketed only surplus cattle or gain. Land therefore, as in traditional Sotho-Tswana society, continued to have a predominant use-value rather than exchange-value. Land, nevertheless, was 'bought' and 'sold', 'ownership' was transferred, the same sites saw successive occupants. The manner in which this occurred was characteristic of the frontier-zone: once again, as in the related

³³ See Chapters 3, 5, 7 in particular.

³⁴ Mackenzie, *Ten Years*, 130-1.

instances of political leadership, *de facto* possession was, by and large, what counted and the transactions of exchange were various forms of legitimation. In the most well-known example, whites who ‘bought’ land from African chiefs or even from Griqua did not in fact ‘buy’ the land: while the non-white political leader regarded the ‘price’ as a recognition of his own authority over the land, the white ‘purchaser’ regarded it as transferring authority to some white-ruled polity.

Formerly when the only parties desiring the use of land amongst them were people of their own stock [wrote the missionary Cameron in 1845] having the same notions of landholding as themselves, the Chiefs exercised the prerogative of allowing applicants to take up their residence within their Territory on condition that their supremacy should be acknowledged by periodical presents of cattle or other produce. But latterly the influence of Europeans with their peculiar views about land tenures has led to transactions which furnish precedents for an extension of the prerogatives of the Chiefs to the *bona fide* sale of land, even in cases where the purchasers could neither become their subjects nor recognise their authority.³⁵

Or, as Arnot and Orpen wrote from a different perspective

A state having certain boundaries and wishing to extend them, makes a law authorising the registration in its registry office, of so-called transfers of land purchased by any white person, whether their own subject or not, from native subjects of the surrounding tribes. Thus every such sale and purchase constitutes an annexation to the Free State of the property thus acquired, and is by the Free State so considered even when the purchaser was a merchant living in Port Elizabeth or Cape Town; and to render such progressive annexation more easy, the transfer dues thereon are reduced by half.³⁶

Such ‘progressive annexation’ — as opposed to ‘bloc annexation’ by conquest or by Treaty could occur only in frontier zone conditions where authority over the territory concerned was disputable, or unenforceable. In such conditions white farmers could, if necessary, assume or claim ‘sovereignty’ themselves until they could transfer authority over the land to a white-ruled state: even missionary societies, as has been demonstrated in this study, could claim the same.

However land alienation — from non-white communities to white-ruled states — did not only occur by ‘progressive annexation’. It occurred also when chiefs agreed to cede their autonomy. The problem in Transorangia in the latter part of the nineteenth century when this occurred, however, was to determine over what territorial area this autonomy was ceded: areas of jurisdiction overlapped and intermingled. It has been argued by many that this overlapping was a consequence of the ‘personal jurisdiction’ in non-white politi-

³⁵ Cameron to CO, June 16, 1845 [MMS: XII]. See also, for example, Casalis, *Basuto*, 157, 159, 161-2.

³⁶ Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 64.

cal communities: that chiefs had authority over subjects and not territory.³⁷ This argument is untenable; as has been argued earlier in this study, traditional Sotho-Tswana communities (and Khoi and San communities as well) all recognized some form of territorial dominion. Those *settled* within that territory owed obligations to its ruler.³⁸ That by the 1860's and 1870's this situation had altered was a consequence of the formation of a frontier zone, and not of traditional practice.

This may be illustrated by the case of the area between the Harts and Vaal Rivers, and more particularly the site of Lekatlong at the junction. Through much of the eighteenth century, there can be no doubt, this fell within the area of Rolong hegemony. When the Rolong moved north, however, and while the Tlhaping were gathering in the Langeberg, Kora groups moved up the Vaal to this area. Jan Bloem senior, in particular, is believed to have occupied the site of Lekatlong. When Bloem died and his son left the area, other Kora groups continued occupying the Harts-Vaal region. Then, in the period 1818-1833, Lekatlong and the area north of it came gradually under the hegemony of the loosely-structured state of Berend Berends, which had among its elements Jan Bloem Jr's following, Kora, Griqua and Sotho-Tswana. When Berends left for the Caledon Valley he left some of his Griqua followers behind, while Jan Bloem and Mosweu Taaibosch also remained in the Harts-Vaal area. In 1835 Mahura moved to Taungs to establish yet another loosely-structured state in the region, embracing Mosweu Taaibosch though possibly not Bloem; three years later Mothibi moved his settlement up the Vaal to Lekatlong and handed over the chieftainship to Jantje. Thus at this time Griqua, Kora, Rolong and Tlhaping groups could all claim 'rights' of one form or another to territory between the Harts and Vaal: occupation there was, and continued to be, mixed.³⁹ For Lekatlong itself there were two specific chains of 'transfer'. While Jantje claimed it on the grounds that it was Tlhaping territory through their succession from the Rolong, Jan Bloem claimed that it was his through occupation by his father, and that he had sold it to the Karse family, Griqua followers of Berends.⁴⁰ Furthermore, according to Waterboer's territorial agreements with Philippolis, it fell within the Griquatown state; while Cornelius Kok II also laid claim to territory embracing Lekatlong. The resolution added further complications. Just as Waterboer had left the question of hegemony over Daniels Kuil unresolved by

³⁷ See, for example, Agar-Hamilton, *Read to the North*, 86.

³⁸ See Chapter 1. See also Schapera, *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies* (London: Watts, 1956) passim.

³⁹ The specific movements of groups in this area is not of concern here; elements of each continued in occupation. Even some of Berends' Griqua followers appear to have returned here from the Caledon valley in about 1847: see Moffat, March 23, 1847 [LMS 23/1/A]; March 1848 [LMS 23/4/A].

⁴⁰ See particularly Jantje in *Bloemhof Bluebook*, 100, 103-4, 295-6, Jan Bloem, Jr. in *ibid.*, 294. Also J. Brown, 'Bechuana Tribes,' 3-4.

'buying' it from Berend Berends after the dispute of 1832-3 (and buying it with money borrowed from Peter Wright) so Jantje did the same. He apparently 'bought' Lekatlong from the Karse family with money borrowed from a trader named Greef. In 1863, however, the money was still not paid, and the matter seems to have been referred to Waterboer, who ordered Greef to leave the country. When Griqualand West was annexed, however, the matter had still not been resolved, and Greef was still living at Lekatlong.⁴¹

At Lekatlong itself *de facto* occupation by Jantje ensured the declaration of the settlement as a 'native reserve' soon after annexation. But the lack of legitimacy — or rather multiple legitimacy — in claims to the territories east and north of Lekatlong was demonstrated by the ability of the diamond diggers to establish a miniature republic, dissolved upon annexation. Thereafter the claims and counter-claims to the Harts-Vaal territory by major parties — the Orange Free State, the Transvaal, and the British — rested on the distortion, partial statement, and manipulation of the claims and counter-claims that had accumulated in the frontier zone earlier in the century. Jantje lost his autonomy; many of the other Griqua, Sotho-Tswana and remaining Kora of the area lost their autonomy and their land. The consequence was rebellion in 1878-9 which returned to them neither.

The frontier zone situation, then, facilitated a vicious circle of land alienation and erosion of political power which permitted further land alienation as the crucial dimension of the oppression of non-whites in nineteenth, or twentieth century, South Africa, South Africa. Although on the Cape eastern frontier, in Transorangia, in certain areas of the Transvaal Republic, and in some parts of Natal, such land alienation occurred, with whites occupying non-white territory in the aftermath of the *Difaqane* or in a frontier zone situation, this did not produce a significant 'landless' class. Those non-whites who came to labor at the Diamond-Fields came more to buy guns than because they were driven off the land; and it is notorious that even in the early twentieth century it was hard to recruit non-whites within South Africa for the gold-mines.⁴² The creation of a 'landless' class of whites and non-whites was predominantly a feature of the twentieth century, and in itself a necessary part of the process of industrialization. But what ensured that the landless whites would receive preferential treatment in entering the industrializing economy, and ensured that landless Africans would become rightless labor force, was the fact that white supremacy had been established. The barriers of discrimination in South Africa were built by the white-controlled Parliament of the Union of South Africa, which had been made possible by the erosion of non-white political power. It had been made

⁴¹ See, for example, Warren, *On the Veldt*, 320 – 4. Also Nicholas Kruger, Lambert Jansz, Klaas Hendricks, Andries Karse in Bloemhof Bluebook, 5, 10, 11, 13, 22, 25.

⁴² See, for example, D. J. N. Denoon, 'The Transvaal labour crisis, 1901 – 6.' *Journal of African History*, VIII (1967), 3, 481 – 494.

possible, in other words, because the power of autonomous Bantu-speaking communities had not been transferred to the plural societies which took their place. In conclusion, some aspects of this questioned which have emerged in this study will be considered.

The Missionaries, the Griqua, and the Sotho-Tswana

'It will, I presume be admitted,' wrote Peter Wright in 1840 in reply to Lemue's attack on his 'political' activities as confidential Government Agent,

...that in the present incipient state of things in this country, every Missionary throws around him an influence in reference to external affairs, either beneficial or injurious, and of course I and Mr. L[emue] are among the rest, and whether we do it ostensibly or not we do it effectually, and our respective views and consequent influence may be gathered from this correspondence.⁴³

Different elements in South Africa society, then and subsequently, have evaluated this 'influence in reference to external affairs' differently: as Wright's colleague, Isaac Hughes, noted,

We missionaries are blamed by the Natives as forerunners to them of oppression and destruction from the hand of our fellow white men. The Colonists, on the other side blame us as sacrificing their interests for favour of the natives...⁴⁴

To evaluate 'the missionary influence' is of course impossible: as this study has made abundantly clear, the missionaries were as often as not in violent opposition to each others' policies. As yet another missionary reported, a Tlhaping royal asked 'if teachers in England were as angry with each other as they are in this country, or whether they had not sent another sort to the Bechuanas.'⁴⁵

Some generalizations of a political kind may nevertheless be made about the missionaries. Their concern with 'civilization' made them, as has been earlier in this study, natural associates of the Colonial government.⁴⁶ Unlike the frontiersmen themselves, white or non-white, they did not constitute an interest-group of their own: they were rather shapers and manipulators of the interests of others. Consequently, as Waldemaar Campbell established in his study of British expansion 'the role of the missionaries in advancing the political frontier stands out clearly.'⁴⁷ But if the missionaries were both manipulators

⁴³ Wright, September 25, 1840 [LMS 17/2/B].

⁴⁴ Hughes, June 12, 1851 [LMS 26/1/A].

⁴⁵ Ashton, October 26, 1848 [LMS 23/4/C]. See also Philip, July 2, 1842 [LMS 18/3/C].

⁴⁶ See Chapter 3.

⁴⁷ Campbell, 'The South African Frontier, 1865 – 1885...', 221.

of interest-groups and expansionists, they had — or some of them had — more specific political aims, in both the short-term and long-term.

One such aim which has emerged in this study was the attempt by John Philip, in conjunction with Peter Wright and Andries Waterboer, to establish in Transorangia a Christian Griqua republic, 'accommodationist' in policy towards the Colony. What is not so easy is to separate fact from propaganda in understanding Philip's aims in promoting this state-formation. Certainly one aim was the furtherance of missionary enterprise: 'there is a great propensity in the inhabitants of this country to separate themselves into small parties, and by this means defeating all our attempts to evangelise and civilize them.'⁴⁸ But was Waterboer's state genuinely intended as a 'defender of the northern frontier,' or was this simply Philip's device for obtaining government support for the venture? Was it intended, if so, to defend the Colony against Mzilikazi, or against dissident non-white frontiersmen, or to prevent the expansion of white colonists' settlement? None of those latter aims were achieved by the state though, at least until the British withdrawal of the 1850's, and despite the failure of the state to achieve the expected hegemony, the missionaries remained optimistic about the progress of the 'civilizing' influences they favored.⁴⁹ So far as Philip's other possible aims were concerned, it would seem that if he believed in them, he was deceived by the habitual exaggeration of his own propaganda. This propaganda, in particular the apocalyptic visions of the future in which either the non-whites would be themselves 'exterminated' or would 'exterminate' the Colony, was not characteristic only of Philip, but it may have inhibited him from implementing rather more effectively less ambitious political aims.⁵⁰ Perhaps, for example, by concentrating his efforts in the 1830's in building a smaller but stronger Griqua state at Philippolis, better prepared to enforce its authority over white farmers within its jurisdiction, he could have guaranteed to the Griqua at least one fertile region in which to survive.

One other aim of Philip's, however, had been mentioned in the course of this study. It would seem that he saw in the Christian Griqua republic in Transorangia, as Read and he saw at the Kat River settlement, an opportunity to build South Africa's first non-white elite. Here, in the frontier zones on the fringes of the Colony, the missionaries had the freedom to achieve what was more difficult in the missionary institutions of the Colony: the existence of the frontier zone, in fact, was as essential to this aim as it was inherent in the whole political role of the missionaries. Until the 1840's much progress had been

⁴⁸ Philip, June 15, 1845 [LMS 22/1/D].

⁴⁹ See, for example, Hughes, December 23, 1848 [LMS 23/4/C]; December 9, 1850 [LMS 25/1/E]; Read, February 6, 1850 [LMS 25/2/B].

⁵⁰ For another example see Admonitor [Robert Moffat] in British Banner [in LMS 21/1B].

made in the direction of creating a non-white — a Khoi or Coloured — elite. The policy, however, had two deficiencies. One was not of Philip's making: the decline in evangelical enthusiasm in Britain, and the consequent decline in finances of the missionary societies. Hence the training establishment for native agents which Philip wished to establish in Cape Town was not set up, and hence from the 1840's and the 1850's the London Missionary Society withdrew its support from the Khoi institutions, and sought to create self-supporting churches.

...the London Missionary Society, no longer strong with the driving force and statesman-like genius of the mind and personality of Philip, abandoned all thought of comprehensive efforts to achieve a social policy, and was content to function as one of many merely evangelizing agencies. In the sixties the LMS plunged into a policy of abandonment. Their Cape congregations must prepare to stand on their own feet, and release the Society, its men and resources for 'pioneer' work in 'heathen fields' beyond. Its policy was one of deliberate withdrawal and from the seventies onwards its responsibilities were confined to Hankey and to Bechuanaland, ultimately to Kuruman alone...when it finally withdrew it did so piecemeal, leaving each tiny community to stand on its own feet, with no vestige of a national Church organization. When Dr. Philip was 'Superintendent', his personality gave the Society in South Africa many of the advantages of almost Episcopal unity of aim...the great majority [of the self-supporting churches] in fact were too weak to survive at all, and were either taken over or superseded by some more strongly organized Communion.⁵¹

The other deficiency, of course, was that the elite Philip sought to create was a Coloured elite, in a situation which within fifty years would demand instead an African elite. Philip, as has been noted earlier, can perhaps not be blamed for this. Like Van Rhee in 1685, he perhaps saw 'that in time the whole country may be handed over to the same,' that is, to the Coloureds.⁵² But he can be faulted, even within the context of the Cape Colony and the Griqua states, for launching so ambitious a policy which, when it failed, produced complete demoralization. He can be faulted, both within the Cape Colony and the Griqua states, for taking so much responsibility into the hands of himself and the London Missionary Society that the Coloured people were unable to recover themselves when the props were removed. 'The fate of the LMS institutions in the 1870's, Marais has argued, 'indicates that the time was not yet ripe for the abolition of tutelage over their Coloured inhabitants taken in the mass': the land of the institutions, parceled into individual allotments fell soon into white hands.⁵³ It could alternatively be argued that the 'tutelage', though not necessarily the institutions, had been already in existence too long. It is perhaps not a coincidence that, so far as available evidence shows, there were no

⁵¹ Macmillan, *Cape Colour Question*, 283, 286-7.

⁵² See Chapter 2, Footnote 8.

⁵³ Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 253. See generally *ibid.*, 249-255.

more Coloured leaders of the stature of Stuurman (of the 1799 rebellion), the Afrikaner family, the Kok family, or Andries Waterboer until the emergence of the A.P.O. and Dr. Abdurahman in the early twentieth century. And then, apparently the motivating force was from the few Coloureds of the Transvaal.⁵⁴ In the intervening fifty years, moreover, the position of the Coloured, particularly with regard to educational segregation, had considerably worsened. One of the characteristic defects of even — indeed, especially — an enlightened paternalism is the vacuum of interest-group pressure left when it is abruptly removed.

But those missionaries who resisted Philip's policies, and in so doing believed they were acting in the interests of the Sotho-Tswana, offered no better alternative. Their paternalism was less enlightened than Philip's, and inadequate finances perhaps, but their own racial attitudes certainly, placed less emphasis on the development of a Sotho-Tswana elite. By the end of the century such an elite certainly existed: Molema, for example, brother of chief Moroka of the Rolong-Seleka,

...as a teacher and religious reformer...established the Wesleyan Methodist Church [at Mafeking]. He gave a new and inspired lead in education, his sons being the first members of the tribe to attend Missionary Training Institutions, and to attain the standard of secondary education, later returning to open the first day — school among their people; and his grandsons being the first Barolong to become ministers of the gospel of Jesus Christ, and others to attend Universities in America and Europe, and qualify in law or obtain degrees in the arts and sciences.⁵⁵

Such accounts could be reproduced from other Sotho-Tswana communities, but as the quotation suggests, the impetus towards elite-formation derived to a greater extent than in the Coloured case from Sotho-Tswana themselves, and it was shaped by the missionaries on a base much narrower: the elite that came into being, therefore, was more separated from its people than the Coloured elite projected by Phillip had been. Some accepted the challenge of this narrow path. Others, prompted by the growing racialism of the missionaries and the growing racial discrimination of the church, rejected it. It is no accident that one of the first separatist churches to come into existence in South Africa, and indeed in Africa, seceded from a Tlhaping congregation of the London Missionary Society in 1885. Known as the Native Independent Congregational Church, it is still the largest of the separatist churches in the area today.⁵⁶

The missionary political tradition, as it lost its expression through the missionary societies themselves, merged into and stimulated the 'liberal' tradition of the Cape Colony.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 274-6.

⁵⁵ Molema, *Moroka*, 33-4.

⁵⁶ Pauw, *Religion in a Tswana Chieftdom*, 47.

To give one clear example, Peter Wright's son married the daughter of Isaac Hughes, and their child married Olive Schreiner, herself the daughter of a third Transorangia missionary, Gottlieb Schreiner. A daughter of Peter Wright, moreover, married William Thompson whose sister married John Philip's son.⁵⁷ In recent decades, on the other hand, the African elite, and even some of the Coloured elite, have re-established their links with the people from whom they emerged. Through non-violent protest, through strikes, boycotts and civil disobedience, through sabotage, and as this is written through armed revolutionary struggle, they are seeking to end the white supremacy which was established over South Africa in the nineteenth century; they are seeking to employ the results of a hundred and fifty years of mutual acculturation to restore what they regard as their birthright.

⁵⁷ See Chapter 12. Also Freeman's notebook, 1849-1850 [LMS: Africa, Odds, Box 4].

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
Appendix: Maps and Tables


Notes on Maps¹


The maps are intended to give a rough indication of Griqua and Sotho-Tswana population movements in the period 1800-1840, and a schematic outline of the changing balance of power in Transorangia. It should be stressed that they do not give an adequate indication of the cultural and political mingling of the frontier zone, where Sotho-Tswana, Griqua, Kora and San all lived at one time or another under each other's hegemony or in some form of 'alliance' or confederation. Nor are they intended to describe the movements of *Difaqane* raiders. The following symbols are used:


Kwena	Cultural groupings, or clusters of autonomous chiefdoms
<u>Tlhaping</u>	Single chiefdoms
MAHURA	Rulers of 'plural' chiefdoms or states
. Taungs	Place names
† Kuruman	Mission stations
.....	Approximate boundary lines between political communities
	Spheres of influence of 'plural' chiefdoms or states
	Expansionist Griqua states
	The form of shading has been used to outline the area hardest hit by the <i>Difaqane</i> and Bergenaar raiding in the period 1822-4 (See map III).

¹ I am grateful to Hilary Barker for preparing the maps and for other much appreciated assistance.









Transorangia in c. 1838.





Table I: The Kok Family



Notes

¹ See Arnot and Orpen, *Land Question*, 1.

² The birthdate is presumed from his place of birth (Piketberg) and the fact that his wife was born at least as early as 1741: see Campbell, *Second Journey*, II, 260; see Bartlett, December 26, 1831 [LMS 12/4/D]. For his death see Sass, March 29, 1823 [LMS 9/1/B]; Helm, October 20, 1823 [LMS 9/1/D].

³ For his death see Melvill, October 17, 1825 [LMS 9/4/A]. See also Anderson [LMS Journals 1/8]

⁴ See Arnot and Orpen, *op. cit.*, 154.

⁵ For these, who included Cupido, Willem, Gert and Ruiter, see *ibid.*, 154; Lindley, *Adamantia*, 168; A. Waterboer to Wright, December 11, 1832 [425 of 1837, 151]; Burchell. *Travels*. I. 247, 251; II, 100. For Gert’s death (in 1831) see also Smith, *Diary*, I, 190.


⁶ See Andries Waterboer, ‘A short account...’ [LMS 10/3/D] for the relationship of the Berends and Kok families. Whether the father of Berend Berends was Nicholas, Piet of Klaas Berends is unknown, as is his date of birth. B. Berends died probably in the 1840’s.

⁷ See Lindley, *op. cit.*, 137; but also Arnot and Orpen, *op. cit.*, 221.

⁸ The birthdate here is speculative: for Adam II’s death see Chapter X.

- ⁹ See Arnot and Orpen, *op. cit.*, 153-4; Lindley, *op. cit.*, 139.
- ¹⁰ See, for example, L. Jansz in *Bloembhof Bluebook*, 12.
- ¹¹ He appears to have moved from Pella to Philippolis in 1829: See Melvill, October 29, 1829 [LMS 11/4/A].
- ¹² See Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 252.
- ¹³ See Melvill, January 1, 1829 [LMS 11/3/A].
- ¹⁴ This was Abraham who ruled at Philippolis in 1835-7. The Abraham of the previous generation appears to have moved between Griquatown and Campbell, and was still alive in 1863. When either Abraham did is uncertain.
- ¹⁵ For these persons, and for corroboration of much of this genealogy, see J. Frank Clark to Audrey Beale, June 3, 1940; July 27, 1940 [LMS: Africa, Odds, Box 1].

Table II: Tlhaping Genealogy




Sources: Mackenzie, *Austral Africa*, I, 43.
Language, 'Herkoms en Geskiedenis.'
Breutz, *Kuruman and Postmasburg*.
Breutz, *Vryburg*.

Notes

- ¹ See Borchers, *Memoir*, 81, 132-3; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 291 – 3; Burchell, *Travels*, II, 153, 388. For Molehabangwe's (and Mothibi's) wives see also note 82 in Chapter I.
- ² See Burchell, *Travels*, II, 258; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 292; Helmore, November 17, 1845 [LMS 21/1/B]
- ³ See Burchell, *Travels*, II, 258; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 234.
- ⁴ See Burchell, *Travels*, II, 258.
- ⁵ For other sons of Molehabangwe, and deaths, see Campbell, *Travels*, 194; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 51, 211, 234; Hamilton, entry August 21, 1816 [LMS Journals 2/55]; Read, November 12, 1816 [LMS 6/4/C]; entry December 30, 1816 [LMS Journals 3/61].
- ⁶ See Burchell, *Travels*, II, 348; Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 68; Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 179.
- ⁷ Gasibonwe is not mentioned by Campbell as a son of Mothibi and would thus appear to be born after 1813: he is first noted in Bain, *Journal*, 15. Breutz (*Kuruman*, 161) claims that Gasibonwe and Phetlu were sons of Tehe, a son of Mothibi who died an early death. Gasibonwe was killed in a war against the OFS.
- ⁸ See Campbell, *Travels*, 194; Kuruman missionaries, July 2, 1838 [LMS 16/2/E].
- ⁹ Breutz (*Kuruman*, 162) claims he died at Rooidam north of Majong in the Langeberg, while Language asserts that he was killed in OFS war of 1857.
- ¹⁰ Breutz (*Kuruman*, 162) claims he was killed in the Langeberg rebellion of 1897.

Table III: Rolong Genealogy




Sources: Breutz, *Mafikeng District*, passim.
Molema, *Moroka*.
Molema, *Montshiwa*.
Legassick, 'Mokalaka, Regent of the Rolong boo Ratlou ba Mariba...' (Unpublished Paper).

Note: There has been no attempt made to set down dates, of birth, death or rule, for the Rolong rulers, or to resolve contradictions or vagueness in relationships. This would involve a more systematic study of the sources of nineteenth century Rolong history, comparing contemporary accounts with oral traditions, than has been possible to date. The table does, so far as possible, indicate the relationships of the rulers mentioned in the text and provide a guide to their descendants of the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Table IV: Hurutshe Genealogy

(a) Oral Tradition



Sources: TNAD, Short History, 11-3.
Brown, *Bantu Nomads*, 264-5.
Breutz, *Marico District*, 36a, 92-8, 123-6.
Jensen, 'Hurutshe' Jensen, 'Hurutshe'

Notes

- ¹ Breutz claims that Moilwa I lived from c. 1720 to c.1805/1810; but the contemporary evidence on the rule of Sebegodi (see note 3) would seem to preclude this. Brown claims that Moilwa I died when his sons were young and that his uncle Boikanyo acted as regent for him: for the latter see also TNAD and Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 316.
- ² All sources of oral traditions are agreed that Dibetswe's rule was unpopular and that he was banished with his followers, fleeing to Thabaneng in 'Lesotho': he may not even have ruled at all.
- ³ TNAD and Breutz claim that Sebegodi was killed in the battle against the Mmenaana-Kgatla: Brown says that Sebegodi lived only a short time. For contemporary references to Sebegodi as the Hurutshe chief see Lichtenstein, *Travels*, II, 325; Campbell, *Travels*, 203.
- ⁴ For the death of Diutwileng see Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 77.
- ⁵ The end of Mokgatla's regency is given only approximately; a better date depends on investigation of the complex Hurutshe politics of the 1840's onwards.
- ⁶ TNAD, Breutz, and Brown are agreed that Menwe II was a son of Sebegodi, though Brown contradicts himself by describing Menwe as a brother of Diutwileng and Mokgatla. TNAD says Menwe died while a minor; Breutz claims he predeceased his father Sebegodi. See also section (b).

⁷ For dates of Moilwa's birth and death see Campbell, *Second Journey*, I, 220; TNAD. For the first specific mention of Moilwa and Motlaadile as sons of Sebegodi see Hughes, October 13, 18 36 [LMS 15/1/E]. See also section (b).

⁸ For Lentswe's death in battle see TNAD, Breutz. For Lentswe's ancestry see section (b).

⁹ For Gopane's death see Breutz.

(b) Discrepancies Between Oral Tradition and Contemporary Sources

The first traveller to provide data on the Hurutshe ruling house was John Campbell on his visit to Kaditshwene in 1820. He encountered the regent Diutwileng and the latter's brother Mokgatla, as well as Moilwa and an unnamed married one of his father's widows who was some 10-12 years older than himself. The unnamed brother was 16. The name of Moilwa's father is not mentioned, and this adds to the confusion of Campbell's remarks, which may be illustrated by two quotations:

...the name of the Regent, the late King's eldest brother, is Liqueing; and...though Mocolway be the late king's eldest son, he cannot reign, because his mother was not the eldest queen; the eldest queen had no children by her first husband, the king, but after his death, another brother... "took her and raised up seed to his brother." By him he had a son, whose dignity is the same as though he had actually been the son of the king.

He will be acknowledged as the successor of the former king, when he comes of age, though Mocolway at this time seemed to possess all the honours of the heir apparent by a kind of courtesy. (*Second Journey*, I, 226-7).

The following is a list of Marootzee kings...9. Menoo...10. Sibbewhooree, brother to Menoo, who died under age, without children. 11. Liqueing, nephew of Menoo, succeeded his father Sibbewhooree, and seemed to be holding the regal power in his hands to the prejudice of four sons of Menoo. (*Ibid.*, 242).


There is no completely consistent manner of resolving the internal contradictions in these two statements. The most acceptable would make Moilwa the son of Menwe II, with the unnamed 16-year old the 'son' of Menwe II also, but fathered under the levirate by perhaps Mokgatla (or Sebegodi or Diutwileng?). Menwe II, Sebegodi, and Diutwileng would then all be sons of Moilwa I. This conflicts with available traditions and other evidence in two ways: (a) Menwe II becomes a son of Moilwa I rather than of Sebegodi, (b) Moilwa (and Hotlaadile?) become sons of Menwe II rather than of Sebegodi. At this stage one can only mention, with reconciling the differences, traditions on the paternity of these people other than those already listed in section (a):

- (1) TNAD claims, in a genealogy, that Menwe II and Lentswe are sons of Sebegodi, and that Moilwa and Hotlaadile are sons of Diutwileng. In the text it is argued that

Mokgatla married a woman from the family of Menwe II's mother, and fathered Moilwa and Hotlaadile as 'sons' of Menwe II. Lentswe, the text suggests, may be an 'illegitimate' son of one of Sebegodi's wives.

- (2) Brown argues that Menwe II, Moilwa and Hotlaadile are all sons of Sebegodi, and that Lentswe is the son of Menwe II.
- (3) Breutz argues that Menwe II was Sebegodi's son in the great hut, Hotlaadile in the second hut, and Moilwa in the third hut by the wife Merenyana. Mokgatla, it is claimed, married Menwe II's bride-to-be, Tsadi by name, and fathered Lentswe.

Table V: Ngwaketse Genealogy



Sources: I. Schapera, *Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom*.
Moffat, *Apprenticeship*, 172, 174.

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The main body of material used was the Incoming Correspondence of missionaries of the London Missionary Society in South Africa to the Secretary and Directors in London. This is chronologically collected in boxes, Sub-divided into jackets and folders. It is cited as [LMS 8/3/A], referring to Incoming Correspondence: South Africa, Box 8, Jacket 3, Folder A. This was supplemented by Incoming Journals from South Africa, by papers of John Philip, by miscellaneous South African material, and in certain instances by the minutes of the LMS Directors. Citations are as follows: [LMS: PPapers 1/1/B] refers to the Philip Papers, Box 1, Jacket 1, Folder B; [LMS Journals 1/7] refers to Incoming Journals: South Africa, Box 1, number 17; [LMS: Africa, Odds, 3/4/A] refers to collected miscellaneous documents on Africa, Box 3, Jacket 4, Folder A; LMS Board Minutes refers to the chronologically arranged minutes of the Board of Directors. On occasions, published materials of the London Missionary Society, available in the library, were consulted: these included issues of the *LMS Quarterly Transactions* (published from 1803 to 1832); the *LMS Missionary Chronicle*; and the *Register of Missionary Deputations, etc. from 1796 to 1923* (compiled James Sibree) (4th edition, 1923).

2. Methodist Missionary Society Archives

The main body of material used was the Incoming Correspondence of missionaries of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society in South Africa to the London headquarters. This is chronologically collected in boxes, and in some cases the letters are classified by year and number. The letters are either cited as [MMS: II-1823/45], which refers to Incoming Correspondence: South Africa, Box II, letter 45 of year 1823; or as [MMS: VII] which, where letters are unnumbered, refers to the box in the same series in which they may be found. This material was supplemented by the minutes of South African Wesleyan District Committee Meetings, and in some instances by Outgoing Correspondence from the Wesleyan headquarters to South Africa. These are cited as follows: [MMS: Synod Minutes] which refers to the chronologically arranged minutes of the South African District Committee Meetings; [MMS: Outgoing Correspondence] which refers to the chronologically arranged letter-books containing outgoing correspondence. Also used

was the periodical *Wesleyan Missionary Notices*, which is cited as [WMN, IV, 334-5], referring to volume and page number.

3. Paris Evangelical Missionary Society

The main source material obtained in these archives was the published periodical *Journal des Missions Evangeliques*, which contained most of the incoming letters from Paris Evangelical missionaries in South Africa in full: it is cited as [JDM, VII, 34] referring to volume and page number. Where necessary, this was supplemented by the individual files of the incoming correspondence of different missionaries, for example, [PEMS: Lemue file].

4. Berlin Missionary Society

Difficulties of language, finance, and time prevented consultation of these archives. Occasional issues of the Berlin Missionary Society *Jahresberichte* were however used.

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This book publishes Martin Legassick's influential doctoral thesis on the preindustrial South African frontier zone of Transorangia. The impressive formation of the Griqua states in the first half of the nineteenth century outside the borders of the Cape Colony and their relations with Sotho-Tswana polities, frontiersmen, missionaries and the British administration of the Cape take centre stage in the analysis. The Griqua, of mixed settler and indigenous descent, secured hegemony in a frontier of complex partnerships and power struggles.

Legassick's study, completed in 1969, is one of the most widely cited South African dissertations. It "remains by far the best account of what is a crucial, and fascinating, episode in Southern African history ... constructed on the impressive basis of documentary and other forms of primary source material". (*Robert Ross, Leiden University*)

The author's subsequent critique of the "frontier tradition" in South African historiography drew on the insights he had gained in writing this dissertation. It served to initiate the debate about the importance of the precolonial frontier situation in South Africa for the establishment of ideas of race, the development of racial prejudice and, implicitly, the creation of segregationist and apartheid systems. Today, the constructed histories of "Griqua" and other categories of indigeneity have re-emerged in South Africa as influential tools of political mobilisation and claims on resources.

Martin Legassick is Emeritus Professor of History at the University of the Western Cape (Cape Town). He has written on almost all periods of South African history, from precolonial times to the present day. He is co-author with *Ciraj Rassool* of *Skeletons in the Cupboard: South African Museums and the Trade in Human Remains, 1907–1917* (2000) and is the author of *Subjugation and the Roots of South African Democracy: The Struggle for the Eastern Cape, 1800–1854* (2006) as well as *Towards Socialist Democracy* (2007), a far-reaching account of the twentieth-century world.